Business Description
Adaptive Biotechnologies Corporation, founded in 2009 and headquartered in Seattle, Washington (operating as Adaptive TCR Corporation until its name change in December 2011), is a commercial-stage entity focused on pioneering an immune medicine platform. This advanced platform is engineered for the precise diagnosis and effective treatment of a broad spectrum of illnesses. The company offers several core technological solutions. Its immunoSEQ platform, a foundational immunosequencing product, is vital for translational research and discovering novel prognostic and diagnostic markers. For confirming past COVID-19 infections, Adaptive provides T-Detect COVID. Additionally, clonoSEQ functions as a critical clinical diagnostic tool, enabling the detection and continuous monitoring of minimal residual disease in individuals with multiple myeloma, B-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia, and chronic lymphocytic leukemia; it is also available as a CLIA-validated laboratory-developed test for other lymphoid cancers. Another specialized offering, immunoSEQ T-MAP COVID, aids vaccine developers and researchers in quantifying T-cell immune responses to vaccines. Beyond its current product lineup, Adaptive Biotechnologies actively develops a pipeline of clinical products and services designed for the diagnosis, monitoring, and treatment of conditions such as cancer, autoimmune disorders, and infectious diseases. Its solutions cater to life science research, clinical diagnostics, and drug discovery applications. The company has established key strategic collaborations: one with Genentech, Inc., for the joint development, manufacturing, and commercialization of neoantigen-directed T-cell therapies aimed at treating various cancers; and another with Microsoft Corporation, dedicated to creating sophisticated diagnostic tests capable of identifying multiple diseases early from a single blood sample.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 7:45pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.39
Total Equity: $218.79M
Shares: 151,721,939
Total Debt: $210.36M
Cash: $70.50M
EBITDA: -$29.85M
Total Debt: $210.36M
Cash: $70.50M
Revenue: $276.98M
Shares: 151,721,939
Revenue: $276.98M
Revenue: $276.98M
Revenue: $276.98M
Total Equity: $218.79M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $218.79M
Total Debt: $210.36M
Cash: $70.50M
Current Liabilities: $89.92M
Long-Term Debt: $196.79M
Total Debt: $210.36M
Total Equity: $218.79M
Shares: 151,721,939
Shares: 151,721,939
CapEx: -$2.96M
Shares: 151,721,939
Stock Price: $20.96
Net Income: -$59.50M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The 2025 numbers genuinely look like an inflection: revenue +54.7% YoY ($179M→$277M), gross margin rebuilt from 55.6%→74.2%, operating margin from -90.8% to -20.6%, and FCF burn cut roughly in half ($-98.9M→$-48.9M). Mechanical earnings-quality checks are clean (Beneish -2.39, accruals -5.7%, OCF/NI 0.78x), and with $227M cash and current burn the company has ~18 quarters of runway — no forced raise in 2026. That's the real bull case and it's stronger than the 'turnaround-bet' framing suggests.
But the gross-margin jump from 59.7% to 74.2% in a single year is suspicious for a diagnostic/services business and is the fingerprint of a high-margin milestone or pharma contract pull-in, not steady-state clonoSEQ economics. SBC at 18.6% of revenue ($~51M) means 'adjusted' profitability is materially overstated — the real operating loss is structural. Diluted shares have crept from 140.4M→151.7M (8% over 4 years), modest but persistent. Insider activity is one-sided: 37 sells / 0 open-market buys over 12 months, and the recent tape is dominated by Rubinstein doing daily option-exercise-and-sell programs — these are 10b5-1 mechanical sales, not panic, but the absence of ANY P-code buying across an entire management team during a supposed inflection is itself a tell.
At $15.22 / $2.44B market cap, the stock trades at ~8.8x trailing revenue on a business that just printed its first credible quarter of operating leverage. If 2025 is the new run-rate the multiple is defensible; if Q3'25 contained a milestone bolus, fair value collapses toward the AI synthesis's $9-11. The pipeline is right that this is binary on the next 1-2 prints.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 11:35am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $154.3M | $185.3M | $170.3M | $179.0M | $277.0M |
| Cost of Revenue | $49.3M | $57.9M | $75.6M | $72.1M | $71.4M |
| Gross Profit | $105.0M | $127.4M | $94.7M | $106.9M | $205.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $314.0M | $327.6M | $321.8M | $269.4M | $262.7M |
| Operating Income | -$209.0M | -$200.2M | -$227.0M | -$162.5M | -$57.1M |
| Net Income | -$207.3M | -$200.2M | -$225.3M | -$159.5M | -$59.5M |
| EBITDA | -$193.3M | -$175.2M | -$189.3M | -$128.8M | -$29.8M |
| EPS | $-1.46 | $-1.00 | $-1.56 | $-1.08 | $-0.39 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 11:35am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $139.1M | $90.0M | $65.1M | $47.9M | $70.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $402.7M | $562.1M | $410.2M | $283.8M | $300.2M |
| Total Assets | $923.3M | $856.6M | $661.1M | $539.4M | $512.7M |
| Current Liabilities | $113.8M | $109.8M | $88.0M | $98.1M | $89.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $196.8M |
| Total Liabilities | $319.2M | $392.5M | $352.9M | $336.9M | $287.7M |
| Total Equity | $604.0M | $464.2M | $308.4M | $202.7M | $218.8M |
| Retained Earnings | -$718.9M | -$919.1M | -$1.1B | -$1.3B | -$1.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 11:35am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$192.7M | -$183.9M | -$156.3M | -$95.2M | -$46.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$61.7M | -$16.3M | -$10.7M | -$3.7M | -$3.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$254.5M | -$200.3M | -$167.0M | -$98.9M | -$48.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $15.6M | -$49.0M | -$25.0M | -$17.2M | $22.4M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$352.1M $348.9M – $358.3M
|
$429.0M $429.0M – $429.0M
|
$524.9M $519.0M – $531.7M
|
$658.0M $650.6M – $666.6M
|
| EBITDA |
-$265.7M -$270.4M – -$263.2M
|
-$323.7M -$323.7M – -$323.7M
|
-$396.1M -$401.2M – -$391.6M
|
-$496.5M -$503.0M – -$490.9M
|
| Net Income |
-$38.0M -$45.2M – -$26.5M
|
-$17.4M -$48.3M – $15.1M
|
$6.8M $6.7M – $6.9M
|
$1.5M $1.5M – $1.5M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 11:35am (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.1% | -8.1% | +5.1% | +54.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.3% | -25.6% | +12.8% | +92.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +4.2% | -13.4% | +28.4% | +64.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +3.4% | -12.5% | +29.2% | +62.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +9.4% | -8.0% | +32.0% | +76.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | ROBINS HARLAN S | S-Sale | 100,000.00 | $17.37 | $1.7M |
| 2026-06-16 | ROBINS HARLAN S | S-Sale | 6,160.00 | $18.01 | $110,942 |
| 2026-06-11 | BOBULSKY SUSAN | S-Sale | 5,000.00 | $19.00 | $95,000 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 9,376.00 | $8.12 | $76,133 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 2,344.00 | $3.99 | $9,353 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 2,009.00 | $8.46 | $16,996 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 5,792.00 | $12.14 | $70,315 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | S-Sale | 39,741.00 | $17.49 | $695,070 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 5,792.00 | $12.14 | $70,315 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 9,376.00 | $8.12 | $76,133 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 2,344.00 | $3.99 | $9,353 |
| 2026-06-04 | LO FRANCIS | M-Exempt | 2,009.00 | $8.46 | $16,996 |
| 2026-06-04 | BOBULSKY SUSAN | S-Sale | 11,000.00 | $18.00 | $198,000 |
| 2026-05-18 | PISKEL KYLE | S-Sale | 3,115.00 | $13.04 | $40,620 |
| 2026-04-27 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | M-Exempt | 14,707.00 | $8.46 | $124,421 |
| 2026-04-27 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | S-Sale | 19,037.00 | $14.23 | $270,897 |
| 2026-04-27 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | M-Exempt | 14,707.00 | $8.46 | $124,421 |
| 2026-04-22 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | M-Exempt | 14,722.00 | $8.46 | $124,548 |
| 2026-04-23 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | M-Exempt | 14,722.00 | $8.46 | $124,548 |
| 2026-04-24 | RUBINSTEIN JULIE | M-Exempt | 14,722.00 | $8.46 | $124,548 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more ambiguous story than the "55% revenue growth" headline suggests. Yes, FY25 revenue of $277M vs FY24 $179M is +54.7%, and operating loss compressed from -$162.5M to -$57.1M — genuine operating leverage. But look at the quarterly cadence: Q3'25 spiked to $94.0M with +$9.5M net income (the only profitable quarter in the file), then Q4'25 collapsed back to $71.7M and Q1'26 to $70.9M with losses re-widening to -$20M. That Q3 print smells like a milestone payment, a Genentech amortization catch-up, or a lumpy pharma deal — not a sustainable run-rate. Strip Q3 out and the underlying business is doing ~$70M/quarter ($280M annualized) with ~25-28% net margin losses. The "trajectory" the synthesis touts is largely one quarter of noise.
The balance sheet is where I most disagree with the prior models' relative calm. $70.5M cash against -$48.9M FY25 FCF and a Q1'26 that just printed -$20M net income implies roughly 12-18 months of runway absent a raise, depending on working capital. The "current_ratio 3.34" is misleading because total debt and equity are missing from the tile — I can't verify capital structure, but with an 11.3x P/B and ~$2.44B market cap implying ~$217M of book equity, dilution risk is material and likely imminent. Insider activity reinforces this: ten consecutive M-Exempt/S-Sale pairings in April-May 2026 is mechanical option-exercise-and-dump, not conviction selling, but there's zero offsetting open-market buying near $15. Nobody inside thinks this is cheap.
I largely agree with Market Forces' "neutral" and Narrative Economics' "fragile durability" reads, and I think the Synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is too polite — it's a hedge dressed as a call. At 8.9x sales for a company that posted one profitable quarter on what looks like lumpy revenue, with decelerating sequential quarters (Q4 -23.7% QoQ, Q1 -1.1% QoQ), the multiple is pricing clonoSEQ MRD dominance AND immunoSEQ platform monetization AND no dilution. The Pre-Flight thesis acknowledges this requires 2-3 years to profitability, but the cash position doesn't support 2-3 years of current burn. A contrarian bull would argue clonoSEQ ordering volumes are the real KPI (not GAAP revenue, which gets distorted by deferred Genentech revenue recognition) and that gross margin at 74.2% — genuinely strong, up from ~60% — proves unit economics work at scale. That's the steelman, and it's not crazy. But it requires believing the next capital raise comes at or above $15, which insider behavior contradicts.
I dissent from the implied "hold and watch" tone. At $15.23 / $2.44B, ADPT is priced for a successful platform outcome with no margin for the binary risks the Narrative layer correctly flags (clinical readouts, competitive sequencing pressure from 10x/Illumina-adjacent, reimbursement). Fair value on a sober revenue-multiple basis — 5-6x sustainable ~$285M revenue, haircut for dilution risk of ~15% — lands around $9-11. The bull case to $22-25 requires Q2'26 to re-accelerate above $80M organically and a financing event at premium. Risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside until the next quarterly print clarifies whether Q3'25 was signal or noise. The decelerating quarterly trend flagged in Revenue Confidence is the single most important data point in this file and the synthesis underweights it.
GPT Critique
Adaptive Biotechnologies presents a complex picture with both encouraging and concerning elements. The raw data indicates a strong revenue growth of 54.8% from FY24 to FY25, with a significant improvement in operating losses, shrinking from -$162.5M to -$57.1M. This suggests a potential trajectory toward profitability, though the path is not straightforward. The quarterly data highlights a volatile revenue pattern, with a notable Q3 2025 spike to $94M and positive net income, but followed by a return to losses in subsequent quarters. This suggests that the Q3 spike may have been due to a non-recurring event, rather than a sustainable trend. The gross margin of 74.2% is a positive indicator, reflecting strong unit economics that could support future profitability if revenue stabilizes.
I concur with Opus's assessment that the Q3 2025 spike appears anomalous and possibly driven by lumpy or one-time factors, rather than a stable increase in business operations. The analysis correctly points out that excluding Q3, the business appears to operate at approximately $70M per quarter, with persistent net margin losses, indicating ongoing financial challenges. I also agree with Opus's concerns regarding the company's cash position, with $70.5M on hand and a negative free cash flow of -$48.9M in FY25, suggesting a limited runway without additional capital. This aligns with the insider selling activity, which signals a lack of insider confidence at current valuations.
However, I diverge from Opus in the interpretation of the market's pricing of Adaptive. While Opus suggests the company is overvalued at an 8.9x P/S multiple, I would argue that this multiple reflects the market's anticipation of future profitability and platform success. The strong gross margin supports the potential for profitability if the company can stabilize its revenue. Additionally, the narrative around Adaptive's platform potential in MRD monitoring and immune sequencing holds significant promise, as reflected in the market's optimism.
A careful skeptic might argue that both our views underestimate the potential for Adaptive to secure strategic partnerships or breakthrough technological advancements that could rapidly accelerate revenue and profitability. They might also point out that the current valuation already reflects a significant risk premium, and the market has priced in the binary risks identified, such as competitive pressures and clinical readouts.