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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for STMicroelectronics N.V. (STM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 11 · Value -59 · Sentiment -46 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $7.33 vs $55.79 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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STMicroelectronics N.V.
STM NYSESTMicroelectronics N.V. is a global semiconductor company that designs, develops, manufactures, and markets a broad portfolio of electronic components for diverse end markets. Its products include analog and mixed-signal chips, discrete power semiconductors, microcontrollers, digital integrated circuits, and MEMS and other sensors used in electronic systems. STMicroelectronics serves key sectors such as automotive, industrial automation, power and energy management, personal electronics, communications equipment, and computing and peripherals, supplying chips that enable control, connectivity, sensing, and power efficiency in these applications. The company operates through specialized business groups, including the Automotive and Discrete Group, Analog, MEMS and Sensors Group, and Microcontrollers and Digital ICs Group, allowing it to address both high-volume consumer devices and demanding industrial and automotive platforms. Founded in 1987 and headquartered in the Netherlands with major operations in Switzerland, STMicroelectronics plays a significant role in the global electronics supply chain as a key supplier to equipment manufacturers across Europe, the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific region.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.18
Total Equity: $18.23B
Shares: 923,051,667
Total Debt: $2.13B
Cash: $2.84B
EBITDA: $2.03B
Total Debt: $2.13B
Cash: $2.84B
Revenue: $11.80B
Revenue: $11.80B
Revenue: $11.80B
Total Equity: $18.23B
Tax Rate: 55.0%
Equity: $18.23B
Total Debt: $2.13B
Cash: $2.84B
Current Liabilities: $3.35B
Long-Term Debt: $1.84B
Total Debt: $2.13B
Total Equity: $18.23B
Shares: 923,051,667
Shares: 923,051,667
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 923,051,667
Stock Price: $55.79
Net Income: $166.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:22am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.8B | $16.1B | $17.3B | $13.3B | $11.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $7.4B | $8.5B | $9.0B | $8.0B | $7.8B |
| Gross Profit | $5.3B | $7.6B | $8.3B | $5.2B | $4.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $3.5B | $3.8B |
| Operating Income | $2.4B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $1.7B | $175.0M |
| Net Income | $2.0B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $1.6B | $166.0M |
| EBITDA | $3.5B | $5.7B | $6.2B | $3.4B | $2.0B |
| EPS | $2.21 | $4.37 | $4.66 | $1.73 | $0.19 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.16 | $4.19 | $4.46 | $1.66 | $0.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:22am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $2.3B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $7.8B | $9.8B | $11.8B | $11.7B | $11.3B |
| Total Assets | $15.5B | $20.0B | $24.5B | $24.7B | $24.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.9B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.0B | $1.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.3B | $7.2B | $7.6B | $7.1B | $6.6B |
| Total Equity | $9.3B | $12.8B | $16.9B | $17.7B | $18.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $5.2B | $8.7B | $12.5B | $13.5B | $13.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:22am (49d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.1B | $5.2B | $6.0B | $3.0B | $2.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $134.0M | $334.0M | $498.0M | $503.0M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$205.0M | -$212.0M | -$223.0M | -$288.0M | -$321.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$485.0M | -$346.0M | -$346.0M | -$359.0M | -$367.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $219.0M | $33.0M | -$36.0M | -$940.0M | $555.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:22am (49d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +26.4% | +7.2% | -23.2% | -11.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +43.4% | +8.5% | -37.0% | -23.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +83.5% | +3.9% | -63.7% | -89.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +98.0% | +6.3% | -63.0% | -89.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +63.3% | +9.1% | -44.3% | -40.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 10:15am (56d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-23 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-24 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-23 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-24 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-25 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-17 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-24 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-25 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-18 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-11 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-18 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-26 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-20 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-12 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-19 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-17 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-21 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-15 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-20 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-08-19 00:38Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 07:17The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a brutal cyclical story, not a structural one. STM's revenue collapsed from $17.29B (2023) to $13.27B (2024) to $11.80B (2025) — a 32% peak-to-trough decline — while net income imploded from $4.21B to $166M, a 96% earnings collapse. Gross margin fell from 47.9% (2023) to 33.9% (2025), and operating margin from 26.7% to 1.5%. This is what a semi downturn looks like when a fab-heavy business runs into negative operating leverage: fixed costs don't flex, so a -32% revenue move wipes out ~$4B of operating income. The balance sheet, however, is pristine — $2.84B cash vs $2.13B debt (net cash), $18.23B equity, current ratio 3.36, D/E 0.12. This is not a company in distress; it's a cyclical trough.
The synthesis verdict of $7.23 fair value is absurd and I dissent hard. A DCF that spits out a 87% downside on a net-cash European semiconductor champion with $18.2B of book equity is almost certainly extrapolating trough FCF or trough earnings into perpetuity — a textbook cyclical-DCF error. At $7.23, STM would trade at 0.4x book and ~$6.5B market cap for a business that earned $4.2B just two years ago on $17.3B revenue. That's not a valuation, it's an arithmetic accident. The pre-flight note flagging PE hyper-sensitivity above 150 applies to the entire model chain: at 1.5% operating margin, every downstream multiple is garbage. EV/revenue of 3.9x and P/B of 2.65x are the honest anchors here, and both are middle-of-the-range for a cyclical semi at trough — not "overvalued 87%."
That said, the bull narrative also overreaches. Revenue CAGR of -17.4% over the visible window is real, and the platform-monopoly framing is wrong — STM is not TSMC, not Nvidia, and not irreplaceable. It's an analog/MEMS/power player with genuine automotive exposure but facing SiC competition from Wolfspeed, Infineon, and onsemi, plus Chinese domestic substitution at legacy nodes. European cost structure is a real drag. The honest normalized earnings power is probably $2.5–3.0B (midcycle, between the 2021 $2.0B and the 2023 $4.2B peak), which at a 15x cyclical multiple gets you $37–45B market cap, or roughly $42–50/share. Current $55.79 is modestly rich to that midcycle anchor but nowhere near the synthesis's $7 catastrophe. A contrarian would argue the automotive semi cycle bottoms in 2H26, and buying trough EPS at 1.1x book is how you make money in semis — Infineon and onsemi tell the same story.
Where I'd push back on my own read: the -89.3% recent earnings YoY and -11.1% revenue YoY suggest the trough isn't in yet, and there's no quarterly data in this file to verify stabilization — that's a real gap. The 193% payout ratio is unsustainable and the dividend will likely be cut or held flat as earnings recover, removing one support. If SiC share loss is structural rather than cyclical (Chinese EV OEMs designing out STM), midcycle earnings could reset to $1.5–2.0B, which pulls fair value down to $30–35. So the bear case has teeth, just not $7-of-teeth. Net: the synthesis is directionally defensible (stock is not cheap at 22x EV/EBITDA on trough numbers) but quantitatively deranged. Fair value is $42–50; current $55.79 is 10–30% rich, not 87% rich. Wait for a cycle turn signal or a sub-$45 entry.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not that STMicroelectronics is “expensive on trough earnings,” but how violently its earnings power has reset in just two years and how much of the old mid-cycle profitability the current market cap still seems to assume. Revenue fell from $17.29B in 2023 to $13.27B in 2024 and then to $11.80B in 2025, a cumulative 32% drop. The bigger issue is margin collapse: gross margin went from 47.9% in 2023 ($8.29B gross profit on $17.29B revenue) to 39.3% in 2024 and just 33.9% in 2025. Operating income cratered from $4.61B in 2023 to $1.68B in 2024 to only $175M in 2025, taking operating margin from 26.7% to 12.7% to 1.5%. That is not a normal “optical P/E problem”; it is evidence that this business is highly exposed to utilization and pricing, and that the earnings base investors were anchoring to in 2022-23 was cyclical, not structural.
At $49.8B of market cap, investors are paying 4.1x 2025 sales, about 22.7x EV/EBITDA, and roughly 300x earnings for a company that earned just $166M last year and generated $2.15B of operating cash flow. Even if I give credit for a net cash balance sheet—$2.84B cash against $2.13B debt—and a strong current ratio of 3.36, the valuation only makes sense if 2025 is very close to the bottom and STM can recover to something much nearer its 2023 economics. But that is a huge bridge. On 2025 numbers, return on equity is 0.9% and ROIC is 0.45%, which says today’s capital base is barely earning anything. A 2.65x price-to-book multiple is not crazy for a quality semiconductor franchise in an upswing; it looks rich for a manufacturer currently producing almost no operating profit on $18.23B of equity.
The raw data tells me this is a classic cyclical semi name being valued as if normalized earnings are both high and imminent. If I normalize off 2024 rather than the 2025 trough, the stock still does not look cheap: $1.56B of net income on a $49.8B market cap is about 32x earnings, and 2024 was already a sharp step down from 2023. If I normalize off 2023, it looks optically reasonable at roughly 12x peak earnings, but that assumes the 24% net margin of 2023 is repeatable. The three-year path—2023 net margin 24.4%, 2024 11.8%, 2025 1.4%—argues the opposite. For a capital-intensive analog/power/automotive supplier, the key question is not whether demand eventually improves, but whether the prior margin structure was flattered by shortage-era pricing and unusually high factory loading. I think it was. That makes the current price too generous.
The best case against this bearish read is that STM’s balance sheet and market positioning give it real staying power, and the market may be correctly looking through a temporary air pocket. Revenue in 2025 is still only modestly below 2021’s $12.76B, yet the company remains profitable, cash generative at the operating line, and essentially net-cash. If 2025 is simply an inventory correction plus underutilization trough, then a rebound even halfway back toward 2023 profitability would make today’s valuation look much less demanding. A move back to, say, $2.5B-$3.0B of operating income on a recovered $14B-$15B revenue base would quickly compress the apparent multiples, and investors could justify paying ahead for automotive and industrial semiconductor content growth. That is the core bull case, and it is not irrational; I just weigh it less because the data here shows not mere volume softness but a severe deterioration in gross margin, which usually signals weaker pricing power and a less favorable mix, not just temporary shipment timing.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 is truly the earnings trough rather than a step-change lower in returns. Specifically, I would want to see revenue stabilize back above $13B annualized, gross margin recover decisively above 38%-40%, and operating margin move back into at least the high single digits without financial engineering. If STM can show that 2025’s $175M operating income was aberrational and that operating cash flow above $2B can coexist with a much stronger P&L, then a rerating is deserved. Absent that, I think the stock is still priced off old peak economics and deserves to trade materially lower—closer to a value justified by 2024-like earnings at best, not 2023 nostalgia.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a classic semiconductor downcycle that has gone further and faster than a simple inventory correction. Revenue fell from $17.29B in 2023 to $13.27B in 2024 and $11.80B in 2025—a cumulative 32% drop—while net income collapsed from $4.21B to $1.56B to just $166M. Gross margin compressed from roughly 48% at the peak to 33.9%, and operating margin is now 1.5%. Free-cash-flow and earnings CAGRs of –40% and –80% confirm the trough is real, not an accounting artifact. At $55.79 the market still assigns a $49.8B enterprise that is 4.1× trailing sales and 2.65× book for a business generating sub-1% ROE and ROIC. The rule-based “high-growth profitable” label is simply wrong; this is a mature, capital-intensive analog and automotive supplier whose mid-cycle economics have been reset lower, at least for now.
What stands out most is the mismatch between the cash-generation profile and the price. Even if one generously normalizes mid-cycle net income back to $2.0–2.5B (well below the 2022–23 peaks), a 15–18× multiple—already generous for a European foundry-exposed analog name—implies a $30–45B equity value, or roughly $34–50 per share. The current $55.79 quote therefore embeds a full recovery plus a geopolitical premium that the DCF layer correctly flags as extreme. The balance sheet is the only genuine bright spot: $2.84B cash against $2.13B debt, a 3.36 current ratio and 0.12 debt-to-equity mean STM can endure another year of trough conditions without distress. That solvency, however, does not justify paying 290× trailing earnings or a payout ratio above 190% on a 0.7% yield.
The strongest contrary case is that $55 already reflects a 50%+ drawdown from cycle highs and that trough multiples are always optically absurd. A smart opponent would note STM’s entrenched position in automotive MCUs, power discrete and MEMS, the structural rise in semiconductor content per vehicle, and the political tailwind of European semiconductor sovereignty subsidies. They would also argue that book value of $18.23B understates the replacement cost of the installed process technology and that any sequential stabilization in industrial and auto demand would trigger a violent re-rating. Those points have merit on a multi-year view; they do not erase the fact that gross margins have structurally narrowed 1,000–1,400 bps from peak and that the market is still capitalizing a narrative of irreplaceability that the 2024–25 P&L does not yet support.
I would reverse the overvalued call if two consecutive quarters show revenue stabilizing above $3.2B with gross margin reclaiming 38%+, or if management guides 2026 free-cash-flow conversion back above 15% of sales while automotive SiC and industrial bookings turn positive on a year-over-year basis. Until those prints appear, the stock prices a recovery that the current income statement and return ratios have not begun to deliver.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
STM shows the classic profile of a well-run cyclical semi caught in a deep downcycle. Revenue peaked at $17.29B in 2023 with 47.9% gross margin and 26.7% operating margin, then collapsed to $11.80B (-32% from peak) with GM crushed to 33.9% and OpM to just 1.5% in 2025. Net income fell from $4.21B to $166M — a 96% decline. Yet the machine still generated $2.15B FCF even at trough, funded itself, and preserved $1.69B net cash. Diluted share count actually shrank (-0.1% CAGR), SBC is a trivial 1.6% of revenue, and buybacks exceed SBC 1.75x — genuine per-share value discipline that is rare in semis.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Segment detail: is the collapse concentrated in Automotive/Power (share loss?) or broad-based cyclical inventory correction across Industrial and Personal Electronics
- Utilization rates and any fab-underloading charges baked into the 2025 GM of 33.9%
- Any restructuring/impairment charges distorting the 1.5% operating margin
- Customer concentration and whether key auto customers (e.g. Tesla) have shifted sourcing
- Capex trajectory and whether the FCF preservation came at the expense of needed investment in 300mm/SiC capacity
- Any convertible or off-balance-sheet obligations behind the $2.13B gross-to-net cash gap
The e2e composite fair value of $7.33 (signal-adjusted $7.23) is almost certainly a runaway output driven by trough earnings - net income has fallen ~96% from peak and operating margin sits at 1.5%, so any earnings-anchored method (anchored-PE $4.47) will spit out a distressed number. I discount those as mechanically broken at the bottom of the cycle. The EPV-floor of $17.33 is more defensible as a true bottom-of-cycle anchor but still sits far below the $52.27 price. Even if I normalize to mid-cycle earnings power and grant STM full credit for its clean balance sheet, MEMS/analog/auto franchise, and secular electrification tailwinds, a defensible deserved value on normalized numbers lands in the mid-$30s to mid-$40s range - not $52.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Management's stated path back to 20%+ op margin and the timeline
- Auto/industrial book-to-bill and inventory correction stage
- Any one-time charges masking underlying earnings power
- Capex trajectory vs FCF - is the balance sheet still funding through the trough
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 15.8 and neutral rates, which normally helps a beta-1.52 semi name. But that lift is not landing here: STM is in a strong downtrend (-17% CAGR, -23pp over three years, -11% in the last month) while peers ride AI-datacenter and Vera Rubin power-ramp narratives. The story the market wants to tell about STM (platform monopoly, EV/IoT chokepoint) is intensity-strong but durability only moderate and cult-low, meaning there is no fanatical bid to defend the stock on dips.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the Vera Rubin / AI-datacenter power-semi trade sticks or fades within a week
- Any Q4 pre-announcement or margin guide-down that would confirm the bear framing
- Analyst target revisions post the -12% monthly drop — cuts would deepen the headwind
- Sector rotation flows: are funds adding EU semis or still concentrating in TSM/NVDA
The world is bifurcating inside semiconductors: compute/AI silicon is absorbing capital and growth while analog, power, MEMS and microcontrollers — STM's entire book — are in a demand and pricing trough driven by post-COVID inventory unwind, a slower Western EV ramp, and weak European industrial capex. Layered on top is a genuine structural shift: China is building domestic capacity precisely in mature-node power and general-purpose MCUs, converting what used to be a cyclical price floor into a permanent one. Neutral macro (10y 4.72, positively sloped curve) neither helps nor hurts much; industrial capex is rate-sensitive and stays subdued. The honest read is that STM's markets bottom rather than boom: electrification content growth is real, but STM captures less of it than it would have five years ago because the buyer set now has credible cheaper alternatives. Recovery is available; restoration of peak-cycle earnings power is not obviously available.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, STM was $52.27. We expect it to be $44.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $38.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.