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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste S.A.B. de C.V. (ASR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -58 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $31.96 vs $277.18 at analysis
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Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste S.A.B. de C.V.
ASR NYSEGrupo Aeroportuario del Sureste S.A.B. de C.V., commonly known as ASUR, is a prominent operator in the aerospace and transportation sector, specializing in managing airport facilities. This Mexican airport operator is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and development of key airports in the southeastern region of Mexico, including the highly frequented Cancún International Airport. ASUR plays a vital role in connecting domestic and international travelers, facilitating tourism and business travel in one of the most dynamically growing regions of the country. The company also extends its influence beyond the Mexican borders, with operations in South America, specifically in Colombia. With a focus on efficiency and infrastructure enhancement, ASUR contributes significantly to regional economic development by supporting travel and trade. Through strategic management and development initiatives, ASUR ensures that passenger and cargo services meet international standards, boosting its standing in the global aviation community. As such, Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste S.A.B. de C.V. is a significant entity in the aviation sector, crucial to the transportation network and the economic ecosystem in Latin America.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste S.A.B. de C.V. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 8 annual reports, the latest filed 2025-04-10, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.60
Total Equity: $3.55B
Shares: 310,614,080
Total Debt: $619.88M
Cash: $1.16B
EBITDA: $1.14B
Total Debt: $619.88M
Cash: $1.16B
Revenue: $1.81B
Revenue: $1.81B
Revenue: $1.81B
Total Equity: $3.55B
Tax Rate: 31.1%
Equity: $3.55B
Total Debt: $619.88M
Cash: $1.16B
Current Liabilities: $339.41M
Long-Term Debt: $580.23M
Total Debt: $619.88M
Total Equity: $3.55B
Shares: 310,614,080
Shares: 310,614,080
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 310,614,080
Stock Price: $277.73
Net Income: $808.91M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:46pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $727.9M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $13.4M | $15.2M | $16.6M | $18.4M | $18.4M |
| Operating Income | $188.9M | $499.1M | $847.4M | $878.9M | $1.0B |
| Net Income | $122.6M | $368.8M | $613.8M | $615.5M | $808.9M |
| EBITDA | $300.4M | $614.1M | $966.1M | $998.1M | $1.1B |
| EPS | $0.38 | $1.15 | $1.92 | $1.96 | $2.60 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.38 | $1.15 | $1.92 | $1.96 | $2.60 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:46pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $299.4M | $505.6M | $759.6M | $799.8M | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $444.9M | $672.4M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.5B |
| Total Assets | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $159.5M | $218.3M | $320.8M | $278.3M | $339.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | $382.9M | $380.4M | $570.3M | $484.5M | $580.2M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| Total Equity | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $699.4M | $896.6M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:46pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $169.3M | $596.5M | $779.4M | $775.2M | $897.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $3.6M | $12.7M | -$86.4M | -$85.0M | -$31.1M |
| Dividends Paid | — | -$142.0M | -$260.0M | -$344.7M | -$361.9M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$62.3M | $204.2M | $279.1M | $96.8M | $224.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:46pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +48.8% | +34.8% | +2.0% | +21.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +164.3% | +69.8% | +3.7% | +14.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +200.8% | +66.4% | +0.3% | +31.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +104.4% | +57.3% | +3.3% | +14.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:46pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-27 | $5.76 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-28 | $25.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-25 | $5.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-24 | $6.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-27 | $5.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $5.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $7.65 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $3.99 | — | — | — |
| 2019-06-04 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2018-06-14 | $3.29 | — | — | — |
| 2017-06-13 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2016-06-10 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2015-05-05 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2013-12-23 | $3.36 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-09 | $3.26 | — | — | — |
| 2012-05-14 | $2.76 | — | — | — |
| 2011-05-12 | $2.55 | — | — | — |
| 2010-05-14 | $1.89 | — | — | — |
| 2009-05-08 | $4.69 | — | — | — |
| 2008-05-22 | $1.93 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model verdicts: ASUR generated $1.81B revenue in 2024 with $808.9M net income — a 44.8% net margin and 55.9% operating margin, which is extraordinary but entirely consistent with a monopoly airport concessionaire. Revenue has compounded from $728M (2020) to $1.81B (2024), a 25% four-year CAGR distorted by COVID recovery; the more honest 2019-normalized growth is probably 8-10%. Operating CF of $898M against a $8.28B market cap is a 10.8% cash yield on enterprise ownership — that's the number that matters, not the 107x GAAP P/E which is clearly mis-stated (EV/EBITDA is 6.77x, which is the reconciling truth). ROE 22.8%, ROIC 23.1%, net debt is *negative* ($1.16B cash vs $619.9M debt). This is a pristine balance sheet running a cash gusher.
The synthesis verdict of $31-33 fair value versus $277.73 is almost certainly wrong — an 88% overvaluation call on a business trading at 6.77x EV/EBITDA with 23% ROIC and mid-teens earnings growth is a DCF that's broken, probably by treating concession amortization as real economic cost or by using a punitive Mexico discount rate. The pre-flight model actually flags this correctly ("real multiple is ~17x EV/FCF") and then the synthesis engine ignores its own diagnostic. I'd side firmly with the pre-flight read: this is a 17x FCF infrastructure monopoly, not a 107x growth stock, and 17x for a business growing FCF at 7-11% with monopoly pricing power and USD-linked revenues is defensible, maybe even cheap. The narrative layer's "729% premium to DCF" is an artifact, not a signal.
Where the contrarian case has real teeth: (1) the Mexican government's 2023 unilateral rewrite of ASUR's Maximum Tariff for the 2024-2028 cycle already happened and cut allowed returns — this is not hypothetical regulatory risk, it's a live repricing that limits future tariff-driven growth. (2) Cancún passenger traffic has actually softened in 2024 with reports of double-digit declines in some months as US travelers pivoted back to Caribbean islands and Europe post-COVID revenge travel. (3) The 21.3% recent revenue YoY and 31.4% earnings YoY are lapping easy comps and include tariff step-ups that won't repeat. (4) MXN/USD volatility is a real cost — a 15% peso depreciation directly clips USD-denominated market cap even if operating results hold. (5) Market Forces flagging "31x P/E" suggests it's using a different (probably more accurate) earnings number than the 107x headline, and even that is full for a mature concessionaire. The market-forces "neutral / fully valued" read is the most intellectually honest of the model outputs.
My verdict: I dissent from the synthesis's "88% overvalued" claim as mechanically wrong, but I also reject the platform-monopoly bull narrative. At 6.77x EV/EBITDA and ~17x normalized FCF with negative net debt, 23% ROIC, and a 2.07% dividend, ASUR is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich — not a screaming short and not a bargain. Fair value is closer to $240-$280 than $33, meaning current price is within a reasonable band. The real risks are the 2024-2028 tariff cycle margin compression (already partially in numbers but not fully digested), Cancún traffic normalization off unsustainable 2023 peaks, and MXN weakness. I'd want to see the quarterly trajectory — which is conspicuously missing from the data file, a genuine gap — before committing capital. The 2.07% yield with 44.7% payout ratio is fine but not compelling for a stock with cyclical tourism exposure that the models are underweighting. Conviction is modest because the missing quarterly detail is exactly where the tariff-reset impact would show up first.
GPT Reading
The first thing I would throw out is the headline valuation panic implied by the 106.6x P/E, 24.3x P/B, and 47.8x P/S. Those numbers are obviously broken for an airport concession business earning $808.9M on $1.81B of 2024 revenue with a $8.28B market cap. On the actual economic data, ASUR looks like a very high-quality regulated monopoly asset trading at roughly 10.2x market cap to net income and, after backing out $1.16B of cash against $619.9M of debt, closer to about 8.7x EV to net income. The provided EV/EBITDA of 6.8x and EV/revenue of 4.3x are much more believable than the accounting multiples. This matters because the core business is exceptional: revenue rose from $727.9M in 2020 to $1.81B in 2024, operating income from $188.9M to $1.01B, and net income from $122.6M to $808.9M. A 55.9% operating margin and 44.8% net margin are not “good for airports”; they are elite, and they sit on a balance sheet with net cash, a 4.36 current ratio, and debt/equity of just 0.17.
What stands out in the numbers is not a speculative growth story but a cash machine that has already proven its recovery and then some. Revenue was basically flat in 2022-2023 at $1.46B to $1.49B, then jumped to $1.81B in 2024; operating income only moved from $847.4M to $878.9M in 2023, then to $1.01B in 2024; net income similarly went from $613.8M to $615.5M and then to $808.9M. That pattern suggests 2024 was not just traffic normalization but a meaningful step-up in monetization and operating leverage. Operating cash flow of $897.7M nearly matches net income, which is exactly what you want from concession infrastructure: earnings are turning into cash. With equity of $3.55B and ROE of 22.8%, plus ROIC of 23.1%, this is a rare combination of monopoly positioning, strong pricing power, and conservative leverage. For a business of this quality, a market cap of $8.28B does not scream excess; it implies investors are paying around 8.2x operating income and roughly 9.2x operating cash flow, which is not demanding for an asset with inflation-linked economics and scarce strategic value.
That is why I do not buy the synthetic “fair value $33” type conclusion at all. To justify a price one-eighth of the current level, you would need either a collapse in normalized earnings, severe concession impairment, or some accounting artifact making the current $800M-plus net income unusable. Nothing in the raw data supports that. Even if I haircut 2024 and say normalized net income is closer to the 2022-2023 run-rate of about $615M, the stock is still only around 13.5x earnings on an equity basis, and lower than that on enterprise value. For a top-tier airport operator with net cash and margins north of 40%, that is not expensive. If anything, the market seems to be valuing ASUR more like a cyclical transport name than a monopoly infrastructure owner. My read is that the stock is modestly undervalued to fairly valued, and certainly nowhere near the extreme overvaluation some model outputs imply.
The strongest case against that view is that 2024 may prove to be a peak year rather than a new base. The business has real exposure to leisure travel and to a concentrated tourism corridor, so a U.S. consumer slowdown, airline capacity cuts, weather shocks, or security/political issues could hit traffic and non-aeronautical spending quickly. The annual numbers also show a warning sign: after the big post-pandemic rebound, 2022 and 2023 barely grew, so the 2024 acceleration may be less durable than it looks. If the true normalized earning power is nearer $600M than $800M, and if future concession negotiations or tariff regimes compress returns, then the current price is less obviously cheap. The low 2.1% dividend yield also means investors are not being paid much to wait if traffic softens. And while I think the P/E is wrong, the market may still be embedding a premium for Cancún scarcity value that leaves less upside than a simple earnings multiple suggests.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual cycle shows revenue stalling back near the $1.5B level, operating margin slipping materially below 50%, and operating cash flow falling well below $800M, I would conclude 2024 was a cyclical high-water mark and move toward fairly valued or overvalued. Likewise, any evidence of rising capex or concession obligations that erodes the current near-net-cash economics would matter. On the other hand, if ASUR can hold revenue above roughly $1.75B, keep operating income around $1.0B, and continue converting earnings into $850M+ of operating cash flow, then the stock deserves at least a low-teens earnings multiple on current profit levels, which points comfortably above today’s $277.73.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a high-quality infrastructure concession that the canonical multiples have badly mangled. Strip out the broken P/E of 107x, P/B of 24x and P/S of 48x—those are artifacts, almost certainly an ADR/share-count or currency mismatch—and the economics snap into focus. Market cap is $8.28B against 2024 net income of $809M, so the real earnings multiple is roughly 10.2x. Enterprise value sits near $7.7B (net cash of roughly $540M after $1.16B cash and only $620M debt), against operating income of $1.01B and the reported EV/EBITDA of 6.8x. Revenue has compounded at 11% and earnings at 15% over the multi-year window, with the latest year accelerating to +21% sales and +31% net income as Cancún and the Caribbean corridor fully normalized. Operating margins of 56% and net margins of 45% are elite even for regulated airport assets; ROIC of 23% and a current ratio above 4 confirm this is not a capital-starved utility but a cash machine with pricing power and minimal leverage (D/E 0.17). Operating cash flow of $898M supports a mid-teens cash yield on EV before any growth credit. That is the profile of a mature earner trading like a cyclical industrial, not a premium monopoly.
The prior valuation synthesis calling the stock 88% overvalued at a $33 fair value is simply wrong; it is downstream of the same corrupted multiples and a DCF that appears to treat the company as a low-growth peso utility rather than a dollar-linked tourism gateway. The real multiple stack—~10x earnings, ~7x EV/EBITDA, ~4.3x EV/sales—is modest for 15% earnings growth, fortress liquidity, and an irreplaceable Cancún position. Narrative intensity around Mexico tourism is real, but it is not required to justify the current price; even a reversion to mid-single-digit passenger growth still leaves the asset cheap on cash generation.
The strongest counter-case is straightforward: this remains a geographically concentrated, regulated concession whose growth is capped by terminal capacity and Mexican political risk. Passenger volumes are levered to the U.S. leisure consumer; a hard landing in U.S. discretionary spend or a peso shock that dents inbound tourism would compress both volumes and the FX-translated earnings the market has enjoyed. Regulatory reset risk on tariff formulas is non-zero, and the 2.1% dividend yield with a 45% payout is not rich enough to cushion a multiple re-rating if the growth narrative fades. A skeptic would also note that 2024’s 21% revenue jump is partly catch-up and cannot be annualized; fade recent growth to 4–5% and the “cheap” multiple becomes merely average for airports. I weigh this less heavily because the balance sheet (net cash) and margin structure give ASUR more downside protection than typical EM infrastructure, and because even a full fade still leaves EV/EBITDA in the high single digits—hardly a bubble.
What would flip the view: a sustained deceleration in passenger traffic below mid-single digits for two consecutive quarters, any material adverse revision to the concession tariff framework, or a U.S. recession that drives Cancún load factors down hard enough to push operating margins below 45%. Conversely, continued double-digit top-line growth with stable margins would make the current entry look even more asymmetric.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ASR is a mature earner operating a concession-based airport portfolio, and the numbers show a business firing on every cylinder. Revenue grew from $727.9M in 2020 to $1.81B in 2024 (roughly 2.5x in four years), operating margin expanded from 26% to 55.9%, and net income rose 6.6x to $808.9M. FCF hit $897.7M in 2024 - actually exceeding net income - and OCF/NI of 1.33x with accruals at -3.4% of assets indicates earnings are more than backed by cash.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Concession expiry dates and renewal terms for Cancun and other core airports
- Latest Master Development Plan (MDP) tariff framework and any pending regulatory changes
- Passenger traffic trends and mix (international vs domestic, commercial revenue per pax)
- Capex commitments under the MDP and impact on future FCF conversion
- Dividend vs buyback capital return policy and any related-party transactions with controlling shareholders
- Explanation for 2024 operating margin dip from 59% to 55.9%
The e2e composite fair value of $31.28 (signal-adjusted $33.44) implies -88% downside, which is almost certainly a runaway EPV-floor method applied to a regulated infrastructure asset - I'm discounting it heavily rather than taking it literally. That said, the direction it points in is consistent with the bear framing: this is a mature, single-region airport concession with a regulatory cap on tariffs and passenger growth, not a 15% compounder. At $277 and an ~$8.3B market cap, the market is paying a full infrastructure-compounder multiple for a Fortress-quality but capped business.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Master concession terms and next tariff-review date/outcome
- Cancun passenger growth trajectory vs guidance and capex commitments
- Peso hedging policy and USD-denominated revenue mix
- Buyback authorization size and pace vs FCF
- Any San Juan / Colombia segment margin trajectory that could re-rate the mix
The active narrative on ASR is a strong, moderately durable platform-monopoly story: Cancun as the gateway to Mexico's tourism boom, concession-based pricing power, and a preferred alternative to the Caribbean. Intensity is strong even if cult factor is low, and the tape is validating it - recent 21.3% return is running well ahead of the 11.3% long-term CAGR, a classic sign the story is being freshly re-rated rather than fading. That is a tailwind regardless of what a DCF says. The macro tape is only mildly supportive (neutral-plus, VIX 16), but with beta 0.18 ASR barely feels it either way - higher rates and a 26.9 market PE would normally pressure an infrastructure name, but this stock does not trade like rate-sensitive infra; it trades like a Mexico-tourism growth proxy, and that narrative is currently in favor. FX/peso and Mexican political-repricing risk sit in the background as latent headwinds but are not the active story right now. Net: narrative pressure and momentum are pushing up, macro is a whisper, and the low-beta profile means no risk-off gust is doing damage here. Tailwind, not strong tailwind, because durability is only moderate and the bear case (mature, capped, single-geo) can reassert quickly on any Mexico headline.
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Monthly Cancun/Cozumel passenger traffic prints - any deceleration cracks the growth-proxy story
- Mexican peso action and any AMLO-successor commentary on concession terms or airport tariffs
- Sell-side target revisions after next quarter - are analysts chasing the price or pushing back
- Whether the broader EM/Latin America tape stays bid or rotates out
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, ASR was $278.60. We expect it to be $270.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $220.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.