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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Deckers Outdoor Corporation (DECK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-13): Designation Gem · Cairn score +48 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 79 · Value 23 · Sentiment -64 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $115.26 vs $91.20 at analysis
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Deckers Outdoor Corporation
DECK NYSEDeckers Outdoor Corporation is a global footwear and apparel company that designs, markets, and distributes products for both casual lifestyle use and high-performance activities. Its portfolio centers on well-known brands including UGG, which offers premium footwear, loungewear, and accessories; HOKA, focused on performance and lifestyle running shoes and athletic apparel; and Teva, known for sandals and outdoor-oriented footwear. The company serves a broad customer base through a combination of wholesale channels, international distributors, and a direct-to-consumer network that includes e-commerce platforms and branded retail stores. Deckers Outdoor Corporation sells its products across multiple regions worldwide, positioning its brands in sectors such as outdoor, athletic performance, fashion, and comfort-focused lifestyle. Founded in 1973 and headquartered in Goleta, California, the company plays a significant role in the global footwear and athleisure markets by leveraging distinct brand identities that appeal to both performance-driven and style-conscious consumers.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 13| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 23, 2026 | $0.88 | $0.94 +6.8% | — | — |
| May 21, 2026 | $0.83 | $0.96 +15.7% | — | — |
| Mar 24, 2026 | $-0.40 | $-1.00 -150.0% | — | — |
| Feb 25, 2026 | $0.16 | $0.43 +168.8% | — | — |
| Jan 29, 2026 | $2.77 | $3.33 +20.2% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Jul 30, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Jul 24, 2026 | ARS | View |
| Jul 24, 2026 | DEFA14A | View |
| Jul 24, 2026 | DEF 14A | View |
| Jul 23, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jun 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.02
Total Equity: $2.50B
Shares: 145,805,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
EBITDA: $1.34B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
Revenue: $5.47B
Revenue: $5.47B
Revenue: $5.47B
Total Equity: $2.50B
Tax Rate: 22.8%
Equity: $2.50B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.91B
Current Liabilities: $804.07M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.50B
Shares: 145,805,000
Shares: 145,805,000
CapEx: -$84.62M
Shares: 145,805,000
Stock Price: $93.84
Net Income: $1.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 11:37am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.2B | $3.6B | $4.3B | $5.0B | $5.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Gross Profit | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Operating Income | $564.7M | $652.8M | $927.5M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $451.9M | $516.8M | $759.6M | $966.1M | $1.0B |
| EBITDA | $607.6M | $700.6M | $985.1M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| EPS | $3.29 | $3.90 | $4.89 | $6.36 | $7.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.25 | $3.87 | $4.86 | $6.33 | $7.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 11:29am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $843.5M | $981.8M | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| Total Assets | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $3.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $541.7M | $497.4M | $720.0M | $769.9M | $804.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $793.4M | $790.5M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Total Equity | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 11:37am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $172.4M | $537.4M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$51.0M | -$81.0M | -$89.4M | -$86.2M | -$84.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $121.3M | $456.4M | $943.8M | $958.4M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$356.7M | -$297.4M | -$414.9M | -$567.0M | -$1.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$245.8M | $138.3M | $520.3M | $387.1M | $18.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 12, 2026 11:37am (1d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.1% | +18.2% | +16.3% | +9.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.5% | +30.7% | +21.0% | +9.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +15.6% | +42.1% | +27.1% | +7.1% |
| Net Income Growth | +14.4% | +47.0% | +27.2% | +6.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.3% | +40.6% | +26.7% | +7.2% |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-12Deckers' cost of demand creation (creative production, localized campaign assets, DTC merchandising, customer service, demand planning across wholesale and 60+ markets) is highly automatable, and at 57.7% gross margin with pricing power those savings drop close to operating income rather than being handed back in price.
AI collapses the cost of launching and scaling a footwear brand - design iteration, 3D renders, ad creative, influencer-grade content, Asian contract-manufacturer sourcing - which raises the volume of credible challengers competing for the same running and comfort-lifestyle shelf space HOKA and UGG now occupy.
Whether footwear discovery migrates into AI assistants that rank on spec, fit-data and price versus brand desire. Watch DTC traffic mix, paid-search/social efficiency, and whether full-price sell-through holds as agentic shopping surfaces alternatives.
HOKA's earned authority with run specialty retailers and serious runners, UGG's decades-deep cultural association, and the tooling/factory/inventory infrastructure behind $5.47B of physical product - none of which cheap software manufactures.
AI Lens thesis
Deckers sells a physical good whose value rests on brand meaning and fit, so AI cannot substitute the product or the transaction; it reaches the P&L through three narrow channels - lower cost per unit of marketing and creative output, better inventory and size-curve forecasting across a hybrid wholesale/DTC model, and cheaper service on a growing e-commerce base - all margin-accretive against an already 23% operating margin. The offsetting mechanisms are competitive rather than technological: AI-native brands can reach niche running and comfort audiences at a fraction of historical marketing cost, wholesale partners can build private label faster, and if LLM-mediated shopping becomes the front door, the brand's paid-acquisition advantage and DTC price integrity erode. Net: modestly positive, low-magnitude, and the outcome is still decided by product cycles and consumer discretionary demand, not by AI.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Fit and return prediction: footwear e-commerce returns run punitively high, and AI-driven size/fit matching on Deckers' own DTC order and return history is a direct, quantifiable gross-margin and freight-cost gain the market treats as a rounding error.
Downside Agentic and AI-summarized shopping rewards structured attributes over aspiration; UGG in particular monetizes desire rather than specification, and a discovery layer that answers 'best warm boot under $150' compresses exactly the premium Deckers charges.
Outcome range spread 32
Claude Reading
The raw numbers show a company that just decelerated hard. Q1 FY27 (Jun-2026) revenue of $1.02B vs $964.5M prior year is +5.7% YoY — a sharp step-down from the 13% five-year CAGR and the 20%+ prints that defined FY24-25. More telling: net income of $130M vs $139.2M is actually *down* 6.6% YoY, and net margin compressed from 14.4% to 12.7% in what is seasonally the weakest quarter. Fiscal Q4 (Mar-2026) told a similar story: $1.12B revenue up ~10% but NI of $135.6M vs $151.4M is -10% YoY with margin down 270bps. The synthesis model's "+34% upside to $133" fair value leans heavily on trailing full-year numbers ($5.47B rev, 18.7% net margin, $1.02B NI) that the two most recent quarters suggest are the peak, not the run rate. If FY27 comes in at $5.7B with margins normalizing to 15-16%, you get ~$900M NI, and 13x on that is $11.7B — right at the current $12.4B cap.
The balance sheet is genuinely pristine — $1.91B cash, zero debt, $2.5B equity, 41% ROE, current ratio 3.5, $1.1B FCF on $84M capex. That's a fortress, and it's why the "fallen angel" narrative frame is defensible. But the market-forces model's flag on "unexplained cash hoarding" is the right question no one wants to ask: management is sitting on ~15% of the market cap in cash while the stock is 27% off highs and buybacks would be obviously accretive at 13x. Either they see something we don't (inventory build for a HOKA reset, an acquisition, tariff exposure) or capital allocation discipline has become capital allocation timidity. Neither is bullish in the near term.
I disagree with the synthesis "fair value $133" framing and side closer to the thesis-evaluation +32 "reasonable premium" read, but for different reasons than either model articulates. The bear case the narrative layer describes — HOKA decelerating, UGG fashion-cyclical — is not hypothetical anymore; it is showing up in the June quarter margin print. HOKA's competitive set (On Running growing 30%+, Nike reasserting in running, Asics resurgent) is materially tougher than 18 months ago, and DTC-heavy premium footwear brands historically compress margins fast when growth slows because the fixed-cost base of stores and marketing doesn't flex. The 57.7% gross margin and 23% operating margin are structurally at risk if the growth algorithm shifts from 20% to 6%. A careful contrarian would note that at peak-cycle margins, 13x looks cheap; at normalized margins, 13x on a decelerating consumer discretionary brand is roughly fair, and history says fashion-exposed footwear names (Skechers, Crocs pre-HeyDude, Under Armour) trade to 10-11x when the growth story cracks.
That said, dissenting fully from the bull case requires ignoring some real things: HOKA is still a genuinely differentiated brand with international runway (Asia-Pacific still <15% of mix), UGG's year-round positioning has actually worked (multiple summer quarters of growth), the balance sheet gives infinite optionality, and 41% ROE with zero leverage is rare. My read: fairly valued to modestly undervalued, but not the +34% asymmetric setup the composite claims. Fair value is $95-105 assuming FY27 EPS lands around $6.00-6.50 (vs consensus that probably still models $6.50+) at a deserved 15-16x multiple for a decelerating but high-quality brand. Below $85 the risk/reward gets genuinely interesting; at $91 you're paying roughly fair price for a story that needs the September/December quarters to confirm HOKA isn't rolling over. I'd wait for the next print rather than anchor to the $133 signal-adjusted number, which I think is mechanically overweighting a trailing margin peak. Partial agreement with synthesis directionally (not overvalued), dissent on magnitude (nowhere near +34%).
GPT Reading
At $91.2, Deckers looks mispriced on the cheap side because the market is valuing a debt-free, 19% net margin branded footwear business as if earnings are near a cyclical peak and about to roll over hard. The raw numbers do not show that. Fiscal 2026 revenue rose to $5.47B from $4.99B, up 9.6%, while net income still climbed to $1.02B from $966M, up 5.6%, after a huge prior-year base. Gross margin held at 57.7%, operating margin was 23.1%, and free cash flow reached $1.10B against only $84.6M of capex. With $1.91B of cash and no debt, enterprise value is only about $10.5B, or roughly 10.3x trailing earnings and 2.1x revenue. For a company compounding revenue at 13% and earnings at 16% over several years, that multiple is low unless you assume the brand portfolio is about to structurally deteriorate.
The quarterly pattern actually reinforces resilience more than decay. The latest quarter, June 2026, posted $1.02B of revenue versus $964.5M a year earlier, up about 5.8%, with net income of $130.0M versus $139.2M, a modest margin compression from 14.4% to 12.7%. That is not great, but it is far from collapse, especially after March 2026 revenue of $1.12B versus $1.02B a year earlier, nearly 9.8% growth, despite net income easing from $151.4M to $135.6M. What stands out is that revenue is still expanding while profits have flattened only slightly after a very strong multi-year margin expansion cycle. That looks like normalization, not impairment. On a trailing quarterly run-rate, the business has generated roughly $4.45B of revenue and about $1.01B of net income over the last four quarters, so the current equity value implies around 12.3x trailing quarterly-based earnings even before giving credit for the cash pile. For a business with ROE above 40%, current ratio 3.5, and no leverage, that is an undemanding setup.
I also think the market is over-penalizing Deckers for being a two-story company when the financials say the overall machine remains unusually efficient. A lot of consumer names can produce growth or margins; fewer can do both while staying asset-light enough to convert $1.18B of operating cash flow into $1.10B of free cash flow. Price-to-book at 5.3x looks high in isolation, but with ROA of 27.8% and no debt, book value is not the right anchor. This is a brand earnings stream, and the relevant question is whether a company earning about $1B annually deserves only a low-teens P/E despite still growing sales high single digits. My answer is no. Even assigning no multiple expansion and assuming earnings merely hold around $1.0B, the current valuation is already reasonable; if revenue continues growing 7-10% and margins settle only modestly below FY26 levels, the stock should support something closer to 15x earnings, which would point toward roughly $105-$110 on current earnings power, with upside beyond that if growth re-accelerates.
The best counterargument is straightforward and serious: the market may be right that FY2026 represented peak economics. The last two quarters show the warning signs bears want to see: March revenue up nearly 10% but net income down about 10%, then June revenue up 5.8% with net income down 6.6%. That says incremental growth is getting less profitable. Annual net margin also ticked down from 19.4% in FY2025 to 18.7% in FY2026 despite strong top-line growth, suggesting the operating leverage story has stalled. If HOKA is maturing faster than expected and UGG is entering a more pronounced fashion fade, then 13x earnings is not cheap for a business facing negative revisions. On that view, the cash balance is less a hidden asset than evidence management lacks better uses for capital, and the low multiple is a rational discount for brand cyclicality and possible earnings compression back toward, say, $800M-$850M. If that happens, today's valuation would look far less attractive.
What would change my mind is not a narrative update but a couple of hard prints. If the next two quarters show revenue growth falling below 5% while net margin drops another 150-200 bps year over year, I would conclude the market correctly sniffed out a de-rating from peak earnings and that fair value is closer to the low $80s. Conversely, if Deckers can sustain even 7-9% revenue growth with net income roughly flat to up, or demonstrate more decisive capital allocation with the $1.91B cash balance, then the current price will look too low for this quality level. The burden of proof for a bull case here is not heroic growth; it is simply showing that a $1B-earning, debt-free brand owner has not started a structural decline. The data so far still support that.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality branded footwear franchise that the market has marked down to a mature-earner multiple while the cash engine is still compounding. Fiscal 2026 delivered $5.47B of revenue and $1.02B of net income on a 57.7% gross margin and 18.7% net margin, with operating cash flow of $1.18B converting into $1.10B of free cash flow after only $85M of capex. That is an 8.9% FCF yield at the $12.42B market cap and a trailing PE of roughly 13x—levels usually reserved for structurally impaired retailers, not a zero-debt balance sheet holding $1.91B in cash against $2.50B of equity and printing a 41% ROE. Annual revenue has scaled from $3.15B to $5.47B over four years (13% CAGR) and earnings from $452M to $1.02B (16% CAGR); the most recent year still grew top line nearly 10% and net income mid-single digits. Seasonality is loud and intact—December quarters alone throw off $1.8–2.0B of revenue at 25% net margins—so the softer March/June prints ($1.0–1.1B, 12–13% margins) are calendar, not collapse. What stands out is the disconnect: fortress liquidity, mid-teens historical growth, elite returns on capital, and a sub-13x earnings multiple that prices in a permanent step-down to low-single-digit growth and margin erosion that the income statement has not yet delivered.
Quarterly trends do show deceleration—June revenue up only ~6% year-on-year versus the prior mid-teens run-rate, and recent earnings growth lagging revenue—which is exactly the factual ammunition behind the fallen-angel narrative. Yet absolute profitability remains exceptional: operating margin held at 23% for the full year, and the company continues to generate more than a billion dollars of unlevered free cash with negligible reinvestment need. At $91.2 the stock sits well below the composite fair-value anchors near $111–134 that the quantitative layer produced even after signal adjustment; the ~30% discount is almost entirely narrative—HOKA saturation fears and UGG cycle fatigue—rather than a visible break in cash-flow durability. With EV/revenue at 2.1x and no net debt, the downside is cushioned by the cash pile alone, while any stabilization of growth in the high-single-digit range would force a re-rating toward 16–18x, implying material upside from here.
The strongest counter-argument is that the deceleration is the new base case, not a soft patch. Revenue growth has stepped from 15–18% down to ~10% and the latest quarter is already mid-single digits; earnings growth has compressed to 6% year-on-year. If HOKA’s athletic share gains are saturating against Nike, On, and broader performance footwear and UGG’s fashion relevance is structurally rolling over rather than cycling, then mid-teens CAGRs are gone forever and a 13x multiple on flattening earnings is fair, not cheap. Macro headwinds for discretionary footwear amplify that risk, and the $1.91B cash hoard without a clear buyback or dividend step-up invites the charge of lazy capital allocation—exactly the “unexplained cash” flag in the market-forces layer. Thesis fragilities correctly weight HOKA fashion-cycle risk and UGG brand fatigue as the two largest threats; a couple more quarters of sub-5% growth or gross-margin slippage below 55% would validate the bear story that premium brand economics are mean-reverting and that the current multiple already embeds the right terminal growth.
I would flip to a fair-value or overvalued stance if the next two reported quarters show revenue growth sticking below 5% with operating margin compressing under 20% on a trailing basis, or if management signals that HOKA unit growth has structurally rolled over. Conversely, a return to double-digit organic growth, explicit large-scale capital returns, or gross margins re-expanding above 58% would push conviction higher and justify price targets back toward the $120–130 zone. Until one of those arrives, the raw cash generation and fortress balance sheet at 13x earnings and a near-9% FCF yield make the stock undervalued relative to its demonstrated earning power.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
The business trajectory is exceptional: revenue grew from 3.15B (FY22) to 5.47B (FY26), a ~15% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 51.0% to 57.7% and operating margin from 17.9% to 23.1%. Net income more than doubled from 452M to 1.02B and FCF scaled from 121M to 1.10B, indicating operating leverage plus working-capital discipline. Cash conversion is clean (OCF/NI ~1x, accruals -0.8% of assets, Beneish M -2.64) and the Altman Z of 10.59 with 1.91B net cash and zero net debt places the balance sheet firmly in fortress territory. Dilution is well-contained: diluted share count went from 138.9M to 145.8M (roughly 1.2% CAGR, with some noise from a split-era count in FY24), SBC is only 0.8% of revenue, and buybacks run 15x SBC - per-share value is protected, not eroded. Insider tape shows only routine awards and tax-withholding; no directional buys or sales to read. Key qualitative risk not visible in the numbers is brand concentration (HOKA + UGG carry the franchise), which is a durability question the modules can't resolve.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- HOKA vs UGG revenue mix and growth rates in the 10-K segment disclosure
- Wholesale vs DTC channel mix and any customer concentration
- Inventory levels and days-on-hand trend vs FY26 revenue growth
- International revenue trajectory and FX sensitivity
- Any long-lived assets, lease commitments, or off-balance-sheet obligations that soften the net-cash picture
- 10b5-1 plan disclosures and CEO/CFO ownership levels given absent open-market activity
Price is $93.39 against a composite fair value of $104.90 (roughly 12% upside) and a signal-adjusted FV of $125.84 (35%). The DCF pegs it at $109.15 and the anchored PE at $133.39, while the EPV floor sits at $67.90 - meaning even a no-growth, steady-state view still supports roughly 73% of today's price. That EPV floor is the important sanity check: you are not paying a heroic multiple for future HOKA growth; you are paying about a 38% premium to steady-state earnings power for a business that is actually still growing and expanding margins. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so no haircut is warranted on the reported numbers.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- HOKA wholesale vs DTC growth split and any guidance on FY revenue growth deceleration
- UGG international (Asia/EMEA) growth to confirm the non-HOKA leg is still expanding
- Gross margin trajectory and any promotional/inventory commentary that would signal margin give-back
- Buyback pace vs share issuance - per-share value depends on continued net reduction
- Any input-cost or tariff exposure flagged in the next print
The immediate pressure on DECK is negative and sector-driven. ON Holding just posted its worst day ever (-20%) after cutting growth targets, and financial media is openly lumping Nike, Lululemon, DECK and ONON together as a 'struggling footwear sector.' That is exactly the read-through that hurts DECK most: the bull case rests on HOKA being a genuine performance-running compounder, and ONON's guide-down attacks that same premium-running-shoe narrative. With beta 1.17 and a discretionary-consumer footprint, DECK absorbs sector risk-off harder than the tape suggests.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether HOKA-specific channel checks or a DECK pre-announce follow ONON's guide-down
- Sell-side target revisions on DECK in the next 2 weeks post-ONON
- Whether the footwear cohort trades as a bloc or DECK decouples on the next tape day
- Asia/ME UGG demand commentary from peers or luxury names
Deckers sells a physical good whose value rests on brand meaning and fit, so AI cannot substitute the product or the transaction; it reaches the P&L through three narrow channels - lower cost per unit of marketing and creative output, better inventory and size-curve forecasting across a hybrid wholesale/DTC model, and cheaper service on a growing e-commerce base - all margin-accretive against an already 23% operating margin. The offsetting mechanisms are competitive rather than technological: AI-native brands can reach niche running and comfort audiences at a fraction of historical marketing cost, wholesale partners can build private label faster, and if LLM-mediated shopping becomes the front door, the brand's paid-acquisition advantage and DTC price integrity erode. Net: modestly positive, low-magnitude, and the outcome is still decided by product cycles and consumer discretionary demand, not by AI.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Run specialty channel share for HOKA
- UGG international brand-heat metrics
- Athlete/community endorsement depth
- New running brand share in specialty
- Time-to-scale of AI-native DTC brands
- HOKA growth rate vs category growth
- DTC traffic source composition
- Paid-search efficiency/CAC trend