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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Allstate Corporation (ALL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -6 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 38 · Value -42 · Sentiment 45 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $638.73 vs $261.15 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
The Allstate Corporation
ALL NYSEThe Allstate Corporation is a diversified insurance company that provides a broad range of protection products and related services across the United States and Canada. Its core business centers on property and casualty insurance, with a strong emphasis on private passenger auto and homeowners coverage offered under well-known brands such as Allstate and National General. The company also delivers other personal lines and commercial insurance solutions tailored to individuals, families, and small businesses. In addition to traditional insurance, The Allstate Corporation offers health and benefits products, protection services, and specialized plans that cover risks related to accidents, health events, and various personal assets. Distribution is achieved through a mix of exclusive agents, independent agents, contact centers, and digital channels, reflecting its focus on broad market reach and multi-channel accessibility. Founded in 1931 and headquartered in Northbrook, Illinois, The Allstate Corporation today plays a significant role in the North American insurance market as a major provider of personal lines property and casualty coverage.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 38.06
Total Equity: $30.59B
Shares: 270,152,391
Total Debt: $7.49B
Cash: $678.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $7.49B
Cash: $678.00M
Revenue: $67.07B
Revenue: $67.07B
Revenue: $67.07B
Total Equity: $30.59B
Tax Rate: 22.0%
Equity: $30.59B
Total Debt: $7.49B
Cash: $678.00M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $7.49B
Total Debt: $7.49B
Total Equity: $30.59B
Shares: 270,152,391
Shares: 270,152,391
CapEx: -$228.00M
Shares: 270,152,391
Stock Price: $261.15
Net Income: $10.28B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 10:43am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $50.6B | $51.4B | $57.1B | $63.5B | $67.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $6.6B | $7.6B | $7.1B | $8.6B | $8.9B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.6B | -$1.3B | -$188.0M | $4.7B | $10.3B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.04 | $-5.22 | $-1.20 | $17.22 | $38.56 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.96 | $-5.22 | $-1.20 | $16.99 | $38.06 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:19am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $763.0M | $736.0M | $722.0M | $704.0M | $678.0M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $99.4B | $98.0B | $103.4B | $111.6B | $119.8B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.0B | $8.0B | $7.9B | $8.1B | $7.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $74.3B | $80.6B | $85.7B | $90.3B | $89.2B |
| Total Equity | $25.1B | $17.4B | $17.6B | $21.4B | $30.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $53.3B | $51.0B | $49.7B | $53.3B | $62.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 8:47am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.1B | $5.1B | $4.2B | $8.9B | $10.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$345.0M | -$420.0M | -$267.0M | -$210.0M | -$228.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.8B | $4.7B | $4.0B | $8.7B | $9.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$436.0M | $0 | -$7.0M | $145.0M | -$600.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.1B | -$2.5B | -$335.0M | -$2.0M | -$1.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | $386.0M | -$27.0M | -$14.0M | -$18.0M | -$26.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 10:43am (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +1.6% | +11.1% | +11.2% | +5.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -179.9% | +85.4% | +2,582.4% | +120.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:17am (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-09 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-10 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.89 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $0.89 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-01 | $0.89 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.89 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-30 | $0.81 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-19Loss-adjustment and underwriting expense is the largest controllable line in a personal-lines insurer, and AI compresses it directly — photo/video damage estimation, automated first-notice-of-loss, subrogation and fraud detection, and imagery-based property risk selection cut both cost per claim and adverse selection on homeowners roofs.
AI agents and comparison layers turn personal auto into a near-frictionless price auction: shopping frequency rises, retention and policy-life expectancy fall, and Allstate — historically a higher-cost captive-agent distributor versus direct-model rivals — is the one whose acquisition cost premium becomes most visible to a machine shopper.
Whether AI-driven expense and LAE savings persist as a relative combined-ratio advantage or get filed away in rates; watch Allstate's expense ratio versus the top direct writers alongside policies-in-force and retention in auto.
Fifty-state licenses and rate-filing history, statutory capital and reserve credibility for catastrophe-exposed property risk, the physical claims/repair network, and Arity's accumulated driving-behavior and claims-outcome data linked to actual loss costs.
AI Lens thesis
Allstate is paid to absorb legally enforceable risk with regulated capital — a function AI cannot perform, so the underlying need and the monetized unit (premium on insured exposure) survive intact; AI reaches the economics through three channels: it deflates the cost of handling and adjudicating claims (favorable, and large in dollars), it universalizes pricing and segmentation sophistication so underwriting alpha that once separated carriers converges (mildly unfavorable to a carrier that was catching up), and it removes friction from consumer shopping so that whatever cost savings emerge get competed toward the policyholder rather than the shareholder; the long tail is the auto premium pool itself, where ADAS and eventual autonomy cut frequency and shift liability toward manufacturers, shrinking the base on which Allstate earns.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Arity as a data business — driving behavior and claims-outcome telemetry sold into an ecosystem of AI shoppers, OEMs and other carriers — is an asset whose relative value rises as everyone else's models improve but their data does not.
Downside The plaintiffs' bar is an AI adopter too: cheap intelligence industrializes bodily-injury claim generation, demand-package drafting and litigation targeting, raising severity and social inflation faster than Allstate's defense-side automation offsets it.
Outcome range spread 40
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 10:56The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Allstate printed $10.28B in 2025 NI on $67.07B revenue after a $188M loss in 2023 and a $1.29B loss in 2022. That's not a "recovery" — that's a violent swing from underwriting hell to underwriting heaven in 24 months. The 2025 quarterly cadence tells the story: Q1 2025 NI was $595M (3.6% margin), then Q2-Q4 ran $2.1B, $3.75B, $3.83B. Q1 2026 dropped back to $2.46B (14.5%), Q2 2026 $3.27B (17.6%). ROE of 33.6% on $30.6B equity is not a sustainable P&C insurance number — Progressive at its peak runs mid-20s, and industry normal is 10-15%. So the 6.8x P/E is doing exactly what it should: refusing to capitalize peak-cycle earnings.
The synthesis verdict of $638-724 fair value versus $261 is, frankly, absurd for a P&C insurer and reveals the DCF is capitalizing an unsustainable earnings base. A 177% upside call on a mature insurer with $7.5B debt, $678M cash, and earnings that lose $3B when the cat cycle turns is a model artifact, not a thesis. The Thesis Evaluation at -22 and Market Forces "Neutral/peak-cycle" reads are the honest ones here. Normalize ROE to 15% on $30.6B equity → ~$4.6B run-rate earnings. At a defensible 12-14x normalized multiple that's $55-64B market cap, i.e., roughly $217-253/share — meaning the current $261 is already fair-to-slightly-rich on normalized numbers, not 64% discounted.
The contrarian pushback: bulls will argue Allstate's rate filings, telematics-driven risk selection, and Layer3/National General repositioning genuinely reset the loss ratio floor, and that reserve development has been favorable for legitimate reasons rather than luck. Fair — but you'd want to see combined ratios sub-95 through a real cat year (2026 hurricane season, California wildfire exposure) before capitalizing it. The Q1 2026 dip to 14.5% margin is a hint that variance is still enormous quarter-to-quarter. Also, dividend yield is only 1.59% and buybacks aren't dominating the cash return story, so you're not being paid handsomely to wait. Insider activity is neutral-to-slightly-negative (option exercises with sales, no meaningful open-market buys), which is what you'd expect if insiders viewed the stock as fairly valued after a big run.
Data gaps worth flagging: no combined ratio disclosure in this file (the only metric that matters for a P&C insurer), no catastrophe loss breakdown, no reserve development detail, and gross/operating margin lines are blank. Judging Allstate on net margin and revenue CAGR is like judging a bank on gross profit — wrong denominator. The 58% FCF CAGR is meaningless in insurance where operating cash flow is dominated by premium timing and float dynamics. I dissent from the synthesis's undervalued call and side with the Thesis Evaluation and Market Forces reads: this is peak-cycle earnings priced approximately correctly by a market that's seen this movie before (2013, 2019). The narrative engine's "fallen-angel at 36 cents on the dollar" framing is exactly the trap — Allstate isn't fallen, it's flying, and the low multiple is the market's memory of what comes after the flight.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how violent Allstate’s earnings swing has been and how much of the current valuation hangs on whether 2024-2026 is a new earning power level or just a hard-market crest. Revenue has genuinely stepped up: from $50.6B in 2021 to $67.1B in 2025, and the latest two quarters ran at $16.9B and $18.6B, well above the $16.4B-$16.6B range a year earlier. That is not cosmetic. But the real story is margin repair, not top-line growth. Net income went from -$1.29B in 2022 and -$188M in 2023 to $4.67B in 2024 and $10.28B in 2025; quarterly net margin moved from 3.6% in 2025 Q1 to 21.7%-22.1% in 2025 Q3-Q4, then stayed very strong at 14.5% and 17.6% in the first half of 2026. On the surface, a stock at $261 with a 6.9x trailing P/E, 1.05x sales, and only 0.24x debt/equity looks obviously cheap for a business producing $10.1B of operating cash flow and nearly $9.9B of free cash flow.
I don’t think it is obviously cheap. I think the low multiple is the market correctly refusing to capitalize peak-cycle insurer earnings at face value. A P&C carrier is not a software company where a margin snapback is automatically durable; one or two years of very high profits can be the product of aggressive rate catch-up, favorable catastrophe experience, reserve development, and temporarily elevated investment income. The clue is the amplitude of the move. Allstate didn’t merely improve from mediocre to good; it went from losses in 2022-2023 to a 15.3% annual net margin in 2025 and 33.6% ROE. For a company with $30.6B of equity, $10.3B of earnings is extraordinary. Extraordinary insurer ROE usually invites mean reversion, either through loss-cost inflation catching up, cat losses normalizing upward, or regulators slowing price. At today’s $66.0B market cap, investors are paying about 2.16x book and around 6.4x 2025 earnings. If normalized earnings are not $10B but, say, $5B-$6B, the stock is really on 11x-13x mid-cycle earnings, which is not a screaming bargain for a catastrophe-exposed insurer.
The quantitative valuation calling for something like $640-$725 strikes me as implausible because it appears to treat current free cash flow and earnings as if they are broadly distributable and durable in a straight-line way. That is exactly the mistake people make with insurers at the top of the underwriting cycle. Yes, operating cash flow was $10.11B and capex is trivial, but “FCF” is a slippery concept here; insurance cash generation is heavily shaped by premium timing, claims development, and float dynamics, not just recurring owner earnings in the industrial sense. Likewise, the very low debt load is a plus, but insurers are capital businesses first, and book value plus normalized underwriting/investment returns matter more than a simple EV/revenue or FCF screen. On that lens, 2.3x book is not cheap enough for me to dismiss the risk that 2025 was close to a best-case year. My read is that Allstate is a good company, but the stock is around fair value to mildly rich if you haircut current earnings meaningfully.
The strongest case against my skepticism is that the recovery may be more structural than I’m allowing for. Revenue has not just risen for one or two quarters; annual revenue is up roughly 32% from 2021 to 2025, and the quarterly run-rate in 2026 implies still more growth. Earnings have also held up better than a one-quarter spike: after $595M in 2025 Q1, profits were $2.11B, $3.75B, $3.83B, $2.46B, and $3.27B over the next five quarters. That persistence matters. A bull would say the company has repriced risk correctly, claims inflation is no longer outrunning premiums, and higher reinvestment yields on the portfolio can support a better baseline ROE than the market assumes. They would also point to the balance sheet: $7.49B debt against $30.59B equity is conservative, so even if earnings normalize lower, capital return and compounding can still justify a higher price than $261. I weigh those points seriously; if this is a true reset to even $7B-$8B of sustainable earnings, the stock is cheap.
What changes my mind is straightforward. If Allstate can post another two to three quarters with revenue above $18B and net income staying north of roughly $2.5B per quarter despite a more normal catastrophe environment, I would concede that normalized earnings are much higher than I think and that the stock deserves to trade materially above book, likely into the low $300s or better. Conversely, if margins slip back toward high-single digits, annualized earnings trend down toward $5B-$6B, or book value growth stalls despite the headline profits, then today’s multiple will prove not cheap but appropriate. The key event is not a narrative shift; it is whether 2026 underwriting profitability remains resilient after the easy comparison period has passed.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a company that has completed one of the sharper earnings pivots in large-cap P&C. Allstate went from cumulative losses of roughly $1.5B across 2022–2023 to $4.67B of net income in 2024 and then $10.28B in 2025, a more-than-doubling that produced a 33.6% ROE on $30.59B of equity. Quarterly run-rate confirms the level rather than a one-quarter fluke: the four most recent prints delivered $3.27B, $2.46B, $3.83B and $3.75B of net income on revenues of $16.9–18.6B, with margins oscillating between 14.5% and 22.1%. Free cash flow of $9.88B against only $228M of capex and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.24 leave a balance sheet that can absorb reserve development or a heavy cat year without threatening solvency. At $261 and a 6.86x trailing P/E, the market is capitalizing that $10.3B earnings base at a discount usually reserved for structurally impaired franchises, not a firm generating $10B of operating cash and a mid-teens net margin.
Revenue has compounded at 8.4% over the multi-year window and is still growing 5–6% year-on-year even after the hard-market rate surge, so the top line is not collapsing as pricing power moderates. The $66B market cap sits at 1.05x sales and 2.3x book—multiples that embed an assumption of severe and permanent margin compression. Even if normalized earnings settle at half the 2025 peak, say $5B, the stock would still trade at roughly 13x; the current multiple therefore requires something closer to a full reversion to the 2022–2023 loss regime to be justified. That is the central contradiction the data force: either the underwriting and investment engines that just produced a 15% net margin and 34% ROE are illusory, or the 6.9x multiple is an over-correction.
The strongest counter-argument is that 2025 simply captured peak-cycle conditions—benign catastrophe experience, residual rate adequacy from the hard market, and possible favorable prior-year reserve development—that will not repeat. California regulatory overhang and structurally rising climate severity could push the combined ratio back toward 100, compressing ROE into the low teens and making today’s earnings look like a temporary spike. The thesis-evaluation layer already assigns higher mass to the “cyclical peak misread as structural” bear case, and the valuation models that spit out $640–720 fair values may be under-weighting tail-risk frequency that traditional DCF discount rates do not fully capture. Progressive’s richer multiple exists for a reason: cleaner growth and fewer legacy regulatory exposures. If those headwinds materialize, the 177% upside implied by the composite fair-value estimate evaporates quickly.
What would flip the view is concrete evidence that the earnings base is already rolling over: two consecutive quarters of net margins below 8%, a combined-ratio print sustained above 98, or full-year 2026 net income falling below $6B would confirm the market’s skepticism and push the stock toward fair value near current levels. Conversely, another year of $8B-plus net income with ROE still above 20% would force a re-rating and validate the deep-value bid.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Allstate is a mature P&C insurer that has clearly worked through a rough 2022-2023 underwriting cycle (net losses of -$1.29B and -$188M) and emerged with a materially stronger earnings profile: 2025 net income of $10.28B on $67.07B revenue and FCF of $9.88B, versus $4.77B FCF in 2021. Revenue growth from $50.6B to $67.07B (roughly 7% CAGR) alongside the earnings recovery suggests rate actions and improved loss ratios are flowing through. FCF has consistently exceeded reported net income across the period, which for an insurer is consistent with reserve build and float dynamics rather than an accrual red flag. Capital return discipline is a genuine strength: diluted share count has trended down at roughly a 4.6% CAGR, and management is a net buyer of its own stock. Insider tape is neutral - the sales are option-exercise driven, no open-market P buys, no unusual dumping. The Altman Z of 1.73 flags 'distress' but that model is built for industrials, not insurers with large investment portfolios and reserve liabilities, so I discount it heavily. Real constraint: net debt is negative ($-1.93B net cash position), so the balance sheet is a working tool not a cushion, and OCF/NI ratio of -4.08x is a data artifact of the volatile NI base rather than a quality signal. Overall: a well-run cyclical earner that has clearly turned the corner, but not a fortress and not moat-elite.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Combined ratio trend by segment (auto vs homeowners) to confirm underwriting recovery is structural not just rate-driven
- Reserve development history - are prior-year reserves developing favorably or unfavorably?
- Investment portfolio composition and unrealized loss position given rate environment
- Catastrophe reinsurance program terms and net retention
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization; dividend coverage from statutory earnings
- Holding-company liquidity and debt maturity ladder underlying the $1.93B net debt figure
The e2e composite fair value of $638.73 (signal-adjusted $724.50) implies 177% upside, but that fails the sanity check for a P&C insurer. Applying an anchored P/E of $651 to normalized earnings assumes mid-cycle underwriting margins hold indefinitely, which ignores that 2025's $10.28B net income sits well above a through-cycle normal after the 2022-2023 catastrophe losses. A more defensible deserved value uses a normalized EPS closer to $18-22 (vs TTM run-rate near $38) at a 12-14x P&C multiple, landing around $220-290 - right where the stock trades.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Management's stated normalized combined ratio target and whether 2025 margins are sustainable
- Catastrophe reinsurance program cost trend and retention levels
- Auto and homeowners rate adequacy commentary - is further pricing needed or is the cycle turning
- Investment portfolio yield roll-forward as duration extends into higher rates
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether hurricane season delivers an outsized cat-loss event that reignites the bear narrative
- Any sell-side target revisions or downgrades that would break the cautiously-optimistic consensus
- Rotation out of defensive/value into growth that would drain the income-screen bid
- Q3 earnings tone on pricing power and combined ratio guidance
Allstate is paid to absorb legally enforceable risk with regulated capital — a function AI cannot perform, so the underlying need and the monetized unit (premium on insured exposure) survive intact; AI reaches the economics through three channels: it deflates the cost of handling and adjudicating claims (favorable, and large in dollars), it universalizes pricing and segmentation sophistication so underwriting alpha that once separated carriers converges (mildly unfavorable to a carrier that was catching up), and it removes friction from consumer shopping so that whatever cost savings emerge get competed toward the policyholder rather than the shareholder; the long tail is the auto premium pool itself, where ADAS and eventual autonomy cut frequency and shift liability toward manufacturers, shrinking the base on which Allstate earns.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Reserve development trends
- Statutory surplus adequacy
- Regulatory rate approval cadence
- Auto retention and policy-life expectancy
- Aggregator/agent-sourced new business share
- Advertising spend per new policy
- Underwriting expense ratio vs peers
- LAE per closed claim
P&C personal lines is late in a hard market: rate adequacy restored, loss-cost inflation (used vehicles, parts, medical, rebuild costs) cooler than 2022-23, and consumer shopping activity elevated. That combination pushes the industry from price-led growth to unit-led growth — good for volumes, worse for margins. A 4.7% 10-year with a positive curve is a quiet tailwind to investment income on a large float. The persistent structural negative is climate-driven cat severity plus regulatory friction in catastrophe-exposed states, which caps how much of the homeowners premium growth converts to stable earnings. Tariff/parts-cost re-inflation is the main upside surprise to loss trend.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, ALL was $261.02. We expect it to be $305.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $215.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.