Business Description
Etsy, Inc. oversees online retail platforms designed to link independent merchants with a global customer base. Its primary marketplace is dedicated to unique and handcrafted items, while its Depop division focuses on the resale of apparel. The company's revenue streams largely originate from diverse marketplace fees, such as those for product listings, transactions, and payment processing, as well as from advertising services and optional seller utilities like shipping labels. Furthermore, Etsy administers programs aimed at improving search placement, providing buyer protection for qualifying orders, and offering financial incentives for seller-driven traffic. The enterprise was founded in 2005, formally incorporated as Indieco, Inc. in 2006, and then rebranded as Etsy, Inc. in June of the same year. Its corporate headquarters are located in Brooklyn, New York.
Business History
Generated: May 1, 2026 4:52pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.68
Total Equity: -$1.10B
Shares: 123,541,000
Total Debt: $2.98B
Cash: $1.40B
EBITDA: $367.02M
Total Debt: $2.98B
Cash: $1.40B
Revenue: $2.88B
Revenue: $2.88B
Revenue: $2.88B
Total Equity: -$1.10B
Tax Rate: 33.9%
Equity: -$1.10B
Total Debt: $2.98B
Cash: $1.40B
Current Liabilities: $1.36B
Long-Term Debt: $2.33B
Total Debt: $2.98B
Total Equity: -$1.10B
Shares: 123,541,000
Shares: 123,541,000
CapEx: -$54.66M
Shares: 123,541,000
Stock Price: $72.83
Net Income: $162.98M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Etsy is a real cash machine — FCF of $638.8M on $2.88B revenue (~22% FCF margin), gross margin steady at ~71-72%, and OCF/NI of 1.87x with sharply negative accruals (-21.7%) signals clean, high-quality earnings. Management is using that cash aggressively: diluted share count has fallen from 146.7M (2021) to 123.5M (2025), a -4.2% CAGR, with buybacks running 237% of SBC. That is genuine per-share value concentration, not the typical tech 'buyback offsets dilution' charade.
The problem is the underlying business is flat-lining. Revenue went $2.33B → $2.57B → $2.75B → $2.81B → $2.88B — growth has decelerated to ~2.5%. Operating margin has compressed from 20% (2021) to 12.8% (2025), and net income has dropped from $493.5M to $163.0M over the same window despite the buyback tailwind. The marketplace appears to be ex-growth while losing operating leverage, which is concerning for a 'platform' business model that should scale.
Altman Z of 1.57 (distress zone) and net debt of -$1.36B against $1.62B cash reflect prior convert issuances funding the buyback program — financially survivable given $638M FCF, but it removes the cushion. Insider tape is one-sided: 22 sells, 0 buys, $26.4M sold over 12 months, with CEO Silverman exercising and selling on the same day in June 2026. Lawful and routine, but no insider is putting fresh money in.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- GMS (gross merchandise sales) trend and active buyer/seller counts — is the marketplace shrinking on a unit basis under the flat revenue?
- Take-rate trajectory — is revenue holding only because Etsy is raising the take rate on a shrinking GMS base?
- Composition and maturity of the ~$3B debt — convertible notes? When do they come due, and at what conversion prices?
- Segment breakdown: Etsy core vs Depop vs Reverb — is the core marketplace declining while smaller properties mask it?
- Competitive context vs Shein/Temu/Amazon Handmade pressure on the handmade/vintage category
- Detail behind the 2025 net income drop ($303M → $163M) — one-time charges or structural margin reset?
The e2e synthesis lands at 'Reasonable Premium,' which lines up with the tape: at $72.83 the market is paying roughly 18-20x trailing earnings for a cash-generative marketplace whose GMS and revenue have flatlined and whose operating margin has been cut by roughly a third from peak. That's not a heroic multiple, but it isn't a distressed one either — it embeds a soft assumption that Etsy reignites GMS growth or holds take-rate without losing sellers, which is exactly the contested point in the narrative.
Deserved value, after adjusting for the Mixed quality grade (-10), is probably in the high-$60s to high-$70s: cash-generative, disciplined buybacks (4% annual share shrink) and clean earnings quality push deserved value up, but flat revenue, decaying net income, leverage on the balance sheet, and ~8.5%-of-revenue SBC drag it back down. With the stock at $72.83 that puts the gap inside the noise — call it +/- 10%. I see no margin of safety, but I also don't see the kind of priced-for-perfection setup that screams short. This is the textbook 'fairly valued' verdict.
To get genuinely interesting on valuation alone, I'd want the multiple to compress toward a high-single-digit FCF yield with the buyback still running — roughly a mid-$50s handle. Above $85 it starts pricing in a re-acceleration the numbers don't yet support.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward GMS and active-buyer trajectory in the next print — any stabilization changes the deserved multiple meaningfully
- Take-rate trend and any seller backlash metrics (churn, listings) that would hit fee revenue
- Updated buyback authorization pace vs SBC dilution — net share count change is the real per-share lever
- Segment disclosure on Depop/Reverb profitability — losses here are dragging consolidated margin
- Net debt and interest expense given the leveraged balance sheet flagged by quality lens
The macro tape is officially neutral, but the underlying mix - 10y at 4.49%, VIX elevated vs its trailing year, and a tagged macro-headwind regime - punches above its weight on a name like ETSY with beta 1.86, consumer-discretionary exposure, and a platform-monopoly story whose durability is only moderate. This is exactly the cohort that gets sold first when risk appetite wobbles, even if nothing has changed at the company. The 2.4% revenue CAGR and -5.5pp three-year deceleration give the bear narrative (TikTok Shop, Amazon Handmade, seller fee fatigue, Depop ROI questions) live ammunition, while the bull marketplace-moat story has lost intensity without a clear re-acceleration catalyst. Analyst tone is the one offset: still Buy-skewed (22 Buys vs 3 Sells) and the consensus target ($71.2) sits essentially at spot ($73.30), meaning the sell-side has not chased the name down - but with zero revisions this month, that stance looks stale rather than supportive. The divergence (backward-looking Buys vs a fading growth narrative and a rate-pressured tape) typically resolves by analysts catching down, not the stock catching up. Net: modest but real headwind pressure, more about who owns this archetype in this tape than about Etsy itself.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any Q-print or KPI that re-accelerates GMV/active buyers - would revive the moat story
- Sell-side revisions: first downgrade or target cut would confirm the catch-down risk
- TikTok Shop / Amazon Handmade share-of-wallet datapoints in handmade and resale
- Rate path: a decisive move below 4.25% on the 10y would lift this whole cohort
- VIX behavior: sustained drop below 15 would mute the high-beta penalty
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 9:28am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $654.5M | $744.6M | $828.7M | $774.6M | $817.8M |
| Gross Profit | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $2.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Operating Income | $465.7M | -$658.6M | $279.8M | $380.2M | $367.9M |
| Net Income | $493.5M | -$694.3M | $307.6M | $303.3M | $163.0M |
| EBITDA | $555.8M | -$551.1M | $398.2M | $532.7M | $367.0M |
| EPS | $3.88 | $-5.48 | $2.56 | $2.64 | $1.68 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:59pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $780.2M | $921.3M | $914.3M | $811.2M | $1.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $3.8B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $615.6M | $631.8M | $710.8M | $665.1M | $1.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.2B | $3.2B | $3.2B | $3.2B | $3.9B |
| Total Equity | $628.6M | -$547.3M | -$543.7M | -$758.9M | -$1.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $71.7M | -$1.0B | -$1.4B | -$1.8B | -$2.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 9:28am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $651.6M | $683.6M | $705.5M | $752.5M | $693.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$30.1M | -$37.2M | -$39.9M | -$43.5M | -$54.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $621.4M | $646.4M | $665.6M | $709.0M | $638.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.7B | $0 | $0 | $0 | $100.5M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$302.8M | -$425.7M | -$577.0M | -$723.9M | -$776.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$463.9M | $141.1M | -$12.3M | -$103.1M | $593.2M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$2.9B $2.8B – $3.0B
|
$3.0B $3.0B – $3.0B
|
$3.2B $3.1B – $3.3B
|
$3.3B $3.2B – $3.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$281.0M $271.3M – $290.7M
|
$293.6M $292.8M – $294.3M
|
$310.2M $302.0M – $321.4M
|
$323.4M $314.8M – $335.1M
|
| Net Income |
$448.7M $397.9M – $642.4M
|
$486.8M $454.6M – $714.8M
|
$697.2M $673.3M – $730.0M
|
$787.6M $760.6M – $824.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 17, 2026 9:28am (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.2% | +7.1% | +2.2% | +2.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.8% | +5.4% | +5.9% | +1.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -241.4% | +142.5% | +35.9% | -3.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -240.7% | +144.3% | -1.4% | -46.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -199.2% | +172.3% | +33.8% | -31.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:05am (9d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-24 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 97,389.00 | $10.62 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-24 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 97,389.00 | $10.62 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-24 | Silverman Josh | S-Sale | 97,389.00 | $79.00 | $7.7M |
| 2026-06-17 | REIFF MELISSA | S-Sale | 3,544.00 | $75.00 | $265,800 |
| 2026-06-15 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 50,000.00 | $10.62 | $531,000 |
| 2026-06-16 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 52,479.00 | $10.62 | $557,327 |
| 2026-06-16 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 52,479.00 | $10.62 | $557,327 |
| 2026-06-15 | Silverman Josh | M-Exempt | 50,000.00 | $10.62 | $531,000 |
| 2026-06-16 | Silverman Josh | S-Sale | 52,479.00 | $74.00 | $3.9M |
| 2026-06-15 | Silverman Josh | S-Sale | 50,000.00 | $72.50 | $3.6M |
| 2026-06-09 | WILSON FREDERICK R | A-Award | 9,904.00 | $68.76 | $680,999 |
| 2026-06-09 | REIFF MELISSA | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | REIFF MELISSA | A-Award | 3,921.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | REIFF MELISSA | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BURNS M MICHELE | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BURNS M MICHELE | A-Award | 3,921.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | BURNS M MICHELE | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Blow Marla J | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Blow Marla J | A-Award | 3,921.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Blow Marla J | M-Exempt | 4,733.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: Etsy is doing $2.88B revenue with $638.8M FCF — a 22% FCF margin that most "platforms" would kill for. But revenue CAGR is 2.4% over five years, and the 2021 print ($2.33B with $493M NI) versus 2025 ($2.88B with $163M NI) tells the real story: revenue grew 24% cumulatively while net income fell 67%. That's not maturation, that's margin erosion masked by GMV stability. The quarterly trajectory looks better on the surface — Q1'26 at $631M vs Q1'25 at $612M (+3.1%), Q4'25 at $881M vs Q4'24 at $852M (+3.4%) — but you're paying 24x earnings and ~11x FCF for sub-4% top-line growth. The Q1'25 net loss of -$52M is a red flag the synthesis glosses over; even with Q1'26 recovery to $69.7M NI, the volatility suggests the cost structure isn't as fixed/scalable as platform bulls claim.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the Market Forces signal calling this "catastrophic market share loss" with an "over-leveraged balance sheet" is overcooked. Etsy has $1.4B cash and generates $639M FCF annually — that's not over-leveraged, that's a fortress. The negative book value (driving the -4.96 P/B) is from aggressive buybacks, not distress; they've been retiring stock at the expense of equity, which is shareholder-friendly capital return, not a solvency issue. Meanwhile the Synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict is too generous in the other direction — calling 10.6% implied FCF growth "achievable" when actual FCF CAGR is -2% and earnings CAGR is -27% requires heroic assumptions about margin recovery. Both extremes are wrong; the truth is a high-quality cash machine in secular decline relative to TikTok Shop, Shein, Amazon Handmade, and Temu.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: at 11x FCF, you're not paying for growth — you're paying for the cash flow. If Etsy simply holds GMV flat and keeps buying back stock with $600M+ annual FCF, the per-share math works even with zero revenue growth. Market cap $6.91B / FCF $639M = ~9% FCF yield. That's a real number. The bear case requires not just competitive pressure but actual FCF decline, and so far the cash generation has been remarkably resilient even as GAAP earnings whipsaw. The insider selling is concerning but the M-Exempt/S-Sale pattern (50,000 and 52,479 share blocks on consecutive days) looks like scheduled 10b5-1 option exercises, not panic selling — the prior models flagging "unanimous insider selling" as a value-trap signal is reading too much into routine executive comp mechanics.
Where the data is thin: we have no debt figure ("Total debt: —"), which matters because Etsy carried ~$2.3B convertibles last I checked — at 9% FCF yield that changes the EV math materially (EV/EBITDA at 16.7x already reflects this). The ROE of -25% is meaningless given negative book value. The 2022 -$694M loss was a Depop/Elo7 impairment, not operations, so excluding it the business has earned $160-307M every year. My read: this is neither the headwind death-spiral Market Forces describes nor the comeback story Synthesis hedges toward. It's a melting ice cube with a very large bucket — quality cash flows from a structurally challenged marketplace. Fair value with no growth and current FCF discounted at 10% is roughly $60-65/share assuming flat FCF in perpetuity; you'd need a credible re-acceleration story to justify $73. I dissent from "Reasonable Premium" — at $72.83 this is modestly overvalued, not fairly valued, and the insider activity plus competitive landscape argue for patience over conviction. Wait for sub-$60 or a Q4 GMV print that breaks the 3% growth ceiling.
GPT Critique
Etsy's financials paint a mixed picture. Revenue has been steady, reaching $2.88 billion in 2025, but the real concern is the decline in net income from $493.5 million in 2021 to $163 million in 2025. Margins have compressed, with net margins dropping from 21.1% in 2021 to just 5.6% in the trailing twelve months. The free cash flow remains strong at $638.8 million, supported by a high gross margin of 71.6%, but growth is tepid with a revenue CAGR of just 2.4%. The market is valuing Etsy at a P/S ratio of 1.8883, which is reasonable given its revenue stability, but the negative P/B ratio highlights a concerning negative book value.
Opus argues that Etsy is "modestly overvalued" at its current price, citing its high-quality free cash flow but weak revenue growth and competitive challenges. I agree with Opus that the company's cash flow is a strong point; however, I diverge on the interpretation of competitive pressures. The Market Forces signal suggests "catastrophic market share loss," which Opus critiques as exaggerated. I concur with Opus that Etsy's $1.4 billion cash balance and robust free cash flow don't indicate an over-leveraged balance sheet. The narrative that competitive pressures from platforms like TikTok Shop and Amazon Handmade are leading to a collapse seems overstated given Etsy's consistent cash generation capabilities.
Opus also notes the insider transactions as routine executive compensation mechanics rather than panic selling, a point I agree with. The pattern of M-Exempt and S-Sale transactions suggests planned sales rather than a response to any immediate business distress. However, I find the "reasonable premium" verdict by the synthesis overly optimistic. Given the actual financial performance, particularly the negative earnings CAGR of -27.2%, the expectation of a 10.6% FCF growth seems overly optimistic without clear evidence of a turnaround in revenue growth or margin expansion.
A careful skeptic might argue that our analyses are downplaying the potential for a platform like Etsy to pivot successfully or leverage new growth opportunities, such as international expansion or strategic acquisitions. They might also point out the potential for further market penetration and the strength of Etsy's brand among its niche audience, which could mitigate some competitive pressures.