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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for BlackRock, Inc. (BLK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -17 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 52 · Value -73 · Sentiment 43 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $516.19 vs $1,126.63 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
BlackRock, Inc.
BLK NYSEBlackRock, Inc. is a global investment management and financial technology company headquartered in New York City. It provides a broad range of investment products, including mutual funds, exchange-traded funds under the iShares brand, separate accounts, and alternative investment strategies spanning equities, fixed income, multi-asset, cash management, and private markets. BlackRock serves institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and corporations, as well as financial advisors and individual investors worldwide. A distinguishing feature of BlackRock is its Aladdin platform, which offers portfolio management, risk analytics, trading, and operations technology to asset managers, banks, insurers, and other financial institutions, positioning the firm as both an asset manager and enterprise technology provider. The company also offers advisory and risk management services, including portfolio advisory and retirement solutions, playing a central role in global capital markets and investment infrastructure. Founded in 1988 and headquartered in New York City, BlackRock operates across North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia-Pacific.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 35.31
Total Equity: $61.54B
Shares: 157,264,231
Total Debt: $12.77B
Cash: $11.47B
EBITDA: $9.48B
Total Debt: $12.77B
Cash: $11.47B
Revenue: $24.22B
Revenue: $24.22B
Revenue: $24.22B
Total Equity: $61.54B
Tax Rate: 22.0%
Equity: $61.54B
Total Debt: $12.77B
Cash: $11.47B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $12.77B
Total Debt: $12.77B
Total Equity: $61.54B
Shares: 157,264,231
Shares: 157,264,231
CapEx: -$375.00M
Shares: 157,264,231
Stock Price: $1,127
Net Income: $5.55B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 8:34pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.4B | $17.9B | $17.9B | $20.4B | $24.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.9B | $9.4B | $9.5B | $10.3B | $12.9B |
| Gross Profit | $9.5B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $10.1B | $11.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $3.4B |
| Operating Income | $7.5B | $6.5B | $6.3B | $7.5B | $7.9B |
| Net Income | $5.9B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $6.4B | $5.6B |
| EBITDA | $8.0B | $7.1B | $7.2B | $8.8B | $9.5B |
| EPS | $38.60 | $34.31 | $36.85 | $42.45 | $35.83 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $38.07 | $33.97 | $36.51 | $42.01 | $35.31 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 8:34pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | — | $8.7B | $12.8B | $11.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | — | $123.2B | $138.6B | $170.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | $7.9B | $12.3B | $12.8B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | $82.0B | $89.3B | $108.5B |
| Total Equity | $37.8B | $37.9B | $41.2B | $49.4B | $61.5B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 8:34pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.0B | $4.2B | $5.0B | $3.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$533.0M | -$344.0M | -$255.0M | -$375.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.4B | $3.8B | $4.7B | $3.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$189.0M | -$2.9B | -$3.5B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$750.0M | $1.2B | $4.5B | $284.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.0B | -$3.0B | -$3.1B | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.3B | -$1.9B | -$1.9B | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.9B | $1.3B | $4.0B | -$1.3B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 8:34pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -7.7% | -0.1% | +14.3% | +18.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -10.9% | -0.9% | +20.8% | +12.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -13.3% | -2.4% | +19.0% | +4.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.3% | +6.3% | +15.8% | -12.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -11.7% | +2.5% | +22.1% | +7.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 8:34pm (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $5.73 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $5.73 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-05 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-09 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-06 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-07 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-06 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-06 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-06 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-03 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-04 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-06 | $4.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-03 | $4.13 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:37Even the bull case prices 19% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 57%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($1,126.63) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +36% | 27.7% | $912.87 | -19% |
| Base — stabilizes | +24% | 24.1% | $582.01 | -48% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +12% | 20.5% | $359.40 | -68% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +25% | 18.8% | $486.41 | -57% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a coherent story that the models are partially misreading. Revenue growth is real and accelerating: TTM revenue is roughly $24.2B vs $17.9B two years ago, and the most recent quarter ($6.70B) annualizes to ~$26.8B — that's genuine 18-19% top-line growth, driven substantially by the GIP/HPS/Preqin acquisitions that closed through 2024-2025. But look at what's happening beneath: 2025 annual net income of $5.55B is actually *below* 2024's $6.37B despite revenue growing 19%. Operating margin compressed from 42% (2023) to 33% (2025). ROE of 9.0% is mediocre for an asset manager — TROW and Ameriprise historically clear 15-20%. This isn't a compounding machine right now; it's a company diluting margins to buy AUM growth in private markets, and the market is paying 32x earnings for the promise it works.
The synthesis DCF at ~$530 fair value (implying -53%) strikes me as too aggressive on the downside, and the Market Forces "tailwinds" read is too rosy. Both can be wrong. A saner frame: apply a 22-24x multiple (historical asset manager range, adjusted upward for Aladdin's genuine stickiness) to normalized ~$40-42/share earnings power once acquisition noise clears, giving $880-1,000 fair value. That's still 12-22% downside from $1,126, not 53%. The composite DCF appears to be penalizing the FCF trough (-3.6% CAGR) as if it's structural, when much of it reflects deal integration and one-time items. Meanwhile the "market tailwinds" framing hand-waves through the fact that earnings CAGR is 0.5% over five years — that's not a tailwind, that's stagnation masked by acquisition-fueled revenue.
The contrarian case against my own moderate-bear view: BlackRock genuinely is the only firm operating at $11.5T+ AUM with a proprietary tech platform (Aladdin) that competitors cannot replicate, and the GIP/HPS deals bought them a credible private markets franchise at what will look cheap if alts fees hold. If Aladdin revenue inflects to $2B+ with 40%+ SaaS-like margins, a sum-of-the-parts justifies $1,200+. The unusual insider selling (multiple sales July 16) is noise — executive comp cycles, not signal, at a company this size. And the Q1 2026 print at 33% net margin suggests margin recovery is already underway post-integration. That's the strongest bull data point in the file and the DCF model appears to ignore it. Also flag: the 2024-12-31 negative revenue print (-$1.94B) is clearly a reporting artifact (likely a reclassification of investment losses), and any model treating it as real is contaminated.
Where I land: the synthesis is directionally right (overvalued) but the magnitude is overstated, and the market-forces "patient investor" framing understates real risks — passive fee compression is a decade-long secular headwind, ROE at 9% is genuinely poor, and paying 32x for 0.5% five-year EPS growth requires believing narratives that haven't shown up in the P&L. The narrative-economics layer nails it: ~55-60% fundamentals, ~40% platform-premium story. That premium is defensible but not at current price. I dissent from the -53% magnitude but agree with the overvalued direction. A fair entry is $850-950; current $1,126 offers negative expected return over 2 years unless Aladdin materially inflects or alts fees prove stickier than base case. The Q1 margin recovery is the single most important data point to monitor — if 33% holds through 2026, my fair value moves toward $1,050 and this becomes a hold, not a sell.
GPT Reading
At $1,126, BlackRock is being valued like a hybrid of a premium asset manager and a financial infrastructure platform, but the reported economics here still look much more like the former than the latter. The most favorable fact in the file is revenue growth: 2025 revenue reached $24.22B, up 18.7% from $20.41B in 2024 and well above the roughly $17.9B level of 2022-2023. Quarterly revenue also accelerated from $5.28B in 1Q25 to $6.70B in 1Q26. But the income statement is not keeping pace. Net income fell from $6.37B in 2024 to $5.55B in 2025 despite that strong top-line growth, taking net margin down to 22.9% from roughly 31.2%. The quarter pattern shows the same issue: 3Q25 net margin was only 20.3%, then 1Q26 rebounded to 33%, which tells me the franchise remains strong but earnings quality is being distorted by integration, mix, market-related items, or accounting noise rather than demonstrating clean operating leverage. When a stock trades at 31.9x earnings, 7.3x sales, and 18.6x EV/EBITDA, I want clearer evidence that each incremental dollar of revenue is structurally more valuable than the last. This dataset doesn’t show that.
The balance sheet is fine, not the problem. Debt of $12.77B against $11.47B of cash is modest for a company with $61.54B of equity, and operating margins remain excellent at 32.7%. But cash generation is underwhelming relative to the equity value. Free cash flow of $3.55B against a $183B market cap is roughly a 1.9% FCF yield. Even allowing for working-capital and market-linked distortions that can affect asset managers, that is thin for a mature financial company whose earnings CAGR over the period shown is only 0.5% and whose FCF CAGR is negative 3.6%. Return metrics also fail to justify a software-like multiple: ROE is 9.0%, ROIC 9.8%, ROA 3.3%. Those are respectable, not extraordinary. If this were trading at 20-24x earnings, I could make the case that scale, resilience, and optionality around Aladdin and alternatives deserve a premium. At nearly 32x, the market is already capitalizing those positives as if they are proven margin-expanding engines rather than promising but still only partially visible in the numbers.
The biggest tell for me is the mismatch between the growth narrative and the realized profit trajectory. Over five years, revenue grew from $19.37B in 2021 to $24.22B in 2025, but net income went from $5.90B to $5.55B. Said differently: the business is larger, but not more profitable. That can be fine during a strategic transition, yet valuation only works if you underwrite a re-acceleration in earnings that is not yet in evidence. The strange quarterly lines, including a negative $1.94B revenue quarter in 4Q24 and a missing 4Q25 revenue figure, make me cautious about overprecision, but they do not alter the central picture: the annual numbers are clean enough to say the market is paying a very high price for anticipated future monetization. Insider activity is not decisive, but the recent cluster of option exercises and sales rather than open-market buying does nothing to challenge the idea that management sees the stock as at least fully valued.
The best argument against my view is that BlackRock is not a normal asset manager and should not be valued on backward earnings alone. A smart bull would point to the 18.7% revenue growth, the 1Q26 rebound to $2.21B of net income on $6.70B of revenue, and the possibility that 2025 was a trough year for margin due to deliberate investment or acquisitions that enlarge the long-run moat. They would also argue that scale in ETFs, institutional relationships, and technology creates a much stickier revenue base than traditional active managers enjoy, so 31.9x trough-ish earnings may be less expensive than it looks if normalized earnings power is materially above $5.55B. I take that seriously, especially because a 33% margin quarter shows the engine can still throw off elite profitability. But to justify $183B, I think normalized earnings need to be demonstrated, not inferred. On the current figures, the stock is priced for earnings power that sits notably above what the annual statements presently show.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next full year can translate the revenue ramp into something like $6.8B-$7.2B of net income with free cash flow moving above $5B, then today’s multiple compresses toward a more defensible mid-20s earnings range for a category leader. I would also want to see operating margin hold above 33% while revenue stays above a $26B annualized run rate; that would indicate the platform thesis is finally showing up in reported economics. Absent that, fair value looks materially lower. A business with 9%-10% returns on capital, sub-2% FCF yield, and flat multi-year earnings should not command a tech-adjacent premium simply because the story is excellent.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a clear story of a franchise that is growing the top line while failing to grow the bottom line. BlackRock printed $24.22B in 2025 revenue, up nearly 19% from $20.41B, yet net income fell from $6.37B to $5.55B and free cash flow sits at only $3.55B. That is a 1.9% FCF yield on a $183B market cap. Operating margin held near 33% on an annual basis, but quarterly NI margins have swung violently—from 31% in mid-2024 down to 20% in Q3 2025 before snapping back to 33% in Q1 2026 on $6.70B revenue and $2.21B of earnings. Revenue CAGR of 16.5% against an earnings CAGR of 0.5% and an FCF CAGR of –3.6% is the central contradiction: the company is getting larger without getting more profitable for shareholders. At 31.9x trailing earnings, 7.3x sales, and 18.6x EV/EBITDA, with ROE of just 9.0% and ROIC of 9.8%, the multiple is priced for a growth compounder while the cash economics still look like a mature asset manager. The balance sheet is clean—$12.77B debt against $11.47B cash and a 0.21 debt-to-equity ratio—but balance-sheet strength does not justify paying nearly double a DCF-implied value near $530.
The Q1 2026 print is the one data point that forces a harder look: $2.21B of net income in a single quarter, if annualized near $8–9B, would pull the forward P/E toward the low-20s and make the current $1,127 price less absurd. Revenue has stepped up from the mid-$5B quarterly run-rate into the mid-to-high $6B range, consistent with alternatives AUM ramping and iShares flow share remaining dominant. The market is explicitly paying a 40–45% narrative premium for Aladdin as an institutional operating system and for structural passive share gains; that story is not pure fantasy given BlackRock’s scale and switching costs. Insider activity shows option exercises paired with sales rather than open-market accumulation, and FCF quality remains acceptable, so the franchise is not deteriorating in an absolute sense—just failing to earn its cost of capital at this valuation.
The strongest case against calling this overvalued is that the earnings trough in 2025 reflects integration and mix-shift costs from the alternatives push, and that patient capital will be rewarded once those margins normalize and Aladdin contribution becomes visible in the segment numbers. A smart opponent would argue that 16–19% revenue growth at this scale is rare in asset management, that the 2025 NI decline is transitional noise, and that applying a 25x multiple to a normalized $7–8B earnings power still supports $1,000-plus. I weigh that differently because the multi-year evidence shows earnings and FCF stubbornly flat-to-down while the stock has already capitalized the optimistic case; until NI and FCF actually compound, the premium is hope, not demonstrated economics. Fee compression in passive and political/regulatory overhangs around concentration and ESG remain real, not theoretical, risks to the narrative that is carrying nearly half the market cap.
I would flip to neutral or constructive if the next two quarters sustain net income above $2.0B with operating margins locked above 30%, if management breaks out Aladdin revenue showing high-teens growth and software-like margins, or if trailing FCF crosses $5.5B while the multiple compresses below 25x forward earnings.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue grew from $19.4B in 2021 to $24.2B in 2025 (roughly 5.7% CAGR), with operating margin holding in the 33-39% range and net income between $5.2B and $6.4B annually. Gross margins have stayed near 47-49%, and free cash flow has run $3.5B-$4.7B per year. Diluted share count went from 155.0M to 157.3M over five years (0.4% CAGR), with buybacks running 180% of SBC - real per-share discipline for a business with 6.4% SBC/revenue. The concerns are secondary but real: operating margin fell from 36.9% in 2024 to 32.7% in 2025 even as revenue jumped 18.7% (likely GIP/HPS/Preqin acquisition integration costs and share issuance for deals, since share count ticked up from 151.6M to 157.3M in 2025). OCF/NI at 0.8x and 2025 FCF at $3.55B (down from $4.70B in 2023) show earnings running slightly ahead of cash. Insider activity is one-sided (32 sells, 0 buys, $191M) but this is a mature large-cap where routine executive selling is normal. The Altman Z of 1.31 is essentially meaningless here - the model is calibrated for industrial/asset-heavy firms and systematically flags asset managers and financials as 'distressed' due to their balance-sheet structure. Net debt of $1.3B against $11.5B of liquid cash and $3.5B+ of annual FCF is trivial coverage.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether 2025 operating margin compression is one-time acquisition/integration cost or structural mix shift as private-markets AUM grows
- AUM composition and fee-rate trends by product (index vs. active vs. private markets vs. tech/Aladdin)
- Terms and share issuance associated with GIP, HPS, and Preqin acquisitions
- Client concentration and net new asset flows by channel
- Detail behind the OCF/NI slippage - working capital timing vs. real earnings quality erosion
- 10b5-1 plan coverage on recent Fink and Meade sales
The composite fair value of $481 and signal-adjusted FV of $530 both sit less than half the current $1,127 price, implying roughly -53% downside on the synthesis. Even the most generous input, the anchored P/E at $618, leaves the stock ~45% above deserved value. DCF at $469 and EPV floor at $370 corroborate that intrinsic cash-earnings power does not support a $183B market cap without heroic assumptions about Aladdin monetization and private-markets accretion. I sanity-check the models: none look runaway low - they cluster in a tight $370-$620 band, which is unusual agreement and hard to dismiss. The bull case (platform monopoly, Aladdin as the OS of finance, GIP/HPS accretion) is essentially the consensus narrative already embedded in a mid-20s P/E on a fee-compressing asset manager. Company quality is Strong, which justifies a premium to EPV, but not a 2x premium - and the earnings-quality haircut (weak, -1) argues for trimming deserved value further, not stretching it. Margin compression in 2025 and M&A-funded share issuance are real dings. Net: the price is pricing in near-flawless execution on private markets and tech, with no cushion if fee wars or integration slip.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Aladdin revenue growth and margin disclosure in latest 10-Q - is tech services actually inflecting?
- GIP and HPS deal accretion timeline and realized fee rates on private assets
- Blended fee rate trend across iShares vs active vs alternatives
- Buyback pace vs SBC and M&A issuance - net share count trajectory
- Operating margin trajectory ex-transaction costs to see if 2025 compression is transient
The dominant force on BLK right now is a narrative one: the platform-monopoly / 'operating system of finance' story is getting fresh, credible fuel from this week's tokenized fund launches on Solana and Ethereum and the BSTBL/BRSRV push to become the stablecoin reserve manager ahead of the CLARITY Act. That is exactly the kind of news flow that lets bulls re-underwrite BLK as a fintech/SaaS-adjacent platform rather than a 3-4% organic-growth asset manager, which is the whole reason the multiple sits where it does. Intensity strong, durability moderate, cult medium - the story is being actively reinforced, not fading. The macro tape is a mild risk-on (+34) with VIX 15.9, which is a modest tailwind, but BLK's 1.44 beta means it does lever the tape more than a defensive financial would. Offsetting that, 10y at 4.75 and mkt PE 26.9 are a persistent low-grade headwind for a name already priced for platform economics. Analyst tone is not shown but news cadence is uniformly constructive (tokenization leadership, dividend-stock framing, ETF dominance context via the Corgi comparison). Net: narrative and news flow are pressing the stock up harder than macro is pressing it down.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether tokenized fund AUM (BUIDL, BSTBL, BRSRV) actually scales into a real revenue line or stays a PR narrative
- CLARITY Act passage and whether BLK is codified as a stablecoin reserve manager
- Any signs of iShares fee-war acceleration or Aladdin renewal churn that would crack the platform story
- VIX breaking above 20 or a risk-off rotation, which would hit the 1.44 beta hard
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, BLK was $1,126.63. We expect it to be $1,035.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $650.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.