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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Netflix, Inc. (NFLX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Watch · Gem Score -12 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 73 · Value -69 · Sentiment -42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $24.76 vs $80.43 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Netflix, Inc.
NFLX NASDAQNetflix, Inc. is a leading entertainment services company specializing in on-demand streaming of TV series, movies, and games through subscription plans. Subscribers in over 190 countries access unlimited content across a variety of genres and languages on internet-connected devices, including televisions, digital video players, set-top boxes, mobile phones, and tablets. Members enjoy flexible viewing options, such as play, pause, and resume anytime, anywhere, with the ability to adjust plans as needed. The company offers diverse subscription tiers tailored to different markets and features, distributing content via its app and partnerships with cable, satellite, and telecom operators for seamless integration on their devices. Netflix, Inc. acquires, licenses, and produces original content, including exclusive series and films, catering to global audiences seeking personalized entertainment experiences. Founded in 1997 and headquartered in Los Gatos, California, it plays a pivotal role in the digital streaming sector, transforming how consumers engage with leisure and video content worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.53
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
EBITDA: $13.66B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Revenue: $45.18B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Tax Rate: 13.7%
Equity: $26.62B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Cash: $9.03B
Current Liabilities: $10.98B
Long-Term Debt: $13.46B
Total Debt: $14.46B
Total Equity: $26.62B
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Shares: 4,343,863,000
CapEx: -$688.22M
Shares: 4,343,863,000
Stock Price: $72.78
Net Income: $10.98B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (70d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.7B | $31.6B | $33.7B | $39.0B | $45.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $17.3B | $19.2B | $19.7B | $21.0B | $23.3B |
| Gross Profit | $12.4B | $12.4B | $14.0B | $18.0B | $21.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.2B | $6.8B | $7.1B | $7.5B | $8.6B |
| Operating Income | $6.2B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $10.4B | $13.3B |
| Net Income | $5.1B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $8.7B | $11.0B |
| EBITDA | $6.4B | $6.0B | $7.3B | $10.7B | $13.7B |
| EPS | $11.55 | $10.10 | $12.25 | $20.28 | $2.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.24 | $9.95 | $12.03 | $19.83 | $2.53 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:23pm (70d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.0B | $5.1B | $7.1B | $7.8B | $9.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.1B | $9.3B | $9.9B | $13.1B | $13.0B |
| Total Assets | $44.6B | $48.6B | $48.7B | $53.6B | $55.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.5B | $7.9B | $8.9B | $10.8B | $11.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $14.7B | $14.4B | $14.1B | $13.8B | $13.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $28.7B | $27.8B | $28.1B | $28.9B | $29.0B |
| Total Equity | $15.8B | $20.8B | $20.6B | $24.7B | $26.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.7B | $17.2B | $22.6B | $31.3B | $42.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (70d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $392.6M | $2.0B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $10.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$524.6M | -$407.7M | -$348.6M | -$439.5M | -$688.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$132.0M | $1.6B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $9.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$788.3M | -$757.4M | $0 | $0 | -$17.2M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$500.0M | -$700.0M | $0 | $1.4B | -$1.8B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$600.0M | $0 | -$6.0B | -$6.3B | -$9.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.2B | -$884.5M | $1.9B | $688.8M | $1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:40pm (70d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.5% | +6.7% | +15.6% | +15.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.7% | +12.5% | +28.2% | +22.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -9.1% | +23.5% | +49.8% | +27.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.2% | +20.4% | +61.1% | +26.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -6.8% | +22.5% | +47.0% | +27.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-06 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays -53%; a −1σ run costs 66%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ 14.8%, σ 3.3% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($80.43) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +21% | 32.5% | $42.64 | -47% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 28.2% | $30.80 | -62% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 24.0% | $21.80 | -73% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 27.7% | $29.59 | -63% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +18% | 31.0% | $37.49 | -53% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 27.3% | $27.70 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 15:20The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw tape: Netflix is printing $12.56B in Q2'26 revenue, up 13.4% YoY from $11.08B, with TTM revenue around $48.4B and TTM net income near $13.65B. That's a ~28% net margin on the trailing year and operating margin of 29.5% on FY25 — this is no longer a media company financially, it's an asset-light global distribution platform with 21% FCF margin ($9.46B on $45.2B). Earnings CAGR of 42.5% over four years is real, but the base effect is enormous: 2021 net income was $5.12B against a partially COVID-inflated cost structure. The Q1'26 net margin of 43.1% is almost certainly a one-time item (tax benefit or content amortization change) — normalized quarterly margins are running 22-28%, and the sequential deceleration from 15.9% YoY revenue growth is visible if you squint at the $12.05B→$12.25B→$12.56B ramp (roughly 2-3% sequential, ~12% annualized). The synthesis model calling this "decelerating" is directionally correct.
Where I part company with the synthesis is the fair-value anchor. A $31.67 composite FV against $80.44 price implies a 60% haircut, which almost certainly comes from a DCF penalizing terminal growth too aggressively or a comps model using legacy-media multiples. Netflix at $331B market cap, ~$5.4B net debt, on $13.65B TTM earnings trades at ~24x forward earnings if you assume 15% NTM earnings growth — that is *not* egregious for a business compounding FCF at 17% with 41% ROE and no meaningful capex drag ($688M on $45B rev). The market-forces model's 10-12% normalized growth call is the right pivot point: if Netflix decelerates to 10% revenue growth with 30% operating margins holding, you get roughly $16-18B in operating income by 2027, which at a 20-22x multiple lands you in the $340-400B enterprise value zone — i.e., roughly where it trades. So "overvalued by 58%" overstates it; "fairly valued to modestly rich" is closer.
The contrarian case against my own read: content spend is the ticking clock nobody is modeling honestly. Netflix's operating leverage since 2022 came from *holding* content spend near $17B while revenue grew from $31.6B to $45B. That's a structural bet that global content amortization is now scalable — but sports rights (NFL, WWE, boxing), live programming, and gaming R&D are all inflating cash content commitments in ways that lag the P&L by 2-3 years. Debt sits at $14.46B against $9.03B cash — leverage is modest but not zero, and current ratio of 1.19 is thin for a business with $32B in content obligations off-balance-sheet. Insider activity is a nothingburger — 9,248 shares sold against routine RSU awards is noise, not signal. The narrative-economics layer nails the risk: this is priced as platform monopoly (7.7x sales, 25x EV/EBITDA), not as media. If ad-tier ARPU disappoints in even one quarter or password-sharing tailwind fully laps by mid-2026, the multiple compresses fast.
Net: the synthesis verdict of $31-34 FV is too punitive and likely rests on a bad terminal growth assumption or peer set that includes Warner/Paramount. But the pre-flight and market-forces models are directionally right — this is priced for continued execution with zero room for a soft quarter. My fair value lands at $62-70, roughly 15-22% below current, reflecting a 20-22x multiple on normalized 2026 earnings of ~$15B with 10-12% growth. That's not "sell everything" — it's "trim, don't chase, and wait for the deceleration print that the market hasn't priced." The Q1'26 43% margin spike is a red flag for revenue-quality watchers: something one-time flowed through, and the Street may be extrapolating it. I dissent from the synthesis on magnitude but agree on direction.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not a broken business but a business whose economics have become dramatically better, faster than many old “media” heuristics allow. Revenue has climbed from $29.7B in 2021 to $45.2B in 2025, a 52% increase, but net income has more than doubled from $5.1B to $11.0B and operating income has risen from $6.2B to $13.3B. That is the story: Netflix is no longer just scaling subscribers, it is scaling monetization and margin. Annual operating margin moved from 20.8% in 2021 to 29.5% in 2025, and the latest quarterly run-rate is even stronger: the last four quarters produced about $48.4B of revenue and $13.7B of net income, a 28% net margin. Even with some quarter-to-quarter lumpiness — notably the 43.1% net margin in 1Q26 looks unusually high relative to adjacent periods — the broader trend is unmistakable. This is a business converting moderate top-line growth into outsized earnings growth.
The cash profile reinforces that this is a real earnings story, not accounting theater. In 2025, operating cash flow was $10.15B and free cash flow was $9.46B, with capex only $688M. Against $14.46B of debt and $9.03B of cash, net debt is modest for a company with this level of cash generation. ROIC of 35.9% and ROE of 41.3% are elite, even if part of the ROE strength comes from a capital-light model and accumulated buyback-style economics rather than tangible asset intensity. The balance sheet is not pristine in a zero-debt sense, but it no longer needs to be: annual FCF covers net debt quickly. That matters because the market is paying for durability of earnings power, and on the raw numbers Netflix has earned some premium. A business doing roughly $13B+ of operating profit on a sub-$50B revenue base is not a conventional studio; it is behaving more like a global digital platform with content as its acquisition and retention engine.
That said, the current price still looks rich. At a $331B market cap, investors are paying about 7.3x trailing sales, roughly 30x earnings, and 25.4x EV/EBITDA for a company whose recent revenue growth is 15.9% and whose likely normalized revenue growth should slow from the recent password-sharing and pricing tailwinds. If I annualize the first half of 2026, revenue is tracking around $49.6B-$50.0B, so the stock is still around 6.6x forward sales. That multiple can work for a business compounding 20%+ with obvious runway, but Netflix is increasingly a margin-expansion story rather than a broad-based high-growth story. The latest quarterly revenues rose from $10.54B to $12.25B to $12.56B over five quarters; that is still good growth, but the slope is already flattening. The market is effectively assuming that ad monetization, pricing power, and content efficiency keep offsetting eventual saturation. I think that is plausible, but too fully reflected. This is not a disaster waiting to happen; it is a very good company priced as if its best phase of profit expansion can persist for years with little interruption.
The strongest counterargument is straightforward: maybe the market is right to pay up because Netflix has structurally escaped the low-return media trap. A skeptic of my caution would point to 2023-2025 revenue growth accelerating from $33.7B to $39.0B to $45.2B while operating margins simultaneously expanded from 20.6% to 26.7% to 29.5%. That combination is unusual and powerful. If 2026 can deliver something like $50B of revenue and $14B+ of net income, then today’s multiple compresses quickly into the low-20s on earnings for a business with global scale, a proven subscription product, and growing ad optionality. They would also argue that comparing Netflix to legacy entertainment is the wrong frame: legacy players have weaker engagement, less pricing power, and worse international economics. I weigh that differently because the easy wins appear increasingly harvested. Once margins are near 30% and revenue is near $50B, each additional turn of valuation depends on either a new growth leg or an implausibly smooth continuation of current execution.
What changes my mind is concrete. If the next few quarters show revenue sustaining 14-16% growth while net margins hold above 28% without another one-off spike like 1Q26, then the premium deserves more respect and I would move closer to fair value in the low-to-mid $90s. Likewise, evidence that ad-tier monetization is adding revenue rather than simply shifting mix would matter a lot. On the other hand, if revenue growth drops toward 10-12% while margins stop expanding, then a 30x earnings multiple is too high and the stock deserves a reset toward the mid-$60s. For now, I see an excellent business, but not a mispriced one: quality is real, upside is less so.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a business that has completed its conversion from growth story to cash engine. Annual revenue climbed from $29.70B in 2021 to $45.18B in 2025 while net income more than doubled to $10.98B; operating margin expanded to 29.5 percent and free cash flow reached $9.46B on only $688M of capex. The last four reported quarters show sequential revenue still advancing—$11.08B, $11.51B, $12.05B, $12.25B, $12.56B—with net margins oscillating between 20 and 43 percent, the spike in Q1 2026 almost certainly reflecting a non-recurring tax or content timing item rather than a new run-rate. Returns on capital are elite (ROE 41 percent, ROIC 36 percent), the balance sheet is unlevered enough (debt-to-equity 0.54, net debt under $5.5B), and FCF conversion is clean. That is the fundamental reality: Netflix is a high-quality mature earner generating mid-teens top-line growth and mid-twenties bottom-line growth after a multi-year margin catch-up.
Where the quantitative models and the tape diverge is valuation. At $80.44 the stock trades at 32x trailing earnings, 7.7x sales and 25x EV/EBITDA while the composite fair-value work lands near $34. Even granting that those models embed conservative terminal growth, a 138 percent premium to DCF is not explained by the 15.8 percent revenue CAGR or the 16.9 percent FCF CAGR once the one-time password and pricing tailwinds are normalized. Recent revenue growth is already flagged as decelerating; the 42.5 percent earnings CAGR is largely margin expansion that cannot repeat at the same rate. Paying a software-like multiple for a content business whose incremental dollar still requires rising content spend and faces bundled competition is the stretch the price is asking investors to accept.
The strongest counter-argument is that quality and momentum still justify a premium. A 26 percent year-over-year earnings lift in the latest comparable period, ROIC above 35 percent, and $9-plus billion of annual FCF give the company real scarcity value inside Communication Services. If ad-tier monetization and further international ARPU gains keep revenue growing 14–16 percent while margins stabilize near 25 percent, a mid-20s earnings multiple would not be outrageous and the current 32x would merely be expensive rather than broken. Insider activity is neutral rather than distributional, and the platform-monopoly narrative continues to attract institutional flows that can sustain the multiple longer than pure DCF discipline would allow. Those points have merit; they simply require the growth deceleration already visible in the quarterly trend to reverse, which the data do not yet show.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance only if the next two quarters re-accelerate revenue growth above 18 percent year-over-year with ad revenue contributing clear incremental margin, or if trailing EPS rises enough to bring the forward multiple below 22x while free-cash-flow yield expands above 4 percent at the current price.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has grown from $29.7B (2021) to $45.2B (2025), a ~11% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 20.9% to 29.5% and gross margin from 41.6% to 48.5%. Net income more than doubled ($5.12B to $10.98B) and FCF swung from -$132M in 2021 to $9.46B in 2025 - genuine operating leverage on a maturing content model, not accounting-driven. Altman Z at 9.57 sits deep in the safe zone and accruals at 3.2% of assets are benign.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Content amortization vs. cash content spend reconciliation to explain OCF/NI at 0.73x
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing profile against the $5.4B net debt position
- Subscriber growth vs. ARPU decomposition to test whether margin gains are pricing-led or mix-led
- Ad-tier revenue contribution and trajectory as a diversification signal
- Content spend guidance vs. FCF trajectory - is the FCF sustainable or a temporary underspend
The composite fair value comes in at $31.67 with a signal-adjusted FV of $33.78, implying roughly -58% downside from $80.43. The three methods bracket a tight range - DCF $28.96, EPV floor $18.22, anchored P/E $50.54 - and even the most generous of them (anchored P/E, which explicitly rewards quality) still leaves the stock ~37% above deserved value. That's a consistent story across independent methods, not a single outlier, which raises my confidence that the price embeds heroic assumptions rather than that the models are broken. Netflix is a genuinely strong business (quality 73) with clean earnings, and that justifies a premium multiple - but a strong business does not by itself make the stock cheap, and here the premium has run past what quality alone can defend. What's priced in at $80.43 and 2.4x sales on a $331B cap: continued global sub growth, ad-tier scaling into a real second revenue leg, sustained margin expansion, and no meaningful content-cost re-acceleration. That's the platform-monopoly bull case fully underwritten. Margin of safety is negative - I'd want the price closer to the anchored-P/E line ($50) before the risk/reward tilts, and closer to the composite ($32-34) for a fat pitch.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Ad-tier ARPU and subscriber mix disclosure in next print
- Content cash spend trajectory vs revenue growth (operating leverage sustainability)
- Guidance on operating margin ceiling and any FX-adjusted growth in developed markets
- Any one-time items inflating current FCF that the DCF/EPV may be extrapolating
The tape is nominally risk-on (regime +32, VIX 15) which should help a beta-1.5 name like Netflix, but that tailwind is being overwhelmed by a stock-specific narrative wobble. Recent news flow is dominated by margin-threat framing: YouTube sparking a creator bidding war, sports-rights push, ad-tier cannibalization questions, and headlines noting management is quietly changing what it wants to be judged on - a classic sign that the old story (engagement hours, subscriber moat) is losing potency. The platform-monopoly archetype is still strong but durability is only moderate, and the news cycle is testing exactly that durability. Analyst/investor tone is split: Ackman adding is a cult-signal tailwind, but the repeated 'after its sharp selloff' and 'down 34%' framing tells you the crowd is nursing a wound, not chasing. For a high-beta name that had been a narrative darling, a fading story plus a 4.69% 10y and 25.8x market PE is a real crosswind - rate-sensitive long-duration growth premia get compressed first. Net: mild headwind, not a rout. The story hasn't broken, it's being renegotiated, and the selloff has already absorbed some of it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether next earnings/guidance confirms ad-tier accretion or flags content-cost step-up (would swing the narrative decisively)
- Sports-rights bidding outcomes and creator-deal announcements - concrete margin data points
- Analyst target revisions post-selloff: are cuts finished or continuing
- Whether Ackman disclosure sparks a durable sentiment reset or fades in a week
The world is consolidating fragmented streaming attention into two or three winners. Legacy media's retreat — licensing libraries out, cutting direct-to-consumer losses, bundling defensively — hands Netflix both cheaper content and less competition for engagement, which is why a flat category can host a mid-teens grower. The second force is the migration of TV ad dollars to connected TV; Netflix arrives with the largest premium logged-in audience and almost no legacy ad business to cannibalize, so incremental ad dollars are close to pure margin. Against that, streaming is no longer a land grab: growth now comes from extracting more per household, which ties Netflix to consumer wallets in a macro-headwind environment and makes each price increase a test rather than a formality. Net: the structural setup supports durable double-digit growth with expanding margins for several years, but the era of surprise-to-the-upside unit growth is over, and the arithmetic embedded in the price belongs to a much earlier stage of the S-curve.
When we made this prediction on Aug 25, 2026, NFLX was $82.20. We expect it to be $72.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $50.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 25, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.