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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for LiveRamp Holdings, Inc. (RAMP) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -1 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 58 · Value -49 · Sentiment 33 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $30.09 vs $37.79 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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LiveRamp Holdings, Inc.
RAMP NYSELiveRamp Holdings, Inc. is a prominent entity in the space of data connectivity within the technology sector. The company is primarily engaged in providing a comprehensive data connectivity platform that enables organizations to access and utilize customer data safely and effectively, across various marketing channels. One of its key offerings is the identity resolution service, which allows companies to match their in-house data with external sources to create a holistic view of the consumer, enhancing personalization in marketing efforts. LiveRamp's services are critical for industries such as retail, finance, healthcare, and advertising, which rely heavily on precise data usage for strategic decision-making. Through its extensive partnership network, LiveRamp facilitates data collaboration while ensuring compliance with global privacy regulations. As digital marketing trends continue to evolve, LiveRamp's platform stands pivotal in aiding businesses to navigate the complexities of data sharing and privacy, thus holding a vital role in the global data ecosystem.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.24
Total Equity: $971.98M
Shares: 65,045,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
EBITDA: $96.87M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
Revenue: $812.94M
Revenue: $812.94M
Revenue: $812.94M
Total Equity: $971.98M
Tax Rate: -47.6%
Equity: $971.98M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $379.55M
Current Liabilities: $264.79M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $971.98M
Shares: 65,045,000
Shares: 65,045,000
CapEx: -$1.38M
Shares: 65,045,000
Stock Price: $37.79
Net Income: $145.95M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $528.7M | $596.6M | $659.7M | $745.6M | $812.9M |
| Cost of Revenue | $147.4M | $170.1M | $179.5M | $215.9M | $238.1M |
| Gross Profit | $381.2M | $426.5M | $480.2M | $529.7M | $574.8M |
| Operating Expenses | $446.8M | $552.3M | $468.8M | $524.3M | $491.4M |
| Operating Income | -$65.5M | -$125.8M | $11.4M | $5.4M | $83.5M |
| Net Income | -$33.8M | -$118.7M | $11.9M | $-814,000 | $146.0M |
| EBITDA | -$41.3M | -$105.0M | $22.9M | $22.6M | $96.9M |
| EPS | $-0.50 | $-1.79 | $0.18 | $-0.01 | $2.28 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.50 | $-1.79 | $0.17 | $-0.01 | $2.24 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:26pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $600.2M | $464.4M | $336.9M | $413.3M | $379.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $815.8M | $714.6M | $602.0M | $656.2M | $653.1M |
| Total Assets | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $184.6M | $174.8M | $216.6M | $247.5M | $264.8M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $270.7M | $246.6M | $282.3M | $310.5M | $322.2M |
| Total Equity | $1.1B | $926.1M | $949.1M | $948.9M | $972.0M |
| Retained Earnings | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $78.1M | $34.4M | $105.7M | $154.0M | $167.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.5M | -$4.7M | -$4.3M | -$1.0M | -$1.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $73.6M | $29.7M | $101.4M | $152.9M | $166.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$19.1M | $0 | -$170.3M | -$2.0M | $-595,000 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$58.6M | -$150.0M | -$60.5M | -$101.2M | -$194.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $18.5M | -$135.7M | -$125.0M | $74.5M | -$34.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +12.8% | +10.6% | +13.0% | +9.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +11.9% | +12.6% | +10.3% | +8.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -91.9% | +109.1% | -52.6% | +1,444.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -250.8% | +110.0% | -106.9% | +18,030.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -154.3% | +121.8% | -1.3% | +328.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 8:27pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-08-19 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2008-05-30 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2008-02-21 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2007-11-01 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2007-02-08 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2006-11-09 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2006-08-10 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2006-06-08 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2006-02-15 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2005-11-09 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2005-08-11 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2005-06-02 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2005-02-10 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2004-11-04 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2004-08-05 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2004-06-03 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2004-02-11 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 10:59Even the bull case prices 5% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 36%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($37.79) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +19% | 21.5% | $35.99 | -5% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 18.7% | $26.48 | -30% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 15.9% | $19.10 | -49% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +9% | 18.7% | $24.06 | -36% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: revenue grew from $528.7M (FY22) to $812.9M (FY26), a 4-year CAGR of ~11%, but the more interesting story is the operating leverage — op income went from -$65.5M to +$83.5M and FCF hit $166.4M on essentially zero capex ($1.4M). Quarterly revenue is decelerating though: 8.2% YoY in Q1 FY26 (June), 7.7% in Q2, 8.6% in Q3, and 9.2% in Q4 — call it high-single-digits, not the 11% trailing CAGR. The Q4 FY26 net income of $70.9M at 34.4% margin is a huge outlier vs. the prior three quarters ($7.7M, $27.4M, $39.9M) and likely reflects a tax benefit or one-time item — FY26 NI of $146M vs. operating income of only $83.5M confirms ~$60M+ came from below the line. Strip that out and normalized earnings power is closer to $85-100M, making the "16.9x P/E" more like 23-27x on clean earnings.
On the balance sheet: $379.5M cash, zero debt, $972M equity — enterprise value is roughly $1.92B. Against $166M FCF that's ~11.5x EV/FCF, which is genuinely cheap for a software infrastructure business growing 8-9% with 70% gross margins and expanding op margins. The synthesis model's $29.21 composite fair value implies FCF should be discounted at something like a 15% cost of capital or assume terminal growth near zero — that feels too punitive for a debt-free business with structural positioning in identity resolution. But I also can't ignore the insider ledger: it's entirely F-InKind (tax withholding on vests) and A-Award (grants) with zero open-market buying. On a stock that's presumably re-rated from prior lows, insiders taking nothing off the table is neutral-to-mildly-positive, not the "no insider transactions" the secondary signal claims — that tag is wrong.
Where I disagree with the stack: the pre-flight and narrative layers call this "platform-monopoly" with moderate durability, but the deceleration from ~11% to ~8% YoY while the cookieless transition is supposedly LiveRamp's tailwind is a yellow flag the models underweight. If identity resolution were truly a monopoly moment, we'd see acceleration, not deceleration. The synthesis verdict of $32.86 (13% downside) and Market Forces' "fairly priced turnaround" are internally consistent but rely on DCF assumptions I'd want to see. My contrarian read: on clean FCF of $166M and EV of $1.92B, this trades at 11.5x — cheaper than nearly any comparable data/martech name (LSPD, DV, IAS all trade higher on worse FCF conversion). The bear case isn't valuation; it's that FCF conversion may not sustain if the $70.9M Q4 tax benefit reverses and stock-based comp (implied by all those F-InKind events) is eating true economic earnings. SBC-adjusted FCF is likely $100-120M, putting real EV/FCF at 16-19x — fair, not cheap.
Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis fair_value verdict but land close to it in direction. The models are too bearish on the multiple (11.5x headline EV/FCF is not "13% overvalued") but I'm too skeptical of the clean earnings quality to call it undervalued. Fair value on SBC-adjusted FCF of ~$110M at 18-20x multiple is $1.98-2.2B EV, or $35-39 per share — right where the stock trades. The Q4 tax windfall makes the trailing P/E look artificially cheap; strip it, and this is a fairly-priced high-quality compounder decelerating into a contested regulatory environment. I wouldn't short it, wouldn't chase it, would buy meaningfully below $32 where the SBC-adjusted multiple compresses to ~15x and the risk/reward tilts. The narrative premium is real but modest, and the deceleration curve is the tell that the platform-monopoly thesis is aspirational, not proven.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is that LiveRamp has quietly crossed the line from “turnaround hope” to real earner. Revenue has gone from $528.7M in FY2022 to $812.9M in FY2026, a clean 54% increase over four years, while operating income swung from -$65.5M to +$83.5M and free cash flow reached $166.4M. At today’s $2.30B market cap, that is roughly a 13.8x FCF multiple for a debt-free software business with $379.5M of cash, implying an ex-cash multiple closer to 11-12x. That is not how software infrastructure names with 70.7% gross margin, 20.8% ROIC, and 11% top-line CAGR usually trade if the market believes the profitability is durable. The numbers say this is no longer a speculative ad-tech asset; it is a cash-generating platform that has found operating leverage.
The quarter pattern matters too. Revenue is not exploding, but it is steadily advancing: $176.0M, $185.5M, $195.4M, $188.7M, $194.8M, $199.8M, $212.2M, then $206.1M. On a trailing basis that is still high-single-digit growth, and the more important change is margin expansion. Net margin moved from -4.3% and 0.9% in mid-2024 to 13.7%, 18.8%, and then 34.4% in the latest quarter. Even allowing for one-time items in a quarter with $70.9M of net income, the annual picture is too strong to dismiss as accounting noise: FY2025 net income was basically breakeven, then FY2026 net income jumped to $146.0M on only $67.3M of incremental revenue. That kind of drop-through is the signature of a software model that has already absorbed most of its fixed cost base. If management can hold even a 15-18% net margin on a business growing near 10%, the current 3.0x sales multiple looks undemanding.
I also think the market is over-penalizing LiveRamp for being adjacent to ad-tech rather than recognizing that the balance sheet and cash flow profile now insulate the story. There is no debt, current ratio is 2.47, and capex is trivial at $1.4M, so nearly all operating cash flow converts to free cash flow. That means the company does not need heroic revenue acceleration to create value; modest growth plus stable margins is enough. On enterprise value, the stock is at 2.36x revenue and 19.8x EBITDA, but those are backward-looking optics on a company whose profitability inflected sharply only in the last year. If FY2026 is even roughly repeatable, I get to a fair value above the current price simply by giving a debt-free, 70%+ gross margin software infrastructure business a mid-teens to high-teens FCF multiple ex-cash, which supports something in the low-to-mid $40s without requiring multiple expansion into “premium SaaS” territory.
The best case against this view is that the income statement may have improved faster than the underlying business quality. Revenue growth is decent but not strong: FY2026 grew 9% over FY2025, and quarterly growth appears to be flattening into single digits. A 34.4% net margin quarter on a company that posted a -3.3% net margin in the comparable quarter a year earlier is probably not a clean run-rate. The market may be right to discount the earnings because identity resolution and data collaboration sit in a politically and competitively fragile corner of software. Privacy regulation, platform changes, and customer budget pressure could cap both growth and pricing power. On that reading, the 16.9x P/E is not “cheap software” but a value trap multiple on peak margins. I take that seriously, but I weigh it differently because cash flow, balance sheet strength, and the full-year operating margin of 10.3% suggest the business no longer needs aggressive assumptions to justify the price. Even if FY2026 margins back off, the stock is not priced for much durability.
What would change my mind is pretty specific. If the next few quarters show revenue slipping back toward low-single-digit growth or below $200M for multiple quarters while net margins retreat into the low single digits, then FY2026 will look like a temporary earnings spike and the stock should trade nearer $30. I would also turn more cautious if operating cash flow falls materially below roughly $140M annualized despite stable revenue, because that would indicate the FCF strength was overstated. Conversely, if LiveRamp can keep quarterly revenue growth around 8-10% and sustain annual operating margin above 10% with FCF above $150M, the current price will look too low and the shares should work into the mid-$40s.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a clean turnaround story that the valuation models are underselling. LiveRamp has gone from $528.7M revenue and deep operating losses in FY2022 to $812.9M revenue, $83.5M operating income, and $146.0M net income in FY2026, with free cash flow of $166.4M on essentially zero capex. That is a 11% revenue CAGR accompanied by an earnings and FCF inflection that is not noise: quarterly net margins marched from negative territory through 4%, 13.7%, 18.8%, and a standout 34.4% in the March 2026 quarter. Gross margin sits at a software-like 70.7%, the balance sheet carries $379.5M cash against zero debt, and ROIC prints 20.8%. At a $2.30B market cap the stock trades at roughly 14x trailing FCF and an EV/FCF nearer 11.5x once net cash is stripped out; EV/revenue of 2.36x for a 70% gross-margin infrastructure name growing high-single to low-double digits is not a premium multiple. The market is still anchoring to the old loss-making identity-resolution narrative rather than the cash-compounding business that now exists.
Sequential revenue did slip from $212.2M to $206.1M and year-over-year growth has decelerated to ~9%, so the growth engine is maturing rather than accelerating. The gap between $83.5M operating income and $146.0M net income also flags that the latest-year earnings (and the headline 16.9x P/E) contain non-operating or tax benefits that will not fully recur; normalized earnings power is closer to the operating line plus clean FCF conversion. Still, even on that sober basis the cash yield remains attractive, operating leverage is visible in the margin climb, and the absence of leverage removes a classic downside vector. Insider activity is pure award-and-withhold noise, offering no contradictory signal.
The strongest case against this read is the one the valuation synthesis already leans on: composite fair value around $29–33 implies the current $37.79 price embeds a 13–30% premium that is not justified once growth settles into the high single digits and the cookieless/privacy tailwind proves less durable than bulls assume. A smart opponent would note that operating margin is still only 10.3%, leaving the company exposed if customers consolidate vendors or if regulatory fragmentation raises compliance costs; they would also flag that EV/EBITDA near 20x is not cheap if the earnings CAGR of 250% simply reverts to mid-teens. I weigh those points as real but already partially discounted: the FCF quality is excellent, the net-cash fortress gives management time and optionality, and 2.4x EV/sales leaves limited room for multiple compression relative to software-infrastructure peers that trade richer on weaker cash conversion.
Sustained quarterly revenue growth reaccelerating above 12–13% with operating margins holding above 12%, or conversely a print showing growth stuck at mid-single digits alongside FCF margins compressing below 15%, would flip the verdict. Watch the next two quarters’ organic growth and the durability of the sub-35% net-margin run-rate once one-time items clear.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business trajectory is genuinely encouraging. Revenue compounded from $528.7M (FY22) to $812.9M (FY26), roughly 11% CAGR, while operating margin swung from -12.4% and -21.1% in FY22-23 to +10.3% in FY26 and net income turned from a $118.7M loss to $146M profit. Gross margin sits stably in the 70-73% band, consistent with a data/software platform. FCF has scaled from $73.6M to $166.4M, and OCF dwarfs net income across the window, so the earnings turn is cash-backed rather than accrual-driven (accruals -8.6% of assets, Beneish -2.4, Altman Z 7.06). Balance sheet is a fortress: $387M cash, zero net debt, ~16.9% of market cap in cash. Capital allocation is unusually disciplined for a mid-cap software company: diluted shares fell from 68.2M to 65.0M (-1.2% CAGR) with buybacks running 118.8% of a still-elevated 10.2% SBC/revenue - so per-share value is being concentrated. The main soft spots are that GAAP operating margin, though positive, is still only ~10% despite 70%+ gross margins (heavy opex load), SBC at ~10% of revenue is high in absolute terms even if offset, and the FY26 net income of $146M on ~1% prior-year op margin suggests some non-operating or tax benefit inflating the bottom line that warrants a look. Insider tape shows only awards and tax-withholding events - no open-market conviction buys, but also no signaling sales.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition of FY26 net income - was there a large deferred tax asset release or one-time gain inflating the $146M vs ~$84M operating income?
- Organic vs inorganic revenue growth and any customer concentration in the data connectivity segment
- Detail on SBC vesting/dilution cadence and whether buyback pace is sustainable at current FCF
- Competitive positioning vs walled gardens (Google, Amazon, Apple) and post-cookie durability of the identity graph
- Contractual retention and net revenue retention metrics from the 10-K/investor materials
The composite fair value lands at $29.21 and the signal-adjusted read at $32.86, both below the $37.79 quote. The DCF ($33.17) and anchored P/E ($42.07) bracket the price, while the EPV floor at $8.43 is a runaway low-side method (implies near-zero growth credit) and shouldn't anchor thinking — but it does warn that if growth stalls, the downside gap is severe. Weighting the credible methods, deserved value sits around $30-35, putting the market ~10-25% ahead of it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance on subscription revenue growth vs 10%+ needed to justify anchored-PE
- true non-GAAP op margin trajectory ex-SBC
- buyback pace vs SBC dilution net
- customer concentration and net revenue retention trend
- any Google cookie-deprecation update that shifts TAM assumptions
The dominant non-fundamental force on RAMP right now is deal arbitrage, not macro. Publicis' May 18 announcement to acquire LiveRamp for $2.2B repriced the stock roughly 27% and effectively decouples it from the broader tape until the deal closes or breaks. That single event outweighs the platform-monopoly narrative debate; the market is no longer trading the cookieless-future story, it is trading spread-to-deal-price. With the anchor at $37.79, sentiment is pinned by arbitrage flows rather than growth or narrative intensity. Against that, the macro backdrop is genuinely hostile: VIX 20.7 in the top 3% of the past year, S&P off recent highs, 10y at 4.61%, and a stretched market PE. A 1.27 beta and small-cap adtech-software profile would normally amplify that stress meaningfully, but M&A pending status mutes beta and dampens the usual risk-off drawdown. The residual headwinds are deal-break risk (regulatory scrutiny of adtech consolidation, GDPR/state privacy overhang making European approval non-trivial) and the fact that a merger-arb setup caps upside while leaving downside if the bid fails in a weak tape. Net: a real tailwind from the bid, tempered by a nervous macro that would punish a broken deal hard.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Regulatory review milestones for the Publicis deal (EU competition, US antitrust) and any hint of concessions or delay
- Current arbitrage spread vs deal price - a widening spread signals sentiment souring on close probability
- Any competing bid, revised terms, or Publicis walk-away commentary
- Sector rotation out of adtech/martech that would deepen a break scenario
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, RAMP was $37.87. We expect it to be $36.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $30.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.