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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CBRE Group Inc. (CBRE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 25 · Value -64 · Sentiment -8 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $175.12 vs $139.46 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
CBRE Group Inc.
CBRE NYSECBRE Group Inc. is a global commercial real estate services and investment company headquartered in Dallas, Texas. The firm provides a comprehensive suite of services that support both real estate investors and occupiers across office, industrial, retail, multifamily, and specialized property types. CBRE Group Inc. organizes its activities around advisory services such as leasing, property sales, capital markets, and valuation; global workplace solutions including facilities management, project management, and outsourced real estate operations; and real estate investments encompassing property development, investment management, and related services. The company plays a central role in the professional real estate ecosystem by connecting capital, occupiers, and developers, and by managing properties and critical infrastructure on behalf of corporations, institutions, and public-sector clients in more than 100 countries. Founded in 1906 and incorporated in its current form in Delaware, CBRE Group Inc. is recognized as one of the world’s largest and most diversified commercial real estate platforms.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.85
Total Equity: $8.88B
Shares: 300,519,481
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $1.86B
EBITDA: $1.57B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $1.86B
Revenue: $40.55B
Revenue: $40.55B
Revenue: $40.55B
Total Equity: $8.88B
Tax Rate: 19.9%
Equity: $8.88B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $1.86B
Current Liabilities: $12.32B
Long-Term Debt: $7.17B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Total Equity: $8.88B
Shares: 300,519,481
Shares: 300,519,481
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 300,519,481
Stock Price: $139.46
Net Income: $1.16B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:44am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $27.7B | $30.8B | $31.9B | $35.8B | $40.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $21.6B | $24.2B | $25.7B | $28.8B | $33.0B |
| Gross Profit | $6.2B | $6.6B | $6.3B | $7.0B | $7.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.6B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.7B | $6.3B |
| Operating Income | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $1.8B | $1.4B | $986.0M | $968.0M | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.6B |
| EPS | $5.48 | $4.36 | $3.20 | $3.16 | $3.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.41 | $4.29 | $3.15 | $3.14 | $3.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:37am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.4B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.1B | $8.5B | $9.7B | $10.0B | $13.5B |
| Total Assets | $22.1B | $20.5B | $22.5B | $24.4B | $30.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.4B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $9.3B | $12.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.7B | $2.2B | $3.9B | $4.6B | $7.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $12.7B | $11.9B | $13.5B | $15.2B | $21.3B |
| Total Equity | $8.5B | $7.9B | $8.3B | $8.4B | $8.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $8.4B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $9.6B | $9.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:44am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.4B | $1.6B | $480.0M | $1.7B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$209.9M | -$260.1M | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.2B | $1.4B | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $492.3M | $0 | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$368.6M | -$1.9B | -$665.0M | -$627.0M | -$968.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $500.5M | -$1.1B | -$34.0M | -$150.0M | $793.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:44am (27d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.1% | +3.6% | +12.0% | +13.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +6.9% | -4.8% | +10.9% | +8.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -15.3% | -17.9% | +16.6% | +1.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -23.4% | -29.9% | -1.8% | +19.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -13.1% | -4.1% | +7.0% | -13.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:41Recovery pays +39%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 66%. Ratio 0.6:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($139.46) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 9.2% | $193.68 | +39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 8.0% | $134.61 | -3% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 6.8% | $90.83 | -35% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +12% | 2.8% | $46.75 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model outputs: CBRE printed $40.55B revenue in 2025 vs $27.75B in 2021 — a real 12.7% CAGR, that's not fake. But look at what happened to profitability along the way: net income went from $1.84B (2021) to $1.16B (2025), operating margin collapsed from 5.7% to 3.2%, and gross margin slid from 22.2% to 18.7%. That is not a "capital-light platform in transition" — that's a services roll-up absorbing lower-margin facilities/outsourcing revenue (GWS-style contracts) that dilute mix while the high-margin capital markets and leasing brokerage lines got hammered by rate-driven transaction drought. The Q1 2025 print ($8.88B rev, 1.8% margin) vs Q4 2024 ($10.41B, 4.7%) shows the extreme seasonality/back-end-loading typical of brokerage — this is emphatically a cyclical services business, not a SaaS platform.
The valuation math is where I get uncomfortable. $40.84B market cap on $1.16B net income is 35x trailing, and EV/EBITDA at 26.5x is genuinely rich for a business whose *peak* net income was $1.84B in the ZIRP-fueled 2021 transaction boom. Even if you underwrite a full capital markets recovery back to 2021 earnings power ($1.84B), you're paying 22x peak-cycle earnings for a business with $9.99B of debt against $1.86B cash and $8.88B equity — leverage that matters when brokerage revenue can drop 30% in a quarter. FCF of $1.19B against a $40B+ EV is a ~3% FCF yield. The "161% FCF CAGR" momentum number is a base-effect artifact — 2022-2023 FCF was crushed, so any recovery looks parabolic. Don't be fooled by it.
Where I part with the prior models: the pre-flight framing of "services-platform-hybrid" and the narrative layer's "steady-compounder" archetype both give CBRE too much credit for a transformation that the margin data actively refutes. If workplace solutions were building software-like recurring economics, you'd see gross margin *expansion*, not a 350bp contraction over five years. The synthesis "Priced for Perfection" verdict is directionally right but the reasoning ("50% FCF growth required") leans on that noisy FCF CAGR. The Market Forces "Neutral" call is too generous — this is a rate-sensitive, office-exposure-heavy cyclical trading at a growth multiple heading into a period where the 10Y and office vacancy are both structural headwinds. The insider activity data is useless here (gifts and awards, no open-market buying visible, dated 2026 which is either a data error or forward-dated filings — flag it).
The contrarian case for the bulls: CBRE is genuinely the #1 global CRE services franchise, GWS (Global Workplace Solutions) is a real annuity-like business with 90%+ retention, and if/when capital markets transaction velocity mean-reverts, the operating leverage is violent — 2021 showed $1.84B NI is achievable, and a normalized cycle midpoint might be $1.5B, putting forward P/E closer to 27x. That's still not cheap, but it's defensible for a #1 franchise. However, the bull case requires (a) office to stabilize, (b) rates to normalize enough to reawaken deal flow, and (c) GWS margins to actually expand rather than dilute. Zero of those three are visible in the current data. I agree with the synthesis verdict but for different reasons: it's not that the model is wrong to call "Priced for Perfection," it's that the model underweights the cyclicality risk and overweights the platform-transformation narrative on the way to that conclusion. Fair value on a mid-cycle $1.5B NI at 18-20x (appropriate for a leveraged cyclical services leader) is $27-30B market cap, or ~$95-105/share. The current $139 embeds ~35-45% narrative premium for a transformation the P&L doesn't corroborate.
GPT Reading
What jumps out to me in the raw data is not simply “cyclical brokerage weakness,” but a business whose revenue mix has changed so much that revenue growth has become a worse indicator of value creation than it used to be. CBRE has taken revenue from $27.75B in 2021 to $40.55B in 2025, yet operating income fell from $1.57B to $1.29B and net income from $1.84B to $1.16B. That is a brutal trade: 46% more sales for 18% less operating profit and 37% less net profit. Gross profit only rose from $6.17B to $7.57B over that span, so most of the top-line gain came at much lower incremental economics. The quarterly pattern reinforces that this is a low-margin volume machine, not an emerging high-margin platform: over the last five reported quarters, revenue ranged from $7.94B to $10.41B while net margin stayed in a narrow 1.5%-4.7% band, with the most recent quarter at just 1.8%. I see a stronger franchise than a commodity broker, but the numbers describe a scaling service network with weak incremental margins, not a business on the cusp of software-like operating leverage.
The balance sheet and cash flow add a second important layer. Net debt is roughly $8.1B against $8.88B of equity, so this is not distressed, but neither is it a pristine balance sheet for a company producing only $1.29B of operating income and $1.19B of free cash flow. At the current $40.84B market cap, investors are paying about 34-35x trailing earnings and roughly a 2.9% FCF yield for a business with 3.2% operating margins and 2.9% net margins. That combination is the core issue for me. You do not need to believe office is permanently broken to find the stock expensive; you only need to believe that a low-margin global services leader should not command a multiple that assumes either a sharp cyclical rebound or a structural margin step-up. The market is effectively capitalizing quality and scale as if they can offset mediocre economics. I do not buy that at $139.
I agree with Opus on the big call: the stock is overvalued, and the “compounder” framing is too generous relative to the current P&L. Opus argues this is “a services roll-up absorbing lower-margin facilities/outsourcing revenue,” and the data backs that. Gross margin fell from 22.2% in 2021 to 18.7% in 2025 while operating margin dropped from 5.7% to 3.2%; that is classic mix dilution, not evidence of latent platform economics. I also agree with Opus that the 161% FCF CAGR in the model outputs is basically unusable as a valuation anchor. With FCF at $1.19B on a $40.84B equity value, the current cash return is plainly thin, and the “parabolic” growth framing overstates what is likely just recovery from a depressed base. I further agree that the insider data should be ignored; gifts and awards dated 2026 tell us nothing actionable about conviction.
Where I part company with Opus is mainly on magnitude and on what the cyclicality implies for valuation. Opus says “fair value $95-105 on mid-cycle earnings power” and frames $1.5B of net income as a reasonable midpoint. I think that is too punitive for the franchise quality and too anchored to troughish sentiment. If CBRE can earn $1.16B in a still-imperfect environment after already rebuilding revenue to $40.55B, then a normalized earnings band of roughly $1.35B-$1.50B seems plausible without requiring a return to 2021’s $1.84B boom conditions. For a clear category leader with diversified service lines and solid cash generation, I would not insist on only 18-20x normalized earnings as Opus does; 22-24x is more defensible even for a cyclical services name of this quality. That still does not justify today’s price: on $1.35B-$1.50B, that framework supports something more like a $30B-$36B equity value, or roughly $103-$123 per share, not $139. So I agree the stock is expensive, but I think Opus’s $95-105 range leans too bearish unless you assume little or no margin recovery at all.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both over-reading margin compression as permanent deterioration. They would point out that annual revenue climbed from $31.95B in 2023 to $35.77B in 2024 and then to $40.55B in 2025, while net income also recovered from $968M in 2024 to $1.16B in 2025, suggesting the earnings engine may already be reaccelerating. That skeptic would also argue that a 1.0x sales multiple and 1.0x EV/revenue are not absurd for the global leader in an essential outsourced function, especially if transaction activity rebounds faster than expected and drops through at higher margins. That is the real risk to the bear case. But even granting that, the current valuation already asks investors to pay up before that margin recovery is visible in the numbers.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
CBRE is a mature, global real estate services platform running at $40.55B revenue in 2025, up from $27.75B in 2021 (roughly 10% revenue CAGR). It throws off real cash - $1.56B FCF in 2025, OCF/NI of 1.21x, accruals at -1.1% of assets, Beneish M of -2.4 and Altman Z of 3.1 - all consistent with clean, well-supported earnings. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly: diluted shares fell from 339.6M to 300.5M (about -3% CAGR), and buybacks run 6.3x SBC while SBC itself is only 0.3% of revenue - a genuinely disciplined comp structure for a services firm. The concern is quality of growth. Gross margin has slid every year from 22.2% (2021) to 18.7% (2025), and operating margin compressed from 5.6% to 3.2% even as revenue grew ~46%. Net income is still below the 2021 peak of $1.84B despite $12.8B more revenue - operating leverage is running the wrong way. The balance sheet is a constraint: net debt of $8.13B, and $2.82B of short-term debt against $1.86B liquid cash creates refinancing exposure, though $1.56B annual FCF comfortably services it. Insider tape is neutral-to-soft: zero open-market buys, ~$1.76M in sales over 12 months, with recent activity dominated by awards and gifts. Nothing alarming, but no conviction signal either. Overall a solid, durably profitable operator with real earnings and shareholder-aligned capital returns, held back from a higher grade by cyclical margin erosion and a levered balance sheet.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix shift driving the 350bp gross margin decline - is it a structural move toward lower-margin outsourcing/facilities revenue or cyclical weakness in transactions/leasing?
- Debt maturity schedule and rate structure behind the $2.82B short-term debt to gauge refinancing risk.
- Acquisition contribution to the 2021-2025 revenue growth (organic vs. M&A) and goodwill/intangibles buildup.
- Composition of $1.56B FCF - working capital swings vs. underlying earnings power - given the volatile 2023 FCF dip to $480M.
- Customer/geographic concentration in Global Workplace Solutions and any exposure to office-sector distress.
The e2e composite pins fair value at $128.93 (signal-adjusted identical), against a market price of $139.46 - roughly an 8% premium to deserved value. That's not egregious, but it's the wrong side of zero for a cyclical services business whose net income has gone backwards even as revenue added $12.8B. The 'Priced for Perfection' tag from the e2e work lines up: buyers here are underwriting a transaction-volume recovery and margin recapture that hasn't shown up in the P&L yet.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Segment margin trajectory in Advisory vs GWS - is the bleed mix or structural?
- Capital-markets/transaction volume guidance for next 2-4 quarters
- Any one-time items or acquisition-related costs inflating the revenue-vs-income divergence
- Leverage and interest expense trajectory into 2025
The tape is neutral-to-slightly-risk-off (VIX 18.6, S&P -2.6% off highs, 10y at 4.71%, market PE 26.6) and CBRE's 1.21 beta means it takes a bit more than its share of that pressure. As a Real Estate Services name it also sits directly under the 'rates higher for longer' and 'office structurally broken' overhangs that periodically flare up in the sector narrative. That is a real, if moderate, headwind. Offsetting it, CBRE carries a steady-compounder story with moderate durability - the market treats it as the essential platform layer of global CRE rather than a pure office cyclical, which insulates sentiment somewhat versus REIT peers. The most recent news flow is constructive but low-voltage: a pre-Q2 preview flagging outsourcing and leasing strength, and a bullish European hotel capital-flows piece that reinforces the 'capital is still being deployed' angle. Nothing viral, no analyst tone shock, no cult energy. Net: small headwind from macro, small tailwind from narrative and news, no decisive push either direction into the print.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q2 print reaction and whether analyst tone shifts on outsourcing/leasing guidance
- Any renewed spike in the 10y or VIX that would reawaken the CRE-rates bear narrative
- Sector rotation signals - if REITs and CRE services catch a bid on rate-cut repricing, sentiment flips to tailwind quickly
- Office vacancy or major leasing headlines that could reactivate the structural-bear story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 27, 2026, CBRE was $139.46. We expect it to be $139.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $115.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.