Business Description
Amprius Technologies, Inc. is a company primarily focused on the development, production, and supply of advanced lithium-ion battery solutions. Their innovative product line notably includes cutting-edge silicon nanowire anode lithium-ion batteries. The firm's technological offerings cater to significant sectors such as aerospace, defense, and electric vehicle manufacturing. Founded in 2008, Amprius Technologies, Inc. operates from its headquarters located in Fremont, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 8:27pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:07am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.35
Total Equity: $103.82M
Shares: 124,639,991
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $90.47M
EBITDA: -$39.66M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $90.47M
Revenue: $73.01M
Shares: 124,639,991
Revenue: $73.01M
Revenue: $73.01M
Revenue: $73.01M
Total Equity: $103.82M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $103.82M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $90.47M
Current Liabilities: $17.87M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $103.82M
Shares: 124,639,991
Shares: 124,639,991
CapEx: -$4.40M
Shares: 124,639,991
Stock Price: $12.91
Net Income: -$44.02M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline numbers look like a turnaround in motion: revenue 3x'd to $73M in 2025, gross margin flipped from -76% to +11%, and Altman Z of 33 plus Beneish -4.74 show no mechanical earnings-quality fraud signals. That's the bull case in one paragraph, and it's not nothing. But the price tells you the market is already paying for the next three years of that curve — $3.08B cap on $73M revenue is ~42x sales for a company still burning $35M FCF/year with only $90.5M cash and 10 quarters of runway.
The insider tape is the loudest signal in the file. Zero open-market buys, 33 sales totaling $82.9M in 12 months — and the cluster is not routine 10b5-1 trickle. CEO/insider Kang exercised 2.8M options on 4/1/2026 and dumped 1.55M shares same-day for $23.9M, followed by another coordinated sell cluster on 5/21 and 5/26-27 across at least four insiders (Dixon, Stepien, Stefan, Sun). That is the behavior of people who think the price is full, not people who believe in a multi-bagger from here. Diluted share count grew from 86M (2023) to 124.6M (2025) — 45% in two years, a 5.4% CAGR understates the recent pace. With $35M annual burn and $90M cash, another raise is a near-certainty inside 18 months, and the share count will keep ratcheting.
The earnings-quality module says 'high quality' but OCF/NI of 0.75x on a deeply negative NI is not a clean signal — there's nothing to convert. FCF quality is correctly flagged weak elsewhere. Net: real product, real revenue ramp, real margin inflection — wrapped in a valuation and an insider exit pattern that say the easy money has been made.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 7:20pm (12h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.8M | $4.4M | $8.8M | $24.2M | $73.0M |
| Cost of Revenue | $7.1M | $9.8M | $23.7M | $42.5M | $64.7M |
| Gross Profit | -$4.3M | -$5.4M | -$14.9M | -$18.3M | $8.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $6.3M | $12.6M | $23.8M | $26.1M | $54.9M |
| Operating Income | -$10.6M | -$18.0M | -$38.7M | -$44.4M | -$46.6M |
| Net Income | -$9.9M | -$17.3M | -$36.8M | -$44.7M | -$44.0M |
| EBITDA | -$8.5M | -$15.2M | -$35.0M | -$39.6M | -$39.7M |
| EPS | $-0.10 | $-0.20 | $-0.43 | $-0.45 | $-0.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 7:20pm (12h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $11.5M | $69.7M | $45.8M | $55.2M | $90.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $14.2M | $75.2M | $50.5M | $68.8M | $126.4M |
| Total Assets | $18.5M | $83.2M | $107.7M | $121.1M | $156.9M |
| Current Liabilities | $4.2M | $6.9M | $13.5M | $17.2M | $17.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $4.7M | $10.1M | $47.9M | $51.7M | $53.1M |
| Total Equity | $13.9M | $73.0M | $59.8M | $69.5M | $103.8M |
| Retained Earnings | -$75.4M | -$92.9M | -$129.7M | -$174.3M | -$218.4M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 7:20pm (12h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$8.0M | -$13.9M | -$25.6M | -$33.4M | -$31.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-609,000 | -$1.5M | -$17.6M | -$3.2M | -$4.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$8.6M | -$15.4M | -$43.1M | -$36.6M | -$35.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $11.5M | $58.3M | -$23.9M | $10.6M | $35.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 7:20pm (12h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$207.9M $183.4M – $226.8M
|
$369.4M $369.2M – $369.7M
|
$545.1M $503.9M – $584.1M
|
$735.9M $680.3M – $788.7M
|
| EBITDA |
-$188.9M -$206.1M – -$166.6M
|
-$335.7M -$335.9M – -$335.5M
|
-$495.3M -$530.8M – -$457.8M
|
-$668.7M -$716.6M – -$618.1M
|
| Net Income |
$10.0M $1.1M – $13.5M
|
$48.7M $24.2M – $80.6M
|
$51.7M $46.6M – $56.5M
|
$72.3M $65.2M – $79.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 7:20pm (12h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +59.1% | +99.4% | +174.9% | +202.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -25.6% | -174.6% | -22.7% | +145.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -69.8% | -114.6% | -14.7% | -5.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -75.1% | -112.2% | -21.5% | +1.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -80.2% | -129.5% | -13.3% | -0.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 6:21am (1h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | BAYLESS KATHLEEN A | A-Award | 10,423.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | SATTERTHWAITE LIVINGSTON | A-Award | 10,423.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | DIXON DONALD R | S-Sale | 85,000.00 | $17.17 | $1.5M |
| 2026-06-12 | DIXON DONALD R | A-Award | 10,423.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Chu Steven | A-Award | 10,423.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | DIXON DONALD R | S-Sale | 40,000.00 | $19.13 | $765,200 |
| 2026-06-04 | Stepien Thomas M | G-Gift | 30,384.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Stepien Thomas M | G-Gift | 36,914.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | Stepien Thomas M | S-Sale | 2,000.00 | $20.97 | $41,940 |
| 2026-06-04 | Stepien Thomas M | G-Gift | 36,914.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-27 | Sun Kang | S-Sale | 356.00 | $17.19 | $6,121 |
| 2026-05-27 | Stepien Thomas M | S-Sale | 4,375.00 | $17.19 | $75,222 |
| 2026-05-27 | Stefan Constantin Ionel | S-Sale | 3,208.00 | $17.19 | $55,157 |
| 2026-05-26 | DIXON DONALD R | S-Sale | 17,895.00 | $17.90 | $320,252 |
| 2026-05-21 | Sun Kang | S-Sale | 67,796.00 | $14.79 | $1.0M |
| 2026-05-21 | Stefan Constantin Ionel | S-Sale | 28,812.00 | $14.79 | $426,083 |
| 2026-05-21 | Stepien Thomas M | S-Sale | 60,702.00 | $14.79 | $897,685 |
| 2025-12-19 | Stepien Thomas M | A-Award | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Sun Kang | A-Award | 6,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Sun Kang | M-Exempt | 187,495.00 | $3.68 | $689,982 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a genuinely improving story that the bearish framing undersells. Quarterly revenue went $3.3M → $7.9M → $10.6M → $11.3M → $15.1M → $21.4M → $25.2M → $28.5M across eight quarters — that's not a flat line dressed up with one-time deals, that's a clean ~8x ramp with sequential growth every quarter. Gross margin flipped from -207% in 2023 to +11.3% in 2025, and the Q1 2026 net loss of just $5.0M on $28.5M revenue (-17.7%) is materially better than the prior trajectory suggested. Cash burn at ~$31M operating, ~$35M FCF against $90.5M cash means roughly 2.5 years of runway absent dilution — tight but not crisis-level. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag in Revenue Confidence looks wrong: 41% QoQ in Q3, 18% in Q4, 13% in Q1 is decelerating in percentage terms only because the base is growing; absolute adds are still ~$3-4M/quarter.
Now the prior models. The Market Forces verdict ("speculative R&D venture masquerading as a growth company… avoid or short") is too cute and contradicts its own evidence — a company going from -374% to -18% net margin while tripling revenue is not "masquerading," it's executing. That said, the Synthesis "High Conviction Required" verdict is the right posture even if its arithmetic is off (it cites 42-44x P/S; actual is ~13x TTM per the canonical metrics, or ~42x on annualized 2025 if you ignore the ramp — the TTM number is the honest one and it's still rich but not absurd for a company growing 200% YoY with improving unit economics). The Narrative layer's "90% story / 10% fundamentals" claim is overstated now that there's $114M+ annualized revenue and positive gross margin; this isn't QuantumScape with zero shipments. The pre-flight thesis (needs $500M revenue at 25-35% margins) is roughly right as a hurdle but reachable if the current ramp continues two more years.
The contrarian-to-the-contrarians case: insider selling in May 2026 is heavy (~180k shares across multiple sellers in a week) and that's a real flag, but it follows option exercises (M-Exempt 187k shares April 1) and comes after a price recovery — it reads more like compensation monetization than panic. The bigger risks the models underweight: (1) Q4 2025's -$24.4M NI on $25.2M revenue is an ugly outlier suggesting either a write-down or that "improving margins" aren't linear; (2) gross margin of 11% is still nowhere near the 25-35% battery-tech assumption baked into valuation — and silicon anode cost curves at scale are unproven; (3) no disclosed debt is suspicious given the capex needs for battery manufacturing — either they'll need to raise equity (dilution at ~3-4x cash) or take on leverage; (4) the $90.5M cash balance against $35M FCF burn means a raise is likely within 18 months regardless of progress.
Where I land: the models are directionally right that this is "high conviction required" but the framing is muddled — Market Forces is too dismissive of real operational progress, Synthesis hedges without committing, and the narrative layer hasn't updated for the Q1 2026 print which is the single most important datapoint in the file. At $21.75 and $3.08B market cap on ~$114M annualized revenue (27x forward sales), you're paying for execution that's actually happening but at a price that assumes continued 100%+ growth and a path to 25%+ gross margins — both plausible, neither proven. Fair value on a sober DCF with $400M revenue in 2029 at 20% GM and 12x sales discounts back to roughly $14-16 today; the bull case ($800M, 30% GM) supports $30-35. I dissent from Market Forces' "avoid or short" — shorting a company growing 200% with improving margins and an aerospace customer base is how you get carried out — but I also can't endorse buying at a 27x forward sales multiple before seeing whether Q2 2026 sustains the margin improvement and whether they raise capital on acceptable terms.
GPT Critique
Amprius Technologies, Inc. presents a compelling yet complex financial picture. The company's revenue growth stands out significantly, with a striking CAGR of 188.2% and recent YoY revenue growth of 202.1%. This is not just incremental growth; it's a transformative leap, moving from $4.4M in 2022 to $73M in 2025. Despite this, the net income remains negative, although improving from a -374.2% margin in early 2024 to -17.7% in Q1 2026. This suggests operational progress, but the persistent cash burn of $35M annually against a cash reserve of $90.5M underscores the urgency for either a capital raise or drastic cost optimization. Meanwhile, the gross margin's transition from negative to 11.3% is a positive signal, though it lags behind the tech sector's expected 25-35% margins. The market's current pricing seems to anticipate this margin improvement, as reflected in the hefty 13.4693 P/S ratio, indicating a high valuation relative to sales.
Opus acknowledges the company's revenue trajectory as a genuine improvement, noting the sequential revenue ramp from $3.3M to $28.5M over eight quarters. I concur with this assessment; the revenue growth is undeniably robust and not a mere result of one-time deals. However, Opus's dismissal of the "speculative R&D venture" label seems premature. The Q4 2025 anomaly, with a $24.4M net loss on $25.2M revenue, cannot be overlooked. This outlier hints at underlying volatility that warrants scrutiny, possibly from operational inefficiencies or strategic missteps. Furthermore, the insider selling activity, although interpreted by Opus as monetization of compensation, raises red flags when juxtaposed with the absence of disclosed debt and imminent capital needs.
I also find myself partially aligned with Opus's critique of the "90% story / 10% fundamentals" narrative. While the gross margin improvement and revenue growth signal execution, the company's valuation at a $3.08B market cap still reflects significant reliance on future promises. The narrative may be less dominant than before, but it remains a crucial component of the stock's valuation. The assumption that Amprius will achieve $500M revenue with 25-35% margins implies a significant leap from current performances, which, while feasible, is not guaranteed.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I underestimate the risks associated with the competitive landscape. The presence of industry giants like Tesla and CATL, with their substantial R&D budgets and production capabilities, poses a formidable threat to Amprius's growth story. Additionally, the reliance on speculative technology and the absence of proven large-scale manufacturing capabilities could lead to operational bottlenecks.