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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +4 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 3 · Value 4 · Sentiment -48 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $88.79 vs $63.63 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
BMY NYSEBristol-Myers Squibb Company is a global biopharmaceutical company headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, and founded in 1933. It discovers, develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells innovative medicines addressing serious diseases worldwide. The company offers a diverse portfolio including small molecule drugs, biologics produced from biological processes, and advanced chimeric antigen receptor (CAR-T) cell therapies. Key therapeutic areas encompass oncology with treatments like nivolumab (Opdivo) and ipilimumab (Yervoy), hematology featuring lenalidomide (Revlimid) and luspatercept (Reblozyl), immunology such as abatacept (Orencia), cardiovascular including apixaban (Eliquis), neuroscience, and other immunology and fibrosis-related conditions. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company plays a vital role in the healthcare sector by providing therapies for cancer, immune disorders, cardiovascular diseases, and beyond, serving patients through collaborations and a focus on unmet medical needs in these critical markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.46
Total Equity: $18.51B
Shares: 2,039,000,000
Total Debt: $45.11B
Cash: $10.21B
EBITDA: $13.34B
Total Debt: $45.11B
Cash: $10.21B
Revenue: $48.19B
Revenue: $48.19B
Revenue: $48.19B
Total Equity: $18.51B
Tax Rate: 24.4%
Equity: $18.51B
Total Debt: $45.11B
Cash: $10.21B
Current Liabilities: $23.42B
Long-Term Debt: $42.85B
Total Debt: $45.11B
Total Equity: $18.51B
Shares: 2,039,000,000
Shares: 2,039,000,000
CapEx: -$1.31B
Shares: 2,039,000,000
Stock Price: $65.89
Net Income: $7.05B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:48am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $46.4B | $46.2B | $45.0B | $48.3B | $48.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.9B | $10.1B | $10.7B | $14.0B | $13.9B |
| Gross Profit | $36.4B | $36.0B | $34.3B | $34.3B | $34.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $28.3B | $28.3B | $25.9B | $42.7B | $24.9B |
| Operating Income | $8.1B | $7.7B | $8.4B | -$8.4B | $9.3B |
| Net Income | $7.0B | $6.3B | $8.0B | -$8.9B | $7.1B |
| EBITDA | $18.8B | $18.0B | $18.2B | $1.2B | $13.3B |
| EPS | $3.15 | $2.97 | $3.88 | $-4.41 | $3.47 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.12 | $2.95 | $3.86 | $-4.41 | $3.46 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:35am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $14.0B | $9.1B | $11.5B | $10.3B | $10.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $33.3B | $27.3B | $31.8B | $29.8B | $29.4B |
| Total Assets | $109.3B | $96.8B | $95.2B | $92.6B | $90.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $21.9B | $21.9B | $22.3B | $23.8B | $23.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $39.6B | $35.1B | $36.7B | $47.6B | $42.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $73.3B | $65.7B | $65.7B | $76.2B | $71.5B |
| Total Equity | $36.0B | $31.1B | $29.5B | $16.4B | $18.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $23.8B | $25.5B | $28.8B | $14.9B | $16.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:48am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.2B | $13.1B | $13.9B | $15.2B | $14.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$973.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $15.2B | $11.9B | $12.7B | $13.9B | $12.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.6B | -$4.3B | -$1.2B | -$21.8B | -$3.9B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$6.0B | -$5.5B | $576.0M | $10.0B | -$5.2B |
| Dividends Paid | -$4.4B | -$4.6B | -$4.7B | -$4.9B | -$5.0B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$6.3B | -$8.0B | -$5.2B | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$657.0M | -$5.0B | $2.2B | -$1.2B | -$129.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:48am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -0.5% | -2.5% | +7.3% | -0.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -1.2% | -4.7% | +0.1% | -0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -4.8% | +9.4% | -199.3% | +211.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -9.5% | +26.8% | -211.5% | +178.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -4.2% | +1.2% | -93.3% | +992.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:36am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-02 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-02 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-02 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-03 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-03 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-04 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-03 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-04 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-05 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-04 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-04 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-05 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-06 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-06 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-05 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-30 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-31 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-06 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-30 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:37Recovery pays +58%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 6%. Ratio 9.3:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($63.63) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 28.2% | $100.32 | +58% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 24.5% | $81.47 | +28% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 20.9% | $64.87 | +2% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 18.9% | $59.67 | -6% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: BMY is running $48.2B revenue essentially flat for five years ($46.4B in 2021 → $48.2B in 2025, a 0.9% CAGR, not the 3.5% the momentum table claims — that number appears to include an acquisition bump). The quarterly trajectory is telling: Q1 2026 rev $11.49B is down 8% sequentially from Q4 2025's $12.50B and down 6% from Q3. Net income volatility is extreme — margins swing from 0.6% (Q4 2024) to 23.3% (Q1 2026) — which reflects IPRD charges, Karuna deal accounting, and legal settlements, not underlying earnings power. The 2024 full-year operating loss of -$8.38B was the Karuna writedown territory. Normalized operating margin is probably 19-22%, in line with the canonical 19.4%.
The balance sheet is where I part ways with the "fortress" framing in the synthesis. $45.1B debt against $18.5B equity (D/E 2.44) and only $10.2B cash post-Karuna is not a fortress — it's a leveraged mature pharma with a 3.89% dividend yielding $6.3B/year against $12.85B FCF (payout ratio 71.5% on GAAP, roughly 49% on FCF). That's covered, but the margin of safety shrinks rapidly if Eliquis (~$12B, ~25% of revenue) faces IRA price negotiation in 2026 and generic entry in 2028. The thesis evaluation's -3 score (bull 84.8 vs bear 88) is closer to reality than the synthesis' "26.5% undervalued" call.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: a $77-80 fair value assumes the FCF is durable through the Eliquis cliff. Do the math — if Eliquis contributes ~$8B in high-margin US revenue and loses 60% within 24 months of LOE, that's ~$5B of gross profit gone, or roughly $3.5-4B in FCF. Against $12.85B current FCF, you're looking at $9B run-rate by 2028 unless Camzyos, Cobenfy (the Karuna asset), Opdualag, and Breyanzi collectively add $4-5B in incremental revenue at reasonable margins. Cobenfy's launch has been disappointing so far — that's a real problem given BMY paid $14B for Karuna. The pre-flight thesis that "the market prices in less growth than projected" needs to specify whose projections; consensus 2027 EPS estimates already assume the cliff. At $65.89 and ~$7.50 normalized EPS post-cliff, you're paying 8.8x trough earnings for a 4% yield — that's not screamingly cheap for a business with negative organic growth, but it's not expensive either.
The contrarian argument the models underweight: BMY has done this before. Post-Plavix LOE (2012) and post-Revlimid LOE (2022), the stock troughed and recovered as new franchises scaled. Opdivo's subcutaneous formulation extends its patent life meaningfully. The 12.5x EV/EBITDA and 8.8x forward trough P/E already discount a bad outcome. Insider activity is genuinely neutral — small awards and option exercises, no meaningful open-market buying or selling, which is what you'd expect from a mature pharma and provides no signal. The narrative engine is right that this is "functionally invisible" — no story premium, no story discount. What's thin in the data: no pipeline NPV, no breakdown of Eliquis vs. Opdivo vs. growth portfolio revenue, no guidance on 2027-2028 base case. Without that, both bull and bear cases are hand-waving.
My verdict: the synthesis' $77-80 fair value is too optimistic — it's applying a peer multiple to a business that structurally deserves a discount for the cliff. But at $65.89, you're not overpaying either. Fair value is closer to $68-72 based on 9-10x normalized post-cliff FCF plus dividend. This is a hold with a 4% yield, not the 26% mispricing the synthesis claims. Partial agreement on direction (mildly undervalued vs fair), strong disagreement on magnitude. The stock re-rates only when Cobenfy inflects, Camzyos hits $2B run-rate, or Eliquis LOE terms are clarified — none of which are imminent catalysts. Dividend-focused investors get paid to wait; capital-appreciation investors have better setups elsewhere in pharma (LLY at a growth premium is a different debate; MRK at similar cliff exposure is arguably cheaper on pipeline).
GPT Reading
Bristol-Myers looks cheaper than its reputation but not cheap enough for the risks staring straight at the income statement. The core numerical story is stagnation masked by good cash conversion. Revenue has gone basically nowhere for years: $46.4B in 2021, $46.2B in 2022, $45.0B in 2023, $48.3B in 2024, and $48.2B in 2025. That is not a growth platform; it is a portfolio manager trying to hold the line against erosion. The quarterly run-rate tells the same story: the last four quarters sum to about $48.5B, only modestly above the prior four-quarter period. Yet net income is far more erratic than revenue, swinging from a 2024 annual loss of $8.95B to a 2025 profit of $7.05B, with quarterly net margins ranging from 0.6% to 23.3%. When a pharma name has flat sales and highly unstable reported earnings, I care much more about cash flow and balance sheet durability than optical P/E. On that basis BMY is solid, not extraordinary: $14.2B of operating cash flow and $12.9B of free cash flow on a $134.6B market cap is a respectable roughly 9.5% FCF yield, but it sits alongside $45.1B of debt and only $10.2B of cash.
What stands out most is that the market’s skepticism is rationally tied to capital structure and product-life-cycle risk, not to some emotional overreaction. Equity is only $18.5B, so debt-to-equity above 2.4x is not a footnote for a business that is about to navigate major exclusivity cliffs. The dividend yield near 3.9% is attractive, but the annual payout ratio of 71.5% on earnings is less comforting when earnings themselves have been volatile and when the company’s gross margin of 71% still translates into only a 19.4% operating margin and 14.6% net margin in 2025. In other words, this is not a wildly over-earning pharma asset priced for perfection; it is a mature company producing decent but not expanding economics while carrying meaningful leverage. At 18.7x earnings, 12.5x EV/EBITDA, and 3.45x EV/revenue, the stock is not demanding if you believe 2025 earnings power is durable. My issue is that the sales base has not demonstrated durability beyond “flat,” and flat in pharma often precedes down when concentration points hit.
That is why I don’t buy the simple “DCF says 20%+ upside” framing. A model can easily overvalue BMY if it capitalizes recent free cash flow as though the current portfolio is a steady annuity. But recent free cash flow was generated during a period when quarterly revenue still held around $11.2B-$12.5B and margins recovered from the 2024 write-down year. If Eliquis and other mature assets roll over harder than replacement products ramp, the right multiple is lower, not higher, because this is a shrinking-cash-flow equity with leverage. I can justify today’s price if I assume management uses the next several years to defend roughly $12B of annual FCF and keep revenue near the high-$40B range. I have a harder time getting excited above the mid-$60s because the stock already reflects that “managed decline, still pays dividend” scenario fairly well.
The best argument against my caution is the cash machine is plainly real. Even with the ugly 2024 accounting loss, the business returned to $7.05B of net income in 2025, and the most recent quarter posted $2.68B of profit on $11.49B of revenue, a strong 23.3% margin. Gross profit has been remarkably resilient at about $34B for three straight years despite revenue wobbling. A 9%-10% FCF yield before any re-rating is not trivial, and if the feared patent cliffs end up as gradual erosion rather than a cliff-edge, the current 18.7x P/E could prove too low for a high-quality pharma franchise with a near-4% dividend. The bull case would also point out that the company does not need growth to work as an investment; it needs stability. If free cash flow stays around $12B-$13B, debt can be serviced, the dividend can be paid, and the stock can drift higher simply through sentiment normalization. I weigh that less heavily because this company has not shown enough top-line momentum to earn the benefit of the doubt, and because leverage reduces strategic flexibility precisely when pharma companies typically need to spend to replace LOE revenue.
What would change my mind is simple and measurable. I would turn more constructive if BMY showed two things at once: sustained top-line growth above the current flatline and balance-sheet improvement. Specifically, I’d want to see annual revenue move clearly above $50B with quarterly revenue holding over $12B even as mature products fade, while operating cash flow remains north of $14B and net debt trends below roughly $30B. That would tell me the replacement portfolio is actually carrying the enterprise rather than just slowing erosion. Conversely, if quarterly revenue starts slipping under $11B and free cash flow drops toward or below $10B annualized while the dividend remains untouched, I would view the stock as materially overvalued even here because the equity cushion is too thin for a leveraged decline story.
Grok Reading
BMY’s numbers describe a cash-compounding machine whose top line has stopped growing. Annual revenue sat at $48.19B in 2025 versus $48.30B in 2024 and $45–46B the three years prior; the 3.5% revenue CAGR is almost entirely a 2023 bounce that has already faded. Yet free cash flow printed $12.85B last year on only $1.31B of capex, a 27% FCF margin that funds the 3.9% dividend and still leaves room for debt pay-down or bolt-ons. After the $8.95B net loss in 2024 (driven by operating charges that flipped the op-margin to –17%), 2025 restored a clean $9.33B operating profit and $7.05B net income; the most recent quarter (Q1 2026) delivered $11.49B revenue and a 23.3% net margin. At $65.89 the stock trades at 18.7× trailing earnings, 2.7× sales and 12.5× EV/EBITDA—multiples that embed flat-to-negative growth and a roughly 9.5% FCF yield. That is cheap for a diversified pharma with Opdivo, the CAR-T franchise and a still-intact Eliquis contribution, especially once the one-time 2024 hit is stripped out.
The balance-sheet leverage is real—$45B of debt against $18.5B of equity and only $10B of cash—but the $14B of annual operating cash flow keeps interest coverage comfortable and the current ratio above 1.25. ROE looks artificially high at 38% because equity has been compressed by impairments and buybacks; ROIC of 13% is the more honest return metric and is adequate, not spectacular. Insider activity is noise (routine awards and option exercises). Nothing in the recent quarterly cadence suggests an imminent collapse; revenue is oscillating in a $11–12.5B band and margins are re-expanding.
The strongest counter-argument is the binary Eliquis LOE risk that the market is correctly pricing. Eliquis remains one of the largest single products in the portfolio; generic entry between 2026 and 2028 could erase several billion of high-margin revenue in short order, exactly as Revlimid already did. If that cliff arrives before the newer launches (Camzyos, Opdualag, Breyanzi expansions) scale, both the $12.85B FCF and the 71% payout ratio become unsustainable, and the 3.9% yield turns into a value trap. Add the fact that revenue has already stagnated for four years and that sector peers still command mid-20s P/Es, and the 20–25% discount to those peers can be read as rational rather than an opportunity. A smart skeptic would also note that CAR-T commercialization has repeatedly lagged internal expectations and that management’s M&A track record is mixed.
I would flip to a more aggressive buy if two consecutive quarters show revenue re-accelerating above 5% year-over-year while Eliquis erosion stays milder than Street models, or if 2026 full-year FCF holds above $12B despite LOE. Conversely, a cut in the dividend or a guidance cut that implies FCF below $10B would force a re-rating lower.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
BMY is a classic mature earner: revenue essentially flat around $46-48B for five years, FCF a reliable $12-15B annually, and OCF/NI of 1.28x with accruals at -11.1% of assets confirming reported earnings are backed by cash. Beneish M at -2.69 and no earnings-quality flags reinforce that the accounting is clean. Share count has shrunk from 2.25B to 2.04B (a -2.4% CAGR) with buyback/SBC at 743%, so per-share value is genuinely being concentrated rather than optically manufactured.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition of the 2024 net loss - confirm IPRD/impairment charges from Karuna and RayzeBio acquisitions
- Revlimid, Eliquis, and Opdivo LOE timelines and revenue at risk over next 3 years
- New-product portfolio (Reblozyl, Camzyos, Breyanzi, Cobenfy) growth trajectory and share of revenue
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing needs given ~$35B net debt
- Whether the buyback pace continues given deleveraging priorities post-Karuna deal
The e2e composite pins fair value at $77.21 and the signal-adjusted at $80.49, implying ~21-26% upside from $63.63. The methods disagree wildly: DCF at $116.54 is almost certainly a runaway (it capitalizes cash flows without adequately penalizing the Revlimid/Opdivo/Eliquis cliff), while EPV floor of $20.34 assumes the franchise essentially collapses. The anchored P/E of $55.41 is the most sober cross-check and sits ~13% BELOW today's price, which tells me the market is already pricing in cliff erosion but not catastrophe. Splitting the difference, a deserved value in the low-to-mid $70s feels defensible for a solid-quality, cash-generative mature pharma with high earnings quality but $35B net debt and eroding gross margins.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Eliquis LOE exposure and IRA negotiated-price impact starting 2026
- Revlimid biosimilar erosion trajectory in 2024-25 guidance
- New-product portfolio (Reblozyl, Camzyos, Sotyktu) ramp vs consensus
- Dividend coverage and net-debt paydown pace post-Karuna/Mirati deals
- Any goodwill impairment signals on recent M&A
The macro tape is mildly risk-on, but with beta of 0.23 that barely touches BMY either way - the market's mood is not the driver here. What matters is the narrative, and it is a defensive, minimal-intensity 'legacy pharma facing cliffs' story with no aspirational hook. The Braveheart IPO and GLP-1 chatter reinforce that capital and enthusiasm are flowing to newer biotech, not to mature blockbuster owners like BMY. Momentum is negative, D/E has ballooned, and the story lacks any bullish catalyst to lean on. The freshest, most concrete sentiment event is negative: the Reuters denial of AstraZeneca merger talks removed a takeout premium the tape had briefly flirted with - AZN popped 6% on the denial, meaning BMY loses the optionality bid. Peers PFE and ABBV headlines frame the whole cohort as 'cheap for a reason' cash-yield trades, which anchors BMY into the same value-trap bucket. Healthcare sector was green on the day, a small offset, but sector strength on a single afternoon does not overcome a durable defensive narrative and a fading M&A rumor.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any renewed M&A chatter or activist involvement that could re-inject a premium
- Pipeline readouts or FDA decisions that could shift the narrative from defensive to growth
- Analyst target revisions in the next 2-4 weeks post merger-denial
- Whether Eliquis competitive threats materialize into concrete guide-downs
- Sector rotation into defensives if the tape turns risk-off - BMY's low beta would then become a positive selection factor
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 6, 2026, BMY was $63.63. We expect it to be $74.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 6, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.