Business Description
Strive, Inc. functions as an asset management firm that employs a treasury strategy with a singular focus on Bitcoin. The company's paramount objective is to enhance the amount of Bitcoin held per share for its investors, and this specific metric serves as the guiding principle for all its capital allocation decisions.
Business History
Generated: Jun 14, 2026 10:21pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:17pm (12d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -9.75
Total Equity: $731.24M
Shares: 2,213,424
Total Debt: $3.51M
Cash: $67.50M
EBITDA: -$43.54M
Total Debt: $3.51M
Cash: $67.50M
Revenue: $5.73M
Shares: 2,213,424
Revenue: $5.73M
Revenue: $5.73M
Revenue: $5.73M
Total Equity: $731.24M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $731.24M
Total Debt: $3.51M
Cash: $67.50M
Current Liabilities: $10.78M
Long-Term Debt: $3.51M
Total Debt: $3.51M
Total Equity: $731.24M
Shares: 2,213,424
Shares: 2,213,424
CapEx: -$24,000
Shares: 2,213,424
Stock Price: $15.15
Net Income: -$420.59M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Strive is a tiny operating business by any conventional measure: revenue went from $277K (2023) to $3.7M (2024) to $5.7M (2025), against a 2025 net loss of $420.6M and operating margins of -763%. Gross margin near 96% is meaningless when the absolute revenue base is this small — the cost structure (SBC at ~25% of revenue, $21.6M FCF burn in 2024) dwarfs the top line by orders of magnitude. This is a pre-revenue-scale platform wearing the costume of a public company.
The per-share story is where quality collapses. Diluted share count went from ~9.5K (2024) to 2.2M (2025) — a >200x increase in one year, consistent with a reverse-merger / capital raise / token-of-equity issuance event. The $420.6M net loss in 2025 against $5.7M revenue strongly implies massive non-cash charges (likely warrant/derivative remeasurement, goodwill, or share-based comp on the merger), but even stripping those out, the cash burn and dilution mechanics are punishing to existing per-share economics. The 'Significant Insider Buying' of $2.3M is real and directionally positive, but it is dwarfed by the dilution machine and by Cole's 702.9K share award on 3/19/2026 — insiders are receiving far more equity than they are buying.
Balance sheet shows $67.5M liquid cash and 12.5 quarters of runway at current burn — survivable, not strong, especially given the burn is accelerating with the platform build-out. Altman Z of 58.88 is an artifact of the recapitalized equity base, not evidence of operational durability. There is no demonstrated moat, no scaled AUM economics visible in these numbers, and no path to profitability evident in the trajectory.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- What corporate event drove the 2024→2025 share count jump from ~9.5K to 2.2M (reverse merger, PIPE, token-equity conversion)?
- Composition of the $420.6M 2025 net loss — how much is warrant/derivative remeasurement vs. goodwill impairment vs. SBC vs. cash operating loss?
- Actual AUM, fee rate, and net flow trajectory for Strive's ETF/asset management business
- Terms of any outstanding warrants, convertibles, or earn-out shares that could drive further dilution
- Whether the $5.7M revenue is recurring management fees or contains one-time items
- Detail on Cole's 702.9K share award on 3/19/2026 — vesting terms and total grant pool
- Any Bitcoin/crypto treasury or thematic strategy holdings on balance sheet that could explain the cash position and net loss volatility
There is no honest DCF or earnings-multiple path to $15.15 here. The operating company generates ~$5.7M of revenue against a $420M net loss and is diluting violently — by any traditional method, deserved equity value on the asset-management franchise alone is a tiny fraction of the $1.43B market cap (call it sub-$50M, or well under $1/share pre-treasury). The remaining value has to come from the Bitcoin treasury thesis, which makes this a closed-end-fund-style NAV play, not a fundamentals play.
Even granting the treasury narrative, closed-end vehicles holding a liquid asset (BTC) historically trade at or near NAV over time — premiums collapse. Without disclosed BTC-per-share NAV that exceeds ~$15, paying this price means paying a premium to NAV for a sub-scale manager that is the bear case writing itself. The e2e synthesis flagged 'Disconnected from Fundamentals' — agreed. The quality lens grade of Fragile (-100) means deserved value should be marked DOWN, not up, from any operating-business anchor.
The only way $15.15 is defensible is if (a) BTC NAV per share is materially above $15 and disclosed, or (b) BTC rips and the premium-to-NAV holds. Neither is a valuation argument — they're directional bets. Verdict: richly priced relative to anything I can defend with numbers.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Disclosed Bitcoin holdings and BTC-per-fully-diluted-share NAV — this is the single number that determines if any of the price is defensible
- Fully diluted share count including warrants, convertibles, and authorized-but-unissued — the dilution overhang
- Treasury policy: is BTC accumulation funded by ATM equity issuance? If yes, that's structural per-share value leakage
- Any management fee / expense ratio embedded in the structure — tax drag and fees of the bear case
- Lockups or restrictions on the legacy/SPAC shareholders that could trigger overhang
ASST is pure narrative: a mission-driven Bitcoin treasury vehicle whose entire price is confidence in BTC appreciation plus a premium-to-NAV thesis that spot BTC ETFs increasingly undermine. The story is rated fragile with only moderate intensity and medium cult - that is a weak base under a stock that has already given back enormous gains (recent 57% vs 355% long-term CAGR, deeply negative 3-year deterioration). When the story IS the company, decelerating momentum is itself the dominant sentiment force, and that pressure is currently negative.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- BTC price trend and any break of key technical levels - the entire ASST narrative tracks it
- Premium/discount to BTC-per-share NAV - if it compresses further, the wrapper thesis is dying
- Any analyst target cuts (zero revisions this month is stale - first downgrade would crack the floor)
- Spot BTC ETF flow data as a competitive sentiment tell
- VIX move above 20 or a regime flip to risk-off, which would accelerate selling in story-only names
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:22pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $829,618 | $343,106 | $277,038 | $3.7M | $5.7M |
| Cost of Revenue | $0 | $0 | $734 | $2,711 | $220,000 |
| Gross Profit | $0 | $0 | $276,304 | $3.5M | $5.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $814,747 | $988,361 | $5.2M | $26.1M | $49.3M |
| Operating Income | $14,871 | $-645,255 | -$4.9M | -$22.7M | -$43.8M |
| Net Income | $14,871 | $-645,255 | -$4.9M | -$21.6M | -$420.6M |
| EBITDA | $14,871 | $-645,255 | -$4.9M | -$22.5M | -$43.5M |
| EPS | $2.40 | $-96.00 | $-695.76 | $-680.00 | $-9.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:21pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $33,731 | $137,177 | $2.9M | $2.7M | $67.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $33,731 | $137,177 | $3.0M | $2.7M | $71.8M |
| Total Assets | $284,707 | $373,021 | $3.1M | $3.2M | $745.5M |
| Current Liabilities | $15,594 | $219,238 | $153,541 | $430,895 | $10.8M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $3.5M |
| Total Liabilities | $15,594 | $219,238 | $153,541 | $430,895 | $14.3M |
| Total Equity | $269,113 | $153,783 | $2.9M | $2.8M | $731.2M |
| Retained Earnings | $18,137 | $-627,118 | -$5.6M | -$12.0M | -$474.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:21pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $-602,829 | -$3.8M | -$4.9M | -$21.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-1 | $-13,557 | $-3 | $-24,000 |
| Free Cash Flow | $-602,830 | -$3.8M | -$4.9M | -$21.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $400,000 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $-176,876 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $103,446 | $2.8M | $-263,699 | $4.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:19pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$5.0M $4.4M – $5.9M
|
$12.1M $11.6M – $12.6M
|
$10.7M $10.4M – $11.1M
|
| EBITDA |
-$4.0M -$4.7M – -$3.5M
|
-$9.7M -$10.1M – -$9.2M
|
-$8.6M -$8.9M – -$8.3M
|
| Net Income |
-$6.3M -$7.4M – -$5.2M
|
-$8.1M -$10.5M – -$7.3M
|
$-788,687 $-930,745 – $-646,629
|
| EPS | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:22pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -58.6% | -19.3% | +1,217.5% | +57.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | +1,151.5% | +59.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -4,439.0% | -664.2% | -359.4% | -93.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -4,439.0% | -664.2% | -337.6% | -1,849.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | -4,439.0% | -664.1% | -355.6% | -93.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 14, 2026 10:22pm (12d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-31 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 11,329.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Pham Benjamin | F-InKind | 4,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 11,329.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Cole Matthew Ryan | A-Award | 702,856.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-17 | Pham Benjamin | P-Purchase | 7,900.29 | $8.23 | $65,000 |
| 2026-02-18 | Pham Benjamin | P-Purchase | 6,213.84 | $8.06 | $50,095 |
| 2026-02-13 | Beirne Brian Logan | P-Purchase | 11,500.00 | $8.73 | $100,387 |
| 2026-01-16 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 226,583.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Pham Benjamin | F-InKind | 95,816.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 212,930.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 226,583.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Pham Benjamin | M-Exempt | 212,930.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Beirne Brian Logan | M-Exempt | 164,810.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Beirne Brian Logan | F-InKind | 83,178.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | Beirne Brian Logan | M-Exempt | 164,810.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | SEMLER ERIC | A-Award | 13,395,083.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | SEMLER ERIC | A-Award | 3,157,500.00 | $2.80 | $8.8M |
| 2026-01-16 | SEMLER ERIC | A-Award | 1,637,079.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-16 | SEMLER ERIC | A-Award | 1,578,750.00 | $1.72 | $2.7M |
| 2026-01-16 | SEMLER ERIC | A-Award | 260,493.00 | $1.11 | $289,147 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a story the "asset management" label actively obscures. Quarterly revenue of $1.5M, $1.5M, $1.5M, $2.8M is not a growth business — it's a flat fee stream of roughly $6M annualized from whatever advisory wrapper Strive operates. The 355% revenue CAGR is an artifact of a $277K 2023 base; the meaningful number is the four most recent quarters being essentially flat-to-rounding-error. Meanwhile net losses exploded from -$3.7M in Q1'25 to -$206.7M, -$393.6M, -$265.9M — a roughly $866M cumulative loss over three quarters that cannot be operating burn (opex was running $5-10M/qtr through mid-2025). That's mark-to-market on crypto holdings, share-based comp on the 702,856-share March award, and/or warrant/derivative remeasurement. The pre-flight model is right that this is a Bitcoin treasury vehicle wearing an asset manager costume; the rest of the income statement is noise.
Where I'd push back on the synthesis: calling this "248x P/S" and "disconnected from fundamentals" misframes the security. For a treasury vehicle, P/S is the wrong denominator — the right one is mNAV (market cap vs. BTC holdings per share). The file doesn't disclose BTC holdings, which is the single number that determines whether $15.15 is a 2x premium to NAV or a 50% discount. Without that, both the bull and bear cases are unfalsifiable. The synthesis treats the absence of that data as evidence of overvaluation; I'd treat it as evidence the analysis can't be completed. The $7-to-$252 intra-year range cited by pre-flight screams reverse-merger/SPAC dynamics with a small float, not fundamental repricing — and a P/B of 0.045 (if accurate) suggests the book carries enormous equity relative to the $1.43B cap, which is inconsistent with a thinly-capitalized burn vehicle and probably reflects a recent PIPE or equity raise that funded BTC purchases not visible in the stale 2025-12-31 balance sheet showing only $67.5M cash.
The contrarian case: insider activity is genuinely interesting. Three separate open-market purchases in Feb 2026 (7,900 / 6,214 / 11,500 shares) at presumably depressed prices, alongside the option exercises, is not what you see at a terminal capital-exhaustion story. If management is buying with personal cash after a stock that traded to $252 collapsed to $15, either they know the BTC-per-share math is favorable here, or they're signal-pumping. The 6.94% dividend yield flag is almost certainly a data error for a money-losing shell — ignore it. The market-forces "avoid entirely" verdict is too confident given we don't have the BTC holdings disclosure; "strong headwinds" is a reasonable prior, but the framing assumes the operating business matters, and for a treasury vehicle it doesn't until BTC enters a sustained bear.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "Disconnected from fundamentals" is correct directionally but incomplete: this security has no fundamentals in the traditional sense, so the question is whether $1.43B market cap exceeds (BTC holdings + $67.5M cash - liabilities) by more than a reasonable premium for the wrapper. I can't answer that from this file, and neither can the prior models — they're substituting revenue multiples for the actual NAV calculation. That said, the structural bear case is real: spot Bitcoin ETFs at 20-25bps fees have eliminated the wrapper premium that MicroStrategy enjoyed in 2020-2022, the fragile narrative durability call is correct, and a $260M+ quarterly loss in a flat-revenue shell means dilution risk is enormous if BTC stalls. The 702,856-share award in March 2026 alone is ~0.7% dilution in one grant. Position sizing should assume this is a 3-5x leveraged BTC call option with a decaying time value, not an equity investment.
GPT Critique
In analyzing Strive, Inc., the raw data reveals a company with significant financial volatility and a lack of traditional asset management characteristics. Strive's revenue has increased from $93K in mid-2024 to $2.8M in early 2026, but this growth is overshadowed by staggering net losses, peaking at -$393.6M in Q4 2025. The consistently negative margins, notably -9634.3% in the most recent quarter, highlight an unsustainable financial structure. The cash position of $67.5M without total debt information suggests some liquidity but also raises questions about how long the company can sustain such losses without urgent capital influx. The current ratio of 6.6601 indicates strong short-term liquidity, but this doesn't alleviate the underlying issues of profitability and strategic direction.
I find myself largely in agreement with Opus's assessment. He correctly identifies that the label of "asset management" obscures Strive's true nature as a Bitcoin treasury vehicle. The revenue flatlining at around $1.5M per quarter doesn't reflect a robust growth story; instead, it suggests a stagnant operation with revenue spikes likely tied to volatile Bitcoin valuations rather than operational improvements. I agree with Opus that the 355% revenue CAGR is misleading, a product of an extremely low base rather than substantive business growth. His criticism of the 248x P/S ratio as a misframing without Bitcoin holdings data is valid; however, the absence of this critical data point renders any traditional valuation metric almost irrelevant, echoing the narrative that this is more a speculative Bitcoin proxy than a value-driven investment.
Where I diverge slightly from Opus is in his interpretation of insider buying activity as potentially positive. While insider purchases could signal confidence, they might also reflect attempts to prop up or manipulate market perception, particularly when juxtaposed with significant share-based compensation diluting shareholder value, as seen in the 702,856-share March 2026 award. I am less optimistic about this insider activity as a genuine indicator of underlying value without clearer transparency on Bitcoin holdings and strategic financial metrics.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overly reliant on the absence of Bitcoin holdings data to frame our analyses, potentially missing other strategic shifts or operational pivots Strive might be undertaking. They might also contend that the current depressed stock price reflects an opportunity if Bitcoin appreciates significantly, assuming the company can manage dilution effectively. However, without transparency, this remains speculative.