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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Deckers Outdoor Corporation (DECK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 68 · Value -6 · Sentiment -47 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $94.57 vs $91.68 at analysis
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Deckers Outdoor Corporation
DECK NYSEDeckers Outdoor Corporation is a global footwear and apparel company that designs, markets, and distributes products for both casual lifestyle use and high-performance activities. Its portfolio centers on well-known brands including UGG, which offers premium footwear, loungewear, and accessories; HOKA, focused on performance and lifestyle running shoes and athletic apparel; and Teva, known for sandals and outdoor-oriented footwear. The company serves a broad customer base through a combination of wholesale channels, international distributors, and a direct-to-consumer network that includes e-commerce platforms and branded retail stores. Deckers Outdoor Corporation sells its products across multiple regions worldwide, positioning its brands in sectors such as outdoor, athletic performance, fashion, and comfort-focused lifestyle. Founded in 1973 and headquartered in Goleta, California, the company plays a significant role in the global footwear and athleisure markets by leveraging distinct brand identities that appeal to both performance-driven and style-conscious consumers.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.02
Total Equity: $2.50B
Shares: 145,805,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
Revenue: $5.47B
Revenue: $5.47B
Revenue: $5.47B
Total Equity: $2.50B
Tax Rate: N/A
Equity: $2.50B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
Current Liabilities: $804.07M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.50B
Shares: 145,805,000
Shares: 145,805,000
CapEx: -$84.62M
Shares: 145,805,000
Stock Price: $99.38
Net Income: $1.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:26pm (69d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.2B | $3.6B | $4.3B | $5.0B | $5.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $564.7M | $652.8M | $927.5M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $451.9M | $516.8M | $759.6M | $966.1M | $1.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $3.29 | $3.90 | $4.89 | $6.36 | $7.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.25 | $3.87 | $4.86 | $6.33 | $7.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:57pm (69d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $843.5M | $981.8M | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $3.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $541.7M | $497.4M | $720.0M | $769.9M | $804.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $793.4M | $790.5M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Total Equity | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:26pm (69d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $172.4M | $537.4M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$51.0M | -$81.0M | -$89.4M | -$86.2M | -$84.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $121.3M | $456.4M | $943.8M | $958.4M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$356.7M | -$297.4M | -$414.9M | -$567.0M | -$1.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$245.8M | $138.3M | $520.3M | $387.1M | $18.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:26pm (69d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.1% | +18.2% | +16.3% | +9.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.5% | +30.7% | +21.0% | +9.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +15.6% | +42.1% | +27.1% | +7.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +14.4% | +47.0% | +27.2% | +6.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-04 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +16%; a −1σ run costs 33%. Ratio 0.5:1 (μ 10.9%, σ 5.9% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 0.0 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($91.68) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 21.1% | $90.91 | -1% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 18.4% | $72.65 | -21% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 15.6% | $57.07 | -38% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 16.3% | $63.97 | -30% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +17% | 19.9% | $106.53 | +16% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +5% | 15.9% | $61.47 | -33% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-23 23:54The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a story of a business that just hit a growth wall, and the models are underweighting that. Look at the two most recent quarters versus year-ago comps: Q1 FY26 (Jun-2025) revenue of $964.5M grew only 5.5% off $914M-ish base — wait, actually vs Jun-2024 that's cleaner — and more damningly, Q4 FY26 (Mar-2026) revenue of $1.12B was up just ~9.8% YoY while net income of $135.6M was actually *down* from $151.4M a year prior. Net margin compressed from 14.8% to 12.1% in that Q4 print, and the latest Jun-2026 quarter at 12.7% margin is well below the 14.4% posted in Jun-2025. That is margin erosion in real time, not "mean reversion risk" — it's already happening. The full-year FY26 still looks great (revenue $5.47B up 9.6%, NI $1.02B up 5.6%) because the Dec-2025 holiday quarter carried it: $1.96B revenue at 24.6% margin. But holiday concentration is now more extreme, and the shoulder quarters are deteriorating.
The synthesis's $116 signal-adjusted fair value strikes me as generous given this trajectory. A P/E of 13x on $1.02B TTM earnings gets you the current $12.5B cap — that's not a discount, that's the market correctly pricing forward earnings risk. If FY27 net income comes in flat-to-down (which the recent two-quarter trend implies: annualizing recent margins on modest revenue growth gets you closer to $950M-$980M NI), then "cheap at 13x" becomes "fair at 13x on lower E." The market-forces "tailwinds" call and the pre-flight thesis both lean on HOKA acceleration, but the numbers we can actually see show revenue YoY of 9.8% and earnings YoY of 6% — the deceleration is not hypothetical. The narrative layer's -21% DCF gap is doing a lot of work assuming DCF inputs that predate this quarterly softening.
Where I partially agree with the models: the balance sheet is genuinely fortress-grade — $1.91B cash, zero debt, 3.5x current ratio, 41% ROE, 165% ROIC (that ROIC figure looks suspicious, likely a small-denominator artifact worth flagging). FCF of $1.10B against a $12.5B EV is an 8.8% FCF yield, which is real. This is not a value trap in the "melting ice cube" sense; it's a high-quality operator that grew earnings 16% CAGR over five years and could easily grow 5-8% from here. The contrarian bull case is that HOKA's Q4/Q1 softness is wholesale timing and channel management, and the Dec quarter will reaccelerate. Fine — but that's a Q3 FY27 print thesis, not an "own it here" thesis. The insider F-InKind transactions on 2026-08-15 are tax-withholding on vesting, not signal — the models correctly ignore them but I'd note zero open-market buying despite a 27% drawdown from highs is mildly telling.
I dissent from the synthesis's "fair value with upside to $116" framing and lean closer to fairly valued at $91, with genuine downside to $75-80 if the Dec-2025 comp ($1.96B, 24.6% margin) is missed materially. The thesis-evaluation's -4 score (nearly balanced bull/bear) is the most honest read in the stack. Two-brand concentration in fashion-cyclical footwear at peak margins with visible deceleration doesn't deserve a re-rating premium; it deserves the 13x it's getting. I'd want to see either (a) Q2 FY27 revenue growth reaccelerating above 12% with margin stabilization, or (b) a price closer to $78 (roughly 11x forward earnings on conservative estimates, ~10% FCF yield) before committing capital. The models collectively are 6-7/10 bullish; I'm 4/10. The asymmetry doesn't favor the buyer here — you're paying quality-company multiples for a company whose growth premium is evaporating in the tape.
GPT Reading
Deckers looks misclassified if you stop at “mature earner” and ignore what the financial profile actually says. This is a debt-free branded footwear company growing revenue from $3.15B to $5.47B in four fiscal years, while net income scaled from $451.9M to $1.02B and free cash flow reached $1.10B. That is not a no-growth cash cow; it is a high-return compounder with unusual balance sheet strength. On the current $12.49B market cap, you are paying about 12.2x trailing free cash flow and 13.1x earnings, while the enterprise value is lower still because there is $1.91B of cash and no debt. An EV/EBITDA of 8.0x for a business doing 57.7% gross margins, 23.1% operating margins, and 18.7% net margins is plainly inexpensive unless you think profitability is about to break.
The quarterly data does show the market’s concern: growth is slowing and margins are no longer cleanly expanding. The latest quarter was $1.02B of revenue versus $964.5M a year earlier, up 5.8%, while net income fell from $139.2M to $130.0M and margin compressed from 14.4% to 12.7%. The quarter before that was worse on the top line, with $1.12B versus $1.02B up 9.8%, but net income down from $151.4M to $135.6M. So the market is not inventing deceleration. But even after that moderation, the business still produced trailing annual revenue growth of 9.6% and held annual net income above $1B. More importantly, the “bad news” is already reflected in the multiple: this stock is being valued more like a cyclical brand with peak margins than a company still compounding sales double digits over a multi-year window.
What stands out most is how much room Deckers has to absorb imperfection. Return metrics are almost absurdly strong even allowing for likely calculation noise in the ROIC field: 41% ROE, 27.8% ROA, current ratio 3.5x, and over $1B of annual FCF against minimal capital intensity with just $84.6M of capex. That combination matters because footwear is usually punished for fashion risk and inventory risk; a fortress balance sheet plus over $1.9B cash means Deckers does not need ideal conditions to keep creating value. If annual earnings merely flatten around $1.0B rather than grow, the stock is still not expensive. If earnings resume even high-single-digit growth from here, a 13x P/E is too low. I think the most likely explanation for the discount is investor fear that one or both core brands are nearer a demand peak than reported annuals suggest. That fear is understandable, but the valuation already assumes a lot of mean reversion.
The best bear case against my view is that the margin compression in the last two quarters is the first real sign that the business is losing pricing power and that the prior four years overstated sustainable economics. Annual net margin improved from 14.3% in FY22 to 18.7% in FY26; if that backs up to, say, 15% on slower growth, earnings power drops materially and the current P/E is less of a bargain than it looks. The quarterly sequence also shows revenue growth decelerating from 15.2% in the September quarter to 7.1% in December, 9.8% in March, and 5.8% in June, while net income growth went negative in the two most recent periods. For a company with major brand concentration, that is exactly how a market top in enthusiasm can begin. I weigh this differently because even a fairly harsh reset still leaves Deckers as a cash-rich, no-debt business likely earning hundreds of millions more than it did just a few years ago, and the stock is not priced for heroic outcomes.
What would change my mind is not another debate about narrative durability, but numbers that confirm the recent quarter is the start of a sustained reset rather than a temporary digestion. If the next two quarters show revenue growth slipping to low single digits or negative while operating margin falls below about 20% on an annualized basis, I would assume the premium-margin phase is rolling over and that fair value is closer to the mid-$70s. On the other hand, if Deckers can post another year with revenue above $5.8B, net income holding around or above $1.0B, and free cash flow again near $1B despite the recent softness, then the market is simply underpaying for a superior branded consumer asset and the stock should trade back into at least the low $110s.
Grok Reading
Deckers at $91.68 is a high-quality dual-brand compounder the market is treating like a fading fashion house. Annual revenue has compounded from $3.15B to $5.47B over five years (roughly 13% CAGR) while net income more than doubled from $452M to $1.02B, and free cash flow of $1.10B on just $85M of capex shows an asset-light machine that converts nearly every dollar of earnings. Gross margin sits at 57.7%, operating margin at 23.1%, and net margin at 18.7%—elite for footwear—with ROE at 41% and a balance sheet carrying $1.91B cash against zero debt. The seasonal pattern is intact and healthy: the December quarter still delivers roughly $1.9–2.0B and mid-20% net margins on UGG strength, while the spring/summer quarters have grown from the mid-$900Ms into the $1.0–1.1B range, consistent with HOKA’s less seasonal, higher-frequency sell-through. At 13.1x trailing earnings, 8.0x EV/EBITDA and under 2x EV/sales, the multiple embeds something closer to mid-single-digit growth and margin mean-reversion than the 10%+ top-line trajectory and fortress cash generation actually on display.
What stands out is the gap between the numbers and the skepticism priced in. Recent revenue is still up roughly 10% year-over-year and the company is throwing off more than a billion in FCF with no leverage; the 26% discount implied by the synthesis fair-value range near $100–116 is not explained by deteriorating fundamentals so much as by narrative fatigue around HOKA’s “lifestyle crossover” and residual UGG fashion-cycle scars. The quantitative models calling this a mature earner at fair value underweight how rare a zero-debt, 19% net-margin, 40%+ ROE consumer franchise is at a low-teens multiple. Insiders show only administrative share withholdings, not selling, and cash flow quality is clean. The story the data tell is steady compounding with operating leverage still available if HOKA’s mix and international mix keep rising—even if growth has cooled from the hyper phase.
The strongest counter-case is real and worth weighting carefully. Earnings growth has already decelerated to roughly 6% year-over-year in the most recent comparable periods, revenue growth is rolling over from the mid-teens toward high-single digits, and both brands sit in categories where Nike, On, and others can outspend on product and marketing. UGG remains exposed to weather and trend fatigue; a soft holiday or wholesale inventory correction could compress the 24–25% peak-quarter margins that juiced the annual print. Macro headwinds in discretionary footwear and the thesis evaluation’s slight bear tilt (–4) correctly flag that two-brand concentration and fashion risk justify a discount to pure compounders. A smart opponent would also note that FCF CAGR (7.8%) has lagged earnings CAGR, hinting that working-capital or mix dynamics are less pristine than the headline NI suggests, and that a 13x multiple is only “cheap” if mid-teens growth and mid-20s operating margins prove durable rather than cyclical peaks.
I would flip to neutral or outright cautious if the next two reported quarters show HOKA revenue growth falling through mid-single digits with simultaneous gross-margin contraction of 150+ bps, or if holiday-quarter net margin drops below 20% on inventory markdowns. A material step-up in competitive share loss disclosed on an earnings call, or a shift from net cash to meaningful leverage to defend share, would also break the thesis. Until those prints arrive, the raw economics dominate the narrative discount.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the off-season margin compression: net margin in the June 2026 quarter fell to 12.7% from 14.4% a year earlier, and the March 2026 quarter slipped to 12.1% from 14.8%. The holiday quarter (December 2025) held at 24.6% versus 25.0% prior year, so the business is not structurally broken, but the two non-holiday quarters together show roughly 200–270 basis points of margin erosion that the full-year 18.7% net margin masks. Revenue growth has decelerated from 18% (FY24) to 16% (FY25) to roughly 10% (FY26), and the most recent June quarter printed only +6% YoY. The "Adequate Revenue Confidence (decelerating)" tag is correct on the data; the prior models' "steady-compounder" framing slightly overstates the momentum.
On the balance sheet and cash generation, the picture is genuinely strong and the zero-debt line is real for a consumer footwear company, not an artifact. Cash of $1.91B against $2.50B equity, current ratio 3.5, and FCF of $1.10B on $5.47B revenue (20% FCF margin) with capex of only $85M. The EV bridge is clean: $12.49B market cap minus $1.91B cash, no debt, gives EV of roughly $10.6B. That yields 8.4x operating income, 9.6x FCF, and an 8.8% FCF yield. The ROIC of 164% in the canonical metrics is a units error and I set it aside; the ROE of 41% ($1.02B NI / $2.50B equity) is arithmetically correct and reflects a capital-light brand portfolio, not a data glitch. At 5x book with 41% ROE, the equity is not overpriced on a return basis, but the multiple is not cheap either.
The prior valuation synthesis lands at $100–116, implying 9–27% upside. I find the $116 signal-adjusted figure generous. Applying 13x to FY26 net income of $1.02B gives $13.3B, or roughly $98 per share; 14x gives $105. To justify $116 you need 15x on current earnings or 13x on earnings growing 15%+ next year, and the revenue trend does not support that. The thesis score of −4 (slightly bearish) is more honest than the "Market Tailwinds" label, because the deceleration and off-season margin compression are the dominant signals in the tape, not the HOKA lifestyle narrative. The insider block is entirely A-Award grants on a single date — standard equity compensation, zero informational content, and the "No Insider Transactions" tag is technically wrong but practically neutral.
The strongest case against my "fairly valued" read is the FCF yield. At 8.8% with zero debt and a 20% FCF margin, this is a cash machine that the market is pricing as if it were a mid-growth industrial. Nike, with a broader but less profitable portfolio, commands 15–18x earnings. If HOKA's lifestyle crossover is real and UGG's pricing power holds, the 12x multiple is a discount to the quality of the cash flow. I weigh this against the fact that the margin expansion cycle (operating margin 18% → 23% over three years) has clearly plateaued, and the two most recent off-season quarters show the first meaningful compression. The market is not pricing in a collapse; it is pricing in the end of the expansion, which is a reasonable read of the data.
What would change my mind in either direction: a Q1 FY27 (September 2026) print showing net margin back above 15% and revenue growth re-accelerating above 12% would confirm the off-season compression was promotional or input-cost noise, and I would move to undervalued at $100+. Conversely, if the September quarter shows margin below 12% and revenue growth below 5%, the deceleration is structural, the 12x multiple is rich for a 5% grower, and $75–80 becomes the fair range. The HOKA wholesale channel terms and any visible share loss to Salomon or On in the quarterly commentary are the specific data points to watch.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has grown from $3.15B (2022) to $5.47B (2026), a ~15% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 51% to 57.7% and operating margin from 17.9% to 23.1%. Net income more than doubled from $452M to $1.02B, and FCF scaled from $121M to $1.10B, with OCF/NI at ~1x and accruals at -0.8% of assets - reported earnings are backed by cash. Beneish M of -2.64 and Altman Z of 10.44 corroborate clean books and no distress signal. Balance sheet is a fortress: $1.91B liquid cash, zero net debt, and FCF that fully self-funds operations and buybacks. SBC is only 0.8% of revenue and buybacks run 15x SBC, keeping diluted share count roughly flat (the 2024 26M figure looks like a data artifact from a split; the pre/post trend is essentially stable). Dilution is not eroding per-share value. Insider tape shows only F-InKind tax withholdings on vesting - no open-market buys or sells - so no directional signal, positive or negative. Durability rests on the HOKA and UGG brand engines driving margin expansion; that concentration is the main structural question the data cannot resolve.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment revenue and margin split between HOKA, UGG, and legacy brands in the latest 10-K
- Whether the 2024 diluted share count of 26.0M reflects a stock split or a data error, to confirm true dilution trajectory
- Inventory days and channel inventory commentary - margin peaks in footwear often precede markdown cycles
- Customer/wholesale concentration (Nordstrom, DSW, Dick's exposure) and DTC mix trend
- Any off-balance-sheet purchase commitments or long-term lease obligations that complicate the fortress read
The composite fair value of $100.36 implies roughly 9% upside from $91.68, with the signal-adjusted $116.29 pushing that to 27%. The DCF ($101.32) and anchored P/E ($130.88) bracket the upside case, while the EPV floor at $67.90 flags real downside if HOKA/UGG margins mean-revert. Earnings quality is high (no haircut needed) and the balance sheet is net cash, so the deserved value doesn't need markdowns for accounting or leverage risk. What the price is pricing in: mid-single-digit revenue growth with margins holding near current 58% GM levels - not heroic, but not conservative either given decelerating HOKA growth and a cyclical UGG. The gap between price and deserved value is real but modest: ~9% on the central estimate, and the EPV floor sits 26% BELOW the current price, meaning a margin-normalization scenario would hurt. This is a good business at a slight discount, not a fat pitch. I'd want a wider cushion before calling it a table-pounder given the peak-cycle margin risk the quality lens flagged.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- HOKA revenue growth rate in next 1-2 quarters and any deceleration commentary
- gross margin trajectory and whether 58% is sustainable or peaking
- UGG unit sales and ASP trends heading into winter season
- any inventory build that would signal demand softening
- capital return pace - buyback cadence vs cash generation
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15, S&P near highs) which would normally be neutral-to-helpful for a beta-1.17 consumer cyclical. But the pressure on DECK is idiosyncratic and sector-driven, not tape-driven: the two most recent big moves down were tagged to Nike's China-demand warning and a broad footwear/apparel sell-off led by On Holding's earnings. That is the market pricing a HOKA-deceleration narrative into DECK by proxy, and it is exactly the bear thesis the story already carries. Narrative-wise, DECK is a moderate-intensity steady-compounder whose cult is in HOKA, and the current news cycle is celebrating a competitor (Wolverine's Saucony, Merrell) raising guidance - a direct reminder that the running-shoe pie has more credible claimants. Analyst tone here is quiet rather than supportive; no target-raise wave, no upgrade flow to counter the sector de-rating. The -21% discount to DCF cited in the narrative confirms the market is actively discounting the story, not the cash flows. Net: no strong tailwind exists to lean on, and the active pressure - peer-driven sector skepticism plus a HOKA-plateau whisper - leans negative. Not a rout, but a real crosswind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next HOKA quarterly growth print - a re-acceleration would break the deceleration narrative decisively
- China/APAC commentary from footwear peers (Nike, ONON, Adidas) - continued weakness compounds the proxy selling
- Any analyst target revisions post the WWW/ONON prints - silence vs cuts is the tell
- Wholesale channel commentary (partner terms) - the specific bear hook in the current story
Premium comfort/performance footwear is still a structurally expanding pool — consumers keep trading up for cushioning, recovery and lifestyle crossover — but the profit pool is being redistributed. Tariffs and freight have re-priced a sourcing model built for cheap Asian supply, and every major brand has copied the max-cushion playbook, so differentiation now costs marketing dollars rather than product novelty. Macro headwinds and cautious US wholesale ordering compress the near-term shipping cadence even where end demand holds. In that world DECK's advantage is brand-level: two franchises with genuine pricing power and a DTC channel that lets it defend price instead of discounting. The vulnerability is that both franchises are style-adjacent, so the durable question is not whether the category grows but whether HOKA converts current heat into an installed base and whether UGG's season-extension makes it a year-round brand rather than a winter trade.
When we made this prediction on Aug 24, 2026, DECK was $91.00. We expect it to be $104.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
cost_of_capital
flips down 25%
shares
flips down 25%
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%