Business Description
CNH Industrial N.V. operates as a multinational producer of heavy-duty industrial machinery, specializing in a diverse portfolio that includes both agricultural and construction equipment. A testament to its legacy, the highly recognized Case IH brand has been a trusted partner to farmers for generations. The company's reach is extensive, supported by a robust global distribution network comprising over 3,600 dealer and distribution outlets. To boost accessibility and sales, CNH also operates a dedicated financial services division, offering retail financing directly to end-customers and crucial wholesale funding to its widespread dealer base.
Business History
Generated: Jun 15, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.41
Total Equity: $7.73B
Shares: 1,251,000,000
Total Debt: $26.85B
Cash: $3.23B
EBITDA: $2.87B
Total Debt: $26.85B
Cash: $3.23B
Revenue: $18.10B
Revenue: $18.10B
Revenue: $18.10B
Total Equity: $7.73B
Tax Rate: 26.7%
Equity: $7.73B
Total Debt: $26.85B
Cash: $3.23B
Current Liabilities: $4.05B
Long-Term Debt: $26.76B
Total Debt: $26.85B
Total Equity: $7.73B
Shares: 1,251,000,000
Shares: 1,251,000,000
CapEx: -$543.00M
Shares: 1,251,000,000
Stock Price: $10.60
Net Income: $510.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
CNH is a mature, capital-intensive ag-machinery business living through a clear cyclical downturn: revenue has fallen from $24.69B (2023) to $18.10B (2025), a ~27% peak-to-trough decline, and operating margin compressed from 20.0% to 15.4% while net income collapsed from $2.28B to $510M. Gross margin held up reasonably well (31.4% vs 32.7% peak), suggesting the damage is largely volume/operating-leverage driven rather than pricing destruction — consistent with a normal ag cycle. Importantly, free cash flow actually inflected positively to $2.00B in 2025 as working capital (likely dealer inventory/floorplan) unwound, more than covering the depressed $510M net income (OCF/NI 1.92x).
Earnings quality screens clean: accruals -0.9% of assets, Beneish M -2.69, and FCF > net income in the trough year argue the reported numbers are real. Per-share discipline is genuine — diluted shares dropped from 1.36B (2021) to 1.25B (2025), a -2.1% CAGR, with SBC effectively 0% of revenue, which is rare and a real strength. The major caveat is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$23.6B against $3.23B liquid cash and a grey-zone Altman Z of 1.98. Much of that debt is almost certainly captive-finance receivables (CNH Capital), not corporate leverage, but the raw figures still mean this is a business with a constraint, not a cushion, going through a downturn.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Split of the $23.6B debt between Industrial and Financial Services segments — industrial-only net debt is the true leverage figure
- Quality and delinquency trends in CNH Capital's finance receivable book given the ag downturn
- Dealer inventory levels and whether the FCF boost in 2025 is sustainable or a one-time working-capital release
- Order book / backlog commentary for 2026 to gauge whether revenue has troughed
- Capital allocation framework: buyback authorization size and any pause given cycle conditions
- Customer/geographic concentration (North America row-crop exposure) and tariff/trade impacts
The e2e synthesis pins composite and signal-adjusted fair value at $7.52 against a $10.60 price — a ~29% premium to deserved value, or put differently, you need ~40% upside from FV to justify today's quote. Earnings quality screens clean (so no haircut warranted) and the business is a decent cyclical with real per-share discipline, but the company-quality lens explicitly flags revenue and margins 'rolling over hard.' Paying above fair value for a cyclical mid-down-cycle is the textbook setup for disappointment.
The steady-compounder bull narrative is doing heavy lifting here: to justify $10.60 you need to believe trough earnings are already in, dealer-network moat translates to durable mid-teens ROIC through the cycle, and ag-equipment demand re-accelerates on EM mechanization. The bear case — lumpy cyclical tied to grain prices and credit, debt-heavy balance sheet — is more consistent with the $7.52 anchor. I don't see a margin of safety; I see the market crediting CNH for a recovery that hasn't shown up in the numbers yet.
This isn't an obvious short — the quality is real and buybacks shrink the float — but it is not cheap. Fairly Valued would be generous; Rich is the honest read.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY guidance and order book trajectory — is the trough actually in?
- Industrial net debt and Financial Services receivables credit quality
- Gross/operating margin walk vs prior down-cycles to gauge how deep this trough goes
- Buyback pace and capital allocation commentary on next earnings call
CNH carries a 1.23 beta into a tape that is technically neutral but tilted defensive (VIX in the upper half of its range, 10y at 4.48%, market off its highs). For a cyclical ag-machinery name with no compounder narrative to defend it, that environment is mildly punishing rather than benign - the stock has no story bid to offset macro chop. Momentum confirms it: -14% CAGR and still bleeding (-8.8% recent), meaning sellers have the tape and buyers have no catalyst to rally around. The narrative lens is the key tell. Intensity is 'minimal' and the archetype claim (steady compounder) is being actively rejected by price action; the market is treating CNH as what the bear case says it is - a lumpy cyclical tied to grain prices and farm credit, not a moat story. With grain prices soft and dealer inventory a known overhang, there is no narrative tailwind to lean on. Analyst tone is the classic stale-bull divergence: 9 Buys, 5 Holds, zero revisions this month, target $13.39 vs spot $10.30 - a 30% implied upside that nobody is actually defending with fresh notes. That gap usually closes by targets drifting down, not price rallying up, which is itself a slow headwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether analyst targets start getting cut toward spot (confirming the stale-bull unwind)
- Grain price action and USDA prints - the real narrative driver here
- Dealer inventory commentary from peer DE; any destocking signal hits CNH harder
- Any shift in ag-equipment ETF flows or sector rotation back into late-cycle industrials
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.5B | $23.6B | $24.7B | $19.8B | $18.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $14.1B | $16.6B | $16.8B | $13.4B | $12.4B |
| Gross Profit | $5.4B | $7.0B | $7.8B | $6.5B | $5.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.6B | $2.9B |
| Operating Income | $3.3B | $4.4B | $4.9B | $3.9B | $2.8B |
| Net Income | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $1.2B | $510.0M |
| EBITDA | $3.0B | $3.9B | $4.6B | $3.7B | $2.9B |
| EPS | $1.27 | $1.50 | $1.71 | $0.99 | $0.41 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:02am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.0B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $3.2B | $3.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $39.2B | $29.7B | $35.4B | $32.0B | $31.4B |
| Total Assets | $49.4B | $39.4B | $46.3B | $42.9B | $42.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $17.7B | $5.6B | $17.5B | $14.8B | $4.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $20.9B | $23.0B | $15.8B | $16.0B | $26.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $42.6B | $32.4B | $38.1B | $35.2B | $34.9B |
| Total Equity | $6.8B | $6.9B | $8.0B | $7.7B | $7.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.8B | $7.9B | $9.7B | $10.3B | $10.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.1B | $557.0M | $907.0M | $2.0B | $2.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$921.0M | -$999.0M | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$543.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.2B | -$442.0M | -$288.0M | $782.0M | $2.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$153.0M | -$652.0M | -$702.0M | -$100.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.8B | -$716.0M | -$84.0M | -$1.2B | -$637.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$18.9B $18.4B – $19.4B
|
$20.6B $20.1B – $21.1B
|
$20.9B $20.5B – $21.5B
|
$22.3B $21.8B – $22.8B
|
| EBITDA |
$3.2B $3.1B – $3.3B
|
$3.5B $3.4B – $3.6B
|
$3.5B $3.5B – $3.6B
|
$3.8B $3.7B – $3.9B
|
| Net Income |
$878.8M $659.1M – $1.0B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.3B
|
$1.4B $1.3B – $1.4B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.8% | +4.8% | -19.7% | -8.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +29.2% | +12.5% | -17.4% | -12.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +32.0% | +13.5% | -22.1% | -27.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +17.8% | +12.1% | -45.2% | -59.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +30.1% | +19.0% | -20.4% | -21.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:06am (12d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | Nasi Alessandro | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Buffett Howard W. | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Simonelli Lorenzo | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Sorensen Vagn O | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Bastoni Elizabeth A. | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Palmer Richard Keith | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Linehan Karen | A-Award | 5,634.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Schroeder Jay | A-Award | 23,472.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Chishti Humayun | A-Award | 15,469.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Heywood Suzanne | A-Award | 41,080.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Pampalone Stefano | A-Award | 44,899.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Nickolas James AJ | A-Award | 95,863.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | MacLeod Douglas | A-Award | 19,057.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Worthen Britton M. | A-Award | 27,888.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Tutino Francesco Vincenzo Maria | A-Award | 34,997.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Simonelli Lorenzo | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-08 | Palmer Richard Keith | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-13 | Schroeder Jay | F-InKind | 1,246.00 | $10.62 | $13,233 |
| 2026-05-11 | KRAMER RICHARD J | M-Exempt | 4,980.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-11 | KRAMER RICHARD J | F-InKind | 93.00 | $10.84 | $1,008 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-21 | $0.10 | 2026-03-25 | 2026-05-21 | 2026-05-29 |
| 2025-05-21 | $0.25 | 2025-03-24 | 2025-05-21 | 2025-05-30 |
| 2024-05-10 | $0.47 | 2024-03-19 | 2024-05-13 | 2024-05-29 |
| 2023-04-24 | $0.40 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-05-03 | |
| 2022-04-19 | $0.30 | 2022-04-20 | 2022-05-04 | |
| 2021-04-19 | $0.13 | 2021-04-20 | 2021-05-05 | |
| 2019-04-23 | $0.20 | 2019-04-24 | 2019-05-02 | |
| 2018-04-23 | $0.17 | 2018-04-24 | 2018-05-02 | |
| 2017-04-24 | $0.12 | |||
| 2016-04-25 | $0.15 | |||
| 2015-04-20 | $0.22 | |||
| 2014-04-22 | $0.28 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a brutal cyclical story that the prior models partially obscure with hedging language. Revenue collapsed from $24.69B (2023) to $18.10B (2025) — a 27% peak-to-trough drop — and net income cratered 78% from $2.28B to $510M over the same window. Q1 2026 just printed $3.83B revenue with $7M net income (0.2% margin), which is essentially breakeven and worse than Q1 2025's $131M NI on identical revenue. That's not a stabilizing trough; that's still-deteriorating unit economics likely reflecting dealer destocking, price concessions, and underabsorbed fixed costs. The "accelerating quarterly trend" tag in Secondary Signals is misleading — sequential Q4→Q1 is seasonal, and the YoY comparison shows margins compressing further, not bottoming.
My independent read: this is mid-cycle-down, not late-cycle-down. Deere's commentary, US net farm income forecasts, and dealer inventory data suggest ag equipment demand troughs in late 2025/early 2026 with recovery pushed into 2027. CNH at $10.6 trades at 0.64x sales and ~26x trough earnings — neither cheap on current numbers nor expensive on normalized. Normalized EPS at mid-cycle (call it $1.50, between 2025's ~$0.40 and 2023's ~$1.70) at a 10-12x cyclical multiple gets you $15-18, roughly 40-70% upside but only on a 2027 recovery. The 2.89% dividend pays you to wait, but coverage thins fast if 2026 deteriorates further.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the Synthesis "High Conviction Required" verdict and the Narrative layer's framing of a "41% premium to DCF" both feel disconnected from the print. There is no premium here — the stock trades at 0.64x sales versus a 5-year average closer to 0.9-1.0x and Deere at ~1.8x. The reverse-DCF implying 12.6% growth is an artifact of using depressed FCF as the base; that's a known trap in cyclicals. The Pre-Flight call of "cyclical-industrial-with-captive-finance" is the most honest framing — and critically, the captive finance arm (CNH Capital) means the $3.23B cash figure and 7.75 current ratio are misleading because finance receivables and associated debt dominate the balance sheet (the "—" for total debt is a serious gap). ROE of 5% and ROIC of 5.75% on TTM are trough numbers, not steady-state; citing them as evidence of low quality is regime-inappropriate.
The contrarian case against buying: (1) Chinese ag equipment exporters (YTO, Lovol) are gaining share in emerging markets where CNH had hoped to grow, and tariff retaliation could compress export margins permanently; (2) Deere is widening its precision-ag technology lead, and CNH's Raven acquisition hasn't closed the gap — this could be partly structural share loss masquerading as cyclical; (3) higher-for-longer rates crush farmer financing demand and inflate CNH Capital's funding costs simultaneously; (4) the insider "awards" on 2026-05-26 are all grants, not open-market buys — zero conviction signal, and the Secondary Signals "Neutral" tag overstates it. The bull needs grain prices to recover, which requires either supply shock or China demand resumption — neither is in the analyst's control.
GPT Critique
Analyzing CNH Industrial N.V., the immediate focus for me is the stark revenue decline from $24.69 billion in 2023 to $18.10 billion in 2025, paired with a net income drop from $2.28 billion to $510 million over the same period. These figures indicate significant operational challenges and margin pressures, with Q1 2026 posting a near-zero net income of $7 million on $3.83 billion revenue, suggesting ongoing deterioration rather than stabilization. The cyclical nature of the agricultural machinery industry is evident, as CNH's fortunes are tightly linked to commodity cycles and farmer economics. The balance sheet's cash position of $3.23 billion and a high current ratio of 7.75 might suggest financial flexibility, yet these could be misleading due to CNH Capital's role and unlisted total debt, highlighting potential risks not immediately visible in the headline numbers.
Opus argues that CNH is not yet cheap enough on trough earnings to warrant a clear buy, emphasizing the need for margin stabilization or a price drop to $8.50-$9.00 to justify investment. I agree with this cautious stance, noting the Q1 2026 margin at 0.2% as an indicator that the company hasn't bottomed out yet. The call for a recovery that hasn't started is valid, especially with the 2.89% dividend yield offering limited comfort in the face of potential further deterioration in free cash flow as inventories rebuild.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the interpretation of the "High Conviction Required" narrative. While Opus points out that this sentiment feels disconnected from the print, I see it as a necessary reflection of the high-risk environment CNH operates in. The reverse DCF's implied 12.6% growth is indeed a questionable metric given the depressed base, yet it does highlight the market's pricing of a cyclical recovery, albeit one that may be optimistic given the current fundamentals.
From a skeptic's perspective, one could argue that the narrative of CNH as a cyclical value play is overly reliant on an eventual recovery that might not materialize as expected. The encroachment of Chinese manufacturers in emerging markets and Deere's technological advancements could signify a structural shift rather than a temporary downturn. Furthermore, the absence of insider buying and reliance on stock awards might underscore a lack of internal confidence in a near-term turnaround. Additionally, the macro environment—characterized by persistent high interest rates—could suppress demand further and strain CNH's financial arm, exacerbating funding challenges.