Business Description
Analog Devices, Inc. (ADI) is a technology leader specializing in the conception, production, validation, and global marketing of integrated circuits (ICs), software solutions, and advanced subsystems. Their offerings leverage sophisticated analog, mixed-signal, and digital signal processing technologies. The company's comprehensive product lineup features data converters, which are critical for transforming real-world analog signals into digital data and subsequently converting digital data back into analog signals. They also provide power management and reference devices, essential for power conversion, driver supervision, system sequencing, and energy optimization in industries such as automotive, telecommunications, industrial applications, and premium consumer markets. These power ICs are supported by integrated performance, integration, and software design simulation tools for precise power supply development. ADI's portfolio further includes high-performance amplifiers, designed for conditioning analog signals, as well as radio frequency (RF) and microwave ICs that underpin cellular infrastructure. They also develop microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) technology, encompassing accelerometers for sensing acceleration, gyroscopes for measuring rotation, inertial measurement units (IMUs) for detecting multi-axis movement, broadband switches for radio and instrumentation systems, and isolators. Moreover, the company supplies digital signal processing (DSP) and system products engineered for rapid numeric calculations. Serving a wide array of clients across the industrial, automotive, consumer, instrumentation, aerospace, and communications sectors, Analog Devices distributes its products globally. This is accomplished via a multifaceted approach, including a direct sales force, authorized third-party distributors, independent sales representatives throughout the United States, the Americas, Europe, Japan, China, and other regions of Asia, in addition to its online platform. Analog Devices, Inc. was founded in 1965 and is headquartered in Wilmington, Massachusetts.
Business History
Generated: Jun 27, 2026 3:04amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:02am (4h ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.59
Total Equity: $33.82B
Shares: 496,709,000
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $2.50B
EBITDA: $5.03B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $2.50B
Revenue: $11.02B
Revenue: $11.02B
Revenue: $11.02B
Total Equity: $33.82B
Tax Rate: 16.4%
Equity: $33.82B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $2.50B
Current Liabilities: $3.25B
Long-Term Debt: $8.15B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Total Equity: $33.82B
Shares: 496,709,000
Shares: 496,709,000
CapEx: -$533.55M
Shares: 496,709,000
Stock Price: $417.93
Net Income: $2.27B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
ADI is a structurally high-quality analog/mixed-signal semiconductor business: gross margin sits at 61.5% in FY25 (with a 66% peak), operating margin recovered to 26.6%, and FCF of $4.28B on $11.02B revenue is a ~39% FCF margin. Earnings quality is clean - OCF/NI of 1.91x, accruals at -3.8% of assets, Beneish M -2.73 and Altman Z 9.45 all corroborate that reported earnings are real cash. The Maxim deal left net debt of ~$4.9B against $3.65B liquid cash, but with $4.28B annual FCF this is a manageable obligation, not a survival issue. The franchise showed its cyclicality clearly: revenue fell from $12.31B (FY23) to $9.43B (FY24) with operating margin compressing from 31.1% to 21.6% and GM from 64% to 57.1% - a real demonstration of industrial/auto cycle exposure, though the FY25 rebound to $11.02B and 26.6% OpM shows the underlying earnings power is intact. Buybacks of ~7.9x SBC indicate genuine capital return discipline, but diluted share count jumped from 401M (FY21) to ~497M post-Maxim and the 5.5% CAGR overstates ongoing dilution - the step-up was M&A-driven, not SBC creep at 2.9% of revenue. Insider tape is small, routine selling (Stata estate-style lots, one officer 1K shares) - no signal either way.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- End-market mix (industrial, auto, comms, consumer) and customer concentration to gauge cyclicality drivers
- Debt maturity schedule and interest coverage post-Maxim integration
- Maxim cost synergy realization vs. plan and any remaining integration charges in reported margins
- R&D intensity trend and design-win pipeline supporting moat durability
- Inventory and channel inventory levels to confirm FY25 recovery is end-demand, not channel restock
- Goodwill/intangibles balance and any impairment risk from Maxim purchase accounting
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $122 and signal-adjusted at $108 versus a $387 price - implying ~72% downside. Even the most charitable input, the anchored-PE at $256, sits ~34% below today's price, while DCF ($90) and EPV ($52) suggest the cash-generative reality of the business is a fraction of the quote. I discount the EPV floor as a worst-case and treat the DCF as one scenario, but the convergence of three methods all well below price is hard to wave away.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY25 guidance and book-to-bill - is the cycle actually inflecting or is consensus extrapolating
- Industrial and auto segment order trends vs inventory normalization
- Capex/buyback split - how much FCF returns to shareholders vs reinvestment
- Gross margin trajectory off the trough - does it return to 70%+ or settle lower
The macro tape is neutral-to-mildly-stressed (S&P off 3.4%, VIX 18.4, 10y at 4.38%), but ADI's 1.18 beta is being overridden by a strong stock-specific narrative. The story in play is platform-monopoly analog as the 'invisible picks-and-shovels' layer of AI infrastructure, EV electrification, and 5G — a durable narrative archetype that lets the market pay a large premium without demanding immediate fundamental proof. News flow reinforces this: pieces noting ADI 'ascends while market falls' and management's deliberate undershipping in industrial (now reversing) feed a recovery-plus-secular-growth framing that is exactly what bulls want to hear. Analyst tone is supportive and, critically, NOT lagging — 43 Buys, zero Sells, two upward target revisions this month at an average $479 (well above the $446 consensus and the $386 price). That is fresh, forward-leaning sell-side conviction rather than stale ratings, and it tells you the desk narrative is strengthening, not fading. Recent 16.9% momentum against a -5.4% long-term CAGR signals a regime change in flows into the name. The only real pressure points are macro: higher rates and stretched market multiples are an ambient headwind for any premium-multiple semi, and a 1.18 beta means a genuine risk-off leg would bite. But right now the narrative, news, analyst revisions, and relative strength all point the same direction.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether AI capex headlines from hyperscalers stay supportive or start to crack (would directly hit the analog-as-AI-picks-and-shovels story)
- Auto/industrial order data — a miss would puncture the undershipping-reversal framing
- VIX move above 22 or S&P breaking another 3-5% lower — would activate the 1.18 beta drag
- Any analyst downgrade or target cut breaking the current revision streak
- Sector rotation out of semis into defensives
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:04am (4h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.3B | $12.0B | $12.3B | $9.4B | $11.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.5B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.0B | $4.2B |
| Gross Profit | $4.9B | $7.8B | $7.9B | $5.4B | $6.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.2B | $4.5B | $4.1B | $3.3B | $3.8B |
| Operating Income | $1.7B | $3.3B | $3.8B | $2.0B | $2.9B |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $1.6B | $2.3B |
| EBITDA | $2.6B | $5.6B | $6.2B | $4.2B | $5.0B |
| EPS | $3.50 | $5.29 | $6.60 | $3.30 | $4.59 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:02am (4h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.0B | $1.5B | $958.1M | $2.0B | $2.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.4B | $4.9B | $4.4B | $5.5B | $7.1B |
| Total Assets | $52.3B | $50.3B | $48.8B | $48.2B | $48.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.8B | $2.4B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.3B | $6.5B | $5.9B | $6.6B | $8.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.3B | $13.8B | $13.2B | $13.1B | $14.2B |
| Total Equity | $38.0B | $36.5B | $35.6B | $35.2B | $33.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.5B | $8.7B | $10.4B | $10.2B | $10.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:03am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.7B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$343.7M | -$699.3M | -$1.3B | -$730.5M | -$533.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.4B | $3.8B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $4.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $2.5B | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$45.7M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.1B | -$2.6B | -$3.0B | -$615.6M | -$2.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | $922.1M | -$507.4M | -$512.5M | $1.0B | $508.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:02am (4h ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$14.7B $13.2B – $15.0B
|
$16.9B $14.8B – $17.7B
|
$18.6B $18.6B – $18.6B
|
$19.0B $17.3B – $20.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$6.5B $5.9B – $6.7B
|
$7.5B $6.6B – $7.9B
|
$8.3B $8.3B – $8.3B
|
$8.4B $7.7B – $8.9B
|
| Net Income |
$6.3B $6.0B – $6.5B
|
$7.2B $6.6B – $7.9B
|
$6.6B $6.5B – $9.8B
|
$8.4B $7.4B – $9.0B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:04am (4h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +64.2% | +2.4% | -23.4% | +16.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +60.7% | +0.9% | -31.7% | +25.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +93.8% | +16.6% | -46.8% | +44.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +97.7% | +20.6% | -50.7% | +38.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +116.2% | +10.2% | -31.8% | +19.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:04am (4h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | Golz Karen | S-Sale | 1,000.00 | $411.95 | $411,950 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 198.00 | $393.11 | $77,835 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 270.00 | $394.13 | $106,415 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 94.00 | $395.04 | $37,133 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 174.00 | $396.25 | $68,948 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 120.00 | $397.21 | $47,666 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 108.00 | $398.48 | $43,036 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 48.00 | $399.49 | $19,175 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 60.00 | $400.65 | $24,039 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 24.00 | $401.33 | $9,632 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 65.00 | $402.63 | $26,171 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 63.00 | $403.93 | $25,448 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 48.00 | $405.72 | $19,474 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 36.00 | $406.45 | $14,632 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 72.00 | $408.07 | $29,381 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 24.00 | $408.88 | $9,813 |
| 2026-06-10 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 12.00 | $410.32 | $4,924 |
| 2026-06-09 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 24.00 | $384.31 | $9,223 |
| 2026-06-09 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 36.00 | $386.76 | $13,923 |
| 2026-06-09 | STATA RAY | S-Sale | 36.00 | $388.36 | $13,981 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 6:44pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-02 | $1.10 | 2026-05-19 | 2026-06-02 | 2026-06-16 |
| 2026-03-03 | $1.10 | 2026-02-17 | 2026-03-03 | 2026-03-17 |
| 2025-12-08 | $0.99 | 2025-11-24 | 2025-12-08 | 2025-12-22 |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.99 | 2025-08-19 | 2025-09-02 | 2025-09-16 |
| 2025-06-04 | $0.99 | 2025-05-21 | 2025-06-04 | 2025-06-18 |
| 2025-03-04 | $0.99 | 2025-02-18 | 2025-03-04 | 2025-03-17 |
| 2024-12-09 | $0.92 | 2024-11-26 | 2024-12-09 | 2024-12-20 |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.92 | 2024-08-21 | 2024-09-03 | 2024-09-17 |
| 2024-06-04 | $0.92 | 2024-05-22 | 2024-06-04 | 2024-06-17 |
| 2024-03-04 | $0.92 | 2024-02-20 | 2024-03-05 | 2024-03-15 |
| 2023-12-01 | $0.86 | 2023-11-21 | 2023-12-04 | 2023-12-14 |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.86 | 2023-08-23 | 2023-09-05 | 2023-09-14 |
| 2023-06-02 | $0.86 | 2023-05-24 | 2023-06-05 | 2023-06-14 |
| 2023-02-24 | $0.86 | 2023-02-14 | 2023-02-27 | 2023-03-08 |
| 2022-12-02 | $0.76 | 2022-11-22 | 2022-12-05 | 2022-12-15 |
| 2022-08-29 | $0.76 | 2022-08-17 | 2022-08-30 | 2022-09-08 |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.76 | 2022-05-18 | 2022-05-31 | 2022-06-09 |
| 2022-02-24 | $0.76 | 2022-02-15 | 2022-02-25 | 2022-03-08 |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.69 | 2021-11-22 | 2021-12-03 | 2021-12-14 |
| 2021-08-26 | $0.69 | 2021-08-18 | 2021-08-27 | 2021-09-08 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly trajectory is the most important fact in this file and the synthesis model appears to have under-weighted it. Revenue has gone from $2.31B (Aug 2024) → $2.42B → $2.64B → $2.88B → $3.08B → $3.16B → $3.62B (May 2026), a 57% climb in seven quarters with net margin expanding from 17% to 32.5%. The most recent quarter's NI of $1.18B annualizes to ~$4.7B; against a $203B market cap that's ~43x run-rate earnings, not the 57x TTM P/E that anchors the bear case. The "decelerating" revenue confidence tag and the -5.4% revenue CAGR are artifacts of including the FY2023→FY2024 trough ($12.31B → $9.43B); they describe the past, not the inflection visibly in progress. Annualizing the last two quarters gets you to ~$13.5B revenue, an all-time high, with operating leverage clearly kicking in.
That said, the Valuation Synthesis's $108 DCF is not crazy — it's just answering a different question. At 43x run-rate earnings and 11x sales, ADI is priced for the up-cycle to continue and for analog content per vehicle/industrial system to compound. The bear story the Narrative model articulates — that this is cyclical inventory restock, not secular re-rating — is the right contrarian frame. Analog cycles historically overshoot on the way up because distributors double-order; ADI's prior peak was $12.31B in FY2023 followed by a 23% decline. If the May 2026 quarter is the new peak rather than a waypoint, $4.7B run-rate NI compresses back toward $3B and the multiple looks absurd. The insider selling pattern (multiple small S-sales clustered in June 2026, right at the revenue peak) is consistent with insiders who think this is closer to the top than the middle — though the share counts are trivially small and look like routine 10b5-1 / RSU vesting, not conviction dumps.
Where I disagree with the prior models: Market Forces calling this a "value trap with structural competitive erosion" is wrong on the facts — gross margin rebuilt from a trough to 61.5% and net margin just printed 32.5%, which is not what erosion looks like. TI, Microchip, and NXP are not taking ADI's data converter share; if anything, ADI/Maxim integration is paying off in mix. The "Macro Headwinds" tag is also stale given the print. Conversely, I think the Narrative model's "platform-monopoly / anchored" framing is roughly right but the durability call ("moderate") is too generous — analog has always re-rated down in mid-cycle, and ADI has done it twice in the last decade. Pre-Flight's ~18-20x forward P/E math assumes ~$11 EPS normalized; the May quarter alone was ~$2.35 EPS, so forward could be $9-10 and the forward multiple is more like 42-46x, not 18-20x. Someone moved a decimal.
My read: this is a high-quality cyclical at or near a cyclical peak being priced as a secular compounder. The $108 DCF is the floor in a hard landing; $417 prices in roughly two more years of this trajectory uninterrupted. Fair value on normalized earnings of ~$3.5B (midpoint between trough $1.64B and current run-rate $4.7B) at a deserved 30x quality multiple is ~$525B / share count ≈ $260-280. I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued to $108" verdict — that's a trough-anchored number that ignores the margin structure that just printed — but I also dissent from the implicit bull case that $417 is reasonable. The right action is to wait: one more quarter confirms whether $3.62B was peak or waypoint, and the stock will move 15-20% on that print either way. Starter positions here are paying a cyclical-peak tax for the privilege of being early to a thesis that needs another two quarters of validation.
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of Analog Devices, Inc. (ADI), I observe a compelling growth trajectory in recent quarters. Notably, ADI's revenue has surged from $2.31 billion in August 2024 to $3.62 billion in May 2026, marking a 57% increase over seven quarters. This growth is accompanied by an impressive expansion in net margins from 17% to 32.5%. The recent net income of $1.18 billion suggests a robust operating environment, which, when annualized, positions ADI with a run-rate earnings multiple closer to 43x, rather than the 56.9x trailing P/E ratio. This discrepancy highlights a potential misalignment in how the market perceives ADI's earnings potential versus its historical performance. Furthermore, ADI's strong free cash flow of $4.28 billion and controlled capex of $533.6 million underscore the company's operational efficiency and capacity to generate shareholder value.
I find myself largely in agreement with Opus's assessment that ADI is overvalued at its current price, although I diverge slightly on the extent. Opus contends that the fair value lies between $260-280, which I find reasonable given the company's current earnings momentum and margin expansion. This range reflects a cautious optimism about ADI's ability to sustain its growth trajectory, particularly in light of its recent performance. I concur with Opus that the Valuation Synthesis's $108 DCF is excessively bearish, as it fails to account for the recent improvements in ADI's financial metrics. However, I also agree with the synthesis that the market may be overly optimistic about ADI's growth prospects, as evidenced by the hefty premium to DCF and the narrative-driven valuation.
Where I part ways with Opus is on the characterization of ADI's market dynamics. Opus disagrees with the notion of "structural competitive erosion," citing ADI's solid gross and net margins. I concur that ADI's margin profile does not suggest erosion; however, I remain cautious about the company's long-term competitive positioning due to potential geopolitical risks and the cyclical nature of the semiconductor industry. The recent insider selling, although minor, could indicate management's awareness of these risks and the possibility of a cyclical peak.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus's might argue that the recent revenue and margin growth could be a temporary phenomenon driven by cyclical factors such as inventory restocking or short-term demand spikes in the automotive and industrial sectors. They might also question whether ADI's competitive edge in analog-to-digital conversion will remain as strong in the face of technological advancements and increasing competition in the semiconductor space.