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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Adma Biologics Inc. (ADMA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -29 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 16 · Value -66 · Sentiment 34 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Adma Biologics Inc.
ADMA NASDAQAdma Biologics Inc. is a commercial biopharmaceutical company specializing in plasma-derived biologics used to treat patients with immune deficiencies and certain infectious disease risks. The company operates an integrated model that spans plasma collection, manufacturing, and commercialization, enabling control over key steps in the supply chain. Its primary business segments are ADMA BioManufacturing, which produces immunoglobulin and related plasma-based therapies, and Plasma Collection Centers, which secure source plasma for its products. Adma Biologics also sells plasma-derived intermediate fractions generated during its FDA-approved manufacturing processes and provides laboratory contracting services, with capabilities that include contract filling, labeling, and packing for select customers. The company serves healthcare providers and patients primarily in the United States, focusing on therapies for individuals with compromised or deficient immune systems who are at elevated risk for infections. Headquartered in Ramsey, New Jersey, Adma Biologics plays a specialized role in the biotechnology and healthcare sectors by supplying targeted plasma-derived therapeutic options.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.60
Total Equity: $477.32M
Shares: 244,904,640
Total Debt: $72.14M
Cash: $87.63M
EBITDA: $199.44M
Total Debt: $72.14M
Cash: $87.63M
Revenue: $510.17M
Revenue: $510.17M
Revenue: $510.17M
Total Equity: $477.32M
Tax Rate: 19.6%
Equity: $477.32M
Total Debt: $72.14M
Cash: $87.63M
Current Liabilities: $69.54M
Long-Term Debt: $69.33M
Total Debt: $72.14M
Total Equity: $477.32M
Shares: 244,904,640
Shares: 244,904,640
CapEx: -$22.58M
Shares: 244,904,640
Stock Price: $9.47
Net Income: $146.93M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:23am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $80.9M | $154.1M | $258.2M | $426.5M | $510.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | $79.8M | $118.8M | $169.3M | $206.9M | $217.4M |
| Gross Profit | $1.2M | $35.3M | $88.9M | $219.6M | $292.8M |
| Operating Expenses | $59.5M | $74.6M | $67.3M | $80.6M | $101.3M |
| Operating Income | -$58.4M | -$39.4M | $21.6M | $139.0M | $191.4M |
| Net Income | -$71.6M | -$65.9M | -$28.2M | $197.7M | $146.9M |
| EBITDA | -$53.6M | -$33.0M | $29.2M | $146.7M | $199.4M |
| EPS | $-0.51 | $-0.33 | $-0.13 | $0.85 | $0.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.51 | $-0.33 | $-0.13 | $0.81 | $0.60 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:09am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $51.1M | $86.5M | $51.4M | $103.1M | $87.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $208.7M | $270.4M | $257.0M | $331.4M | $466.5M |
| Total Assets | $276.3M | $348.5M | $329.2M | $488.7M | $624.2M |
| Current Liabilities | $30.4M | $39.3M | $49.8M | $55.5M | $69.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | $72.3M | $69.3M |
| Total Liabilities | $135.1M | $196.5M | $194.0M | $139.7M | $146.9M |
| Total Equity | $141.2M | $152.0M | $135.2M | $349.0M | $477.3M |
| Retained Earnings | -$412.1M | -$478.0M | -$506.3M | -$308.6M | -$161.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:23am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$112.4M | -$59.5M | $8.8M | $118.7M | $50.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.5M | -$13.9M | -$4.8M | -$8.2M | -$22.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$125.9M | -$73.4M | $4.0M | $110.4M | $27.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $151.8M | $135.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$31.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$4.8M | $35.4M | -$35.2M | $51.8M | -$15.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:23am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +90.4% | +67.6% | +65.2% | +19.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +2,905.7% | +152.2% | +146.8% | +33.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +32.6% | +155.0% | +542.5% | +37.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +8.0% | +57.2% | +800.0% | -25.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +38.5% | +188.7% | +401.8% | +36.0% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15Plasma collection and fractionation economics are yield- and labor-driven: AI-assisted donor recruitment, deferral prediction, center scheduling and pool/titer optimization raise grams of IgG per liter and per labor hour, and because plasma cost is largely fixed per donation, incremental yield falls almost entirely to gross profit.
Two indirect channels: AI-accelerated discovery and development of non-plasma alternatives (FcRn antagonists, engineered recombinant IgG, targeted biologics) that could erode IVIG volume growth in autoimmune/neurology indications late in the decade, and payer-side AI utilization management tightening prior authorization on an expensive, heavily managed therapy.
Whether IVIG demand keeps outrunning industry plasma supply. Observable: ADMA's gross margin per gram and yield-per-liter disclosures versus any softening in IVIG pricing or distributor demand as recombinant substitutes take share in specific indications.
FDA-licensed fractionation capacity, a validated multi-year-built plant, a proprietary high-titer RSV/hyperimmune donor network, and a physical footprint of licensed collection centers — capital, regulatory and biological assets untouched by falling software cost.
AI Lens thesis
The customer need — immunoglobulin replacement for primary immune deficiency — is biological and persistent, and the product is a physical biologic derived from human donors, so no amount of cheap intelligence substitutes for the input or the licensed plant; AI reaches ADMA on the cost side (donor acquisition, center throughput, deferral and titer screening, process/yield modeling, and back-office scale as revenue grows faster than headcount) and only indirectly on the demand side, where AI-compressed drug development timelines could bring competing non-plasma modalities to more Ig indications sooner than the historical pace; the value ADMA creates from AI is retained rather than competed away because its bottleneck is plasma volume, not software features, and because rivals (CSL, Grifols, Octapharma) face the same physical constraint — meaning AI cannot be the reason to own or avoid this name, it is a few points of margin around a supply-and-price story.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside ADMA's profit is unusually leverage-sensitive to yield per liter and donor cost per litre; algorithmic donor targeting and deferral reduction across its own centers can move gross margin several points with no capital spend, an operating lever the market treats as process engineering rather than a repeatable compounding one.
Downside Payer and PBM AI-driven utilization review is an underrated volume tax on a high-cost, indication-fuzzy therapy — automated criteria enforcement can shrink off-label and marginal IVIG use faster than clinical substitution would.
Outcome range spread 29
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:37The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a genuinely impressive story that the synthesis model is undervaluing. Revenue has gone from $80.9M (2021) to $510.2M (2025) — a 6.3x jump in four years — with gross margins expanding from 1.5% to 57.4% and operating margins from -72% to +37.5%. The quarterly trajectory shows revenue steadying in the $114-139M range with net margin climbing from 23.4% in Q1'25 to 39.6% in Q1'26. That's not decelerating profitability — that's operating leverage kicking in on a stable revenue base. ROIC of 33% and ROE of 31% on a debt/equity of 0.15 with a current ratio of 6.7 is a genuinely pristine balance sheet. This is not a "poor cash flow quality" business in any conventional sense — OCF of $50.4M on $146.9M net income does show a working-capital drag (likely inventory build for BIVIGAM/ASCENIV volume), but that's a growth-stage feature, not accounting shenanigans.
Where I diverge sharply from the Valuation Synthesis: a $4.48 DCF fair value implies the model is assuming margin reversion to something like 15-20% steady-state and near-zero volume growth. On 2025 net income of $146.9M, the current $2.12B market cap is 14.4x trailing earnings — for a company that grew revenue 19.6% YoY and expanded net margin ~1600bps sequentially over four quarters. If you assume 2026 revenue lands at $500-550M with 35% net margin (below the most recent quarter), you get $175-190M in earnings, and the stock trades at ~11x forward. The synthesis verdict of "overvalued by 52.7%" would require you to believe ADMA's margin structure collapses back toward 2023 levels, which contradicts the Q1'26 print showing the opposite. The Pre-Flight model correctly identifies this — the market is pricing in mean reversion that the data doesn't support yet.
The contrarian case does exist, though, and it's worth taking seriously. The 2024-12-31 quarter showed $111.9M NI on $117.5M revenue (95% margin) — that's a tax benefit or one-time item distorting the annual comp; strip it out and 2024 "real" earnings were closer to $85-100M, making the 2025 growth less dramatic. Recent earnings YoY of -25.7% is real if you're comparing against that inflated Q4'24. Second, plasma-derived Ig is a commoditized market where CSL, Grifols, and Takeda are 10-50x ADMA's size and can absorb pricing pressure indefinitely; ADMA's scarcity-value narrative around ASCENIV (hyperimmune for immunocompromised) is real but the TAM is narrow. Third, insider activity is mixed — the P-Purchases are tiny (6,400 and 12,500 shares) and the awards/gifts/sales pattern looks like routine comp, not conviction buying. Fourth, revenue sequentially declined from $139.2M in Q4'25 to $114.5M in Q1'26 (-17.7%), which could be seasonality or could be the leading edge of the pricing pressure bears warn about.
My verdict: the synthesis model is anchoring too hard on DCF steady-state and ignoring that operating margins are still expanding in real-time. At $9.47, ADMA trades at ~11-12x forward earnings for a business with 30%+ ROIC, net cash position, and revenue that 5x'd in four years. Fair value is closer to $12-14 (15-16x forward $175M NI) than to $4.48 — the synthesis is off by roughly 2.5-3x on the low side, in my read. That said, the Q1'26 sequential revenue decline is a real yellow flag; if Q2'26 confirms deceleration below $120M with margin compression, the bear case activates and $6-7 becomes the floor. This is a "moderately undervalued, watch the next print" setup, not a table-pounder — the story is anchored to fundamentals that are still improving, but the market's skepticism about durability isn't crazy given how commoditized the end market is.
GPT Reading
ADMA does not read like a typical biotech at all; it reads like a small, newly scaled specialty manufacturer that has finally crossed the absorption threshold where fixed costs stop crushing the P&L. The raw operating trajectory is the first thing that matters here. Revenue went from $80.9M in 2021 to $510.2M in 2025, a 6x jump in four years, while gross profit expanded from essentially breakeven at $1.2M to $292.8M. Even more important, that improvement has held at scale: 2025 operating income was $191.4M, a 37.5% operating margin, versus just $21.6M in 2023. Quarterly revenue has flattened somewhat around the $114M-$139M range over the last five quarters, but profitability has not rolled over; excluding the obvious one-time distortion in 4Q24 net income of $111.9M on $117.5M of sales, quarterly net margins have still generally lived in the high-20s to mid-30s, culminating in 1Q26 net income of $45.3M on $114.5M of revenue, or 39.6%. That is not the profile of a business with “razor-thin margins”; it is the profile of a constrained-supply product business with real operating leverage.
Valuation also looks much less demanding than the bearish models imply. At $2.12B market cap and $9.47 per share, the stock sits at 4.5x 2025 sales, 15.8x earnings, and 11.2x EV/EBITDA, with net cash roughly neutral once $87.6M of cash is offset against $72.1M of debt. For a company that grew revenue 20% in the latest quarter year over year and has moved from losses in 2023 to roughly $147M of 2025 net income, that is not expensive. If anything, the market is already discounting a meaningful normalization of margins. The key interpretive issue is cash flow quality: operating cash flow of $50.4M and free cash flow of $27.8M lag reported earnings badly. I do not ignore that, but for this specific business I weigh earnings more heavily than a one-year FCF snapshot because capex of $22.6M and likely working-capital swings are part of a capacity build and inventory-intensive plasma model. A business moving from $146.9M of net income to only $27.8M of free cash flow deserves scrutiny, but it does not automatically mean the earnings are fictitious when the balance sheet is strong, the current ratio is 6.7, and leverage is modest at 0.15x debt to equity.
What stands out to me is that the stock price seems to reflect disbelief in durability more than evidence of deterioration. The latest quarter’s revenue of $114.5M was basically flat versus $114.8M a year earlier, so the top line has clearly decelerated from the explosive phase, and recent earnings were down year over year against a tougher comparison. But even on that flatter revenue base, net income rose sharply sequentially from $26.9M in 1Q25 to $45.3M in 1Q26, suggesting mix, manufacturing efficiency, or lower cost inputs are still improving. That matters because if ADMA can simply hold annualized revenue around the current run rate of roughly $460M-$500M while sustaining net margins above 25%, the stock is already trading around a mid-teens earnings multiple on a de-risked balance sheet. For a niche healthcare manufacturer with ROIC above 33% and ROE above 30%, that is too cheap unless profits are peaking right now. The insider tape, while not huge, also leans supportive: there were open-market purchases in May 2026 rather than a stream of discretionary sales into strength.
The smartest bear case is straightforward and serious: the market may be correctly treating 2025 as peak economics. Revenue growth has slowed materially, recent quarterly sales have stalled, and the gap between net income ($146.9M) and operating cash flow ($50.4M) is too large to wave away. If working capital keeps consuming cash and capex remains necessary to support production, the earnings multiple is overstating owner earnings power. There is also no escaping that this is a small player in a plasma-derived products market dominated by much larger competitors, and the extraordinary step-up from gross margin of 34.4% in 2023 to 57.4% in 2025 may invite competition, payer pressure, or simple mean reversion. On that view, 4.5x sales is not cheap for a business whose best growth phase is over. I weigh those points differently because even after haircutting 2025 earnings heavily, the enterprise is not priced for much success: if normalized net income is $100M rather than $147M, the stock is still around 21x earnings for a profitable, balance-sheet-clean company that has proven it can manufacture at scale. That is not a bargain-basement multiple, but it is far from the kind of overvaluation that justifies a fair value in the $4-$5 range.
What would change my mind is evidence that the margin story is accounting-deep rather than cash-deep. If the next few quarters show revenue slipping below $110M while net margins fall back toward the teens and operating cash flow continues to trail net income by $20M-$30M per quarter, I would conclude 2025 was the crest and that the current multiple is too high. Likewise, if capex and inventory needs keep free cash flow near zero despite reported profitability, the equity deserves a lower earnings multiple. Conversely, if ADMA can produce another 12 months around $500M revenue, keep operating margin above 30%, and convert even half of net income into free cash flow, this stock should not be sitting under 16x earnings.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a company that has completed a genuine operating turnaround and is now being priced as if that turnaround is about to reverse. Revenue scaled from $80.9M in 2021 to $510.2M in 2025, a 40.6% CAGR, while the business flipped from a $71.6M net loss to $146.9M of net income and a 28.8% net margin. Gross margin sits at 57.4% and operating margin at 37.5%, with ROE of 30.8% and ROIC of 33.4% on a clean balance sheet ($87.6M cash, $72.1M debt, debt-to-equity 0.15, current ratio 6.7). The 2024 net income of $197.7M was inflated by a one-time Q4 item that produced a 95% margin; strip that out and 2025’s $146.9M looks like real, improved earnings power rather than mean reversion. At $9.47 and a $2.12B market cap the stock trades at 15.8x trailing earnings, 4.5x sales and 11.2x EV/EBITDA—multiples that are undemanding for a vertically integrated plasma player posting mid-to-high-thirties operating margins.
What stands out on the recent tape is deceleration, not collapse. Q1 2026 revenue of $114.5M was essentially flat with the year-earlier $114.8M and down sequentially from Q4’s $139.2M, confirming the 19.6% recent revenue growth rate is already slowing from the multi-year CAGR. Yet that same quarter delivered a 39.6% net margin—the highest clean margin in the series—so the profit engine is still expanding even as volume growth cools. Free-cash-flow conversion is the clear soft spot: only $27.8M of FCF on $146.9M of net income and $50.4M of operating cash flow after $22.6M of capex. That gap is consistent with working-capital build in a plasma-collection and manufacturing ramp rather than accounting fiction, but it is real and it keeps the cash-flow-based valuation fragile.
I reject the prior model’s $4.48 fair-value conclusion. A composite that marks the stock 53% overvalued while the company earns a 33% ROIC, carries almost no leverage, and still grows high-teens on the top line is overweighting one year of imperfect cash conversion and an assumed sector contraction that the company’s own margins are not yet reflecting. The 53% drawdown from the $20.46 high already embeds deep skepticism about sustainability; at 15.8x earnings the market is not paying for perfection.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: cash flow quality is poor, revenue is decelerating, and the company competes against far larger, better-capitalized plasma majors. If the Q1 stall is the start of a volume plateau rather than seasonality, and if immunoglobulin pricing compresses, the 57% gross margin and the entire scarcity narrative around the integrated model erode quickly. In that world the stock is worth closer to 8–10x a lower earnings base and the current price is too high. I weigh that risk as material but secondary to the evidence already in hand—margin expansion continuing into the slowdown, fortress liquidity, and insider open-market purchases in May 2026—because the operating leverage has already been demonstrated across multiple quarters, not promised.
My mind changes if two consecutive quarters show revenue declining year-over-year while gross margin falls below 50%, or if full-year 2026 free cash flow remains under $40M despite flat-to-up earnings. Either print would confirm that the earnings are low-quality and the multiple compression thesis is correct.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ADMA has undergone a genuine operational transformation: revenue compounded from $80.9M (2021) to $510.2M (2025), gross margin expanded from 1.4% to 57.4%, and operating margin flipped from -72.1% to +37.5%. Net income turned positive in 2024 ($197.7M, aided by a likely deferred tax asset release) and normalized to $146.9M in 2025. This is not a speculative biotech - it is a scaled, profitable specialty plasma products company with Altman Z of 10.89 and a self-funding FCF profile ($27.8M in 2025, $110.4M in 2024).
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Working capital drivers in 2025 - is inventory build for plasma/ASCENIV the reason OCF trails NI, and is it strategic vs stuck?
- Magnitude and timing of the 2024 deferred tax asset release inflating that year's net income
- Customer/payer concentration and any single-plasma-center dependency
- Convertible or warrant overhang from prior financing rounds that drove 15.1% share growth
- SBC run-rate going forward now that the company is profitable - is dilution normalizing?
- Segment detail on ASCENIV vs BIVIGAM contribution and pricing durability
The composite fair value lands at $5.17 and the signal-adjusted FV at $4.48, implying downside of roughly 45-53% from $9.47. Both underlying methods agree tightly (DCF $5.03, EPV floor $5.45), so this is not a runaway-method problem - the models see a business worth roughly half the quoted price. Even generously flexing assumptions for the improving margin ladder and rare integrated plasma-to-product footprint, closing a ~$4 per share gap requires either a step-change in immunoglobulin volumes or durable pricing that the bear case explicitly disputes given CSL/Grifols/Octapharma scale. Company quality is Solid, which lifts deserved value modestly above pure EPV - but the earnings-quality haircut (score -1, cash vs earnings gap in 2025) pulls the other way. Net-net, a deserved value in the $5-6 range is defensible; $9.47 is not, unless you underwrite a multi-year growth runway well beyond what the composite captures. The $2.1B market cap is pricing the turnaround as substantially complete and extrapolating.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Ig volume growth trajectory and pricing in next 2 quarters
- Free cash flow conversion vs GAAP earnings (the 2025 gap)
- Any signal of renewed equity issuance given prior heavy dilution
- Gross margin durability as capacity scales
ADMA sits inside a moderate turnaround narrative that has already done a lot of work - the stock is up on a 40.6% CAGR and trades at a 111% premium to DCF, meaning sentiment, not fundamentals, is doing the lifting. The risk-on tape (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs) is a supportive backdrop for a small-cap biotech that has crossed into profitability; investors are willing to pay for the 'scarcity value of integrated plasma capacity' story in a calm market. Beta of 0.77 mutes macro whiplash either way, so the higher-rates headwind lands only lightly here. The pressure is tilted positive but softening. Recent 19.6% trailing return versus the 40.6% long-term CAGR signals the narrative is losing intensity - the easy re-rating is behind it, and the story now needs fresh proof points (volume, margin) to keep the premium. Narrative durability is only moderate and the cult coefficient is low, so there is no fan base to defend the name if execution wobbles or if a plasma major cuts price. Net: still a tailwind, but a fading one, not a mania.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether quarterly volume and margin prints reinforce or crack the margin-expansion story
- Any pricing action from CSL, Grifols, or Octapharma that would puncture the scarcity narrative
- Analyst target revisions - whether tone is still catching up to price or starting to fade
- Whether the recent deceleration in trailing return extends into an outright breakdown of the trend
The customer need — immunoglobulin replacement for primary immune deficiency — is biological and persistent, and the product is a physical biologic derived from human donors, so no amount of cheap intelligence substitutes for the input or the licensed plant; AI reaches ADMA on the cost side (donor acquisition, center throughput, deferral and titer screening, process/yield modeling, and back-office scale as revenue grows faster than headcount) and only indirectly on the demand side, where AI-compressed drug development timelines could bring competing non-plasma modalities to more Ig indications sooner than the historical pace; the value ADMA creates from AI is retained rather than competed away because its bottleneck is plasma volume, not software features, and because rivals (CSL, Grifols, Octapharma) face the same physical constraint — meaning AI cannot be the reason to own or avoid this name, it is a few points of margin around a supply-and-price story.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- collection center count and volumes
- plant capacity expansion approvals
- hyperimmune donor pool size
- recombinant polyclonal IgG clinical entries
- FcRn-class label expansions
- subcutaneous vs IV mix shifts
- PI diagnosis and treated-patient counts
- share of revenue from PI vs autoimmune use
Immunoglobulin demand is one of the more insulated pockets of healthcare: chronic, prescribed, largely reimbursed, and gated by plasma supply rather than by consumer discretion. That makes the world backdrop — macro headwinds, a biotech sector in demand contraction, funding stress — less relevant to ADMA than to the average name in its sector, because ADMA is a commercial manufacturer, not a clinical-stage capital consumer. The real world variable is plasma economics: donor compensation costs, collection center throughput, and how much new fractionation capacity the majors bring online. That single variable sets IG price per gram, and IG price per gram sets ADMA's whole earnings inflection. Rates at 4.63% matter only insofar as they price further capacity expansion, which is largely already built.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for ADMA — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.