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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Apple Inc. (AAPL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 100 · Value -100 · Sentiment 82 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $66.17 vs $340.08 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Apple Inc.
AAPL NASDAQApple Inc. designs, manufactures, and markets a wide range of technology products worldwide. These include the iPhone, a line of smartphones; Mac, a line of personal computers; iPad, a line of multi-purpose tablets; and wearables, home, and accessories such as AirPods, Apple Vision Pro, Apple TV, Apple Watch, Beats products, HomePod, as well as Apple branded and third-party accessories. The company operates service platforms including the App Store, Apple Music, and subscription models that provide curated content, cloud services, and digital offerings. Apple Inc. serves individual consumers, businesses, and government sectors through online stores, retail outlets, and partnerships with cellular carriers and resellers. Its products span the information technology sector, impacting mobile communication, personal computing, entertainment, and health monitoring. Founded in 1976 and headquartered in Cupertino, California, Apple Inc. plays a pivotal role in the global technology market by integrating hardware, software, and services into seamless ecosystems.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.46
Total Equity: $73.73B
Shares: 15,004,697,000
Total Debt: $98.66B
Cash: $35.93B
EBITDA: $144.75B
Total Debt: $98.66B
Cash: $35.93B
Revenue: $416.16B
Revenue: $416.16B
Revenue: $416.16B
Total Equity: $73.73B
Tax Rate: 15.6%
Equity: $73.73B
Total Debt: $98.66B
Cash: $35.93B
Current Liabilities: $165.63B
Long-Term Debt: $78.33B
Total Debt: $98.66B
Total Equity: $73.73B
Shares: 15,004,697,000
Shares: 15,004,697,000
CapEx: -$12.72B
Shares: 15,004,697,000
Stock Price: $340.01
Net Income: $112.01B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 4:55pm (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $365.8B | $394.3B | $383.3B | $391.0B | $416.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $213.0B | $223.5B | $214.1B | $210.4B | $221.0B |
| Gross Profit | $152.8B | $170.8B | $169.1B | $180.7B | $195.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $43.9B | $51.3B | $54.8B | $57.5B | $62.2B |
| Operating Income | $108.9B | $119.4B | $114.3B | $123.2B | $133.1B |
| Net Income | $94.7B | $99.8B | $97.0B | $93.7B | $112.0B |
| EBITDA | $120.2B | $130.5B | $125.8B | $134.7B | $144.7B |
| EPS | $5.67 | $6.15 | $6.16 | $6.11 | $7.49 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.61 | $6.11 | $6.13 | $6.08 | $7.46 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 1:55pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $34.9B | $23.6B | $30.0B | $29.9B | $35.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $134.8B | $135.4B | $143.6B | $153.0B | $148.0B |
| Total Assets | $351.0B | $352.8B | $352.6B | $365.0B | $359.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $125.5B | $154.0B | $145.3B | $176.4B | $165.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $119.4B | $109.7B | $95.3B | $85.8B | $78.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $287.9B | $302.1B | $290.4B | $308.0B | $285.5B |
| Total Equity | $63.1B | $50.7B | $62.1B | $57.0B | $73.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $5.6B | -$3.1B | -$214.0M | -$19.2B | -$14.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 4:55pm (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $104.0B | $122.2B | $110.5B | $118.3B | $111.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$11.1B | -$10.7B | -$11.0B | -$9.4B | -$12.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $93.0B | $111.4B | $99.6B | $108.8B | $98.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$33.0M | -$306.0M | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $11.6B | -$4.1B | -$5.9B | -$10.0B | -$6.5B |
| Dividends Paid | -$14.5B | -$14.8B | -$15.0B | -$15.2B | -$15.4B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$86.0B | -$89.4B | -$77.6B | -$94.9B | -$90.7B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.9B | -$11.0B | $5.8B | -$794.0M | $6.0B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 4:55pm (26d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.8% | -2.8% | +2.0% | +6.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +11.7% | -1.0% | +6.8% | +8.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +9.6% | -4.3% | +7.8% | +8.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +5.4% | -2.8% | -3.4% | +19.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.6% | -3.6% | +7.0% | +7.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 1:55pm (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-09 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-11 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-12 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-10 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-08 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-10 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-09 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-10 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-11 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-10 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-04 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-05 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-06 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-04 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-05 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-06 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-22 02:02Even the bull case prices 55% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 73%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($340.08) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +20% | 31.8% | $152.31 | -55% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 27.6% | $109.74 | -68% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 23.5% | $77.34 | -77% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +8% | 28.0% | $93.40 | -73% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: trailing four quarters (Q2'25 through Q1'26 fiscal) sum to roughly $451B revenue and $122.5B net income — a 27.2% net margin, genuinely elite. But the growth is more modest than the multiple implies: FY25 revenue of $416B vs FY22's $394B is 5.6% total over three years, a 1.8% CAGR. Even the "accelerating" recent YoY of 6.4% is against an easy comp (Q1'25 was $95.4B). Free cash flow of $98.8B on a $4.99T market cap is a 2.0% FCF yield. At 45x earnings and 12.4x sales for a business compounding revenue at low-to-mid single digits, the buyer is paying for either buybacks (which shrink the share count ~2-3%/yr), a Services re-rating, or an AI monetization event none of the numbers yet show. The P/B of 69 is a red herring — Apple has spent a decade returning capital and gutting book equity down to $73.7B; ignore it.
On the prior models: the Synthesis "Priced for Perfection" call and the reverse-DCF's 50.6% implied FCF growth are directionally right but the framing overstates. What the price actually requires is more like 8-10% FCF growth for a decade plus terminal multiple maintenance, achievable if Services keeps compounding double-digits and buybacks continue — not "fantastical." So I partially dissent from Synthesis's rhetoric while agreeing with the verdict. The Market Forces "Neutral" and Narrative layer's "anchored/durable/high cult" reads are the most honest pieces here: Apple is expensive but the fundamentals do anchor most of the price. Where the models collectively underweight the bear case: China exposure (~17% of revenue, structurally contested), the App Store fee under active regulatory attack in EU/US (Services gross margins are ~74% — any forced take-rate cut flows straight through), and the fact that Apple is visibly behind on generative AI with no clear monetization path despite the "Apple Intelligence" branding.
The contrarian argument even if you love the business: quarterly margins are noisier than the bull case admits. Q4'24 net margin was 15.5% (one-time tax charge, granted), Q3'25 was 24.9%, and the "26-29%" band cited by pre-flight is really 25-29% ex-anomalies. Net income CAGR of 7.5% is being driven partly by mix and buybacks, not underlying operating leverage — operating income went from $119B (FY22) to $133B (FY25), a 3.8% CAGR. That's slower than nominal GDP. Meanwhile insider activity is one-directional: five sales and a gift in the recent window, zero open-market buys. Not alarming for a mega-cap with scheduled 10b5-1 sales, but not the pattern of insiders who think the stock is cheap. And the FCF CAGR of -0.4% is the single most damning number in the file — Apple's free cash flow has gone nowhere for years while the multiple has expanded from ~25x to 45x. That is pure multiple inflation, and it's what needs to reverse or be sustained by a real catalyst.
Where the data is thin: no segment breakout in the file, so we can't verify the Services growth thesis the whole valuation rests on; no geographic split to size China risk; dated fiscal-year balance sheet (Sept 2025) against Q1'26 (Dec 2025) results means the debt/cash figures are stale by two quarters. Also, the 2026 quarterly dates suggest we're reading Q1 and Q2 FY26 results — the Dec quarter's $143.8B/29.3% margin is the iPhone 17 cycle print, and it was strong, but the March quarter's sequential drop to $111B/26.6% is normal seasonality, not weakness. My verdict: I agree with Synthesis's direction but soften the language — Apple isn't priced for miracles, it's priced for continued excellence plus one new S-curve (AI or Vision or Services re-acceleration) that hasn't shown up in the numbers. At $340 with a 2% FCF yield and 1.8% revenue CAGR, the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside: a 10-15% multiple compression to ~38x (still premium) takes you to $290; sustained execution gets you maybe $370-380 over 12 months. Not a short — the buyback and cash generation make that suicidal — but not a buy here either. Trim above $340,
GPT Reading
What jumps out to me is not “mature hardware company” so much as “ultra-profitable mega-cap whose valuation has detached from its cash-flow tempo.” On the operating side, Apple is still exceptional: the last four reported quarters sum to about $451.5B of revenue and $122.6B of net income, which is roughly a 27% net margin at enormous scale. FY25 was a real improvement year versus FY24, with revenue up from $391.0B to $416.2B and net income up from $93.7B to $112.0B, while gross margin rose to 46.9% and operating margin to 32.0%. That is not a broken story. But over a longer lens the expansion is far less dramatic than the stock price implies: revenue is only modestly above FY22’s $394.3B, operating income is up just $13.6B over three years, and free cash flow at $98.8B is still below the earnings number and barely above where the business sat a few years ago. This is a phenomenal company being valued like a re-accelerating platform.
The balance between quality and valuation is the whole case. Apple’s capital intensity remains low, with $111.5B of operating cash flow against only $12.7B of capex, and that supports relentless capital return. But at a $4.99T market cap, investors are paying about 45.6x earnings, 12.3x sales, and roughly 50x free cash flow. A 2.0% FCF yield for a company with 4.2% revenue CAGR, 7.5% earnings CAGR, and negative 0.4% FCF CAGR is simply expensive, full stop. The latest quarterly trend is decent—March 2026 revenue of $111.2B was up strongly from $95.4B a year prior, and December 2025’s $143.8B quarter was excellent—but those prints do not justify a nearly $5T valuation on their own. The market is capitalizing Apple not merely as durable, but as though durability will be paired with another leg of monetization. That second assumption is where I get skeptical.
I agree with Opus on the core conclusion that the stock is not attractive here, and I agree specifically with the statement that the P/B of 69 is a red herring; with only $73.7B of equity after years of buybacks and a debt load of $98.7B, book value tells you almost nothing economically. I also agree with Opus that the March-quarter sequential decline from $143.8B to $111.2B is just seasonality, not deterioration. But I disagree with Opus’s softening of the reverse-DCF concern when they say the price requires “more like 8-10% FCF growth for a decade plus terminal multiple maintenance, achievable.” That sounds too forgiving relative to the actual file. Apple’s free cash flow CAGR is negative over the measured period, and even its stronger earnings CAGR is only 7.5%, aided by capital return and margin mix. To underwrite 8-10% annual FCF growth for ten years from a $98.8B FCF base means believing Apple can create an additional $100B+ of annual free cash flow over time while already operating at nearly 27% net margins. That is not impossible, but it is much closer to “priced for perfection” than Opus admits.
I also think Opus understates how much multiple expansion, rather than business acceleration, has done the work. They note that FY25 revenue versus FY22 is only a 1.8% CAGR and that FCF has gone nowhere, then still frame the stock as needing “continued excellence plus one new S-curve.” I’d go further: the stock already discounts that S-curve before evidence exists. Whether it is AI, Services re-acceleration, or some device category expansion, today’s valuation gives little credit for execution risk. On the bear-side specifics, I agree with Opus that regulatory threats to App Store economics and China exposure are underweighted by the broader models, but I would not lean too hard on insider sales as evidence; for Apple, routine selling by executives is weak signal at best. Where I do think Opus is exactly right is on operating income: FY22 operating income was $119.4B and FY25 was $133.1B, only about a 3.8% CAGR. That is the right anchor for how much fundamental change has actually occurred beneath the surface.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both making the classic mistake of treating Apple like an ordinary mature company when it plainly is not. They would argue that a business producing $112.0B of annual net income, $98.8B of free cash flow, 46.9% gross margins, and 32.0% operating margins deserves a structural premium because its ecosystem resilience, pricing power, and installed-base monetization are unlike peers. They would also point out that even modest revenue growth can create sizable per-share earnings growth if buybacks continue and margins hold near the high-20s. That skeptic is right to caution against valuation dogmatism here. But the burden of proof still lies with the buyer at $340, not the seller.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Apple is a textbook mature earner operating at extraordinary scale and quality. Revenue grew from $365.8B (2021) to $416.2B (2025) with gross margin expanding meaningfully from 41.8% to 46.9% and operating margin from 29.8% to 32.0% - real operating leverage, not accounting flattery. Net income hit $112.0B in 2025 and FCF has run near or above $99B every year for five straight years, cumulatively over $500B of free cash flow. That is a durability signature very few businesses on earth can match.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Services segment growth and margin contribution vs Products in the latest 10-K to confirm the mix-shift driving GM expansion
- iPhone unit and geographic concentration (Greater China exposure) in segment disclosures
- Regulatory/antitrust exposure (DOJ, EU DMA, Google TAC payments) that could impair Services economics
- Detailed capital return policy and remaining buyback authorization
- Long-term debt maturity ladder given the shift to net debt position
At $340.08 Apple carries a ~$5.0T market cap on a business generating roughly $100B of FCF and growing revenue in the low-single digits. That is a ~50x FCF multiple on a company compounding sales at ~3%. The e2e synthesis flags 'Priced for Perfection' and I agree - to justify today's price you need services to keep compounding double-digits, margins to keep expanding, and an AI/Vision monetization leg that has not yet shown up in the numbers.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Services revenue growth rate and gross margin trajectory in latest 10-Q
- iPhone unit trends and China revenue disclosure
- Guidance or commentary on AI feature monetization
- Buyback pace vs prior years
- Any one-time items inflating trailing FCF
The non-fundamental pressure on AAPL is decisively positive right now. The stock just tagged a $5 trillion market cap and printed a 52-week high the day before Tim Cook's final earnings report as CEO, with the tape framing Apple as having 'avoided a very expensive AI bill' rather than being behind - a full narrative reversal from the 2025 'AI laggard' bear thesis. The archetype is platform-monopoly with high cult coefficient and durable intensity, and the news flow is actively reinforcing it (overtaking Nvidia, record rally, options market pricing an outsized move up). That is the dominant force on this ticker. The macro backdrop is a mild headwind - VIX 18.2, S&P off 2.4%, 10y at 4.65%, Nasdaq in a five-day losing streak on a chip rout - but Apple's 1.1 beta, defensive cash flows, and its current status as the rotation destination AWAY from semis mean the risk-off tape is landing on other names, not this one. AAPL was literally cited alongside KO and PM as the risk-off winners on Tuesday. The one real overhang is Thursday's print itself: sentiment this stretched into a binary event is fragile, and a soft services or China number could snap the narrative violently. But going in, the pressure is a clear tailwind.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Thursday earnings reaction - especially services growth rate and China revenue commentary
- Whether the 'Apple avoided the AI capex bill' framing survives the call or gets challenged by guidance
- Sell-side target revisions in the 48h after print - are analysts chasing or fading
- Any crack in the Nasdaq/semi rout spreading to mega-cap tech breadth
- Cook succession details and whether the transition is framed as continuity or risk
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 29, 2026, AAPL was $340.08. We expect it to be $310.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $240.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 29, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.