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AGING Analysis Report
Jun 16, 2026
11 days ago · 100% complete · +8 refreshed

LiveRamp Holdings, Inc.

RAMP NYSE Categories PDF
Technology · Software - Infrastructure
San Francisco, CA 94104, United States IPO 1983 liveramp.com Updated Jun 16, 3:00am
Price
$37.57
Market Cap
$2.3B
Employees
1,400
Beta
1.28
Avg Volume
1,395,965
CEO
Scott E. Howe
Business Description

LiveRamp Holdings, Inc. operates as a technology enterprise, delivering sophisticated enterprise data connectivity solutions throughout the United States, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. Its product portfolio includes: RampID: A fundamental identifier focused on individuals. Safe Haven: A robust platform designed to empower businesses with data utilization. LiveRamp Data Marketplace: A key tool that facilitates the fluid integration of audience data from various proprietors within the broader marketing landscape. AbiliTec: A specialized platform for resolving offline identity discrepancies. LiveRamp serves a diverse clientele spanning numerous sectors, including finance, insurance, investment services, retail, automotive, telecommunications, high technology, consumer packaged goods, healthcare, travel, entertainment, non-profit organizations, and governmental bodies, among many others. Established initially as Acxiom Holdings, Inc., the entity officially adopted the name LiveRamp Holdings, Inc. in October 2018, the same year it was formally incorporated under this new designation. The company maintains its corporate headquarters in San Francisco, California.

Business History
Generated: Jun 16, 2026 3:02am
Price Overview
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)
$37.57
-0.05 (-0.13%)
Day Range
$37.55 – $37.68
52-Week Range
$21.71 – $37.92
50-Day MA
$32.25
200-Day MA
$28.67
Volume
526,269.00
Analyst Price Targets
Low $38.50
Consensus $38.50
High $38.50
(19 analysts)
Share Structure
Outstanding 60,087,866.00
Float 57,369,463.00
Free Float 95.5%
High free float — 95.5% of shares trade freely, ~4.5% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:06am (11d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:03am (11d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
API Direct from provider CALC Derived from statements
Industry comparison last run: Jun 16, 2026 3:01am
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
API
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
16.06
Stock Price: $37.57
EPS (Diluted): 2.30
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
API
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
1.70
Stock Price: $37.57
Total Equity: $971.98M
Shares: 63,382,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
API
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
17.63
Market Cap: $2.26B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
EBITDA: $111.46M
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
API
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$1.3B
Market Cap: $2.26B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
API
Gross Profit / Revenue
70.7%
Gross Profit: $574.82M
Revenue: $812.94M
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
API
Operating Income / Revenue
10.9%
Operating Income: $88.46M
Revenue: $812.94M
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
API
Net Income / Revenue
18.0%
Net Income: $145.95M
Revenue: $812.94M
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
API
Net Income / Total Equity
15.3%
Net Income: $145.95M
Total Equity: $971.98M
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
API
NOPAT / Invested Capital
8.4%
Operating Income: $88.46M
Tax Rate: -47.6%
Equity: $971.98M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
Zero debt — invested capital = equity minus cash (very efficient)
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
API
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
2.47
Current Assets: $653.14M
Current Liabilities: $264.79M
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
CALC
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.00
Short-Term Debt: $0.00
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $971.98M
Zero debt — this company carries no debt obligations. Strongest possible score.
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
CALC
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$12.83
Revenue: $812.94M
Shares: 63,382,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
CALC
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$15.34
Total Equity: $971.98M
Shares: 63,382,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
CALC
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$2.64
Operating CF: $168.93M
CapEx: -$1.38M
Shares: 63,382,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
API
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
0.0%
Last Dividend: N/A
Stock Price: $37.57
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
Dividends Paid / Net Income
—
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $145.95M
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Jun 16, 2026 3:01am
Compares RAMP against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Three separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-06-16 03:11:22
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality — wait for a dip 7/10
Genuinely good business (Q+91), but the market already knows it — at $37.57 I'm paying ~35% over deserved value, so this is a watchlist name, not a buy.
The cruxWhether you get a chance to own the quality inflection at a price that respects the -62 valuation gap — i.e., a pullback into the low-$30s.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from RAMP's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwayFortress Balance Sheet
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityHigh Earnings Quality
The three lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+91
Strong
edge √Σ 154 · risk √Σ 62 · conf 7/10

LiveRamp has quietly transformed over five years. Revenue compounded from $528.7M (2022) to $812.9M (2026), gross margins held in a tight 70-73% band, and operating margin swung from -12.4% to +10.9% with net income reaching $146M in 2026 after years of GAAP losses. FCF nearly doubled from $103M (2024) to $167.6M (2026), and the company sits on $387M of net cash with no debt drag — survival math is not a question.

Capital allocation looks unusually disciplined for a software company of this size. SBC at 10.2% of revenue is meaningful but is being more than offset by buybacks (buyback/SBC = 118.8%), and diluted share count has actually fallen from 68.2M to 63.4M — a -1.8% CAGR. Earnings-quality screens are clean: Beneish M -2.4, Altman Z 7, accruals -8.8% of assets, and OCF dwarfs net income across the series (FCF $167.6M vs. NI $146M in 2026, and FCF $154.6M in 2025 against roughly breakeven NI), meaning the reported turn is backed by cash, not accrual gymnastics.

The one quality question is durability of the operating-margin step-up — going from 1.7% to 10.9% in a single year is large, and gross margin actually ticked down 70 bps, so the leverage is coming from opex discipline rather than pricing power. Insider tape is non-directional (only F-InKind tax withholdings and A-Awards in the last window; the two reported 'sells' look like routine equity-comp mechanics, not conviction sales).

Strengths 5
m80
Net cash + self-funding
$387M liquid/net cash (17% of cap) with $167.6M annual FCF means zero solvency risk and full optionality for buybacks/M&A.
m78
Per-share value being concentrated
Diluted shares down from 68.2M to 63.4M (-1.8% CAGR) with buybacks running 118.8% of SBC — rare discipline for a 10%-SBC software company.
m75
Real operating inflection backed by cash
OpM moved from -12.4% (2022) to +10.9% (2026); FCF $167.6M exceeds NI $146M, and accruals are -8.8% of assets — the turn is cash-backed, not accrual-driven.
m55
Consistent ~71-73% gross margin
GM has held in a tight 70.7-72.8% band across five years through revenue scaling 54%, indicating stable unit economics.
m50
Clean earnings-quality screens
Beneish M -2.4, Altman Z 7, no red flags on accruals or OCF/NI relationship.
Concerns 3
m45
Margin step-up concentrated in one year
OpM jumped from 0.7% (2025) to 10.9% (2026) while GM declined 30 bps — the leverage source is opex, raising a question of whether 2026 includes one-time benefits or sustainable structural cost reset.
m35
SBC still 10.2% of revenue
Even with buyback offset, ~$83M of annual SBC is a real economic cost; the buyback discipline is what keeps it from being dilutive, not low issuance.
m25
Revenue growth decelerating in absolute terms relative to story
Growth has been ~12-14% range, not the 20%+ typical of a high-quality data infrastructure narrative — moat strength is moderate, not dominant.
This is a better-run business than its reputation suggests. The combination of net cash, self-funded FCF, shrinking share count despite double-digit SBC, and a five-year arc from -12% to +11% operating margins with clean earnings-quality screens is genuinely above-average for mid-cap software. My hesitation is that the 2026 margin print looks like a step-function rather than a glide path, and the moat is more 'useful identity plumbing' than 'irreplaceable network' — so I'd call it Strong, not Fortress. But on the question I'm being asked — is this a high-integrity, durable, well-run company — the answer is clearly yes.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • Composition of the 2026 operating-margin jump — any one-time legal/restructuring reversals or genuinely sustainable opex reset?
  • Customer concentration in data connectivity / Data Marketplace segments (10-K customer disclosure)
  • Net revenue retention and subscription vs. usage mix — durability of the ~71% GM
  • Whether 2026 net income includes a deferred tax asset release or other non-cash benefit inflating GAAP NI vs. FCF
  • Competitive position vs. Snowflake/Databricks-native clean-room offerings and Google/Meta first-party data initiatives
  • Goodwill and intangibles balance — prior years showed large losses; check for any remaining impairment risk
Valuation / Mispricing
-62
Rich
edge √Σ 36 · risk √Σ 98 · conf 6/10
Price $37.57 vs composite FV $27.78 — ~35% premium; even with a generous quality bump to ~$32, no margin of safety. attractive below $30.00

The e2e composite and signal-adjusted fair values both land at $27.78, while the stock trades at $37.57 — roughly a 35% premium to deserved value, not a discount. Earnings quality is high (so no haircut warranted) and the Company-Quality lens calls this a Strong business (91), which justifies pushing deserved value above a mechanical DCF, but not by this much. A reasonable quality premium of 10–15% on $27.78 gets you to ~$31–32, still meaningfully below today's price.

What's priced in: continued margin expansion from the recent 11% operating-margin inflection, durable double-digit revenue growth, and RampID winning the cookieless-identity layer. That's the platform-monopoly bull case taken largely at face value. The bear case — that customers have more leverage than the narrative implies and the cookieless catalyst keeps slipping — is not in the price. With net cash on the balance sheet you do get some downside cushion, but margin of safety against the deserved-value anchor is negative, not positive.

This is the classic 'good company, full price' setup. I'd call it Rich rather than Overvalued because the quality is real and the fair-value model may be under-crediting the FCF inflection, but I'm not paying up here.

Cheap signals 2
m30
Net cash + clean earnings quality support a quality premium
Fortress balance sheet, shrinking share count, and high earnings-quality score (2) justify deserved value above the mechanical $27.78 — but realistically only to ~$31–32, not $37+.
m20
FCF inflection may not be fully in the model
If the composite DCF is anchored on trailing margins it could under-credit the self-funding cash machine the quality lens describes; that softens but doesn't close the gap.
Rich / priced-in 3
m70
Price ~35% above composite fair value
Both composite and signal-adjusted FV sit at $27.78 vs $37.57 spot — a clear premium, not a discount, even before stress-testing the bull case.
m55
Priced for the cookieless catalyst to actually land
The platform-monopoly multiple assumes RampID becomes the default identity standard; the bear's point that this has been '5 years away for 7 years' isn't being discounted at this price.
m40
Margin step-function being extrapolated
The jump to ~11% operating margins looks like a one-time reset more than a glide path; paying 35% above DCF assumes the trajectory continues linearly.
I can't make the math work at $37.57 when both fair-value cuts say $27.78. Even crediting this as a strong business with a clean balance sheet, I get to maybe $31–32 deserved — so I'm being asked to pay a ~20% premium on top of an already-generous quality bump. That's not mispricing in my favor; it's the market correctly recognizing the quality inflection. I'd want this in the low-$30s before it's interesting, and below $30 to get genuinely excited.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • FY guidance on operating margin sustainability — is 11% a new floor or a peak?
  • Net revenue retention and customer concentration in the subscription book
  • Quantified progress on RampID adoption (active connections, % of top-100 advertisers)
  • SBC trajectory vs buyback — is the share-count discipline sustainable at current SBC dollar levels?
  • Any one-time items inflating the recent margin print
General Sentiment
+79
Strong Tailwind
tail √Σ 115 · head √Σ 36 · conf 8/10

The dominant sentiment force on RAMP is not the cookieless-identity narrative anymore - it is the May 18 Publicis cash bid at roughly $2.2B that drove a 27% gap up. With the stock at $37.63 and analyst targets clustered at $38.50, the tape is trading this as a deal stock, not a thesis stock. That collapses beta, mutes the neutral-to-mildly-headwind macro backdrop, and largely sterilizes the platform-monopoly debate until the deal closes or breaks.

Tailwinds 3
m90
Active takeout bid anchors the price
Publicis' announced $2.2B acquisition is the single dominant force; price action and analyst targets are now tethered to deal value, swamping fundamental narrative and macro inputs.
m55
Analyst tone constructive and stable
Buy consensus (1 SB / 8 B / 3 H) with target ($38.5) just above spot and zero negative revisions - no analyst is fighting the deal, which reinforces the floor.
m45
Momentum and narrative aligned
Strong positive 3y momentum plus a moderate-intensity 'identity layer' platform narrative give the deal a friendly backdrop; no story crack is pressuring the tape.
Headwinds 2
m30
Deal-break / regulatory risk overhang
Because the price is pinned near deal terms, any antitrust, financing, or French regulatory wobble around Publicis would snap RAMP back toward the ~$28 DCF anchor - asymmetric downside if the bid cracks.
m20
Neutral tape with mild macro drag
VIX 17, 10y at 4.47%, and a 1.28 beta would normally pressure an ad-tech/software name, but the takeout largely insulates RAMP from this; residual risk only if a risk-off shock widens the deal spread.
This is a deal stock now, not a sentiment stock. The Publicis bid dominates every other input - macro, narrative, analyst tone - and the price is sitting right at the consensus deal-anchored target. Net pressure is a clear tailwind because the bid is live and unchallenged, but the upside from here is capped and the real risk is binary: any sign the deal wobbles and RAMP de-rates fast toward its standalone DCF in the high-20s.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Publicis deal regulatory progress in EU and US
  • Any competing bid or revised terms
  • Deal spread vs offer price as a real-time sentiment gauge
  • Insider/arb commentary on closing timeline
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
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Three lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), and General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Deep Analysis
Last run: Jun 16, 2026 3:05:23 am

Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.

0 Company Classification — What type of company is this?
1 Industry Landscape — Where is the industry headed?
2 Company Momentum — Where is this company trending?
3 Forward Projection — 1Y & 2Y projected metrics (requires Layer 1 + 2)
4a DCF Valuation — Present value of future cash flows
4b Earnings Power Value — Floor value — worth with zero growth
4c Anchored PE — Industry PE adjusted for growth differential
4d Reverse DCF — What growth is the market pricing in?
4e Revenue-Based DCF — For growth/narrative companies (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4f Anchored P/S — Price-to-Sales peer comparison (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4g Scenario Analysis — Bull / Base / Bear (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4h Dividend Discount Model — For dividend/income stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4i Book Value Analysis — For deep value / turnaround stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4j Insider Activity — Are insiders buying or selling?
4f Cash Flow Quality — How trustworthy is the FCF?
4g Debt Maturity Risk — Can it handle its debt?
4h Macro Environment — Rates, market valuation, volatility
4i Sector Intelligence — How does this company compare within its sector?
4j Revenue Confidence — How reliable is the growth projection?
4k Sensitivity Analysis — How fragile is the fair value estimate?
4l Sector Demand Cycle — Is the sector in a boom, steady state, or contraction?
5 AI Investigation — Adaptive research engine (Claude)
5b Thesis Evaluation — What does the market believe? (narrative/platform stocks only)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
6 Valuation Synthesis — Weighted verdict from all methods (requires Layer 4)
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:03am (11d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenue $528.7M $596.6M $659.7M $745.6M $812.9M
Cost of Revenue $147.4M $170.1M $179.5M $215.9M $238.1M
Gross Profit $381.2M $426.5M $480.2M $529.7M $574.8M
Operating Expenses $446.8M $552.3M $468.8M $524.3M $486.4M
Operating Income -$65.5M -$125.8M $11.4M $5.4M $88.5M
Net Income -$33.8M -$118.7M $11.9M $-814,000 $146.0M
EBITDA -$39.8M -$97.7M $46.3M $40.2M $111.5M
EPS $-0.50 $-1.79 $0.18 $-0.01 $2.30
EPS (Diluted) — — — — —
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:02am (11d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Cash & Equivalents $600.2M $464.4M $336.9M $413.3M $379.5M
Total Current Assets $815.8M $714.6M $602.0M $656.2M $653.1M
Total Assets $1.3B $1.2B $1.2B $1.3B $1.3B
Current Liabilities $184.6M $174.8M $216.6M $247.5M $264.8M
Long-Term Debt $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total Liabilities $270.7M $246.6M $282.3M $310.5M $322.2M
Total Equity $1.1B $926.1M $949.1M $948.9M $972.0M
Retained Earnings $1.4B $1.3B $1.3B $1.3B $1.5B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:02am (11d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Operating Cash Flow $78.1M $39.8M $107.4M $155.7M $168.9M
Capital Expenditure -$4.5M -$4.7M -$4.3M -$1.0M -$1.4M
Free Cash Flow $73.6M $35.1M $103.2M $154.6M $167.6M
Acquisitions (net) -$19.1M $0 -$170.3M -$2.0M $-595,000
Debt Repayment — — — — —
Dividends Paid — — — — —
Stock Buybacks -$58.6M -$150.0M -$60.5M -$101.2M -$194.5M
Net Change in Cash $18.5M -$135.7M -$125.0M $74.5M -$34.4M
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)
Metric 2026 2027 2028 2029
Revenue $812.4M
$808.0M – $816.4M
 $886.1M
$881.3M – $890.4M
 $982.2M
$977.0M – $987.1M
 $1.0B
$1.0B – $1.0B
EBITDA $305.2M
$303.6M – $306.7M
 $332.9M
$331.1M – $334.5M
 $369.0M
$367.0M – $370.8M
 $384.7M
$382.7M – $386.6M
Net Income $145.6M
$144.8M – $146.4M
 $187.3M
$178.1M – $196.5M
 $241.1M
$232.0M – $250.3M
 $0
EPS — — — —
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:03am (11d ago)
Metric 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenue Growth +12.8% +10.6% +13.0% +9.0%
Gross Profit Growth +11.9% +12.6% +10.3% +8.5%
Operating Income Growth -91.9% +109.1% -52.6% +1,536.9%
Net Income Growth -250.8% +110.0% -106.9% +18,030.2%
EBITDA Growth -145.4% +147.4% -13.1% +177.2%
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:03am (11d ago)
Type codes PPurchase SSale AAward / grant MOption exercise FIn-kind (tax) CConversion GGift DReturn to issuer
All SEC Form 4 codes
Open market
P Purchase
Open-market or private purchase of shares.
S Sale
Open-market or private sale of shares.
Compensation (Rule 16b-3)
A Award / grant
Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
D Return to issuer
Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
F In-kind (tax)
Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
I Discretionary
Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
M Option exercise
Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
Derivatives
C Conversion
Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
E Short expiration
Expiration of a short derivative position.
H Long expiration
Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
O OTM exercise
Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
X ITM exercise
Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
Other exempt
G Gift
Bona fide gift of securities.
L Small acquisition
Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
W Inheritance
Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
Z Voting trust
Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
Other
J Other
Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
K Equity swap
Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
U Tender / buyout
Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.

Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.

Date Insider Type Shares Price Value
2026-06-22 Sharma Vihan F-InKind 1,232.00 $37.61 $46,336
2026-05-29 JONES JERRY C F-InKind 801.00 $29.66 $23,758
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan A-Award 28,405.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan F-InKind 2,180.00 $37.70 $82,186
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan A-Award 50,273.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan F-InKind 1,602.00 $37.70 $60,395
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan F-InKind 7,260.00 $37.70 $273,702
2026-05-22 Sharma Vihan F-InKind 25,137.00 $37.70 $947,665
2026-05-22 Karasick Matthew F-InKind 630.00 $37.70 $23,751
2026-05-22 Karasick Matthew F-InKind 1,888.00 $37.70 $71,178
2026-05-22 Karasick Matthew F-InKind 1,387.00 $37.70 $52,290
2026-05-22 Howe Scott E A-Award 168,924.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-22 Howe Scott E F-InKind 85,217.00 $37.70 $3.2M
2026-05-22 Howe Scott E F-InKind 3,503.00 $37.70 $132,063
2026-05-22 Howe Scott E F-InKind 3,913.00 $37.70 $147,520
2026-05-22 Howe Scott E F-InKind 18,542.00 $37.70 $699,033
2026-05-22 JONES JERRY C A-Award 36,197.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-22 JONES JERRY C F-InKind 12,665.00 $37.70 $477,471
2026-05-22 JONES JERRY C F-InKind 813.00 $37.70 $30,650
2026-05-22 JONES JERRY C F-InKind 735.00 $37.70 $27,710
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2008-08-19 $0.06 2008-08-06 2008-08-21 2008-09-08
2008-05-30 $0.06 2008-05-23 2008-06-03 2008-06-23
2008-02-21 $0.06 2008-02-13 2008-02-25 2008-03-17
2007-11-01 $0.06 2007-10-26 2007-11-05 2007-11-26
2007-02-08 $0.06 2007-02-02 2007-02-12 2007-03-05
2006-11-09 $0.06 2006-11-02 2006-11-13 2006-12-04
2006-08-10 $0.05 2006-08-03 2006-08-14 2006-09-12
2006-06-08 $0.05 2006-05-31 2006-06-12 2006-07-03
2006-02-15 $0.05 2006-02-09 2006-02-20 2006-03-13
2005-11-09 $0.05 2005-11-03 2005-11-14 2005-12-05
2005-08-11 $0.05 2005-08-04 2005-08-15 2005-09-06
2005-06-02 $0.05 2005-05-25 2005-06-06 2005-06-27
2005-02-10 $0.05 2005-02-02 2005-02-14 2005-03-07
2004-11-04 $0.04 2004-10-27 2004-11-08 2004-11-29
2004-08-05 $0.04 2004-07-29 2004-08-09 2004-08-30
2004-06-03 $0.04 2004-05-26 2004-06-07 2004-06-28
2004-02-11 $0.04 2004-02-04 2004-02-16 2004-03-08
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for RAMP — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent analyst synthesis · Delvantic - Cairn AI · generated 2026-06-16 03:06:00
Reviews the pipeline's own verdicts
Verdict Fairly valued with modest upside — fair value $38-44 on 13-15x FCF; the synthesis under-anchors by ignoring FCF durability, but insider behavior and Chrome cookie reversal cap enthusiasm. Hold, add only below $32.

Looking at the raw numbers first: revenue grew from $528.7M (FY22) to $812.9M (FY26), an 11% CAGR, with the trajectory accelerating modestly — quarterly revenue went from $176M (Jun-24) to $206.1M (Mar-26), about 17% YoY in the latest print. But the headline net income story is misleading. The Q4 FY26 print of $70.9M on $206M revenue (34.4% net margin) doesn't square with the operating margin trajectory — annual operating income was just $88.5M against $146M net income, meaning a significant chunk of FY26 net income came from below-the-line items (likely deferred tax benefit / valuation allowance release). Adjusted for that, real operating earnings power is closer to $88M, putting the genuine P/E nearer 26x, not the 16x screen. That's a meaningful gap the synthesis glosses over.

The FCF picture is the strongest part of the file: $167.6M FCF on $812.9M revenue is a 20.6% FCF margin with essentially no capex ($1.4M), and $379.5M cash with apparently no debt. EV is roughly $1.88B, so EV/FCF ~11x — that genuinely is cheap for infrastructure software IF the FCF is durable. The prior models converge on "Reasonable Premium" against a DCF anchor of $27.78, implying ~35% narrative premium at $37.57. I think they're under-anchoring. At 20% FCF margins, 10-11% revenue growth, no debt, and a real (if contested) position in identity resolution, a 13-15x FCF multiple is defensible, which gets you to $40-46. The DCF anchor seems to assume mid-single-digit growth that the recent quarters don't support — Q4 just printed +17% YoY on revenue.

The contrarian case the models underweight: insider activity is uniformly F-InKind (tax withholding on vesting) and A-Awards (grants) — there is zero open-market buying. That's not "neutral," that's mildly negative for a stock the team supposedly believes is undervalued post-doubling from 52-week lows. Second, the revenue confidence signal flags "decelerating quarterly trend" — but quarterly revenue actually went 194.8 → 199.8 → 212.2 → 206.1, which looks like seasonality (Q3 holiday spike, Q4 step-down) not deceleration. The signal is misreading the pattern. Third, and most important: the bear story about "cookieless future being 5 years away for 7 years" is correct and the market-forces "neutral" rating is too generous — Google reversed its Chrome cookie deprecation in 2024, which directly undermines the regulatory tailwind thesis. The platform-monopoly narrative is weaker than the models grade it.

Net: I dissent slightly from the synthesis. The "Reasonable Premium" framing is directionally right but the fair-value anchor is too low. Real owner earnings (FCF) of ~$168M against a $1.88B EV is the number that matters, and even discounting the FY26 net income tax benefit, the cash generation is real and growing (27% FCF CAGR). The stock isn't cheap on a story basis — it's reasonably priced on a cash basis with optionality on a narrative that may or may not pay off. I'd put fair value at $38-44 (roughly 13-15x FCF, in line with mature infrastructure software), meaning RAMP at $37.57 is fairly valued to modestly cheap, not premium. The asymmetric risk is that the identity-resolution thesis gets disrupted by walled-garden first-party data strategies (Google, Meta, Amazon) which would compress the multiple back toward 9-10x FCF, or ~$28 — exactly the DCF anchor. So the downside scenario validates the bear DCF; the upside requires the cookieless narrative to actually arrive. Given the FCF floor and clean balance sheet, this is a hold-or-nibble, not a conviction buy.

GPT Critique
Second-opinion review · gpt-4o · generated 2026-06-16 03:06:09
Reviews the Opus findings above
Verdict I agree with Opus that LiveRamp is fairly valued with modest upside, pegging fair value slightly higher at $40-46. The future of its narrative hinges on regulatory shifts, but the cash flow foundation provides a solid hold level at the current price of $37.57.

LiveRamp Holdings, Inc. presents an intriguing case with its significant growth and robust cash flow generation. The raw data indicates a consistent revenue increase from $528.7M in 2022 to $812.9M in 2026, with a quarterly revenue jump from $176M in June 2024 to $206.1M in March 2026, reflecting a 17% year-over-year growth in the latest quarter. The company has improved its net income significantly, swinging from losses in earlier years to a net income of $146M in 2026, and a high net margin of 34.4% in the most recent quarter. The balance sheet is solid, with $379.5M in cash and no debt, supporting a strong free cash flow of $167.6M. These figures suggest a well-managed transition towards profitability and cash efficiency, underscoring the potential for LiveRamp to leverage its strategic position in the evolving data privacy landscape.

I agree with Opus's interpretation that the headline net income figures are somewhat inflated by below-the-line items, such as deferred tax benefits, suggesting that the true operating earnings power is closer to $88M rather than the entire net income figure. This adjustment indeed leads to a higher effective P/E ratio than the reported 16x, aligning with Opus's recalibrated estimate of around 26x. I also concur with Opus on the strength of the free cash flow, which at an EV/FCF of ~11x, positions LiveRamp attractively within the infrastructure software space if this cash flow is sustainable.

However, I diverge from Opus's assessment concerning the insider activity and the narrative around the "cookieless future." While Opus characterizes insider transactions as mildly negative due to the absence of open-market buying, I would interpret this as more neutral. The transactions being largely administrative (tax withholdings and awards) do not necessarily indicate a lack of confidence. Additionally, while the delay in Google's Chrome cookie deprecation could be seen as a setback for the narrative, I argue that regulatory and industry shifts toward privacy-compliant solutions are still likely to benefit LiveRamp in the long term. Therefore, the market-forces signal should perhaps remain neutral rather than negative, acknowledging the ongoing strategic importance of identity resolution.

A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I overestimate the durability of LiveRamp's cash flow and market position, especially given the competitive pressures from large tech companies' first-party data strategies. This could potentially compress LiveRamp's future multiples if the anticipated regulatory tailwinds do not materialize or if they face intensified competition.

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My Notes personal — only you see this
Data via Financial Modeling Prep · Cached for performance · fmp
v1.1.352 · d1100787 · 2026-06-26 11:39:30