Business Description
Planet Fitness, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, franchises and operates fitness centers under the Planet Fitness brand. It operates through Franchise, Corporate-Owned Stores, and Equipment segments. The Franchise segment is involved in franchising business in the United States, Puerto Rico, Canada, Panama, Mexico, and Australia. The Corporate-Owned Stores segment operates corporate-owned stores in the United States and Canada. The Equipment segment engages in the sale of fitness equipment to franchisee-owned stores in the United States and Canada. As of December 31,2021, the company had 2,254 stores in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Canada, Panama, Mexico, and Australia. Planet Fitness, Inc. was founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Hampton, New Hampshire.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 7:55pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:42pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.62
Total Equity: -$483.38M
Shares: 83,726,000
Total Debt: $443.00M
Cash: $345.65M
EBITDA: $570.17M
Total Debt: $443.00M
Cash: $345.65M
Revenue: $1.32B
Revenue: $1.32B
Revenue: $1.32B
Total Equity: -$483.38M
Tax Rate: 28.1%
Equity: -$483.38M
Total Debt: $443.00M
Cash: $345.65M
Current Liabilities: $312.49M
Long-Term Debt: $419.12M
Total Debt: $443.00M
Total Equity: -$483.38M
Shares: 83,726,000
Shares: 83,726,000
CapEx: -$163.67M
Shares: 83,726,000
Stock Price: $51.53
Net Income: $219.10M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The forensic picture is mostly clean: FCF of $254.8M is up ~35% YoY and converts at 2.63x net income, accruals are negative (-6.1% of assets), Beneish M at -2.89 shows no manipulation signature, and the diluted share count actually SHRANK from 85.8M to 83.7M with buybacks running 22x SBC. SBC is a trivial 0.9% of revenue. This is the opposite of a dilution trap — management is returning capital and the per-share story is improving. Net cash is positive ($9.4M) and the business self-funds. Insider tape shows two genuine open-market P-purchases in May 2026 (Keating $247K, Rathke $231K) clustered with the annual director award grants — small dollars, but real buying with no offsetting open-market sales in the visible window.
The one thing that genuinely doesn't add up is the gross margin line: 52.0% in 2024 → 82.6% in 2025 is not a business improvement, it's almost certainly a reclassification (likely franchisee equipment/National Ad Fund revenue netting or COGS reclass). That doesn't make the company worse, but it means the apparent 'quality inflection' is partly cosmetic — operating margin only moved 240bps (27.4% → 29.8%), which is the number that actually matters. Altman Z at 1.17 'distress' is a false flag here — the model penalizes asset-light franchise models with high lease liabilities; FCF coverage and net cash position make bankruptcy risk negligible.
Valuation is the real catch. At $51.53 the pipeline's $48.85 fair value implies -5%, and even the more generous AI synthesis ($58-65) only offers ~15-25% upside on a name growing revenue 12% with mature-business multiples. There's no margin of safety here; you're paying for execution to continue. The bull case requires the 2025 margin profile to persist AND unit growth to reaccelerate. The bear case is simply that fitness consumer spend softens and the multiple compresses on a stock with no statistical cheapness.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $587.0M | $936.8M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $271.2M | $462.7M | $513.7M | $566.6M | $230.3M |
| Gross Profit | $315.9M | $474.0M | $557.6M | $615.0M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $172.5M | $244.0M | $284.7M | $290.8M | $699.2M |
| Operating Income | $143.4M | $230.1M | $272.9M | $324.2M | $394.7M |
| Net Income | $42.8M | $99.4M | $138.3M | $172.0M | $219.1M |
| EBITDA | $196.0M | $374.1M | $443.5M | $507.1M | $570.2M |
| EPS | $0.51 | $1.18 | $1.63 | $2.01 | $2.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:56pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $545.9M | $409.8M | $275.8M | $293.2M | $345.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $662.4M | $555.5M | $471.8M | $588.0M | $658.4M |
| Total Assets | $2.0B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $176.6M | $244.5M | $251.3M | $282.5M | $312.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $419.1M |
| Total Liabilities | $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.6B |
| Total Equity | -$645.4M | -$199.0M | -$115.6M | -$215.4M | -$483.4M |
| Retained Earnings | -$708.8M | -$703.7M | -$691.5M | -$822.2M | -$1.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $189.3M | $240.2M | $330.3M | $343.9M | $418.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$54.1M | -$100.1M | -$136.0M | -$155.1M | -$163.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $135.2M | $140.2M | $194.3M | $188.8M | $254.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.9M | -$404.1M | -$43.3M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$94.3M | -$125.0M | -$300.2M | -$500.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | $88.1M | -$131.4M | -$150.4M | $27.6M | $62.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:53pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.5B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$807.2M $786.1M – $859.9M
|
$869.4M $868.3M – $870.4M
|
$987.4M $970.4M – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
| Net Income |
$255.1M $249.8M – $350.8M
|
$353.9M $324.1M – $383.6M
|
$492.3M $481.3M – $512.5M
|
$553.4M $541.1M – $576.2M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +59.6% | +14.4% | +10.3% | +12.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +50.1% | +17.6% | +10.3% | +77.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +60.5% | +18.6% | +18.8% | +21.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +132.4% | +39.1% | +24.4% | +27.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +90.9% | +18.6% | +14.3% | +12.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:58pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | Keating Colleen | F-InKind | 22,494.00 | $50.60 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-12 | Keating Colleen | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $49.54 | $247,700 |
| 2026-05-08 | RATHKE FRANCES G | P-Purchase | 5,000.00 | $46.21 | $231,050 |
| 2026-05-05 | Spinelli Stephen JR | A-Award | 3,226.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Tanco Christopher | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Singh Harmit J | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Beard, Stephen W. | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | RATHKE FRANCES G | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | DUNAWAY CAMBRIA W | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | BENSON CRAIG R | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Anderson Enshalla | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Acoca Bernard | A-Award | 2,254.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Singh Harmit J | A-Award | 43.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Beard, Stephen W. | A-Award | 139.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Tanco Christopher | A-Award | 320.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Spinelli Stephen JR | A-Award | 736.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | RATHKE FRANCES G | A-Award | 346.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Anderson Enshalla | A-Award | 329.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | Fitzgerald Thomas J III | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-16 | Singh Harmit J | A-Award | 263.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 7:53pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016-11-18 | $2.78 | 2016-11-10 | 2016-11-22 | 2016-12-05 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Reading the raw tape first: PLNT printed $1.32B revenue in 2025 vs $587M in 2021 — that's a 22% revenue CAGR off the COVID trough, decelerating to ~12% YoY in the most recent quarter. Net income compounded from $42.8M to $219.1M over the same window, and TTM margins are running 16-17% vs 13-14% a year ago. Q1'26 at $337.2M rev / $51.6M NI grew ~22% YoY against the easy $276.7M Q1'25 comp, so the "decelerating" tag in secondary signals is wrong on a YoY basis — sequentially it's noisy because Q1 is the seasonal low. FCF $254.8M on a $4.09B cap is a ~6.2% FCF yield; EV/EBITDA 7.1x is genuinely cheap for an asset-light franchise royalty stream. The negative book value is a buyback-driven artifact, not distress — operating cash flow of $418M against $345M cash and a 2.1 current ratio says the balance sheet is fine.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the synthesis "fair value $48.40, -5.2%" verdict is anchored to a DCF that I suspect under-weights the margin expansion already in the tape. Gross margin went from 52% (2024) to 82% (2025 ratios line) — that's a reporting/mix shift worth interrogating (likely franchise-mix accounting reclassification), but operating margin genuinely stepped from 27% to 30% and net margin from 14.6% to 16.6%. If you take TTM EPS run-rate implied by the 17.9x P/E ($51.53/17.9 = ~$2.88) and grow it at the earnings CAGR of 25% (or even half that), the multiple compresses fast. The narrative engine calling this "quiet-quality, fundamentals doing 95% of the work" is the most honest read here — but it then concludes fairly valued, which contradicts its own observation that earnings are growing 27% YoY at a 17.9x multiple. That's a PEG well under 1.
The contrarian case is the GLP-1 / saturation thesis the pre-flight flagged, and it deserves more weight than the synthesis gave it. US Planet Fitness unit penetration is the real ceiling — if same-store membership growth stalls and new franchisee builds slow, the royalty stream caps out and 12% revenue growth becomes 4-5%. The "sector in contraction" red flag is real: discretionary consumer spending is wobbly, and a $25 Black Card tier is more elastic than the $10 classic tier. The bear case isn't that PLNT breaks — it's that the terminal growth rate the market is implicitly underwriting (mid-teens FCF growth in perpetuity, per the thesis evaluation) gets cut in half, and the stock re-rates to 13-14x earnings, i.e., closer to $40. The insider activity is weak signal — two 5,000-share open-market purchases against a flood of awards is not a thumping insider bid; it's compensation-driven noise dressed up as conviction.
I dissent modestly from the "fair value" verdict and lean toward modestly undervalued. At 7.1x EV/EBITDA, 6.2% FCF yield, 25% earnings CAGR (even halving forward to 12-15%), and a franchise royalty model with structurally rising margins, the math supports fair value in the $58-65 range, not $48. The synthesis is anchoring on a DCF that's likely punishing the stock for the 55% drawdown narrative rather than the cash flows. That said, this is not a fat pitch — the GLP-1 overhang is real but unquantified, Q1'26 revenue decelerated sequentially in a way that bears watching, and the gross margin jump needs an accounting explanation before I'd size up. Starter position at $51.53 with adds on any pullback to $45 makes sense; the asymmetry is favorable but not screaming.
GPT Critique
In reviewing the raw data for Planet Fitness, Inc. (PLNT), I notice that revenue growth has been robust, climbing from $587M in 2021 to $1.32B in 2025, a CAGR of approximately 22%. This is impressive, but it's important to recognize that this growth is partly rebounding from a low base during the COVID-19 pandemic. The recent quarter's revenue of $337.2M represents a YoY growth of 22% against a softer comparable, suggesting some underlying momentum, although the 12% recent YoY growth indicates a deceleration trend. Net income has similarly expanded from $42.8M to $219.1M over the last five years. Margins are a bright spot, with the net margin improving to 16.6% recently. However, the balance sheet's negative book value, driven by buybacks, and the 2.1 current ratio indicate a stable liquidity position.
I agree with Opus's assertion that the stock appears modestly undervalued. With a 6.2% FCF yield and a 7.1x EV/EBITDA, the valuation metrics suggest some mispricing given the asset-light, high-margin nature of their franchise model. Opus rightly points out that the narrative around a "quiet-quality" company, where fundamentals are doing the heavy lifting, seems consistent with the financials. However, I diverge on the extent of undervaluation. While Opus suggests a fair value range of $58-65, I am more cautious due to potential headwinds. I believe the fair value might be slightly lower, considering the "sector in contraction" flag and the emerging threat from GLP-1 drugs potentially impacting the budget fitness market.
Where I disagree more strongly is on the margin expansion story. Opus highlights a dramatic rise in gross margin from 52% to 82%, attributing it to a likely accounting shift rather than operational improvements. This requires further scrutiny, as such a jump could distort profitability perceptions. Additionally, the reliance on franchise growth as a core strategy could encounter saturation, capping growth and impacting the royalty stream, a concern Opus acknowledges but perhaps underweights in their valuation.
A skeptic might argue that both my view and Opus's overlook the potential impact of macroeconomic pressures on discretionary spending, particularly with inflationary pressures reducing consumer budgets for non-essential services like gym memberships. The narrative that Planet Fitness provides a recession-resistant service might not hold if consumer behavior shifts significantly towards home fitness solutions.