Business Description
GE Vernova Inc. is an energy enterprise primarily engaged in generating electricity. Its business activities are categorized into three main divisions: Power, Wind, and Electrification. The Power segment is responsible for producing and distributing electricity from various sources, including hydroelectric, natural gas, nuclear, and steam power. The Wind division concentrates on the fabrication and sale of wind turbine blades. Meanwhile, the Electrification segment offers an array of services such as grid infrastructure solutions, power conversion technologies, and both solar and energy storage systems. The company was established in 2023 and has its headquarters situated in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Business History
Generated: Jun 25, 2026 3:03amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 17.92
Total Equity: $11.18B
Shares: 276,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.85B
EBITDA: $3.68B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.85B
Revenue: $38.07B
Revenue: $38.07B
Revenue: $38.07B
Total Equity: $11.18B
Tax Rate: -72.5%
Equity: $11.18B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.85B
Current Liabilities: $40.97B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $11.18B
Shares: 276,000,000
Shares: 276,000,000
CapEx: -$1.28B
Shares: 276,000,000
Stock Price: $1,051
Net Income: $4.88B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The trajectory is striking: revenue grew from $33.0B in 2021 to $38.1B in 2025 (about 3.6% CAGR), but the real story is the margin inflection. Gross margin expanded from 15.0% to 19.8%, operating margin swung from -2.7% (and -9.7% in 2022) to +3.6%, and net income went from a $633M loss to $4.88B profit. FCF flipped from -$2.24B in 2021 to +$3.71B in 2025. With $8.85B of liquid cash, zero net debt, an Altman Z of 4.14, and self-funding FCF, the survival math is not in question - this is a fortress balance sheet on the capital structure side. Share count is essentially flat (0.4% CAGR, 272M to 276M), so per-share value is being preserved. That said, the quality is not unblemished. Operating margin at 3.6% is still thin for a $38B industrial, meaning the recent profitability surge is fragile and partly reflects power/grid cycle tailwinds rather than proven through-cycle economics. The earnings quality module flags OCF/NI weakness and negative accruals (-2.9% of assets), and 2025 net income of $4.88B materially exceeds FCF of $3.71B - a ~$1.2B gap worth understanding (tax benefits, working capital, or one-timers). Insider activity is light but skewed to sales (3 sells, $11.5M; no opens). For a recently spun-out heavy-industrial with cyclical end markets, this is a credibly strong business, not yet a proven elite compounder.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Reconciliation of 2025 NI $4.88B vs FCF $3.71B - identify deferred tax benefit, gain on sale, or working capital releases
- Backlog composition and customer concentration in Power and Electrification segments
- Warranty and project loss reserves on legacy onshore/offshore wind contracts (Wind segment historically loss-making)
- Pension and post-retirement obligations inherited from GE parent and cash funding requirements
- Through-cycle operating margin guidance and segment-level margins for Power vs Wind vs Electrification
- Any large one-time tax benefits or NOL utilization driving the 2025 NI step-up
GEV trades at $1,057.65 with a $282.5B market cap against a business that, while genuinely improving, still posts only ~3.6% operating margins on a heavy-industrial revenue base around $35-36B. That implies the market is capitalizing a future margin and growth profile, not the current one - on trailing operating earnings the multiple is extreme, and even on forward consensus the stock carries a premium typical of secular-growth software, not power equipment. The e2e synthesis flagging 'High Conviction Required' is itself a tell that the deserved-value math depends on heroic assumptions.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward operating margin guidance for Power and Electrification segments
- Wind segment path to sustained profitability (current loss-maker)
- Backlog conversion rates and pricing on new orders vs legacy book
- Free cash flow conversion ratio vs reported net income
- Any large one-off gains or working-capital benefits in recent FCF
GEV is sitting inside one of the loudest, cleanest narratives in the market right now: the AI buildout has made electric power the binding constraint, and GEV is being cast as the chokepoint supplier with gas-turbine pricing reportedly up 300% in three years. CNBC plant-tour coverage, GridOS launches, and SMR adjacency news are all feeding the story in the last 72 hours. That is a textbook visionary-founder, strong-intensity narrative with the news flow actively reinforcing it. The macro tape is essentially neutral (VIX 18.6, S&P -3.3% off highs) and rates at 4.41% are a generic drag on long-duration infra equities, but beta 1.05 means the tape itself is not punishing this name and the narrative is more than offsetting it. Analyst tone confirms rather than diverges: 21 Buys / 7 Holds, 3 upward revisions this month with avg target $1,208 vs price $1,058, so the sell-side is chasing the story higher, not pushing back. The one-day -8% drop is a profit-taking wobble after a 103% one-year run, not a narrative crack.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any AI capex slowdown headline from hyperscalers that would crack the power-bottleneck story
- Turbine pricing or backlog datapoints in the next earnings print
- Policy noise around IRA/renewables subsidies that could re-ignite the bear narrative
- Whether the -8% day extends into a multi-day unwind of crowded positioning
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $33.0B | $29.7B | $33.2B | $34.9B | $38.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $28.1B | $26.2B | $28.4B | $28.6B | $30.5B |
| Gross Profit | $4.9B | $3.5B | $4.8B | $6.3B | $7.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.8B | $6.3B | $5.7B | $5.5B | $6.1B |
| Operating Income | -$884.0M | -$2.9B | -$923.0M | $787.0M | $1.4B |
| Net Income | -$633.0M | -$2.7B | -$438.0M | $1.6B | $4.9B |
| EBITDA | $484.0M | -$526.0M | $932.0M | $3.6B | $3.7B |
| EPS | $-2.33 | $-10.06 | $-1.61 | $5.64 | $17.92 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $1.6B | $8.2B | $8.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $25.9B | $27.4B | $34.2B | $40.2B |
| Total Assets | $44.5B | $46.1B | $51.5B | $63.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $26.0B | $29.3B | $31.7B | $41.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $544.0M | $535.0M | $572.0M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $32.9B | $37.7B | $40.9B | $50.7B |
| Total Equity | $10.7B | $7.4B | $9.5B | $11.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $0 | $0 | $1.6B | $6.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$1.7B | -$114.0M | $1.2B | $2.6B | $5.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$577.0M | -$513.0M | -$744.0M | -$883.0M | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$2.2B | -$627.0M | $442.0M | $1.7B | $3.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$369.0M | $53.0M | $60.0M | $838.0M | $99.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$3.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$871.0M | $2.1B | -$516.0M | $6.1B | $643.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$52.0B $48.9B – $53.5B
|
$59.4B $59.3B – $59.5B
|
$67.8B $65.1B – $69.6B
|
$75.0B $72.1B – $77.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$11.5B $10.9B – $11.9B
|
$13.2B $13.2B – $13.2B
|
$15.1B $14.5B – $15.5B
|
$16.7B $16.0B – $17.1B
|
| Net Income |
$6.6B $6.0B – $7.2B
|
$9.0B $6.0B – $12.7B
|
$12.3B $11.6B – $12.7B
|
$14.9B $14.2B – $15.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.2% | +12.1% | +5.1% | +8.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -30.1% | +39.3% | +30.9% | +19.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -225.9% | +68.0% | +185.3% | +76.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -332.2% | +84.0% | +454.3% | +214.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -208.7% | +277.2% | +282.2% | +3.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:04am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Abate Victor | S-Sale | 4,819.00 | $948.08 | $4.6M |
| 2026-05-20 | ANGEL STEPHEN F | A-Award | 299.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | ANGEL STEPHEN F | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Rucker Kim K.W. | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Akins Nicholas K | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | DONALD ARNOLD W | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Matthew C. Harris | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Reynolds Paula Rosput | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | HUNDMEJEAN MARTINA | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | MALAVE JESUS JR | A-Award | 173.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Potvin Matthew Joseph | S-Sale | 2,333.00 | $1,059.09 | $2.5M |
| 2026-05-14 | Matthew C. Harris | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Matthew C. Harris | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Akins Nicholas K | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Akins Nicholas K | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Reynolds Paula Rosput | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Reynolds Paula Rosput | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | DONALD ARNOLD W | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | DONALD ARNOLD W | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | HUNDMEJEAN MARTINA | M-Exempt | 495.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 4:04pm (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | $0.50 | 2026-05-19 | 2026-06-16 | 2026-07-14 |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.50 | 2026-02-17 | 2026-03-17 | 2026-04-14 |
| 2026-01-05 | $0.50 | 2025-12-09 | 2026-01-05 | 2026-02-02 |
| 2025-10-20 | $0.25 | 2025-09-25 | 2025-10-20 | 2025-11-17 |
| 2025-07-21 | $0.25 | 2025-06-23 | 2025-07-21 | 2025-08-18 |
| 2025-04-17 | $0.25 | 2025-04-08 | 2025-04-18 | 2025-05-16 |
| 2024-12-20 | $0.25 | 2024-12-10 | 2024-12-20 | 2025-01-28 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first, something is off with the most recent prints. Q1 2026 shows $9.34B revenue with $4.75B net income — a 50.8% net margin — and Q4 2025 shows $3.66B NI on $10.96B revenue (33.4%). Yet the four quarters prior all sat at 3-6% net margins, and full-year 2025 operating income was only $1.39B on $38.07B revenue (3.6% op margin). The TTM net income of $4.88B is therefore almost entirely below-the-line: tax valuation allowance releases, pension remeasurement gains, or divestiture marks — not operating earnings. The 30x TTM P/E is fiction; on $1.39B of operating income against a $282B market cap, the operating multiple is north of 200x. The synthesis's "$4.9B in net income and $3.7B in FCF" framing is technically correct but analytically misleading — FCF at $3.71B on $38B revenue is a ~10% conversion that exceeds operating income by 2.7x, which screams working-capital tailwind from customer deposits on the order backlog rather than steady-state earning power.
The pre-flight model correctly flags this as a multi-segment turnaround mispriced as a utility, and the narrative layer correctly identifies that the $282B cap is a story-driven premium. I agree with both, but they understate how dependent the bull case is on a single hand-off: Power services + Electrification (grid/data-center) margins ramping from mid-single-digits to mid-teens while Wind stays out of the way. 2023 operating income was -$923M; 2024 was +$787M; 2025 was +$1.39B. That's real progress, but the absolute level is tiny relative to the cap. Revenue CAGR of 7% is mature-industrial pace, not hyper-growth — the multiple expansion has done virtually all the work. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag in revenue confidence is the tell: Q1 2026 at $9.34B is below Q4 2025's $10.96B (seasonal, but) and the YoY comparison against Q1 2025's $8.04B is 16% — decent, but the easy comp window is closing.
A careful contrarian would argue three things. First, the gas turbine super-cycle is a real but finite order book — slots booked through 2028+ at premium pricing reflect a vendor oligopoly (GEV/Siemens Energy/Mitsubishi Power) that historically reverts when capacity catches up; the market is extrapolating peak-cycle margins into perpetuity. Second, Wind remains a structural loss-maker and the bull case quietly assumes it stops bleeding without explaining how, in a post-IRA-uncertainty environment with offshore project cancellations. Third, the insider activity — small option awards plus a 4,819-share sale at ~$1,050 ($5M) — isn't damning but there is zero open-market buying at this multiple, which is what you'd expect if insiders thought the stock were cheap. The cult coefficient being "medium" rather than high is actually a warning: this is institutional-narrative momentum, not retail conviction, and institutions exit faster.
I dissent from the synthesis's "High Conviction Required" punt and lean explicitly bearish on valuation while acknowledging business quality. Strip out the noisy NI line and value GEV on operating earnings: even granting a doubling of operating income to ~$3B by 2027 (aggressive given the Wind drag), at a 25x multiple that's $75B of equity value from earnings, plus maybe $50-80B for the services annuity capitalized generously — call it $130-160B fair value, or $480-600/share against $1,051 today. The bulls need operating margins to hit 12-15% on $50B+ of revenue by 2028, which requires Wind to be fixed, Power services to scale, and Electrification to compound at 20%+ — three independent execution bets each with non-trivial failure probability. The price already pays for all three working. Pre-flight nails the setup; synthesis pulls its punch.
GPT Critique
GE Vernova's financial data paints a picture of a company in a transformative phase, with some inconsistencies between its reported earnings and underlying operational performance. The most striking aspect of the raw data is the significant jump in net income in Q1 2026, which is anomalous compared to the previous quarters. A 50.8% net margin on $9.34B revenue is markedly higher than any other quarter, suggesting extraordinary items rather than sustainable earnings improvements. The annual operating income for 2025 was $1.39B, which is modest relative to its $38.07B revenue, indicating that much of the net income boost is likely due to non-operational factors such as tax benefits or financial restructuring. This raises questions about the true earnings power of GE Vernova.
I find myself in agreement with Opus on several key points. Opus correctly identifies that the impressive net income figures are not reflective of the operational strength but are rather inflated by below-the-line items. The assertion that the market is pricing GE Vernova on a story-driven premium is also valid, given the company's classification as a utility, while its operations resemble those of a complex industrial entity. Moreover, the reliance on a narrative of margin improvement and growth in Electrification and Power services, while Wind remains a challenge, aligns with the current market perception but requires flawless execution to justify the high valuation.
However, I diverge from Opus's evaluation in some areas. While Opus emphasizes the role of Electrification and Power services in driving future growth, I believe the market is underestimating the potential headwinds from a maturing gas turbine cycle and the competitive pressures in renewable hardware markets. The assumption that Wind will cease to be a loss-maker without a clear path to profitability seems overly optimistic. Furthermore, the insider transactions, particularly the lack of significant open-market purchases by insiders, suggest a cautionary stance among those with intimate knowledge of the company's prospects, which could imply a less bullish internal view on the current valuation.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential for strategic partnerships or technological breakthroughs in renewable energy that could significantly enhance GE Vernova's competitive positioning. They might also contend that the macroeconomic environment, including policy support for green energy, could provide a more robust safety net than we anticipate, potentially validating the current valuation in the long term.