For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for BlackRock Inc (BLK) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -19 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 55 · Value -69 · Sentiment 39 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $513.49 vs $1,053.76 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
BlackRock Inc
BLK NYSEBlackRock Inc. is a global investment management and financial technology company that provides asset management, advisory, and risk management services to institutional and individual clients. BlackRock offers a broad range of products across equity, fixed income, multi-asset, alternatives, and cash management, serving pension funds, insurers, governments, corporations, foundations, and wealth managers. The company is also known for its technology platform and portfolio analytics capabilities, which support investment decision-making, risk oversight, and operational workflows for market participants. Its business spans mutual funds, ETFs, separately managed accounts, and advisory solutions, making it a central player in global capital markets and institutional portfolio construction.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 39.87
Total Equity: $64.54B
Shares: 164,942,118
Total Debt: $12.74B
Cash: $10.49B
EBITDA: $8.34B
Total Debt: $12.74B
Cash: $10.49B
Revenue: $20.29B
Revenue: $20.29B
Revenue: $20.29B
Total Equity: $64.54B
Tax Rate: 22.2%
Equity: $64.54B
Total Debt: $12.74B
Cash: $10.49B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $12.74B
Total Debt: $12.74B
Total Equity: $64.54B
Shares: 164,942,118
Shares: 164,942,118
CapEx: -$423.00M
Shares: 164,942,118
Stock Price: $1,054
Net Income: $6.58B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:21pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.4B | $17.9B | $17.9B | $20.4B | $24.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.9B | $9.4B | $9.5B | $10.3B | $12.9B |
| Gross Profit | $9.5B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $10.1B | $11.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $3.4B |
| Operating Income | $7.5B | $6.5B | $6.3B | $7.5B | $7.9B |
| Net Income | $5.9B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $6.4B | $5.6B |
| EBITDA | $8.0B | $7.1B | $7.2B | $8.8B | $9.5B |
| EPS | $38.60 | $34.31 | $36.85 | $42.45 | $35.83 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $38.07 | $33.97 | $36.51 | $42.01 | $35.31 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:21pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | — | $8.7B | $12.8B | $11.5B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | — | $123.2B | $138.6B | $170.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | $7.9B | $12.3B | $12.8B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | $82.0B | $89.3B | $108.5B |
| Total Equity | $37.8B | $37.9B | $41.2B | $49.4B | $61.5B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:26pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.0B | $4.2B | $5.0B | $3.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$533.0M | -$344.0M | -$255.0M | -$375.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.4B | $3.8B | $4.7B | $3.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$189.0M | -$2.9B | -$3.5B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$750.0M | $1.2B | $4.5B | $284.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.0B | -$3.0B | -$3.1B | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.3B | -$1.9B | -$1.9B | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.9B | $1.3B | $4.0B | -$1.3B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:21pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -7.7% | -0.1% | +14.3% | +18.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -10.9% | -0.9% | +20.8% | +12.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -13.3% | -2.4% | +19.0% | +4.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.3% | +6.3% | +15.8% | -12.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -11.7% | +2.5% | +22.1% | +7.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:18pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-08 | $5.73 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-05 | $5.73 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $5.73 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-05 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $5.21 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-05 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-09 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $5.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-06 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-07 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-06 | $5.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-06 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-06 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-03 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-04 | $4.88 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-06 | $4.13 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-03 02:01A +1σ run of quarters pays -28%; a −1σ run costs 64%. Ratio -0.4:1 (μ 22.9%, σ 8.2% , 6 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.5 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($1,053.76) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +31% | 35.0% | $749.47 | -29% |
| Base — stabilizes | +20% | 32.4% | $527.11 | -50% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +10% | 27.6% | $340.89 | -68% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +25% | 25.2% | $485.28 | -54% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +31% | 35.0% | $759.06 | -28% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +15% | 27.1% | $383.60 | -64% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-17 16:29The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
BlackRock's raw trajectory is genuinely impressive on the top line but the composition needs interrogation. TTM revenue is running around $25-26B (Q2'26 $7.08B + Q1'26 $6.70B + Q4'25 implied ~$6.0B + Q3'25 $6.51B), versus $20.41B in FY24 and $17.86B in FY23 — that's a step-function, not organic compounding. The GIP alternatives acquisition and Preqin/HPS-style deals plus market beta (S&P up materially into mid-2026) explain most of it. Strip those and organic AUM-driven fee growth is closer to the 6.6% revenue CAGR the momentum module flagged, not the 27.7% recent YoY. Meanwhile net income tells a very different story: Q2'26 NI of $1.91B on $7.08B revenue is a 27% margin, down from 31.4% a year prior and well below the Q1'26 33% spike (which itself looks like a marking gain or performance-fee lump). Trailing NI is roughly $6.6B — barely above FY24's $6.37B despite 25%+ more revenue. That's the real tell: revenue is being bought with dilutive, lower-margin alternatives AUM.
On valuation, the synthesis's $499 fair value screams for scrutiny but I largely agree with its direction if not its precision. At $1,054 and $168.5B market cap, BLK trades at ~25x TTM earnings and ~8.6x sales — a genuine premium to the 15-18x historical asset-manager band. Justifying it requires believing Aladdin is a software business worth a software multiple. Aladdin generates ~$1.6B in tech revenue (roughly 6-7% of the top line); even at 15x sales that's $24B of the market cap, leaving $144B for an asset manager earning ~$5B in "clean" NI — still ~29x. The $499 DCF looks too punitive (it implicitly assumes fee compression bites hard and alternatives don't scale), but a fair value in the $650-750 range — 18-20x normalized earnings plus an Aladdin premium — is defensible. That's still 30-38% downside from spot.
Where I push back on the models: the thesis evaluator's "55% FCF growth required" framing is misleading because FCF was $3.55B in 2025 versus $4-5B historically — that's a working capital/deal-related trough, not a run rate. FCF should mean-revert toward $6B+ as GIP integration completes, so demanding 55% CAGR off the trough is a strawman. That said, the bear's core point stands: recent revenue acceleration is beta plus M&A, not durable organic reacceleration, and margins are compressing (op margin 43.8% TTM versus 44%+ historically, net margin visibly rolling over quarter-to-quarter). The insider tape — Larry Fink-adjacent sales of ~20K shares against small awards on July 16 — is not a smoking gun but is directionally consistent with "monetize the multiple." The market-forces "neutral" and narrative-economics "anchored/durable" reads are the honest calls; this isn't a bubble, it's a quality name priced for perfection.
A contrarian bull would argue: (1) private markets fee rates are 5-10x public index fees, so the alternatives mix shift is margin-accretive over 3-5 years once integration completes; (2) Aladdin's ~$1.6B in tech services with high retention deserves a genuine software multiple that DCFs systematically undervalue; (3) if rates normalize lower and equity beta stays positive, AUM compounds mechanically and operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base is enormous. That case gets you to maybe $850-900, still below spot. I don't see the path to $1,054 being cheap unless you believe passive/alternatives share gains accelerate AND Aladdin becomes a genuine $30B+ standalone. The synthesis's -52.7% overvaluation is too aggressive; my read is 25-35% overvalued. Wait for a market drawdown that resets AUM 10-15% (BLK typically overshoots on the way down) or a genuine margin recovery print before committing. Starter buys make sense sub-$800; at $1,054 you're paying peak multiple on peak market levels on a business whose margins are quietly compressing.
GPT Reading
BlackRock’s raw numbers say “excellent business, expensive stock.” On the trailing twelve months to 2026-06-30, revenue is about $26.8B from the reported quarters we have, up sharply from the $24.22B posted for calendar 2025 and well above $20.41B in 2024. That top-line acceleration is real: the latest quarter did $7.08B versus $5.42B a year earlier, a 31% jump, and the March quarter grew 27% year over year. But the profit line is not keeping pace. TTM net income is roughly $6.6B using the four quarterly figures, which is only modestly above 2024’s $6.37B and not dramatically beyond prior peaks despite the big revenue step-up. The June quarter margin was 27% versus 29.4% a year ago, and the September quarter was only 20.3%. So the central fact here is not simply growth; it is growth with noticeably lower incremental profitability than the market seems willing to assume.
That matters because the current price of $1,053.76 implies a very full valuation for a business whose economics, while elite, still look like an asset manager first and a software platform second. At 26.4x TTM earnings, 8.6x sales, and nearly 20x EV/EBITDA, BlackRock trades more like a high-quality compounder with long runway than a scaled financial with fee sensitivity and market exposure. The balance sheet is fine — $11.47B cash against $12.77B debt is basically neutral leverage, and debt/equity under 0.2 is conservative. But free cash flow is the weak link in the premium story: 2025 FCF was $3.55B on $24.22B of revenue, just a 14.7% FCF margin, and materially below accounting earnings. Even allowing for working-capital noise that often affects financial firms, paying $168.5B market cap for a company producing sub-$4B annual FCF is hard to square unless one expects a major and durable step-up in cash conversion. The market is not just paying for dominance; it is paying for dominance to become more monetizable than the recent cash numbers show.
What stands out most to me is that BlackRock is being valued on the best interpretation of its franchise while the reported income statement reflects the mixed reality of that franchise. Yes, there is clear scale, and yes, revenue has re-accelerated meaningfully since 2024. Operating margin on a TTM basis is still an outstanding 43.8%, gross margin 46.7%, and returns on capital around 10%-11% are solid for a company of this size. But if this were truly becoming a software-like toll booth, I would expect revenue growth of this magnitude to come with much clearer earnings acceleration, not TTM EPS power that translates into only a low-single-digit growth in recent net income. BlackRock may deserve a premium to peers because iShares and Aladdin are better assets than the average traditional manager owns. I do not think it deserves double-the-sector thinking when fee pressure, product mix shifts, and market-linked revenues still constrain the model.
The best argument against this bearish valuation read is straightforward: BlackRock is not a normal asset manager, and the market may be correctly capitalizing strategic optionality that the backward-looking statements understate. Revenue has gone from $17.86B in 2023 to $24.22B in 2025 and is running above that pace again, which is a much stronger trajectory than most mature financials can show. Net margins are still above 32% TTM, the dividend yield of 2.1% adds carry, and the franchise has proven resilient through cycles. If alternatives, private markets, and technology/services become a larger share of the mix, today’s temporarily uneven margin profile could look like an investment phase rather than structural compression. In that version, 26x earnings is not crazy for the category winner with global distribution, sticky institutional relationships, and embedded exposure to secular passive flows. I weigh that case less heavily because I want evidence in cash flow and earnings mix, not just in the strategic narrative; so far, the stock price is already capitalizing that upside well ahead of the financial statements.
What would change my mind is not another strong revenue quarter by itself. I would need to see the growth convert. Specifically, I’d want at least two things: first, sustained quarterly net income back above $2.0B with margins consistently around 30% despite the higher revenue base; second, free cash flow moving decisively above $5B annually rather than sitting in the mid-$3B area. If BlackRock can show that the recent jump from roughly $20B revenue to a $26B-$27B run rate is not just market beta and mix shift, but a platform effect that expands owner earnings, then a four-digit stock price becomes easier to defend. Without that, I think investors are paying a platform multiple for a best-in-class but still fundamentally cyclical fee business.
Grok Reading
BlackRock’s recent top-line print is the cleanest signal in the packet: quarterly revenue stepped from the mid-$5Bs through mid-2025 into $6.51B, $6.70B and $7.08B, producing a 27.7% recent revenue year-over-year and lifting full-year 2025 sales to $24.22B from $20.41B. That is real operating leverage on AUM and fee pools, not a modeling artifact. Yet the income statement refuses to confirm the same acceleration. Full-year 2025 net income fell to $5.55B from $6.37B even as revenue rose nearly $4B; trailing net margin sits at 32% while the latest quarter compressed to 27%; free cash flow for 2025 was only $3.55B against $5.55B of reported earnings and the FCF CAGR is negative 4.1%. At $1,053.76 the stock trades 26.4× trailing earnings, 8.6× sales and nearly 20× EV/EBITDA while delivering an 11.3% ROE, a 10.4% ROIC and a 2.1% FCF yield—numbers that look like a high-quality bond substitute priced as a compounding platform. The balance sheet is unimpeachable ($12.8B debt, $11.5B cash, 0.20 debt-to-equity), which simply means the premium is not leverage-driven; it is pure multiple expansion on a mature earner whose historical revenue CAGR is still only 6.6%.
The contradiction the quantitative stack flags is therefore visible in the raw series itself: the market is capitalizing a 2025–26 revenue spike and the Aladdin/iShares narrative as if mid-teens earnings and FCF growth were already locked in, while the cash and profit lines have not yet delivered. Operating margin remains high at 44% TTM, but the gap between revenue growth and both net income and free-cash-flow growth says either mix is shifting toward lower-fee products, compensation and investment spend are absorbing the incremental dollar, or market-beta AUM gains are not converting at historical rates. Insider activity is noise—option exercises and routine sales—so it neither confirms nor refutes the thesis. In short, the numbers describe a dominant franchise whose recent sales momentum is genuine and whose competitive position is intact, yet whose current capitalization requires sustained high-teens free-cash-flow growth that the trailing cash-flow statement simply does not show.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and has to be weighed carefully. BlackRock is the default institutional infrastructure player; iShares scale, Aladdin switching costs and the secular passive/ETF share gain are durable, multi-decade forces rather than a single-cycle story. A 26× multiple is not outrageous if the franchise can compound AUM and fee-related revenue at low-double-digit rates with limited capital intensity, and the 2025 revenue jump may mark a structural step-up rather than pure beta. Bulls can also note that 2025 net income was depressed relative to revenue, so a re-acceleration in margins back toward the 30%+ zone plus continued mid-$6–7B quarterly run-rates would make the $168B enterprise value look far less stretched on a forward basis. I weigh that case as real but incomplete: even granting the moat, the stock already embeds roughly a full decade of successful execution at elevated growth while FCF has been going the wrong way and ROE remains only low-double-digit. Quality justifies a premium to traditional asset managers; it does not automatically justify a 50%+ premium to a cash-flow-derived intrinsic value near $500 or a sub-3% free-cash-flow yield.
What would flip the verdict is concrete evidence that the revenue step-up is converting: four consecutive quarters of free-cash-flow above $1.2–1.3B (run-rate >$5B), net margins stabilizing above 30% on the higher revenue base, and organic AUM growth that is demonstrably fee-rate resilient rather than pure market appreciation. Conversely, another year of FCF stuck near $3.5B while the multiple holds would confirm the overvaluation call.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The most glaring contradiction in this dataset is the divergence between the "Mature Earner" classification and the actual revenue trajectory. BlackRock’s revenue has exploded from $17.86B in 2023 to $24.22B in 2025, a 35% jump in two years, with the most recent quarter hitting $7.08B. This is not the behavior of a stagnant, fee-compressed utility; it is the profile of a high-growth platform capturing structural market share. The valuation synthesis model’s verdict of "overvalued" with a fair value of ~$500 is mathematically incoherent when applied to a company generating $3.55B in free cash flow with a 43.8% operating margin. To justify a $500 price tag on a $168B market cap, one would have to assume a terminal growth rate near zero and a discount rate that penalizes the company for its own efficiency. The market is pricing BlackRock at 26.4x trailing earnings, which looks expensive against the S&P 500, but when you strip out the one-time gains and look at the operating leverage, the P/E is effectively lower. The "Momentum" data confirms this: recent revenue YoY is 27.7%, while the 5-year CAGR is only 6.6%. The market is not pricing in "extraordinary" 55% FCF growth as the thesis evaluation claims; it is pricing in the normalization of a business that just re-accelerated from a post-2022 slump. The 2025 net income dip to $5.55B from $6.37B in 2024 is a red herring likely driven by non-operating items or tax adjustments, as operating income actually *increased* from $7.54B to $7.91B. The core engine is accelerating, not stalling.
The strongest case against this bullish read is the "Bear Story" regarding fee compression and the sheer scale of the AUM base. With over $10T in AUM, even a 10bps drop in fees represents a massive revenue hit, and the "Market Forces" signal correctly notes that the company is shifting toward lower-margin alternatives. Furthermore, the insider activity is a genuine yellow flag: while the sales are small in absolute terms (15,895 shares is trivial for a company of this size), the clustering of sales in July 2026 alongside option exercises suggests insiders are taking liquidity at these highs. The "Thesis Evaluation" score of -19 is not wrong to be skeptical; if the 27.7% revenue growth is purely beta-driven (i.e., markets going up) rather than alpha-driven (i.e., share gains), the multiple will compress violently when markets correct. The "Valuation Synthesis" model’s insistence that the stock is 52% overvalued is the outlier here, but it is not entirely baseless if you believe the "Mature Earner" archetype is the correct lens. If BlackRock is just a big mutual fund, 26x earnings is rich. But the data shows a 46.7% gross margin and a 10.36% ROIC, which are software-like metrics, not asset-management-like metrics. I weigh the "platform" narrative more heavily because the operating margin expansion (from 31.4% in 2024 Q3 to 43.8% TTM) is the smoking gun of structural improvement, not just market beta.
The "Pre-Flight Intelligence" correctly identifies the Aladdin moat, but the "Valuation Synthesis" fails to price in the recurring revenue component of that tech stack. The $12.77B in debt is manageable against $11.47B in cash and $61.54B in equity, leaving a net cash position that supports the 2.13% dividend yield without straining the balance sheet. The "Macro Headwinds" signal is the primary risk; if global equity markets correct by 10-15%, BlackRock’s AUM will shrink, and the revenue growth rate will decelerate sharply. However, the "Revenue Confidence" is high, and the quarterly trend is growing. The key is that BlackRock’s revenue is less volatile than its AUM because of the mix shift to alternatives and tech. I am not buying the "overvalued" verdict because it ignores the operating leverage. I am not buying the "undervalued" verdict because 26x earnings is not cheap for a financial. It is fairly valued, perhaps slightly rich, but the downside is protected by the cash flow quality and the structural shift to passive/tech.
What would change my mind is a quarterly report showing operating margin compression below 40% or a significant outflow from iShares ETFs that is not offset by Aladdin revenue growth. If the "recent_revenue_yoy" of 27.7% drops to single digits in the next two quarters, the 26x P/E will become indefensible, and the stock could re-rate to the $700-$800 range. Conversely, if Aladdin revenue is broken out and shows double-digit growth, the "platform" thesis is validated, and the stock could push toward $1,200. The insider sales are a minor negative, but not a deal-breaker given the size of the float. The "Thesis Evaluation" bear case of "55% FCF growth is ahistorical" is the most valid point; I do not expect 55% growth, but I do expect 10-15% growth, which supports the current multiple. The "Valuation Synthesis" model is using a DCF that likely assumes a 2-3% terminal growth rate, which is too conservative for a company with a 10% ROIC and a dominant market position.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BlackRock is the world's largest asset manager, and the numbers reflect a durable, high-margin franchise: revenue rebounded to $20.29B TTM from a $15.90B trough, operating margin sits at 43.8% (with a 47.2% print the prior period), and net income of $6.58B reflects the fee-based scale advantages of a $10T-plus AUM platform. FCF of $3.52B is real if unspectacular relative to net income (OCF/NI ~0.74x), which is normal for an asset manager where accruals and receivables move with market levels and consolidated fund entities distort the tape. The business is self-funding and returns capital: buybacks run 165% of SBC and diluted share CAGR is only 1.6%, so per-share value is protected despite 9.2% SBC/revenue. The main blemishes are balance-sheet-related: net debt of $2.25B and an Altman Z of 1.19, which flags 'distress' but is largely a false positive for a financial-services firm whose balance sheet is inherently asset-heavy and leveraged by design (the Z-score model is calibrated to industrials). Share count actually crept up from 150.7M to 164.9M, likely reflecting the GIP/HPS/Preqin acquisition equity issuance -- a meaningful, if strategic, dilution event to verify. Insider activity is neutral-to-mildly negative (10 sales, 0 buys, $66.8M sold including Fink and the general counsel), but the magnitudes are small relative to holdings and consistent with routine diversification at a mega-cap. Overall this is a top-tier franchise with elite margins, moderate leverage, and disciplined per-share stewardship -- solidly in the 'Strong' band but not 'Fortress' given the leverage profile and the M&A-related share issuance.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the ~14M share increase from 2023 to 2026 ties to GIP/HPS/Preqin stock consideration and the resulting goodwill/intangibles load
- Organic net inflows versus market-driven AUM gains in the recent revenue reacceleration
- Debt maturity ladder and any covenant sensitivity behind the $2.25B net debt position
- Fee-rate compression trends in iShares/index products versus higher-fee alternatives contribution post-M&A
- Whether the 0.74x OCF/NI reflects consolidated fund entities or genuine working-capital drag
- Client concentration and any large sovereign/institutional mandate risk
The composite fair value of $513 and signal-adjusted $499 sit ~52-53% below the $1,054 price. The DCF ($428) and EPV floor ($295) both flag material overvaluation, while the anchored-PE of $902 -- the most generous method -- still implies ~14% downside. Even giving full credit to BlackRock's Strong quality grade and Aladdin/platform moat, deserved value lands somewhere in a $700-900 band; today's price sits above the top of that band. The earnings-quality haircut (weak, -1) argues for trimming, not extending, the deserved multiple.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Organic base fee growth ex-market and ex-GIP/Preqin
- Private markets fee-related earnings run-rate and margin
- Aladdin technology services revenue growth and retention
- Share count trajectory post-M&A and buyback pace
- Fee rate trend across iShares vs institutional index
BlackRock is riding a strong, durable 'operating system of capital markets' narrative that keeps getting fresh proof points: this week alone it was named a validator on Circle's Arc mainnet alongside Visa and DTCC, cementing the story that BLK is the institutional bridge into tokenized finance and on-chain equities. That is exactly the kind of headline that keeps a platform-monopoly narrative intensifying, and it lands on a stock already showing 27.7% recent momentum vs a 6.6% long-term CAGR - the tape is buying the story. Rick Rieder's cautious debt commentary reinforces BLK's brand as the market's macro authority, another soft tailwind for the toll-taker framing. Against that, the macro tape just flipped risk-off (VIX 17.7, S&P -3% off highs, 10y at 5%) and BLK carries a 1.43 beta, so a stress leg would hit it harder than a defensive financial. But the regime is only one day old and shallow, while the narrative flow is concrete and stock-specific. Net: narrative tailwind outweighs a nascent macro headwind, but the beta means any deepening of risk-off would flip this quickly.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the risk-off regime deepens beyond 1 day (VIX >20, S&P -5%+) - would flip the read for a 1.43-beta name
- Monthly ETF flow tables - a share-loss story to JPM/Vanguard would crack the platform narrative
- Any regulatory or competitive news around tokenization/Aladdin that either extends or challenges the moat framing
- Analyst target revisions post the Arc/tokenization headlines - confirmation or divergence from the tape
Capital is reallocating on two axes that both favor BLK: from active public equity into the cheapest scaled index vehicles, and from public credit into private credit/infrastructure — the latter driven by insurers, sovereigns and retirement pools needing duration-matched yield at a ~5% long rate. BLK bought its way onto the second axis while already owning the first, and sells the data layer (Aladdin/Preqin) to everyone playing on either. The offset: high rates and a contracting sector demand backdrop cap market-level appreciation, so AUM growth must come from flows and mix rather than beta, and fee rates continue drifting down. Net: a widening gap between the largest platforms and the mid-sized traditional managers being squeezed — BLK is on the correct side of that consolidation.
When we made this prediction on Sep 18, 2026, BLK was $1,057.88. We expect it to be $975.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $850.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips up 25%
adjusted_pe
flips up 25%