Business Description
NIKE, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, designs, develops, markets, and sells men's, women's, and kids athletic footwear, apparel, equipment, and accessories worldwide. The company provides athletic and casual footwear, apparel, and accessories under the Jumpman trademark; and casual sneakers, apparel, and accessories under the Converse, Chuck Taylor, All Star, One Star, Star Chevron, and Jack Purcell trademarks. In addition, it sells a line of performance equipment and accessories comprising bags, socks, sport balls, eyewear, timepieces, digital devices, bats, gloves, protective equipment, and other equipment for sports activities under the NIKE brand; and various plastic products to other manufacturers. The company markets apparel with licensed college and professional team, and league logos, as well as sells sports apparel. Additionally, it licenses unaffiliated parties to manufacture and sell apparel, digital devices, and applications and other equipment for sports activities under NIKE-owned trademarks. The company sells its products to footwear stores; sporting goods stores; athletic specialty stores; department stores; skate, tennis, and golf shops; and other retail accounts through NIKE-owned retail stores, digital platforms, independent distributors, licensees, and sales representatives. The company was formerly known as Blue Ribbon Sports, Inc. and changed its name to NIKE, Inc. in 1971. NIKE, Inc. was founded in 1964 and is headquartered in Beaverton, Oregon.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 6:54pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:51pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.17
Total Equity: $13.21B
Shares: 1,487,600,000
Total Debt: $7.97B
Cash: $7.46B
EBITDA: $4.51B
Total Debt: $7.97B
Cash: $7.46B
Revenue: $46.31B
Revenue: $46.31B
Revenue: $46.31B
Total Equity: $13.21B
Tax Rate: 17.1%
Equity: $13.21B
Total Debt: $7.97B
Cash: $7.46B
Current Liabilities: $10.57B
Long-Term Debt: $7.96B
Total Debt: $7.97B
Total Equity: $13.21B
Shares: 1,487,600,000
Shares: 1,487,600,000
CapEx: -$430.00M
Shares: 1,487,600,000
Stock Price: $43.81
Net Income: $3.22B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Nike remains a structurally high-quality franchise: $9.15B liquid cash, net cash positive ($1.19B), Altman Z of 3.71, and earnings quality that ties out cleanly (OCF/NI 1.12x, accruals -1.7%, Beneish -2.39). Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly — diluted shares fell from 1.61B (2021) to 1.49B (2025), a ~2% CAGR shrink, and buybacks dwarf SBC at ~493%. SBC is a modest 1.5% of revenue. This is the profile of a mature, self-funding compounder that does not need external capital.
But the operating trajectory is the problem. Revenue peaked at $51.36B in 2024 and fell to $46.31B in 2025 (-9.8%), essentially back to 2022 levels. Worse, operating margin collapsed from 15.6% (2021) → 12.3% (2024) → 8.0% (2025), and net income halved from $5.70B to $3.22B in a single year. Gross margin also slipped to 42.7%, the lowest in the window. FCF dropped from $6.62B to $3.27B (-51%). That is not noise — that is a step-change in earnings power, likely reflecting brand/innovation issues, channel reset (DTC pullback), and inventory/promotion pressure.
The offset: insider behavior is genuinely encouraging. Multiple directors made open-market P-purchases in April 2026 (Hill $1.0M, Cook $1.1M, Swan $500K, Rogers $173K) — directors don't buy on the open market casually. Combined with the durable brand moat and clean books, this looks like a quality franchise going through a real but likely fixable downcycle, not a structurally broken business.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Whether the FY25 op margin collapse to 8% includes one-time restructuring/impairment charges or reflects a clean run-rate
- Inventory levels and days-of-inventory trend — is the channel cleaned up or still bloated?
- China region revenue trajectory and whether weakness is region-specific or global
- DTC vs wholesale mix shift and whether the wholesale rebuild is gaining traction
- Innovation pipeline / new product cycle commentary from management
- Whether the dividend + buyback pace is sustainable at $3.27B FCF run-rate
- Customer/concentration disclosures in the 10-K around key wholesale accounts
The e2e synthesis tags NKE as a 'Reasonable Premium,' which lines up with what the tape shows: $45.20 against a deserved value in the high-$40s to low-$50s for a fortress-balance-sheet brand whose operating margins have compressed but whose earnings quality is clean (quality hint = 3, no haircut). On trailing depressed earnings NKE trades around 30x — optically rich — but that's the wrong anchor; on a normalized mid-cycle EBIT closer to historical 13-14% margins, the multiple compresses into the high-teens, which is roughly what a brand of this caliber deserves. So the market isn't euphoric and it isn't panicking — it's pricing a believable recovery.
What has to go right to justify $45: stabilize China, complete wholesale reset without further share loss to On/Hoka/ASICS, and rebuild gross margin ~150-250bps over 2-3 years. None of that is heroic, but none is in the bag either. The bull case (DTC margin recapture + buyback shrinking the float) gets you to ~$55-60; the bear case (structural China + cultural fragmentation) gets you to ~$32-36. Midpoint sits right around spot. That's the textbook definition of fair, not cheap.
I want a real discount to the deserved value before I lean in — the brand quality argues against calling it expensive, but quality you pay full price for is not edge.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward gross margin guidance and pace of inventory normalization in next 1-2 quarters
- China revenue trajectory ex-FX and any commentary on local brand competition
- Wholesale channel re-engagement progress — door count, sell-in vs sell-through
- Running category share data vs On/Hoka/ASICS to test the structural-decline thesis
- Updated buyback pace and FCF conversion to confirm capital return capacity
The dominant non-fundamental force on NKE is a strong, moderately durable fallen-angel narrative: the market has decided peak Nike is behind it, with the bear story (On, Hoka, ASICS taking cultural share; China structurally impaired; wholesale partners retaliating against DTC) doing more work than the bull story (margin recapture, DTC inflection). Price action confirms it - a -4.9% CAGR and three years of relative underperformance show the tape has been actively de-rating this name regardless of the broader market. With beta 1.12 and consumer-cyclical exposure, a neutral tape with VIX 17 and a slight pullback from highs is a mild incremental drag, not a tailwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next earnings print - any China stabilization or DTC margin reacceleration could break the fallen-angel narrative
- Whether sell-side target revisions continue trending up (6 this month is notable) or stall
- Competitive datapoints from On, Hoka, ASICS - any sign their share gains are decelerating
- Sector rotation into consumer discretionary or a VIX collapse that would let beaten-down cyclicals run
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:57pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $44.5B | $46.7B | $51.2B | $51.4B | $46.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $24.6B | $25.2B | $28.9B | $28.5B | $26.5B |
| Gross Profit | $20.0B | $21.5B | $22.3B | $22.9B | $19.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $13.0B | $14.8B | $16.4B | $16.6B | $16.1B |
| Operating Income | $6.9B | $6.7B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $3.7B |
| Net Income | $5.7B | $6.0B | $5.1B | $5.7B | $3.2B |
| EBITDA | $7.7B | $7.5B | $6.8B | $7.2B | $4.5B |
| EPS | $3.64 | $3.83 | $3.27 | $3.76 | $2.17 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:51pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $9.9B | $8.6B | $7.4B | $9.9B | $7.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $26.3B | $28.2B | $25.2B | $25.4B | $23.4B |
| Total Assets | $37.7B | $40.3B | $37.5B | $38.1B | $36.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.7B | $10.7B | $9.3B | $10.6B | $10.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $9.4B | $8.9B | $8.9B | $7.9B | $8.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $25.0B | $25.0B | $23.5B | $23.7B | $23.4B |
| Total Equity | $12.8B | $15.3B | $14.0B | $14.4B | $13.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.2B | $3.5B | $1.4B | $965.0M | -$727.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:57pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.7B | $5.2B | $5.8B | $7.4B | $3.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$695.0M | -$758.0M | -$969.0M | -$812.0M | -$430.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.0B | $4.4B | $4.9B | $6.6B | $3.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$608.0M | -$4.0B | -$5.5B | -$4.3B | -$3.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.5B | -$1.3B | -$1.1B | $2.4B | -$2.4B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:51pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$46.5B $45.0B – $48.2B
|
$48.6B $48.5B – $48.6B
|
$52.3B $52.1B – $52.6B
|
$58.3B $56.2B – $60.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$6.5B $6.3B – $6.8B
|
$6.8B $6.8B – $6.8B
|
$7.4B $7.3B – $7.4B
|
$8.2B $7.9B – $8.5B
|
| Net Income |
$2.7B $2.3B – $3.4B
|
$3.5B $2.1B – $5.7B
|
$4.1B $3.9B – $4.3B
|
$6.3B $6.0B – $6.6B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:57pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.9% | +9.6% | +0.3% | -9.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +7.6% | +3.8% | +2.7% | -13.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -3.8% | -11.4% | +6.7% | -41.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +5.6% | -16.1% | +12.4% | -43.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -2.8% | -9.9% | +5.6% | -37.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:57pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | Alagirisamy Venkatesh | F-InKind | 9,853.00 | $44.65 | $439,936 |
| 2026-06-10 | McCartney Philip | F-InKind | 9,836.00 | $44.65 | $439,177 |
| 2026-06-12 | McCartney Philip | S-Sale | 17,398.00 | $46.18 | $803,440 |
| 2026-05-14 | PARKER MARK G | G-Gift | 22,230.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-13 | Hill Elliott | P-Purchase | 23,660.24 | $42.27 | $1.0M |
| 2026-04-13 | Hill Elliott | P-Purchase | 23,660.24 | $42.27 | $1,000,000 |
| 2026-04-10 | COOK TIMOTHY D | P-Purchase | 25,000.00 | $42.43 | $1.1M |
| 2026-04-09 | ROGERS JOHN W JR | P-Purchase | 4,000.00 | $43.34 | $173,360 |
| 2026-04-07 | SWAN ROBERT HOLMES | P-Purchase | 11,781.39 | $42.44 | $500,002 |
| 2026-04-02 | Knight Travis A | J-Other | 2,300,480.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-02 | Knight Travis A | J-Other | 2,300,480.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-12 | Leinwand Robert | S-Sale | 9,065.00 | $62.33 | $565,021 |
| 2026-02-11 | KNIGHT PHILIP H | G-Gift | 4,500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-11 | KNIGHT PHILIP H | G-Gift | 4,500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-10 | Leinwand Robert | F-InKind | 4,647.00 | $62.41 | $290,019 |
| 2026-02-10 | Heinle Treasure | F-InKind | 853.00 | $62.41 | $53,236 |
| 2026-02-02 | KNIGHT PHILIP H | C-Conversion | 4,500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-02 | KNIGHT PHILIP H | C-Conversion | 4,500,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | Knight Travis A | J-Other | 3,000,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-31 | Knight Travis A | J-Other | 3,000,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 6:51pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.41 | 2026-05-04 | 2026-06-01 | 2026-07-01 |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.41 | 2026-02-13 | 2026-03-02 | 2026-04-01 |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.41 | 2025-11-20 | 2025-12-01 | 2026-01-02 |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.40 | 2025-08-07 | 2025-09-02 | 2025-10-01 |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.40 | 2025-05-01 | 2025-06-02 | 2025-07-01 |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.40 | 2025-02-13 | 2025-03-03 | 2025-04-01 |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.40 | 2024-11-14 | 2024-12-02 | 2025-01-02 |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.37 | 2024-08-01 | 2024-09-03 | 2024-10-01 |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.37 | 2024-05-02 | 2024-06-03 | 2024-07-01 |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.37 | 2024-02-08 | 2024-03-04 | 2024-04-01 |
| 2023-12-01 | $0.37 | 2023-11-14 | 2023-12-04 | 2024-01-02 |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.34 | 2023-08-03 | 2023-09-05 | 2023-10-02 |
| 2023-06-02 | $0.34 | 2023-05-04 | 2023-06-05 | 2023-07-05 |
| 2023-03-03 | $0.34 | 2023-02-09 | 2023-03-06 | 2023-04-03 |
| 2022-12-02 | $0.34 | 2022-11-15 | 2022-12-05 | 2022-12-28 |
| 2022-09-02 | $0.31 | 2022-08-04 | 2022-09-06 | 2022-10-03 |
| 2022-06-03 | $0.31 | 2022-05-05 | 2022-06-06 | 2022-07-01 |
| 2022-03-04 | $0.31 | 2022-02-10 | 2022-03-07 | 2022-04-01 |
| 2021-12-03 | $0.31 | 2021-11-18 | 2021-12-06 | 2021-12-28 |
| 2021-08-27 | $0.28 | 2021-08-05 | 2021-08-30 | 2021-10-01 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has gone from $12.61B (May'24) to $11.28B (Feb'26), a ~10% top-line erosion, but the more alarming line is net income — $1.50B collapsing to $520M in the most recent quarter, a 65% earnings compression on a 10% revenue decline. That's brutal operating deleverage and tells me gross margin and SG&A are both working against Nike simultaneously. Annual FY25 op income of $3.70B versus FY24's $6.31B (-41%) confirms this isn't noise. Gross margin slipped from ~45% historically to 42.7%, and operating margin from ~13% to ~8%. The TTM net margin of 6.95% is roughly half of Nike's historical 12-14% range. On the latest quarter annualized (~$45B rev, ~$2.5B NI), the stock trades at ~27x trough earnings and ~1.5x sales — neither obviously cheap nor obviously expensive for a franchise in decline.
The prior models are directionally aligned but I think they're soft-pedaling one thing: the Feb 2026 quarter shows margin getting *worse*, not better — 4.6% net margin is the lowest print in the series, below even the May'25 1.9% (which had one-time charges). The synthesis calls this "show me" pricing and Market Forces calls it "Market Headwinds," but the quarterly trajectory labeled "accelerating" in Revenue Confidence is misleading — revenue is seasonally lumpy (Nov is always the peak), and YoY comps are still negative across every recent quarter. I'd dissent from the "accelerating" tag; this is stabilization at a lower base at best. The Pre-Flight read of "traditional-in-transition" is the most honest framing — Nike is neither a compounder nor a turnaround yet, it's mid-fall with an unproven catch.
The contrarian case that nobody is making forcefully enough: Nike's competitive problem is qualitatively different from prior cycles. On Running and Hoka aren't fads — they've taken premium running share that Nike historically owned, and ASICS has reclaimed the performance runner. This isn't an inventory glut or a China cycle; it's brand fragmentation in the highest-margin category. If that's right, the right comp isn't Nike's own history at 30x — it's Under Armour or even Gap, where a structurally diminished brand trades at 0.8-1.2x sales and 12-15x normalized earnings. At 1x sales that's $46B market cap, or ~$31/share — 31% downside from here. The insider buying in April 2026 (multiple P-Purchases) is a genuine positive signal worth weighting — these are open-market buys, not 10b5-1 noise — but insiders have been wrong about brand turnarounds before (see: Intel). The 2.56% dividend yield gives you something to wait on, but FCF of $3.27B against a $3.0B+ dividend obligation means the payout is barely covered if margins don't recover.
I dissent mildly from the "Reasonable Premium" verdict — I think it's closer to fairly valued than premium, but only because the models are anchoring to depressed TTM earnings. On normalized earnings of ~$4.50-5.00B (assuming margins recover to 10%, halfway between current and peak), you get ~$3.10-3.40 EPS and a fair value of $55-65 at 18-20x. On the bear case (margins stay at 7%, revenue flat at $45B), normalized EPS is ~$2.00 and fair value is $30-36. Current $45 splits the difference, which is honest pricing for genuine uncertainty. I wouldn't buy here without seeing one clean quarter of YoY revenue growth AND gross margin stabilization above 43% — both are required, neither has happened. The insider buys would tempt me into a 1% starter only; the Feb'26 margin print tells me the bottom isn't in. The narrative durability call ("2-3 quarters to validate or kill") is exactly right — this is a stock to revisit after the next two prints, not to commit to today.
GPT Critique
Nike's recent financial trajectory paints a concerning picture for a company that has long been a stalwart in the athletic apparel industry. The revenue decline from $51.36B in FY 2024 to $46.31B in FY 2025, coupled with a net income drop from $5.70B to $3.22B, indicates significant operational challenges. The consistent quarterly revenue and net income declines highlight not just cyclical issues but potential structural problems. The decline in gross margin from historical levels of 45% to 42.7% further underscores the pressure Nike is under, particularly in maintaining its pricing power amidst rising competition. These data points suggest a company grappling with both market dynamics and internal inefficiencies.
Opus argues that Nike's recent 4.6% net margin print is indicative of worsening conditions rather than improvement, a point I concur with given the sequential decline in margins over recent quarters. The narrative of a "traditional-in-transition" company aligns with what I observe; Nike is currently neither a compounder nor a clear turnaround story. The revenue and earnings CAGR rates, at -4.9% and -20.3% respectively, reinforce the notion of a business struggling to regain its footing in a competitive landscape. I agree with Opus that the market's "show me" pricing reflects skepticism, but I diverge on the assessment of "accelerating" revenue confidence as misleading. The recent YoY revenue declines don't support an accelerating trend, but rather suggest a stabilization at a diminished level.
I find Opus's skepticism about the competitive landscape particularly compelling. The rise of competitors like On Running and Hoka, combined with ASICS' resurgence, suggests a shift in consumer preferences that may not be easily reversible. This qualitative shift in the competitive environment could indeed justify a re-rating of Nike's stock akin to Under Armour or Gap, as opposed to its historical premium status. The significant insider purchases in April 2026 are a positive signal, yet, as Opus notes, they are not infallible indicators of a turnaround, especially in the face of such structural challenges.
A careful skeptic might argue that Nike's brand strength and global reach provide a buffer against these competitive pressures. They could point to the company's historically strong cash flow generation and the potential for strategic pivots or innovations to reinvigorate growth. However, the current data and competitive context suggest that such optimism should be tempered by the realities of the recent financial performance and market dynamics.