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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for monday.com Ltd. (MNDY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +37 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 64 · Value 15 · Sentiment -44 (timing only, not weighted) · Flagged: Valuation methods disagree 5.5x — too uncertain to confirm as a Gem. · Composite fair value $124.33 vs $84.37 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
monday.com Ltd.
MNDY NASDAQmonday.com Ltd. is a technology company that provides a cloud-based work management platform used by organizations to plan, track, and manage workflows across teams and departments. Its core product is a highly visual Work OS built from modular building blocks that allow users to create customized applications and work management tools without needing extensive technical expertise. The platform supports a wide range of use cases, including project and portfolio management, marketing campaigns, software development, customer relationship tracking, IT service management, and operations coordination. Delivered as software-as-a-service, monday.com integrates with numerous third-party tools and serves as a connective layer that centralizes data, collaboration, and automation across an organization’s digital ecosystem. Customers typically pay on a per-seat basis across different pricing tiers, making the platform adaptable for small teams through to large enterprises. Headquartered in Tel Aviv, Israel, monday.com operates globally and serves customers across multiple regions and industries seeking greater transparency, coordination, and efficiency in their day-to-day work.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
monday.com Ltd. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 5 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-13, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.24
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
EBITDA: $12.06M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Total Equity: $1.25B
Tax Rate: -100.2%
Equity: $1.25B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.50B
Current Liabilities: $714.87M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.25B
Shares: 53,086,984
Shares: 53,086,984
CapEx: -$20.36M
Shares: 53,086,984
Stock Price: $87.15
Net Income: $118.74M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $308.2M | $519.0M | $729.7M | $972.0M | $1.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $39.0M | $66.5M | $80.6M | $103.7M | $133.1M |
| Gross Profit | $269.1M | $452.5M | $649.1M | $868.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $395.3M | $604.5M | $687.6M | $889.3M | $1.1B |
| Operating Income | -$126.1M | -$152.0M | -$38.6M | -$21.0M | -$1.7M |
| Net Income | -$129.3M | -$136.9M | -$1.9M | $32.4M | $118.7M |
| EBITDA | -$123.4M | -$143.4M | -$29.6M | -$9.2M | $12.1M |
| EPS | $-4.53 | $-2.99 | $-0.04 | $0.65 | $2.31 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-4.53 | $-2.99 | $-0.04 | $0.62 | $2.24 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $886.8M | $885.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $913.5M | $923.8M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $933.2M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $228.2M | $298.2M | $416.0M | $575.6M | $714.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $229.8M | $359.3M | $462.1M | $655.3M | $859.8M |
| Total Equity | $703.4M | $679.7M | $813.5M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$445.7M | -$582.5M | -$584.4M | -$552.0M | -$433.3M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.4M | $27.1M | $215.4M | $311.1M | $333.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$11.6M | -$16.0M | -$7.9M | -$13.2M | -$20.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.8M | $11.1M | $207.5M | $297.9M | $313.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$135.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $755.0M | $-918,000 | $230.2M | $295.5M | $91.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:03pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +68.4% | +40.6% | +33.2% | +26.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +68.1% | +43.4% | +33.8% | +26.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -20.5% | +74.6% | +45.5% | +91.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.9% | +98.6% | +1,824.7% | +266.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -16.3% | +79.4% | +69.0% | +231.4% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-17Agents need a durable, permissioned, auditable place to store and hand off work state; monday's boards are already that ledger inside ~250k accounts, and AI-credit/agent consumption pricing can monetize automated work that never occupied a seat.
Monetization is anchored to human seats in exactly the mid-market office functions AI thins, while the differentiating 'no-code building blocks' become a commodity the moment an LLM can generate a bespoke tracker or internal app on request.
Whether AI/agent consumption revenue grows faster than seat expansion decelerates — observable in net revenue retention decomposition (seats vs price vs AI credits) and in ARPA growth for accounts over 50 users.
A high-velocity self-serve + partner distribution machine with brand recall in the mid-market, plus years of embedded operational workflows, permissions and integrations that customers won't unpick for a marginally smarter UI.
AI Lens thesis
The need — coordinating who does what across teams — is permanent, but monday's specific answer (a visual, human-operated, per-seat canvas that non-technical staff assemble themselves) is the part cheap intelligence most directly erodes: generative app-building removes the scarcity of 'no-code', chat becomes a plausible front door that routes around the UI, and Microsoft can bundle AI-native work management into M365 at effectively zero marginal price. Against that, work state must live somewhere trustworthy and multiplayer, and agents amplify rather than reduce the need for a shared ledger with audit trails and permissions — which is monday's asset. Cost side is already near-max efficient (89% GM, ~25% FCF margin), so AI's cost benefit is modest and inference on AI features is a mild GM drag; the value therefore has to come from pricing architecture, not from delivery savings. This is a CRM-pattern name with a weaker moat: real distribution, weak switching costs, and a monetized unit under structural question.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Automated work is a new billable unit with no headcount ceiling — if monday prices agent runs rather than users, its revenue can decouple from customer employment entirely, which would be an expansion, not a defense.
Downside The 'build your own app' use case is monday's premium wedge and its most substitutable feature; if internal teams start generating single-purpose trackers on demand, monday reverts to a commodity task board competing on price against a bundled Microsoft offering.
Outcome range spread 55 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:23The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: MNDY compounded revenue from $308M (2021) to $1.23B (2025) — a 41% CAGR, with 2025 growth still 26.8%. More importantly, the P&L crossed the inflection: op margin went from -41% (2021) to breakeven (-0.14%) in 2025, while GAAP net income swung to $118.7M and FCF hit $313.3M (25.5% FCF margin). Gross margin is 89.2%. Balance sheet: $1.50B cash, zero debt, $1.25B equity. This is a genuinely rare profile — Rule-of-50+ SaaS trading at 3.0x sales and ~12x EV/FCF (EV ≈ $2.2B after net cash). At $87.52 and $3.70B cap, the enterprise is being valued at roughly 7x forward FCF if 2026 delivers even modest growth on current margins. That is not a "solid SaaS" multiple; that is a broken-company multiple applied to a compounding one.
Where I push back on the models: the synthesis $162 fair value is directionally right but the framing is lazy. The composite claims "+92% upside" but leans on DCF assumptions the narrative layer itself flags as "2021 thinking wearing 2024 clothes." The real bull case doesn't need hockey-stick — it needs MNDY to hold 20%+ growth for 2-3 years while FCF margin drifts from 25% toward 30%. That alone justifies $120-140, not $162. The thesis evaluator's "score of 2" (bull 82 vs bear 80) is nonsense given the numbers — you cannot equally weight "competitive compression from Microsoft/Atlassian" (a permanent risk that has existed since IPO and hasn't stopped 27% growth) against a demonstrated profitability inflection with $313M of hard cash. The pre-flight classification of "high-growth profitable" is correct and the most reliable signal in the file. Market Forces failed to render — I'd want to see it before sizing.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously isn't the tired "Microsoft Loop / Notion will kill them" — that's been the bear thesis for four years and revenue tripled anyway. The sharper contrarian read is: (1) the 266% earnings YoY jump is flattered by a tax/one-time item somewhere — going from $32.4M NI to $118.7M while operating income stayed near zero means the $118.7M is largely below-the-line (interest income on $1.5B cash at ~5% ≈ $75M pretax, plus possible tax benefit). Strip that out and you have a company still not GAAP-operating-profitable, trading at 12x FCF that's real but partially interest-income-dependent. (2) NRR at monday.com has been decelerating industry-wide — I don't see the current DBNR disclosed here, and if it's slipped below 110% the growth durability thesis weakens materially. (3) Insider activity is small sales/option exercises — not alarming, but no insider buying at these prices either, which you'd expect if management thought the stock was 50% undervalued. (4) Market cap of $3.70B on $1.23B revenue is oddly low for a name that used to trade at $30B+; something is keeping institutional money away and it may be share overhang or governance (dual-class, Israeli domicile) rather than pure sector de-rating.
Data gaps that matter: no quarterly sequence is shown (the file lists "most recent first" with no rows), so I cannot verify whether Q4-25/Q1-26 growth is holding 25%+ or slipping to 18-20%. The $118.7M NI needs an income-statement breakdown I don't have. Insider transactions post-June 2026 are labeled with placeholder names ("?") — that's a data quality flag, not a signal. The "Macro Headwinds" tag is generic. Sector benchmark comparison is asserted, not shown.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how much monday.com has already crossed the hardest part of the SaaS maturation curve while still growing fast enough that the market seems to be valuing it like a much duller asset. Revenue went from $308.2M in 2021 to $1.23B in 2025, a 4x increase in four years, while gross margin expanded to 89.2%. More important, the income statement and cash flow statement now tell a very different story than the old “growth at any cost” bucket: operating loss narrowed from -$126.1M in 2021 and -$152.0M in 2022 to essentially breakeven at -$1.7M in 2025, net income reached $118.7M, operating cash flow was $333.6M, and free cash flow was $313.3M. On $1.23B of revenue, that is a 25.5% FCF margin. For a company still growing revenue 26.8% recently and about 30% CAGR over the period, that is not normal for a stock sitting at 3.6x sales and just 2.3x EV/revenue once you net out the $1.50B cash pile.
That cash balance is the second thing the headline multiples obscure. With a $3.70B market cap and $1.50B of cash, the enterprise value is only about $2.2B for a debt-free business that generated over $313M of free cash flow last year. That is roughly a 7x EV/FCF for a software company with nearly 90% gross margins and a still-expanding top line. Even if some of the net income benefit includes below-the-line items and even if stock-based compensation is helping cash generation, the valuation is still hard to call expensive. The reported P/E near 38x looks optically fuller than the business really is because the balance sheet is carrying an enormous amount of non-operating cash; EV-based framing is the right one here, and by that lens the market is acting as if growth is about to fade sharply or margins are not durable.
The key story in the raw data is therefore not “cheap because fallen SaaS.” It is “cheap because investors do not fully believe the combination of 25%+ growth and 25%+ FCF margin is sustainable.” I think that skepticism is overdone. Gross profit rose from $269.1M in 2021 to $1.10B in 2025, so the company has built a very large contribution pool to absorb operating costs. Yet operating income remains just below breakeven, which means management still has room to convert gross profit into EBIT if it chooses to moderate investment. Said differently, this is not a business squeezing the lemon dry to show temporary profits; it is one that has already shown cash efficiency before fully harvesting operating leverage. At $87.52, investors are paying a low-single-digit sales multiple for a company that has already de-risked financing, achieved self-funding status, and can likely support materially higher GAAP operating margins over time.
The best argument against this view is that the valuation is low for good reason because the category is crowded and today’s profitability may be less robust than the cash flow figure suggests. Operating margin in 2025 was still slightly negative at -0.14%, so the cleanest measure of core earnings has not yet fully turned. Net margin of 9.6% versus negative operating margin implies some reliance on non-operating items or tax effects. ROIC at 1.37% is underwhelming, and the EV/EBITDA metric is unusable precisely because EBITDA is still close to zero in a true economic sense. A smart bear would also say that work-management software can look differentiated until platform giants compress pricing or bundle adjacent functionality, and when growth inevitably slows from 27% toward the mid-teens, a 3.6x sales multiple may not actually be a bargain if the terminal moat is modest. The insider sales, though small, do not help the “screaming cheap” case either.
I still come out bullish because the bear case requires a very sharp deceleration or margin giveback to justify this price, and the present numbers do not show either. If revenue growth falls below 20% while FCF margin retreats meaningfully below 20%, I would reassess because that would suggest the current cash generation is less durable than it appears. Likewise, if the company continues posting negative operating income despite crossing well above $1.2B in revenue, the leverage thesis weakens. But if the next year shows revenue pushing toward $1.5B, operating income turning clearly positive, and free cash flow holding above $300M, then the current valuation is too low. My bias is that this stock should trade materially above today’s level; fair value is closer to $115-$125, and a stronger margin conversion path could justify more.
Grok Reading
monday.com’s numbers describe a SaaS franchise that has largely completed the hard part of the journey and is now being priced as if the easy part will disappoint. Revenue scaled from $308M in 2021 to $1.23B in 2025—a 29.9% CAGR—while the growth rate stepped down in an orderly fashion (roughly 68% → 41% → 33% → 27% year-over-year). Gross margin held at 89%, operating loss collapsed from $152M in 2022 to essentially breakeven (-$1.7M) in 2025, and free cash flow reached $313M, a 25.5% FCF margin on trailing revenue. The balance sheet is a fortress: $1.50B cash, zero debt, current ratio 2.5. At $87.52 the equity is a $3.7B market cap; strip the cash and enterprise value is roughly $2.2B, or about 1.8–2.3x sales depending on the exact EV construction. That multiple for a business printing mid-20s growth and mid-20s FCF margins is the core of the setup. Net income of $119M and the 38x P/E are less informative than FCF because the operating line is still flat and the bottom line is padded by yield on the cash pile; ROIC of 1.4% simply reflects that idle capital, not a broken model.
What stands out against the prior models is the gap between the operating reality and the $144–$162 fair-value composites. Those marks imply 6–7x sales and a re-rating that assumes both sustained 25%+ growth and a clean march to 30%+ FCF margins without competitive leakage. The data do not yet show operating leverage fully in the P&L—op margin is still -0.1%—even though cash conversion is excellent. The 27% recent revenue growth is solid, not breakout; the Rule-of-40 score near 52 is good, not elite. EV/EBITDA at 236 is noise and should be ignored. Insider activity is option-exercise-and-sell, not a signal. The market is not “pricing 10% growth”; it is pricing a durable mid-teens-to-low-20s grower in a crowded work-management category and refusing to pay 2021 multiples for it. That is disciplined, not irrational.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: deceleration has further to run, Microsoft/Atlassian/Notion keep compressing willingness-to-pay in the mid-market, and SMB exposure turns ugly in a downturn, so 27% becomes 15% and the multiple compresses further toward 2x sales. A skeptic also notes that $313M of FCF on still-negative operating income is partly a function of working-capital timing and low capex (-$20M), not yet a fully mature 30%+ margin machine; if opex reaccelerates to defend share, the FCF margin stalls. I weigh that risk seriously—the TAM is contested and the growth curve is bending—but the cash generation, 89% gross margins, and net-cash balance sheet give management room to absorb share battles without a balance-sheet crisis. At ~2x EV/sales the bear case is already partially in the price; it is not a free option on failure.
I would flip to a clearer undervalued call if the next two quarters show revenue growth stabilizing at or above 25% with operating margin turning sustainably positive (north of 5%) and FCF margin holding above 25%, or if management guides credible 28–30%+ medium-term FCF margins without a growth collapse. I would flip bearish if growth prints below 20% for two consecutive quarters while competitive win rates deteriorate, or if FCF margin compresses back under 18% as sales and marketing reaccelerate.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
monday.com is a genuinely high-quality software business by every operating metric. Revenue has scaled from $308M in 2021 to $1.23B in 2025 (a ~4x in four years), gross margin sits at a best-in-class 89.2%, and operating margin has climbed from -40.9% to roughly breakeven while net income turned positive at $118.7M. FCF has ramped from essentially zero to $313.3M, and the balance sheet is a fortress: $1.67B liquid cash, zero net debt, Altman Z of 3.49, and negative accruals (-15% of assets) with OCF vastly exceeding NI - all consistent with clean, cash-backed earnings and no Beneish flags.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net dollar retention / gross retention trends in the 10-K to confirm durability of the growth curve
- Customer concentration and enterprise vs SMB mix
- SBC expense breakdown and whether grant sizing is normalizing as headcount matures
- Details of any buyback authorization vs actual repurchase pace
- Whether the recent net income turn is sustained or lumpy (e.g., interest income on the $1.67B cash pile flattering NI)
The e2e composite FV of $144 and signal-adjusted $162 imply 70-90% upside from $84.37, driven almost entirely by the DCF at $166; the EPV floor at $26 is the other extreme and reflects a world where growth stops cold. Splitting the difference and haircutting for the quality lens's key complaint - roughly 15%/yr diluted share count growth funded by SBC - the deserved per-share value is meaningfully below the raw DCF. I peg deserved value in the $105-125 range: a high-quality, cash-generative SaaS business growing 25%+ with elite gross margins deserves a premium multiple, but shareholders only capture a fraction of that because employees are siphoning value via dilution.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Diluted share count trajectory and any buyback authorization sized to offset SBC
- NRR and enterprise/large-customer cohort growth in latest quarter
- FCF margin durability net of SBC add-back
- Guidance on operating margin expansion vs reinvestment
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14, S&P near highs), which normally lifts a 1.13-beta growth name. But that lift is being neutralized by a stock-specific narrative problem: MNDY sits inside the bruised mid-cap SaaS cohort where the market has spent two years de-rating growth-at-any-cost stories, and the fresh Q2 print - despite management pointing to accelerating AI adoption - was met with a negative tape reaction. That is the classic fallen-angel signature: good operational data points, no market credit. Analyst and press framing is unhelpful. Recent coverage explicitly pits MNDY against fortress-margin AI infrastructure names (SK Hynix) and flags stock-based comp burden - the exact bear talking points that keep the multiple compressed. Narrative intensity is only moderate and cult is low, so there is no zealot bid to defend the stock on down days; the 48% discount to fair value reflects sentiment, not fundamentals, and sentiment is not turning yet. Net: macro is a small tailwind, narrative and news flow are a larger headwind, momentum is constructive but not enough to override the post-earnings tape. Leans headwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side price targets get revised up or down post-Q2 (analyst tone is the swing factor)
- Any sign the SaaS cohort rotation reverses - watch peers (TEAM, ASAN, NOW) tape
- Follow-through selling in the next 2-3 weeks post-earnings; if it stabilizes, the headwind is fading
- AI-product monetization data points in next quarter that could flip the narrative from fallen-angel to AI-beneficiary
The need — coordinating who does what across teams — is permanent, but monday's specific answer (a visual, human-operated, per-seat canvas that non-technical staff assemble themselves) is the part cheap intelligence most directly erodes: generative app-building removes the scarcity of 'no-code', chat becomes a plausible front door that routes around the UI, and Microsoft can bundle AI-native work management into M365 at effectively zero marginal price. Against that, work state must live somewhere trustworthy and multiplayer, and agents amplify rather than reduce the need for a shared ledger with audit trails and permissions — which is monday's asset. Cost side is already near-max efficient (89% GM, ~25% FCF margin), so AI's cost benefit is modest and inference on AI features is a mild GM drag; the value therefore has to come from pricing architecture, not from delivery savings. This is a CRM-pattern name with a weaker moat: real distribution, weak switching costs, and a monetized unit under structural question.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Net dollar retention decomposition
- Seats per account trend
- Disclosed AI/consumption revenue mix
- Share of usage via chat/agent surfaces
- Custom-app board creation trends
- Feature parity of AI-native rivals
- Pricing concessions at renewal
- Gross margin drift below 88%
The world is doing two contradictory things to monday. Structurally, work-management software keeps absorbing spreadsheets, email threads and legacy point tools, and buyers are consolidating onto fewer platforms — which favors the broad, configurable Work OS over single-purpose apps and explains the share gap. Cyclically, software budgets are tightening (macro headwinds, 4.63% 10y, sector slowdown phase, industry earnings falling -14.3%), which compresses seat expansion and lengthens mid-market sales cycles. The deeper reshaping is AI: it simultaneously validates the no-code thesis (non-technical users building workflows) and threatens the seat meter that monetizes them. monday's advantage is that its data model already sits where the work is described, which is the natural place to sell agents; the risk is that whoever bundles agents into an existing suite gets the seat for free. Net: the category tide is still with the company for the next 1-2 years, and the pricing-model question is the one that decides year three onward.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, MNDY was $83.33. We expect it to be $101.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.