For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Baker Hughes Company (BKR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -35 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 27 · Value -77 · Sentiment -6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $25.66 vs $63.66 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Baker Hughes Company
BKR NASDAQBaker Hughes Company is an energy technology company that provides equipment, services, and digital solutions for the oil and gas industry and related industrial markets. Baker Hughes Company serves onshore and offshore operations across the full well lifecycle, including exploration, development, production, intervention, and decommissioning. Its oilfield services and equipment offerings include well construction, completions, production solutions, and subsea technologies. The company also supplies mechanical-drive, compression, and power-generation technologies used in liquefied natural gas, refining, petrochemical, pipeline, gas storage, and other industrial applications. In addition, Baker Hughes Company offers air and gas handling, thermal management, and lifecycle services, as well as lower-carbon solutions for customers seeking more efficient energy and industrial operations. Headquartered in Houston, Texas, Baker Hughes Company plays a significant role in supporting global energy infrastructure and industrial process performance.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): N/A
Total Equity: $19.01B
Shares: 992,674,071
Total Debt: $6.09B
Cash: $3.72B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $6.09B
Cash: $3.72B
Revenue: $27.73B
Revenue: $27.73B
Revenue: $27.73B
Total Equity: $19.01B
Tax Rate: 8.8%
Equity: $19.01B
Total Debt: $6.09B
Cash: $3.72B
Current Liabilities: $13.88B
Long-Term Debt: $5.40B
Total Debt: $6.09B
Total Equity: $19.01B
Shares: 992,674,071
Shares: 992,674,071
CapEx: -$1.27B
Shares: 992,674,071
Stock Price: $63.66
Net Income: $2.59B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 12:35am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $20.5B | $21.2B | $25.5B | $27.8B | $27.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $1.3B | $1.2B | $2.3B | $3.1B | — |
| Net Income | -$219.0M | -$601.0M | $1.9B | $3.0B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | $2.4B | $2.2B | $3.4B | $4.2B | — |
| EPS | $-0.27 | $-0.61 | $1.93 | $3.00 | — |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.27 | $-0.61 | $1.91 | $2.98 | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 12:30am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.9B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $3.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $15.1B | $14.6B | $16.3B | $17.2B | $18.8B |
| Total Assets | $35.3B | $34.2B | $36.9B | $38.4B | $40.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.1B | $11.1B | $13.0B | $13.0B | $13.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.7B | $6.0B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $5.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $18.6B | $19.7B | $21.4B | $21.3B | $21.9B |
| Total Equity | $16.7B | $14.5B | $15.5B | $17.1B | $19.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$10.2B | -$10.8B | -$8.8B | -$5.8B | -$3.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 12:46am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.4B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$856.0M | -$989.0M | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.5B | $899.0M | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$87.0M | -$767.0M | -$301.0M | $0 | -$830.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$63.0M | $0 | -$651.0M | -$143.0M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$592.0M | -$726.0M | -$786.0M | -$836.0M | -$910.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$434.0M | -$828.0M | -$538.0M | -$484.0M | -$384.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$279.0M | -$1.4B | $158.0M | $718.0M | $351.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 12:35am (36d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.2% | +20.6% | +9.1% | -0.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -9.5% | +95.5% | +33.0% | — |
| Net Income Growth | -174.4% | +423.3% | +53.3% | -13.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -7.0% | +51.6% | +23.9% | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:50pm (38d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-07 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-05 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-04 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-05 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-06 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-11 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-04 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-06 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-03 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-12 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-03 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-07 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-03 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-04 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-08 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-04 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-01 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-03 02:01A +1σ run of quarters pays -10%; a −1σ run costs 75%. Ratio -0.1:1 (μ 2.7%, σ 17.4% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.6 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($63.66) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -1% | 17.3% | $41.00 | -36% |
| Base — stabilizes | -1% | 15.0% | $35.49 | -44% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -2% | 12.8% | $30.17 | -53% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -2% | 11.2% | $26.13 | -59% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +20% | 12.3% | $57.58 | -10% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -15% | 10.1% | $15.66 | -75% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-02 00:59The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: TTM revenue is roughly $27.7B, flat versus 2024's $27.83B, and the most recent two quarters ($6.59B and $6.74B) are running below the year-ago comps ($6.91B and $7.36B implied Q4). That's not a growth story — that's a plateau with a whiff of rollover. TTM net income is around $3.1B (summing the last four quarters: $681+$930+$876+$609), giving an ~11% net margin, but the quarterly margin trajectory (16% → 6.3% → 10.1% → 8.7% → 11.9% → 14.1% → 10.1%) is noisy enough that I don't trust any single "peak margin" narrative. FCF of $2.54B on a $63B market cap is a ~4% yield — respectable for an industrial but not cheap. EV/revenue at 2.36x and P/E at ~24x TTM (or ~20x on my TTM NI math) is priced like a quality compounder, not a cyclical services house whose 2022 earnings were negative.
Where I part company with the models: the synthesis's $42 DCF fair value looks too punitive. It appears to lean on mean-reversion assumptions that ignore that BKR's mix has genuinely shifted toward IET (Industrial & Energy Technology — LNG compression, gas turbines) which carries structurally better margins and longer-cycle backlog than the legacy OFSE segment. LNG order flow through 2025 is real and contracted, not narrative. That said, I also don't buy the market-forces "neutral hold" framing as adequately bearish — the YoY revenue is -0.3% and YoY earnings -13.1% with the stock at 24x. Something has to give. The pre-flight note that market is pricing "moderate pessimism" at 21x TTM is simply wrong directionally; 24x on decelerating earnings for an oilfield-services-adjacent business is optimism, not pessimism.
The contrarian bull case worth stress-testing: if IET backlog conversion accelerates and gas turbine demand from data-center power buildouts is durable (not a 2024-2025 fad), then BKR is closer to a GE Vernova analog than an SLB analog, and 24x is defensible. But the numbers don't yet show that transition — segment mix disclosure would matter here and the tile doesn't give it. The contrarian bear case: insider selling is heavy and clustered (four sales in June alone totaling ~460K shares against modest option exercises), earnings YoY is already negative, and the "supercycle" narrative has been the pitch since 2022 while revenue CAGR is a pedestrian 4.3%. The narrative-economics read that ~50% of the premium is story rather than cash flow feels roughly right in direction, wrong in magnitude — I'd put it at 20-25%, not 50%.
Balance sheet is fine (debt/equity 0.32, current ratio 1.36, $3.7B cash), ROE 13.6% is decent but not extraordinary for this multiple, and the 1.45% dividend with 35% payout leaves room but isn't a catalyst. Net-net: I dissent from the synthesis's aggressive $42 fair value but agree BKR is overvalued at $63.65. My rough fair value is $52-56, anchoring on ~18x normalized TTM EPS of ~$3.00 and a 5% FCF yield on $2.5B. The insider selling plus decelerating quarterly cadence plus 24x multiple is a bad three-way combination — you don't need a bear thesis to underperform from here, you just need continued flat revenue and any margin normalization. I'd wait for either a print that reaccelerates IET or a pullback into the low-$50s before committing. Starter position only makes sense below $55.
GPT Reading
Baker Hughes looks like a good company priced like a better one. The operating story is respectable: revenue has climbed from $20.5B in 2021 to $27.7B in 2025, operating income from $1.31B to $3.08B in 2024 before easing, and net income from losses in 2021-2022 to $2.59B in 2025. Cash conversion is real, not cosmetic: 2025 operating cash flow was $3.81B and free cash flow $2.54B after $1.27B of capex. The balance sheet is also fine, with $6.09B of debt against $3.72B of cash and just 0.32x debt/equity. If this were trading at a market multiple for a cyclical industrial, I’d be constructive. But at $63.66 and a $63.2B market cap, investors are paying about 24x trailing earnings and roughly 25x 2025 free cash flow for a business whose annual revenue was essentially flat in 2025 at $27.73B versus $27.83B in 2024.
The quarterly pattern is the bigger issue. On the surface, recent quarters don’t support a premium multiple. Revenue in the last four quarters was $6.43B, $6.91B, $7.01B, and $7.39B through 2025, then $6.59B and $6.74B in the first half of 2026. That is steady, but not compounding in a way that justifies a growth-stock valuation. More importantly, profitability has become choppy after a very strong 2024. Net income margins ran 11.1% in 2024 Q3 and an exceptional 16.0% in 2024 Q4, then fell to 6.3% in 2025 Q1, recovered to around 10% in 2025 Q2, slipped to 8.7% in 2025 Q3, rebounded to 11.9% in 2025 Q4, hit 14.1% in 2026 Q1, then dropped back to 10.1% in 2026 Q2. That is not a business showing clean operating leverage; it is a cyclical equipment-and-services company earning decent but variable margins near the top half of the cycle. Even the TTM earnings signal is softening: 2026 Q2 net income of $681M was down from $701M a year earlier despite revenue only slipping from $6.91B to $6.74B, while 2026 Q1’s $930M benefited from a very easy comparison to 2025 Q1’s $402M.
What stands out to me is that the stock is being awarded a multiple more fitting for either a secular compounder or a cyclical name with obvious upside acceleration ahead. The data show neither. Return on equity of 13.6% and return on assets of 6.3% are solid, but not rare enough to command this valuation. The free cash flow yield is only about 4.0% on the current market cap using 2025 FCF, and the dividend yield is just 1.45%, so shareholders are not being paid much to absorb cyclicality. Meanwhile, insider activity tilts negative: the recent tape is dominated by sales, including multiple 181,411-share dispositions around option exercises. I do not overread insider sales, but in a stock already valued for confidence, they remove a possible support rather than add one. The market appears to be capitalizing the idea that Baker Hughes deserves to trade closer to a best-in-class energy technology franchise than to a mature oilfield service and equipment supplier. The actual numbers still look mature and cyclical.
The best case against my view is straightforward: the company has genuinely improved. Earnings power is far better than it was in 2021-2023, annual net income went from -$601M in 2022 to $2.98B in 2024 and remained a healthy $2.59B in 2025, and first-half 2026 net income of $1.61B versus $1.10B in first-half 2025 suggests the business may still be moving up despite mixed quarterly optics. If Baker Hughes is shifting toward better-mix, higher-margin businesses, then today’s 24x trailing P/E may be less demanding than it looks because the “E” is still rising. EV/revenue of 2.36x is not egregious for an industrial with improving margin structure, and net debt is modest enough that capital returns or bolt-on M&A remain options. A smart bull would also say flat 2025 revenue understates quality because holding $27-28B of sales while materially above 2023 earnings implies pricing, mix, and execution gains that deserve a rerating. I weigh that less favorably because the quarterly margin pattern still lacks consistency, and until revenue growth re-accelerates above low single digits, I don’t think this business merits a valuation usually reserved for less cyclical models.
What would change my mind is evidence that Baker Hughes can sustain double-digit margins without depending on unusually favorable quarters and can pair that with real top-line growth. Concretely, if the next two quarters show revenue consistently above $7.0B with net income margins holding at 11%-12% or better, that would point to a higher through-cycle earnings base than I’m assuming. I would also become less skeptical if annual free cash flow moves durably above $3.0B, which would bring the FCF yield closer to 5% even without a price pullback. Absent that, a stock at $63.66 feels priced for a cleaner, stronger cycle than the reported numbers actually show. My fairer range is closer to the low-to-mid $50s, with real upside only if the 2026 margin improvement proves durable rather than episodic.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a mature oilfield-services franchise that has already harvested most of the post-2022 recovery and is now stalling at altitude. Annual revenue barely moved from $27.83B in 2024 to $27.73B in 2025; trailing four-quarter run-rate is still glued near $28B while the two most recent prints ($6.59B and $6.74B) sit below the year-ago quarters. Net income fell from $2.98B to $2.59B, and the latest quarter’s 10.1% net margin is unremarkable next to the 16% spike in late 2024. Free cash flow of $2.54B on a $63B equity value produces a roughly 4% FCF yield—acceptable for a fortress balance sheet (net debt only ~$2.4B, debt-to-equity 0.32), but nowhere near enough to justify a 24× trailing P/E when top-line growth has flipped negative and earnings are already contracting 13% year-on-year. The market is paying a mid-cycle multiple for late-cycle volume.
What stands out is the gap between the earnings-power story management and the narrative layer want to sell and the actual cash-flow trajectory. Operating cash flow remains healthy at $3.81B and capex is disciplined, so the business is not broken; it is simply mature and cyclical. Revenue CAGR of 4.3% and the recent deceleration signal that the easy volume recovery is over. Insider activity reinforces the caution: a cluster of sizeable open-market sales in June 2026, some paired with option exercises, is the opposite of accumulation at these levels. Against peers the stock already trades at a discount to SLB on forward multiples, yet that discount looks insufficient once you strip out the supercycle premium the narrative engine correctly flags as roughly half the distance between a ~$42–44 DCF and the $63.66 screen price.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward. Baker Hughes still converts the cycle better than it did five years ago—earnings and FCF CAGRs of 15–17% show real operating leverage when activity is rising—and the LNG, subsea, and compression backlog could extend the plateau for several more years if AI-driven power demand and U.S. export projects keep FID activity elevated. A clean balance sheet and 1.45% dividend with a sustainable 35% payout give patient holders a floor that pure cyclicals often lack. If oil stays in a $70–90 band and OFS spending avoids a classic cliff, the $2.5B+ FCF run-rate can compound quietly and the multiple can compress via earnings growth rather than price decline. That path is plausible; it is simply not the base case implied by flat revenue and falling net income today.
I would reverse the overvalued call if the next two quarters show sequential revenue re-acceleration above mid-single digits with net margins holding above 11–12%, or if management posts multi-billion LNG/compression awards that visibly lift 2027 consensus. A sustained move in the forward order book that pushes FCF toward $3.5B+ would also close the gap to the current price. Absent those prints, the stock is priced for a durability of cycle that the last four quarters have already begun to question.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Baker Hughes has visibly matured over five years: revenue grew from 20.5B in 2021 to 27.7B in 2025, and operating margin expanded from 6.4% to double digits in 2024 (11.1%), while net income swung from a 219M loss in 2021 to 2.59B in 2025. FCF is real and rising (1.52B to 2.54B), with OCF running well above net income and accruals at -4.3% of assets - earnings quality checks are clean. Balance sheet is workable but not a fortress: 3.72B cash against net debt of 2.37B, Altman Z of 2.45 in the grey zone. The company self-funds and returns capital (buyback/SBC 263%), yet diluted shares still compounded at 5.2%/yr from 811M in 2021 to ~993M in 2025 - largely a 2022 step-up. Per-share value creation lags the operational improvement. Insider tape is one-directional: 19 sales, 0 open-market buys, ~73M in disposals over 12 months including recurring CEO option-exercise-and-sell sequences - normal for a mature large cap but not a confidence signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2025 operating margin - trajectory row shows 0%, need 10-K confirmation vs a mix/impairment/one-time item
- Cause of 2022 share-count jump from 811M to 985M - acquisition, GE Baker Hughes structure change, or issuance
- Customer and geographic concentration (national oil companies, LNG exposure) in latest 10-K
- Backlog composition and duration in IET vs OFSE segments to gauge cyclical cushion
- Detail of insider 10b5-1 plans behind the CEO exercise-and-sell cadence
The composite fair value of $43.95 (signal-adjusted $42.02) sits roughly 34% below the $63.66 price. The methods triangulate below price from two directions: DCF at $27.07 and EPV floor at $21.49 both say the cash-generating business as-is is worth substantially less, while the anchored-PE of $100.15 is the clear outlier - almost certainly extrapolating peak cyclical margins and deserves to be discounted heavily. Averaging the two grounded methods puts deserved value in the mid-$20s to low-$40s; even generously weighting the PE anchor, fair sits in the low-to-mid $40s. Earnings quality is clean (no haircut needed) and the business is Solid quality, which supports the higher end of that range but does not stretch it to $63. What is priced in: continued LNG/AI-power capex, sustained pricing power, and margins holding at recently doubled levels through the cycle. That is a coherent bull case but it is the bull case fully capitalized - not a discount. The 22% share-count creep over four years quietly erodes per-share value the price is not accounting for. This is a fine business at a full-to-rich price, not a mispricing in my favor.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2026 orders/backlog guidance and book-to-bill trajectory
- IET (Industrial and Energy Technology) segment margin sustainability vs one-time LNG pull-forward
- Actual net buyback pace vs stock-based comp issuance
- Capex cycle commentary from major E and P and LNG customers
- Whether the flat 2025 line and the 0% OpM anomaly flagged in the quality read reflect a one-off or a peak
The active narrative doing the heavy lifting here is the AI-power-demand energy supercycle - LNG exports, data-center gas, subsea and compression pricing power. That story has lifted the whole OFS cohort and has BKR trading roughly 50% above a mature-DCF anchor. Intensity is moderate and cult is low, but durability is flagged fragile: it is a sentiment prop, not a bedrock belief, and any crack (recession fears, oil weakness, renewables acceleration) hits the multiple before it hits the numbers. Peer tape is mixed and telling - SLB just dropped nearly 5% in a session, TechnipFMC being framed as undervalued on subsea 2.0, Tidewater upgraded - so capital is rotating within the group rather than fleeing it, which keeps BKR supported but not adored. The macro tape is neutral with VIX 16 and the S&P only 2% off highs, so with beta 0.96 BKR is not getting mauled by risk-off flows; however, 10y at 4.75% and a 25.8 market PE are a slow drag on a name whose premium is discount-rate sensitive. Net: a real narrative tailwind offset by a fragile story, rich embedded expectations, and no fresh catalyst in the news flow specific to BKR - the pressure roughly cancels.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any oil price break below recent range - would crack the supercycle narrative fast
- E&P capex guidance revisions from majors this quarter
- Sell-side target revisions on BKR specifically vs SLB/FTI (relative tone)
- AI-power/data-center gas headlines - the narrative's oxygen supply
- 10y yield direction; a move toward 5% pressures premium-multiple energy names
The world is spending less on finding new barrels and more on moving, liquefying and burning gas — plus, newly, on firm power for compute. That splits this company in two. The drilling-levered half is exposed to a capex plateau at mid-cycle oil with OPEC+ spare capacity and disciplined operators; the equipment half sells into LNG liquefaction, compression and gas-fired generation, where the demand curve is set by multi-year infrastructure programs and is largely insensitive to next quarter's crude tape. Higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.75) raise the hurdle on marginal LNG FIDs and on the customers' project financing, which is the real macro transmission channel here — not oil price per se. Net: a mature category where the winner is decided by mix and cost, not by market growth. BKR is positioned on the right side of that split, but the split limits how fast the whole can grow.
When we made this prediction on Sep 2, 2026, BKR was $64.41. We expect it to be $58.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $48.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.