For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Carnival Corporation Ltd. (CCL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-13): Designation Low · Gem Score -55 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -24 · Value -75 · Sentiment -11 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $11.32 vs $25.71 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Carnival Corporation Ltd.
CCL NYSECarnival Corporation Ltd. is a global cruise and leisure travel company that operates a portfolio of well-known cruise brands serving a wide range of vacation preferences. Its business centers on delivering cruise vacations across North America, Europe, Australia, and other international markets, with services spanning contemporary, premium, and luxury travel experiences. The company also supports its cruise operations through port destinations, private islands, and land-based tour and transportation services that complement guest itineraries. Carnival Corporation Ltd.’s brands are used to reach both mainstream leisure travelers and more specialized cruise customers through multiple sales channels, including travel advisors, tour operators, digital platforms, and onboard booking services. Headquartered in Miami, Florida, the company plays a significant role in the global tourism and hospitality market as one of the largest cruise operators in the industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.02
Total Equity: $12.28B
Shares: 1,402,000,000
Total Debt: $26.64B
Cash: $1.93B
EBITDA: $7.27B
Total Debt: $26.64B
Cash: $1.93B
Revenue: $26.62B
Revenue: $26.62B
Revenue: $26.62B
Total Equity: $12.28B
Tax Rate: 0.4%
Equity: $12.28B
Total Debt: $26.64B
Cash: $1.93B
Current Liabilities: $13.09B
Long-Term Debt: $24.04B
Total Debt: $26.64B
Total Equity: $12.28B
Shares: 1,402,000,000
Shares: 1,402,000,000
CapEx: -$3.61B
Shares: 1,402,000,000
Stock Price: $25.71
Net Income: $2.76B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:18am (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.9B | $12.2B | $21.6B | $25.0B | $26.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.7B | $11.8B | $14.3B | $15.6B | — |
| Gross Profit | -$2.7B | $411.0M | $7.3B | $9.4B | — |
| Operating Expenses | $4.3B | $4.8B | $5.3B | $5.8B | — |
| Operating Income | -$7.1B | -$4.4B | $2.0B | $3.6B | $4.5B |
| Net Income | -$9.5B | -$6.1B | -$74.0M | $1.9B | $2.8B |
| EBITDA | -$4.9B | -$2.1B | $4.3B | $6.1B | $7.3B |
| EPS | $-8.46 | $-5.16 | $-0.06 | $1.50 | $2.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-8.46 | $-5.16 | $-0.06 | $1.44 | $2.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:00am (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $8.9B | $4.0B | $2.4B | $1.2B | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.1B | $7.5B | $5.3B | $3.4B | $4.2B |
| Total Assets | $53.3B | $51.7B | $49.1B | $49.1B | $51.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $10.4B | $10.6B | $11.5B | $11.6B | $13.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $28.5B | $32.0B | $28.5B | $25.9B | $24.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $41.2B | $44.6B | $42.2B | $39.8B | $39.4B |
| Total Equity | $12.1B | $7.1B | $6.9B | $9.3B | $12.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $6.4B | $269.0M | $185.0M | $2.1B | $4.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:18am (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$4.1B | -$1.7B | $4.3B | $5.9B | $6.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.6B | -$4.9B | -$3.3B | -$4.6B | -$3.6B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$7.7B | -$6.6B | $997.0M | $1.3B | $2.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$715.0M | -$2.9B | -$3.6B | -$1.2B | $727.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:18am (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +537.7% | +77.5% | +15.9% | +6.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +115.0% | +1,670.3% | +29.0% | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +38.2% | +144.7% | +82.7% | +25.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +35.9% | +98.8% | +2,689.2% | +44.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +56.7% | +305.6% | +41.7% | +18.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:00am (19d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-18 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-20 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-22 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-23 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2019-02-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2018-11-21 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-23 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2018-05-24 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2018-02-22 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2017-11-22 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-23 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2017-05-24 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2017-02-22 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2016-11-22 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-24 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2016-05-25 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2016-02-17 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:01A +1σ run of quarters pays +92%; a −1σ run costs 93%. Ratio 1.0:1 (μ 19.2%, σ 86.0% floored by longrun, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($25.71) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 20.3% | $24.74 | -4% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 17.7% | $20.11 | -22% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 15.0% | $16.07 | -37% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 9.7% | $12.16 | -53% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 12.4% | $49.27 | +92% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -50% | 10.4% | $1.91 | -93% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-25 07:26The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Independently reading the tape: Carnival is a real recovery, not a mirage. TTM revenue is roughly $27.3B (Q3'25 through Q2'26 sums to $27.31B), up from $25.02B in FY24 and $21.59B in FY23. TTM net income is roughly $3.07B ($537+$258+$421+$1,850M), so trailing earnings are actually accelerating past the $2.76B FY25 print. On $35.2B market cap, that's 11.5x trailing earnings; on EV of ~$59.9B ($35.2B equity + $26.64B debt − $1.93B cash), EV/EBITDA of ~8x is not "overvalued" for a business generating $6.2B operating cash flow and $2.6B FCF with 22% Q3 seasonal margins. The debt is heavy but shrinking: management has been refinancing at successively lower coupons, and equity has recovered to $12.3B from deeply negative territory two years ago. ROE of 22% and ROIC of 12% on a supposedly "impaired" asset is not consistent with the synthesis's $12.35 fair value.
Where I diverge sharply from the Valuation Synthesis: a DCF that spits out $14 on a business doing $2.6B FCF growing double-digits implies either a punitive discount rate, terminal decline assumptions, or both — and neither squares with the observable data (record bookings, pricing +3-5% yoy per recent guidance, occupancy back above 100%). The synthesis and Market Forces layer are essentially double-counting the debt: it's already in EV, and EV/EBITDA of 8x is cheap versus RCL at ~11-12x and NCLH at ~9x. The pre-flight framing ("deep-value, market pricing permanent impairment") is closer to right than the synthesis conclusion. These two prior models contradict each other and the synthesis is the weaker read.
The contrarian bear case that actually has teeth: this is peak-cycle earnings on a consumer-discretionary business with 2.2x debt/equity and a 0.32 current ratio (which is scary in isolation but normal for cruise operators who collect deposits as liabilities). Q1 FY26 net income of $258M was weak, Q2 at $537M is below Q2'25's $565M — sequential yoy comps are flattening, not accelerating, and the "44% recent earnings yoy" figure is misleading because it's anchored to a Q2'25 comparison that already benefited from recovery. Fuel, labor, and drydock capex ($3.6B) are structural, and a US consumer recession would hit bookings hard given cruises are the most discretionary of discretionary travel. Insider activity shows a sale but mostly in-kind tax withholdings — genuinely neutral, not bullish. The narrative layer's "fragile durability" call is fair.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the business recovery is real, not optical. Carnival has gone from $21.6B of revenue and a small loss in 2023 to $25.0B and $1.92B of net income in 2024, then $26.6B and $2.76B in 2025. Operating income rose from $1.96B to $3.57B to $4.48B over those same years. The quarterly run-rate also looks solid: the last four quarters sum to roughly $27.3B of revenue and about $3.1B of net income, ahead of fiscal 2025 already. Even more important for this kind of asset-heavy company, operating cash flow was $6.22B in 2025 and free cash flow was positive $2.61B after $3.61B of capex. That is not a distressed equity profile. At $35.2B market cap, the stock is on about 12.7x trailing earnings, 1.35x sales, and 8.0x EV/EBITDA. For a company that has restored double-digit annual net margin to 10.4% and 16.8% operating margin, those multiples are not screamingly expensive.
The core debate is the balance sheet, and here I think the market is right to withhold a premium but wrong to act as if the equity should be cut in half. Net debt is still roughly $24.7B after subtracting just $1.93B of cash from $26.64B of debt, against only $12.28B of equity and a very weak 0.32 current ratio. That leverage matters in a cyclical consumer name. But the raw earnings and cash flow data say Carnival is actively earning its way out of the hole. 2025 free cash flow of $2.61B means the company can delever at a meaningful pace if management stays disciplined. ROIC at 12.1% and ROE at 22.5% also say this is no longer a zombie. The overvalued call from the model, implying fair value near $12-$14, does not fit a company producing over $4B of operating income and over $6B of operating cash flow unless you assume either a sharp recession, structurally collapsing margins, or refinancing pain severe enough to consume much of the recovery. None of that is in the reported numbers yet.
The seasonality also argues for caution in both directions. Carnival earns most of its money in the August quarter, with net income of $1.74B in 2024 and $1.85B in 2025 on roughly $8B of revenue, while winter quarters are much thinner and can flirt with breakeven. That makes the business look more fragile on a quarterly snapshot than it is on a full-year basis, but it also means the margin story can reverse fast if occupancy or onboard spending soften. Still, recent comparisons are favorable: the latest quarter delivered $6.66B of revenue and $537M of net income versus $6.33B and $565M a year earlier in the comparable May quarter, so revenue grew while margin dipped modestly from 8.9% to 8.1%. That is not ideal, but neither is it evidence of a broken pricing model. If anything, the data show a business that has largely normalized but still carries a leverage discount.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: this company remains heavily indebted, capital intensive, and exposed to discretionary spending. Debt of $26.64B is nearly 10x 2025 net income, and because capex is structurally large, a lot of operating cash flow is already spoken for before debt reduction or shareholder returns. If demand stalls, the equity gets hit from multiple angles at once: lower occupancy, weaker ticket pricing, lower onboard revenue, and tighter refinancing conditions. The low current ratio underscores how little balance-sheet flexibility Carnival has compared with a truly de-risked travel company. A skeptic can also point to the slowing top-line cadence — recent revenue growth of 6.4% is not a boom — and say the market is already paying a normalized earnings multiple for what is still a recovery story with no dividend support and limited margin for macro error. That is the strongest argument against owning it here, and it is why I do not think this deserves a sector-leading multiple.
What would change my mind is a break in free cash flow conversion or signs that margins have peaked before leverage is truly reduced. If annual free cash flow falls back below roughly $1.5B while debt stays near $26B, the equity would start to look overvalued at $25+. Likewise, if the next peak-season quarter cannot beat the prior year's $1.85B net income on revenue above $8.15B, the recovery thesis weakens because Carnival needs continued earnings growth to justify carrying this debt stack. On the other hand, if management delivers another year around $3B+ of net income and pushes net debt down by several billion dollars, today's valuation will look more like a reasonable recovery multiple than a trap.
Grok Reading
The numbers show a genuine operational recovery that the valuation models are under-weighting. Carnival printed $26.62B in 2025 revenue and $2.76B in net income, up from $25.02B and $1.92B the prior year, with operating income expanding from $3.57B to $4.48B. Free cash flow of $2.61B on $6.22B of operating cash flow is real cash generation, not an accounting artifact, and it arrived while the company still spent $3.61B on capex. Seasonality remains loud—August quarters deliver ~22–23% net margins and $1.7–1.85B of profit, while February quarters are thin—but the trough has lifted: the February 2026 quarter turned $258M of profit on $6.17B revenue versus a $78M loss a year earlier. At $25.71 the stock clears roughly 12.7× trailing earnings, 8.0× EV/EBITDA and a 7.4% FCF yield. Those are not bubble multiples for a business that has restored double-digit ROE (22.5%) and 16.8% operating margins; they are closer to a leveraged cyclical that the market still refuses to re-rate fully versus peers.
Debt is the dominant overhang and it is not cosmetic. $26.64B of total debt against $12.28B of equity and only $1.93B of cash produces a 2.17× debt-to-equity ratio and a 0.32 current ratio that leaves no margin for a booking shock. Net leverage of roughly $25B means almost a decade of current free cash flow would be required to extinguish the balance sheet, so every dollar of FCF is spoken for by deleveraging long before meaningful buybacks or dividend growth (the 0.6% yield is token). Recent quarterly revenue growth has slowed to the mid-single digits, the models flag decelerating trends, and the company still lags sector peers on multiple expansion. The composite models’ $12–14 fair-value output is directionally wrong—it implies the equity is worth less than five times current earnings despite positive and growing FCF—but the impulse behind it is correct: this capital structure cannot support a growth multiple, and any recession that hits discretionary travel will compress both earnings and the multiple simultaneously.
The strongest counter-argument is simply that the market has already priced the recovery and is now looking through to the next cycle. If normalized mid-cycle earnings are closer to $2.0–2.2B once pricing power fades and dry-dock/capex normalizes higher, then 12.7× becomes 15–16× on a more realistic base, and the EV/EBITDA of 8 starts to look full rather than cheap once you adjust for the refinancing wall still embedded in the $26.6B stack. Credit investors, not equity tourists, set the clearing price here; any widening in cruise spreads or a visible step-down in net yields would validate the “value-trap” label the market-forces layer is already whispering. I weigh this less heavily than the models do because the absolute earnings and cash-flow run-rate have already cleared the survival threshold that justified single-digit multiples in 2022–23, but the risk is asymmetric to the downside if consumer spending cracks.
I would reverse to a clear undervaluation call if the next two printings show net debt falling below $22B while net yields and occupancy hold, or if full-year 2026 FCF exceeds $3.2B. I would flip to outright overvalued on a sub-$2.3B net-income year, a material guidance cut on 2027 bookings, or any credit-rating action that signals refinancing stress.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Carnival has executed a genuine post-pandemic operational recovery: revenue climbed from $1.91B (2021) to $26.62B (2025), operating margin swung from -371% to +16.8%, net income turned from -$9.5B to +$2.76B, and FCF reached $2.61B. That is a real, durable-looking earner in a returned demand environment, and the business now self-funds operations and capex. However, the balance sheet still carries the scars of the shutdown. Net debt is -$24.71B, short-term debt ($2.60B) exceeds liquid cash ($1.93B), and Altman Z at 1.26 sits squarely in the distress band. Even with $2.61B of FCF, deleveraging is a multi-year project, and any demand shock or fuel/rate spike hits an already stretched capital structure hard. Per-share value has also been diluted: diluted share count rose from 1.12B (2021) to 1.40B (2025), a 5.7% CAGR, meaning shareholders funded part of the survival. SBC is modest (0.4% of revenue), so the dilution is legacy pandemic financings, not ongoing comp abuse. Insider activity is neutral-to-slightly-negative (five sells, no opens buys), consistent with routine vesting rather than a signal.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity ladder for 2026-2028 and weighted average interest cost
- Whether OCF/NI -10.36x reflects customer-deposit timing or a one-off working-capital item
- Terms of any remaining convertible notes and potential further dilution
- Booked-position and pricing indicators for forward sailings
- Capex commitments for newbuild ships and impact on future FCF
- Covenants on secured debt and headroom against them
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $13.99 (signal-adjusted $12.35) with DCF at $12.53 and an EPV floor of $16.92 — a tight cluster that says deserved equity value sits in the low-to-mid teens, not the mid-twenties. The gap is not a rounding error: at $25.71 the market is capitalizing a fully-normalized, pricing-power cruise cycle onto an equity stub that still sits behind $24.7B of net debt. Enterprise value, not equity, has done most of the heavy lifting in the recovery; the equity has re-rated ahead of the deleveraging.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward booking curve and net yield guidance in the next earnings release
- Pace of gross/net debt reduction and refinancing rates on the highest-cost tranches
- Any further equity issuance or convert overhang that would dilute per-share value
- Fuel and labor cost trajectory into next-year guide
The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime +18, VIX 15.9, S&P near highs) but only one day old and running against a 4.74% 10y and a 25.8 market PE. For a 2.34-beta consumer cyclical with real balance-sheet baggage, that neutral tape is a lukewarm tailwind at best - any risk-off flinch gets amplified here harder than in most names. Momentum has been strong (11% CAGR, D/E cut in half), which keeps the trend-follower bid alive. The active narrative is cyclical-late-stage, moderate intensity, fragile durability, low cult - meaning the 'cruise demand normalized, deleveraging story' is running but has no fanatical base to defend it if pricing or booking data wobble. News flow (Holland America bandstands) is trivial filler, neither pushing nor hurting. No fresh analyst tone in the brief, but the setup - price ~2.1x DCF, story doing the heavy lifting - is the classic profile where sentiment can snap first and hardest.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward booking commentary or yield guidance from CCL or peers (RCL, NCLH) - any softening cracks the fragile narrative fast
- Analyst target revisions and consensus split - a downgrade cluster would confirm narrative fade
- 10y yield direction and VIX - a move above 20 would punish this 2.34-beta name disproportionately
- Consumer discretionary sector rotation flows - travel is often the first cyclical to be trimmed
Cruise remains the value-per-vacation-day winner in leisure travel, and fixed berth supply keeps pricing firm — the structural post-COVID normalization is real, not a rebound artifact. But the marginal cruise dollar is increasingly captured by newer-ship, newer-brand competitors, and CCL's growth is now more a balance-sheet story (interest expense unwinding) than a demand story. With macro headwinds and a 4.74% 10-year, discretionary travel demand growth cools from here; the durable part of CCL's earnings improvement is the debt paydown, which is finite.
When we made this prediction on Aug 25, 2026, CCL was $25.86. We expect it to be $21.20 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $15.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 25, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.