Business Description
Operating globally through its various subsidiaries, Bank of America Corporation offers a comprehensive range of banking and financial products and services. Its extensive clientele includes individual consumers, small and mid-market businesses, institutional investors, large corporations, and government bodies worldwide. The Consumer Banking division provides diverse options such as traditional and money market savings accounts, certificates of deposit, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and both interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing checking accounts, in addition to investment products. This segment also issues credit and debit cards, originates residential mortgages and home equity loans, and offers direct and indirect financing for needs like automotive purchases, recreational vehicles, and personal loans. Within its Global Wealth & Investment Management segment, the company delivers investment management, brokerage, banking, and trust and retirement solutions. It also crafts tailored wealth management strategies, including specialized asset management services. The Global Banking segment furnishes a broad spectrum of lending products, including commercial loans, leases, commitment facilities, trade finance, and both commercial real estate and asset-based lending. Furthermore, it provides treasury solutions such as cash management, foreign exchange, short-term investment options, and merchant services, alongside working capital management guidance. This segment also engages in debt and equity underwriting, distribution, and advisory services related to mergers and acquisitions. Through its Global Markets segment, Bank of America performs market-making activities, offers financing, and provides securities clearing, settlement, and custody services. It also devises risk management products employing interest rate, equity, credit, currency, and commodity derivatives, as well as foreign exchange, fixed-income, and mortgage-related instruments. As of December 31, 2021, the corporation served approximately 67 million consumer and small business clients. Its widespread infrastructure comprised around 4,200 retail financial centers and approximately 16,000 ATMs, supplemented by digital banking platforms utilized by roughly 41 million active users. Founded in 1784, Bank of America is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Business History
Generated: Jun 25, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.88
Total Equity: $303.24B
Shares: 7,546,900,000
Total Debt: $365.90B
Cash: $231.85B
EBITDA: $40.01B
Total Debt: $365.90B
Cash: $231.85B
Revenue: $191.57B
Revenue: $191.57B
Revenue: $191.57B
Total Equity: $303.24B
Tax Rate: 19.1%
Equity: $303.24B
Total Debt: $365.90B
Cash: $231.85B
Current Liabilities: $2,559.61B
Long-Term Debt: $317.82B
Total Debt: $365.90B
Total Equity: $303.24B
Shares: 7,546,900,000
Shares: 7,546,900,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 7,546,900,000
Stock Price: $57.73
Net Income: $30.51B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Bank of America is a diversified universal bank generating $191.6B of revenue in 2025 with net income of $30.5B (15.9% net margin) and a clear earnings rebound from the 2022-2023 rate-cycle trough. Operating margin recovered to 19.7% from 15.2% in 2024, and net income has now grown for two consecutive years. Per-share value is being concentrated: diluted share count has fallen from 8.56B (2021) to 7.55B (2025), a -3.1% CAGR, with buybacks running nearly 4.5x SBC. That is genuine shareholder-friendly capital return on top of the dividend.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio, SLR, and LCR vs regulatory minimums and peer banks
- Net interest margin trend and deposit beta in latest 10-Q/10-K
- Credit loss provisioning, NPL ratios, and CRE/office exposure
- Unrealized losses on held-to-maturity securities portfolio
- Dividend payout ratio and capital return plan (CCAR results)
- Segment profitability: Consumer, GWIM, Global Banking, Global Markets
The e2e composite and signal-adjusted fair value both land at $47.33, and the price is $57.73 - a roughly 22% premium to deserved value. That gap lines up cleanly with the bull narrative (higher-for-longer NIMs, accelerating buybacks) being priced in rather than left on the table. For a Solid-but-not-elite money-center bank, paying a premium to a fair value that already credits steady compounding is the opposite of a margin of safety.
Quality is real - scaled franchise, disciplined buybacks concentrating per-share value - which supports the deserved value being in the high-$40s rather than lower. But the earnings-quality haircut hint (Poor, -2) argues against stretching deserved value upward to meet price. Net: this is a good business the market already understands and has bid up. Fairly to richly valued, not cheap.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward NIM guidance and deposit beta trajectory in next earnings call
- Pace and authorization size of buybacks vs CET1 capital
- Reserve build adequacy and commercial real estate exposure detail
- Whether the EQ flags reflect normal bank accounting or actual cash-flow deterioration
The macro tape is only mildly stressed (VIX 18.6, S&P -3.3% off highs, neutral regime) and BAC's 1.2 beta means it feels that drag only modestly. What dominates this name right now is a rate-narrative shift: BofA's own economists are calling for three more Fed hikes under a hawkish Warsh, and the press is openly asking whether rising rates change the math for big banks - the answer the market is gravitating toward is yes, positively, via sustained net interest margins. That maps directly onto the active bull story (higher-for-longer NIMs, accelerating capital return) and undercuts the bear case of curve flattening and NIM compression.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the hawkish-Fed narrative holds through the next FOMC meeting or fades on softer data
- Yield curve shape - a renewed flattening would gut the NIM-tailwind story
- Any sell-side PT revisions in the next 2-4 weeks confirming Citi's upgrade direction
- Deposit-flight commentary at next earnings - a key bear-case trigger
- Whether bank-sector ETFs (KBE, KRE) start outperforming on the rate repricing
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $93.9B | $115.1B | $171.9B | $192.4B | $191.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $144.0M | $22.6B | $77.7B | $96.4B | $84.1B |
| Gross Profit | $93.7B | $92.4B | $94.2B | $96.1B | $107.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $59.7B | $61.4B | $65.8B | $66.8B | $69.7B |
| Operating Income | $34.0B | $31.0B | $28.3B | $29.3B | $37.7B |
| Net Income | $32.0B | $27.5B | $26.5B | $27.1B | $30.5B |
| EBITDA | $35.9B | $32.9B | $30.4B | $31.4B | $40.0B |
| EPS | $3.60 | $3.21 | $3.10 | $3.25 | $3.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $355.4B | $237.5B | $341.4B | $296.5B | $231.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $741.6B | $539.4B | $704.8B | $740.8B | $1.1T |
| Total Assets | $3.2T | $3.1T | $3.2T | $3.3T | $3.4T |
| Current Liabilities | $2.6T | $2.5T | $2.3T | $2.4T | $2.6T |
| Long-Term Debt | $280.1B | $276.0B | $302.2B | $283.3B | $317.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.9T | $2.8T | $2.9T | $3.0T | $3.1T |
| Total Equity | $270.1B | $273.2B | $291.6B | $295.6B | $303.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $188.1B | $207.0B | $224.7B | $242.3B | $261.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$7.2B | -$6.3B | $45.0B | -$8.8B | $12.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Free Cash Flow | -$7.2B | -$6.3B | $45.0B | -$8.8B | $12.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$25.1B | -$5.1B | -$4.6B | -$13.1B | -$24.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$32.2B | -$118.0B | $102.9B | -$43.0B | -$58.3B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$121.4B $120.8B – $122.0B
|
$127.5B $125.9B – $128.9B
|
$133.7B $132.8B – $134.5B
|
$133.4B $132.3B – $135.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$29.6B $29.4B – $29.7B
|
$31.1B $30.7B – $31.4B
|
$32.6B $32.4B – $32.8B
|
$32.5B $32.2B – $32.9B
|
| Net Income |
$33.7B $33.2B – $34.1B
|
$38.0B $36.1B – $39.9B
|
$44.1B $41.8B – $46.4B
|
$51.5B $50.9B – $52.3B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +22.6% | +49.4% | +11.9% | -0.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -1.4% | +1.9% | +2.0% | +11.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -8.9% | -8.5% | +3.2% | +28.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -13.9% | -3.7% | +2.3% | +12.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -8.2% | -7.7% | +3.4% | +27.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | M-Exempt | 18,083.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | D-Return | 18,083.00 | $55.87 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | M-Exempt | 18,083.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | M-Exempt | 18,083.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | D-Return | 18,083.00 | $49.77 | $899,991 |
| 2026-05-15 | MOYNIHAN BRIAN T | M-Exempt | 18,083.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-05 | Greener Geoffrey S | S-Sale | 126,756.00 | $53.01 | $6.7M |
| 2026-05-04 | Zuber Maria T | A-Award | 5,365.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | Woods Thomas D | A-Award | 5,365.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | Woods Thomas D | F-InKind | 2,473.00 | $52.19 | $129,066 |
| 2026-05-04 | WHITE MICHAEL D | A-Award | 5,365.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | ROSE CLAYTON STUART | A-Award | 5,365.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | Ramos Denise L | A-Award | 5,365.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | NOWELL LIONEL L III | A-Award | 8,718.15 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | Martinez Maria | A-Award | 5,365.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | LOZANO MONICA C | A-Award | 5,365.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | DONALD ARNOLD W | A-Award | 5,365.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | ALMEIDA JOSE E | A-Award | 5,365.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-04 | Allen Sharon L. | A-Award | 5,365.01 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-22 | de Weck Pierre J.P. | F-InKind | 1,096.00 | $53.12 | $58,220 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $0.28 | 2026-04-23 | 2026-06-05 | 2026-06-26 |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.28 | 2026-02-03 | 2026-03-06 | 2026-03-27 |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.28 | 2025-10-23 | 2025-12-05 | 2025-12-26 |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.28 | 2025-07-23 | 2025-09-05 | 2025-09-26 |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.26 | 2025-04-23 | 2025-06-06 | 2025-06-27 |
| 2025-03-07 | $0.26 | 2025-01-29 | 2025-03-07 | 2025-03-28 |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.26 | 2024-10-16 | 2024-12-06 | 2024-12-27 |
| 2024-09-06 | $0.26 | 2024-07-24 | 2024-09-06 | 2024-09-27 |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.24 | 2024-04-25 | 2024-06-07 | 2024-06-28 |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.24 | 2024-01-31 | 2024-03-01 | 2024-03-29 |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.24 | 2023-10-18 | 2023-12-01 | 2023-12-29 |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.24 | 2023-07-19 | 2023-09-01 | 2023-09-29 |
| 2023-06-01 | $0.22 | 2023-04-26 | 2023-06-02 | 2023-06-30 |
| 2023-03-02 | $0.22 | 2023-02-01 | 2023-03-03 | 2023-03-31 |
| 2022-12-01 | $0.22 | 2022-10-19 | 2022-12-02 | 2022-12-30 |
| 2022-09-01 | $0.22 | 2022-07-20 | 2022-09-02 | 2022-09-30 |
| 2022-06-02 | $0.21 | 2022-04-27 | 2022-06-03 | 2022-06-24 |
| 2022-03-03 | $0.21 | 2022-02-02 | 2022-03-04 | 2022-03-25 |
| 2021-12-02 | $0.21 | 2021-10-20 | 2021-12-03 | 2021-12-31 |
| 2021-09-02 | $0.21 | 2021-07-21 | 2021-09-03 | 2021-09-24 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: BAC is doing $191.6B in 2025 revenue versus $192.4B in 2024 — that's actually a slight decline, not growth. Net income grew 12.5% YoY to $30.5B, driven by operating leverage (op income jumped from $29.3B to $37.7B), which is the real story here. The Q1 2026 print at $30.27B revenue with 28.4% net margin looks anomalous versus the $46-49B quarterly run rate — almost certainly a reporting/classification quirk (likely net interest income vs. total revenue presentation), not a 38% sequential collapse. Anyone treating that quarter as a trend signal is misreading bank accounting. P/E of 13.2, P/B of 1.34, ROE ~10.5%, 2.36% dividend yield — this is textbook mature money-center bank pricing, slightly rich to historical median (~11x) but nowhere near bubble territory.
The synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" with a "29% FCF growth requirement" is, frankly, model malpractice. You cannot run a reverse-DCF on a bank using reported FCF of $12.6B because banks don't have meaningful FCF in the industrial sense — loan growth consumes "cash," deposits create it, and capex is trivial. The right anchor for BAC is ROTCE, P/TBV, and dividend discount modeling on earnings, not free cash flow. The pre-flight model gets this right ("traditional," ~11-12% ROTCE, 1.0-1.2x P/TBV). The Market Forces "deteriorating franchise" call is similarly overcooked — net income up 12.5%, operating income up 29% YoY, and the $231B cash position with stable deposit base does not look like structural decline. The bear case on the AOCI/HTM securities portfolio drag is real (BAC has ~$100B in unrealized losses on its HTM book), but that's a known, slowly-amortizing headwind, not a hidden bomb. The narrative engine's $47.33 DCF anchor implying a 22% premium is more defensible but still leans on a flawed cash flow framework.
A genuine contrarian critique that the models miss: BAC's efficiency at this scale is structurally constrained, and the 10.5% ROE meaningfully lags JPM (~17%) and even WFC's recovery trajectory. If you're paying 1.34x book for a 10.5% ROE business, your forward return is roughly ROE/(P/B) ≈ 7.8% — fine, not exciting. The real risk isn't a "narrative collapse"; it's that BAC continues to under-earn peers while paying out 2.4% and buying back stock at slightly above tangible book, generating ~8-9% total returns in a market where the risk-free rate is 4%+. That's the actual bear case: opportunity cost, not collapse. The insider S-Sale of 126,756 shares on 5/5/2026 is routine for a bank exec at this size — not a signal. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag is an artifact of the Q1 2026 reporting anomaly; ignore it.
Net verdict: I dissent from the synthesis "Disconnected from Fundamentals" call — that framework is wrong for banks. I partially agree with the narrative engine that there's modest premium baked in, but $47 fair value feels too punitive. On 2025 EPS of ~$3.90 and a normalized 11-12x multiple for a mid-tier-ROE money center, fair value lands around $48-54. At $57.73 you're paying ~14.8x for ~10.5% ROE and 2.4% yield — slightly rich but not absurd. The setup is "hold if owned, don't chase here." A pullback to $50-52 (roughly 1.15x tangible book) would be a genuine buy; current levels offer mediocre forward returns with real AOCI/NIM tail risk if the curve flattens or credit deteriorates in 2026.
GPT Critique
Bank of America's financial picture is deeply rooted in its consistent revenue generation and stable, if not stellar, profitability. The company's revenue has hovered around the $190 billion mark for the past two years, with a slight decrease from $192.43 billion in 2024 to $191.57 billion in 2025. This stagnation is indicative of BAC's mature status in the financial sector rather than a growth-driven enterprise. The net income growth to $30.51 billion in 2025, a 12.5% increase year-over-year, is notable, driven by an impressive rise in operating income from $29.25 billion to $37.7 billion. This highlights a significant boost in operational efficiency, albeit against the backdrop of a flat revenue landscape.
I concur with Opus that Bank of America's valuation, with a P/E ratio of 13.2 and a P/B ratio of 1.34, suggests it is trading at a slight premium relative to its historical valuations. However, I disagree with Opus’s dismissal of the "Disconnected from Fundamentals" label as model malpractice. While free cash flow (FCF) metrics may be less applicable to banks, the concern regarding a 29% FCF growth expectation being baked into its pricing does highlight a disconnect if viewed through the wrong lens. Opus rightly points out the need for using ROTCE and P/TBV for valuation metrics, which aligns more appropriately with banking industry standards.
Furthermore, Opus's argument that the Market Forces' claim of BAC as a "deteriorating franchise" is overstated finds support from the numbers. The 12.5% increase in net income and the stable cash position of $231.85 billion underscore a franchise that, while not experiencing rapid growth, is far from decline. However, I am less convinced by Opus's downplay of the $100 billion unrealized loss on the HTM securities portfolio. Although these losses are indeed a known factor, they represent a significant, ongoing financial burden that cannot be ignored and reflect negatively on BAC's asset management efficiency.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and the AI model may underappreciate the potential macroeconomic headwinds BAC faces. The reliance on a stable interest rate environment for maintaining net interest margins is precarious, given the unpredictable nature of monetary policy. Additionally, the potential for increased loan loss reserves, as flagged by skeptics in the market narrative, poses a real risk should economic conditions deteriorate.