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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Autodesk Inc. (ADSK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 70 · Value -75 · Sentiment 39 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $130.14 vs $236.51 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Autodesk Inc.
ADSK NASDAQAutodesk Inc. is a global software company specializing in design, engineering, and entertainment solutions for professional users and organizations. The company’s portfolio centers on computer-aided design and 3D modeling tools that support workflows in architecture, engineering, and construction, including applications for building information modeling, infrastructure planning, and civil engineering projects. In manufacturing, Autodesk provides product development and digital engineering platforms that enable industrial designers and engineers to conceptualize, simulate, and document complex products and production systems. The company is also a key technology provider to the media and entertainment industry, offering specialized software for 3D animation, visual effects, and game development used in film, television, and interactive content. Autodesk delivers its products primarily as subscriptions and cloud-based services, complemented by consulting, training, and enterprise licensing arrangements, and serves customers worldwide from its headquarters in San Francisco, California, where it has operated since 1982.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.23
Total Equity: $3.05B
Shares: 215,000,000
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $2.25B
EBITDA: $1.77B
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $2.25B
Revenue: $7.21B
Revenue: $7.21B
Revenue: $7.21B
Total Equity: $3.05B
Tax Rate: 29.9%
Equity: $3.05B
Total Debt: $2.50B
Cash: $2.25B
Current Liabilities: $5.81B
Long-Term Debt: $2.50B
Total Debt: $2.50B
Total Equity: $3.05B
Shares: 215,000,000
Shares: 215,000,000
CapEx: -$43.00M
Shares: 215,000,000
Stock Price: $236.75
Net Income: $1.12B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:04pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.4B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $6.1B | $7.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $418.5M | $480.0M | $511.0M | $578.0M | $650.0M |
| Gross Profit | $4.0B | $4.5B | $5.0B | $5.6B | $6.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $5.0B |
| Operating Income | $617.6M | $989.0M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Net Income | $497.0M | $823.0M | $906.0M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| EBITDA | $765.7M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| EPS | $2.26 | $3.81 | $4.23 | $5.17 | $5.28 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.24 | $3.78 | $4.19 | $5.12 | $5.23 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 11:33am (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.9B | $1.9B | — | $1.6B | $2.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.3B | $3.6B | — | $3.5B | $4.9B |
| Total Assets | $9.4B | $9.9B | — | $10.8B | $12.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.0B | $4.4B | — | $5.2B | $5.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.3B | $2.3B | — | $2.3B | $2.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $8.3B | $8.1B | — | $8.2B | $9.4B |
| Total Equity | $1.1B | $1.9B | — | $2.6B | $3.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.0B | -$1.7B | — | -$1.3B | -$1.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:04pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.5B | $2.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$56.0M | -$40.0M | -$31.0M | -$40.0M | -$43.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.5B | $2.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.3B | -$96.0M | -$70.0M | -$825.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $997.0M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $499.0M |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$795.0M | -$852.0M | -$1.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$243.8M | $419.0M | -$55.0M | -$293.0M | $650.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:04pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.1% | +9.8% | +11.5% | +17.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +14.0% | +10.2% | +11.4% | +18.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +60.1% | +14.1% | +20.0% | +16.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +65.6% | +10.1% | +22.7% | +1.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +48.8% | +11.2% | +21.1% | +15.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 11:34am (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-03-22 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2004-12-22 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2004-09-22 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2004-06-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2004-03-31 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2003-12-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2003-10-01 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2003-07-09 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2003-04-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2002-12-31 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2002-10-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2002-07-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2002-04-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2002-01-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2001-10-03 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2001-07-03 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2001-04-04 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2001-01-03 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2000-10-04 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2000-07-05 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:28Even the bull case prices 39% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 62%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($236.51) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +25% | 27.5% | $144.62 | -39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +17% | 23.9% | $99.81 | -58% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 20.3% | $67.12 | -72% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +19% | 19.2% | $88.69 | -62% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: ADSK is putting up genuinely strong operational results. Q1 FY26 (Apr 2026) revenue of $1.93B is +18.4% YoY vs $1.63B, and the trailing four quarters sum to ~$7.50B vs $6.13B FY25 — roughly 22% growth, not the 14.5% CAGR the momentum tag suggests. Net margin snapped to 25.4% in the latest quarter, up from 9.3% a year prior (though that Apr-2025 quarter looks like a restructuring-charge outlier — the surrounding quarters were 17-18%). FCF at $2.41B on $7.21B revenue is a 33% FCF margin, ROIC of 33.6%, gross margin 91%. This is a genuinely elite franchise. Balance sheet is fine but not fortress: $2.50B debt vs $2.25B cash, current ratio 0.85 (deferred revenue drives that — normal for SaaS).
Where I part ways with the synthesis: a $116 DCF fair value implying the stock is worth half its current price feels mechanically derived and economically implausible for a business compounding revenue at high-teens with 33% FCF margins and 34% ROIC. At $49.5B market cap and $2.41B FCF, the FCF yield is 4.87% — not cheap, but for a business with this quality signature and pricing power, it's not the 2x overvaluation the synthesis claims. The thesis evaluation's "35% FCF CAGR required" strawman leans on the 37.1% historical FCF CAGR, which is inflated by the billing-model transition (annual→multi-year → annual again) that distorted FCF timing. Normalize to ~10-12% forward FCF growth and 25x FCF gets you to ~$60B, or roughly $290/share. Fair value is more plausibly in the $180-220 band, not $116.
That said, the bears aren't wrong that 45x P/E and 28.5x EV/EBITDA embed real expectations. The contrarian case I'd actually take seriously: (1) Q4 FY26 revenue of $1.96B was flat sequentially with Q1 FY26 at $1.93B — that's the "decelerating" quarterly trend the revenue-confidence signal flags, and it matters because subscription cohorts should compound smoothly; (2) earnings YoY of just 1.1% recent despite 17.5% revenue growth means the margin story is bumpier than the annual numbers suggest, likely stock-based comp and restructuring; (3) the insider "significant buying" signal is one 2,000-share purchase surrounded by routine awards — the classifier is being generous, this is not a meaningful insider signal; (4) AEC end-markets (Autodesk's core) are genuinely cyclical and commercial real estate / construction softness in 2026 is a real risk not yet in the numbers; (5) AI disruption of CAD/design workflows is a legitimate multi-year overhang even if switching costs delay it.
I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued by 51%" verdict but agree with the market-forces "neutral / full valuation" read and the narrative layer's framing that ~$120 of the price is narrative premium — I'd size that premium smaller, maybe $30-50. My read: ADSK is fairly-to-modestly-overvalued around $237, with fair value in the $190-215 range depending on whether you credit the FY26 margin expansion as durable (I'd give it partial credit — the 25% Q1 margin is likely peak, not run-rate). The prior models are internally contradictory: pre-flight calls it a mature earner priced for durable 10-12% growth, but synthesis then claims the market demands 35% FCF growth. Both can't be right. The 10-12% framing is closer to what's actually embedded once you strip out the FCF-timing distortion. Not a short, not a buy at $237 — wait for either a $190 handle or a Q3 print that confirms billings growth is holding above 12%.
GPT Reading
Autodesk looks like a very good business priced like a much better growth story than the numbers now support. The business quality is obvious: annual gross margin is 91%, operating margin 21.9%, free cash flow was $2.41B on $7.21B of revenue, and capex is de minimis at just $43M. Revenue has compounded from $4.39B in FY2022 to $7.21B in FY2026, about 13%-14% annually, while net income rose from $497M to $1.12B. That is exactly the profile investors pay up for in vertical software. But at $49.45B market cap, investors are paying about 7.1x sales, 28.6x EV/EBITDA, and 45x earnings for a company whose annual revenue growth is now in the low-to-mid teens and whose latest quarter showed only 1.1% YoY net income growth despite 18.4% revenue growth. The setup is not broken operationally; it is simply expensive for what has become a mature, highly profitable compounding franchise rather than a reaccelerating software disruptor.
What stands out most is the widening gap between cash flow optics and earnings progression. Free cash flow of $2.41B is more than 2x net income of $1.12B, which on its face looks fantastic, but that also means the stock is still trading at roughly 20.5x trailing FCF. That is not absurd for elite software, yet it already assumes durability and continued growth. Meanwhile, quarterly revenue has climbed from $1.51B to $1.96B over seven reported quarters, but sequentially the most recent quarter declined from $1.96B to $1.93B and the quarterly net margin bounced around from 9.3% to 25.4% rather than showing a clean upward staircase. On an annual basis, operating income improved from $1.35B to $1.58B in FY2026, but that is only 17% growth against 18% revenue growth, so there is no evidence yet of dramatic incremental-margin inflection that would justify a major premium expansion. This is a strong franchise still compounding, but the valuation seems to assume both sustained double-digit top-line growth and another meaningful leg of margin expansion that the reported numbers do not clearly prove.
The balance sheet is fine but not a hidden asset that rescues valuation. Cash of $2.25B almost offsets $2.50B of debt, so net debt is minimal, but equity is only $3.05B, which helps inflate ROE to 36.9% and makes the 16.7x book multiple mostly irrelevant for intrinsic value work. The current ratio below 0.86 is not alarming for subscription software with strong cash generation, yet it reinforces that this is not a fortress-balance-sheet rerating story. If I frame the valuation around operating economics instead of brand quality, Autodesk is being treated closer to a premium platform compounder than to a dependable but maturing design-software incumbent. For that to be right, I would want to see cleaner evidence that revenue can stay near 15%-plus while operating margin pushes well above the current 22% annual level. Right now I see consistency, not acceleration.
The best argument against my view is that I may be underestimating how much of Autodesk’s earnings power is obscured by accounting and how durable its pricing power really is. A business with 91% gross margins, $2.45B of operating cash flow, near-zero net debt, and deep workflow lock-in across architecture, engineering, construction, and manufacturing can deserve a structural premium. Revenue growth from $6.13B to $7.21B in FY2026 was strong for a company of this scale, and the latest quarter’s 25.4% net margin shows there may be more operating leverage available than the annual numbers capture. If free cash flow is the right lens, then a ~20x FCF multiple is not egregious for a mission-critical software asset with high switching costs and recurring revenue. The insider purchase of 2,000 shares is also a small but notable counter-signal to outright bearishness. I weigh these points less heavily because the market is not valuing Autodesk at “fair quality software” levels; it is valuing it as if the next several years will deliver unusually clean execution with little cyclicality, little competitive pressure, and margin tailwinds that are still only partly visible.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next few quarters show revenue sustaining above 15% YoY while net income growth reaccelerates materially above revenue growth, or if annual operating margin moves from 21.9% toward 25% without revenue slowing, then the premium multiple would look more earned than aspirational. Likewise, if free cash flow can grow from $2.41B toward a durable $3.0B-$3.3B run rate without relying on working-capital timing, I would be more constructive even near the current price. Absent that, I think fair value sits materially below today’s level because this is a high-quality business, not a cheap one, and certainly not cheap enough to absorb disappointment.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality subscription franchise that has already harvested most of its easy conversion gains. Revenue climbed from $4.39B to $7.21B over five years (14.5% CAGR), the latest year still printed 17.6% growth, and free cash flow reached $2.41B on only $43M of capex—an FCF margin north of 33%. Gross margin sits at 91% and ROIC at 34%, confirming genuine pricing power inside AEC and manufacturing design workflows. Yet the income statement is sending a quieter signal the cash-flow line obscures: annual net income barely budged from $1.11B to $1.12B despite a 17% revenue step-up and a 17% rise in operating income to $1.58B. The most recent quarter’s 25.4% net margin and $491M profit look strong against the year-ago 9.3%, but sequential revenue slipped from $1.96B to $1.93B and the secondary flags already read “decelerating.” At $236.75 the stock trades at 45× earnings, 20.5× FCF and 7× sales. That is not a distressed multiple, but it is a full one for a company whose earnings CAGR has lagged revenue at 11.4% and whose subscription-accounting tailwind is visibly fading.
The valuation synthesis that anchors fair value near $116 (implying roughly 5× FCF) is mechanically too punitive for a 90%-gross-margin oligopoly still growing mid-teens; a simple mid-cycle framework at 18–22× current FCF lands closer to $180–220. Even so, the market is not being given a margin of safety. A 4.9% FCF yield only works if mid-teens growth and further margin expansion both materialize; any reversion toward high-single-digit revenue growth—entirely plausible given AEC cyclicality and the “macro headwinds” flag—compresses the multiple quickly. Insider activity is also weaker than advertised: one open-market purchase of 2,000 shares is noise beside a string of routine awards. Net debt is modest ($2.50B debt versus $2.25B cash), but the 0.85 current ratio leaves little cushion if enterprise IT budgets tighten.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: you are under-weighting durability. Autodesk’s installed base and file-format lock-in have produced 37% FCF CAGR through the transition years, ROE remains 37%, and the platform-monopoly narrative is coherent enough that institutions will keep paying a scarcity premium for irreplaceable design workflows. If AI-assisted tools raise willingness-to-pay rather than invite new entrants, the same $2.4B FCF stream can compound at 12–15% for longer than a fading-subscription bear case assumes, and 20× FCF becomes cheap in hindsight. I weigh that less heavily because the latest quarterly sequential dip, the flat annual net-income print, and the explicit “decelerating” revenue-confidence tag already show the growth rate rolling over before AI monetization has appeared in the numbers. Narrative durability is high; narrative validation in the P&L is still missing.
I would flip to constructive on two hard prints: a return to sequential revenue acceleration above 4% for two consecutive quarters together with FCF margins holding above 30%, or a clear FY guide that embeds double-digit earnings growth rather than just price-driven revenue. A sustained break below $190 on rising volumes without a broad market drawdown would confirm the multiple compression thesis and make me more aggressive on the short side.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has climbed from $4.39B (2022) to $7.21B (2026), a ~13% CAGR, while gross margin sits at a best-in-class ~91% and operating margin has expanded from 14.1% to 21.9%. Net income roughly doubled to $1.12B and FCF reached $2.41B in 2026, with OCF/NI at 2.13x and accruals at -9.7% of assets - earnings are backed by cash, not paper. Beneish M at -2.66 and Altman Z at 3.9 corroborate clean books and low distress risk. Liquidity is adequate ($2.60B cash, net cash +$97M) for a business that is entirely self-funding via FCF. Capital return discipline stands out: diluted shares fell from 222M to 215M (-0.8% CAGR) with buybacks running 154% of the 10.9% SBC-to-revenue burden, so per-share value is being concentrated despite non-trivial stock comp. An open-market purchase by director Cahill (~$378K) is a small but directionally positive signal. What keeps this short of Fortress: SBC at 10.9% of revenue is high in absolute terms, operating margin at ~22% is well below elite software peers (40%+), and cash-to-market-cap is only 5.3% so the balance sheet is adequate rather than a fortress. FCF was also lumpy (dipped to $1.28B in 2024 before rebounding), likely reflecting the annual-to-monthly billing transition.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment/customer concentration and renewal rates for AEC and manufacturing verticals in the 10-K
- True SBC economic cost after buyback offset - grant-date fair value vs cash spent on repurchases
- Drivers of the 2024 FCF dip - billing transition timing vs underlying demand
- Any recent activist involvement or restatements referenced in filings
- Deferred revenue and RPO trend to confirm subscription momentum
The math is stark: price $236.51 against a composite FV of $119 and signal-adjusted FV of $116, implying roughly -51% downside if the models are right. Even the most generous method, DCF at $145, still leaves the stock ~38% above deserved value; the anchored P/E at $133 says the same, and the EPV floor of $52 shows how little of today's price is supported by steady-state economics without growth heroics. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, and the Strong business grade legitimately lifts deserved value - but not to 2x DCF. What is priced in: durable low-teens growth, continued margin expansion toward best-in-class software peers, and a monetizable AI-design layer that has not shown up in the numbers yet. That is a coherent bull case, but it is the base case in the price, not the upside. Margin of safety is negative on every reasonable method. This is the classic 'great franchise, full price' setup - the quality is real, the discount is not.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward revenue and billings guidance vs the low-teens growth embedded in DCF
- Operating margin trajectory and whether SBC net of buybacks keeps shares shrinking
- Any disclosed AI-product ARR or attach rates that would justify a higher terminal multiple
- One-time items in FCF (deferred revenue swings, restructuring) that could distort the anchored P/E
The tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16) and, more importantly, capital just rotated OUT of high-flying chips and INTO beaten-down software in July - ADSK is explicitly named in that rotation piece alongside WDAY, ADBE, INTU, CRM. That is a direct, name-level tailwind, not a generic market comment. Layer on a strong, durable platform-monopoly narrative with an AI-assisted design overlay, and you have the kind of story the market is currently willing to pay a ~$120 premium over DCF for. The two biggest single-day moves in the last week (+7.7%, +5.1%) were both earnings-preview / AI-optimism driven, confirming the narrative is doing real work on the tape. Counter-pressures exist but are secondary. Beta 1.32 means any risk-off flare hits harder than average, and the macro backdrop (10y 4.68%, market PE 26.9) is a persistent drag on premium-multiple software. The -4.1% air-pocket on 7/30 with no catalyst hints the name is jumpy and the narrative premium is fragile into the print. Analyst tone in the news flow skews cautiously positive (double-digit profit growth expected, 'hefty cash payout' framing) but one piece explicitly flags 'major change and major risk' - the bull story is consensus, which caps the upside surprise. Net: real tailwind, not euphoric, with an event-risk asterisk.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q2 print and guide - whether the AI-design narrative gets fresh proof or a crack
- Whether the software-over-semis rotation persists into August or reverses
- Any analyst target revisions post-print - upgrades extend the tailwind, cuts flip it
- 10y yield behavior - a move back toward 5% would pressure premium software beta
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 26, 2026, ADSK was $209.75. We expect it to be $195.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $135.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.