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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (CHD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -26 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -77 · Sentiment -11 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $49.35 vs $98.59 at analysis
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Church & Dwight Co., Inc.
CHD NYSEChurch & Dwight Co., Inc. is a consumer packaged goods company focused on household, personal care, consumer health, and specialty products. Its portfolio includes well-known brands such as ARM & HAMMER, OxiClean, Trojan, First Response, Nair, Orajel, Batiste, Waterpik, Zicam, TheraBreath, and HERO, spanning laundry care, cleaning, oral care, sexual wellness, diagnostics, hair care, and skin care. The company also operates a specialty products business centered on sodium bicarbonate and related technologies, serving industrial, institutional, food, medical, and animal nutrition applications. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. organizes its operations across Consumer Domestic, Consumer International, and Specialty Products, giving it a broad presence in both retail and business-to-business markets. Headquartered in Ewing, New Jersey, Church & Dwight Co., Inc. is recognized for combining branded consumer products with specialty ingredient and application expertise.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.02
Total Equity: $4.00B
Shares: 244,300,000
Total Debt: $2.21B
Cash: $409.00M
EBITDA: $1.33B
Total Debt: $2.21B
Cash: $409.00M
Revenue: $6.20B
Revenue: $6.20B
Revenue: $6.20B
Total Equity: $4.00B
Tax Rate: 23.0%
Equity: $4.00B
Total Debt: $2.21B
Cash: $409.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.50B
Long-Term Debt: $2.21B
Total Debt: $2.21B
Total Equity: $4.00B
Shares: 244,300,000
Shares: 244,300,000
CapEx: -$122.40M
Shares: 244,300,000
Stock Price: $98.59
Net Income: $736.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 11:42pm (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.2B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.1B | $6.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.4B |
| Gross Profit | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $1.7B |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $597.8M | $1.1B | $807.1M | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $827.5M | $413.9M | $755.6M | $585.3M | $736.8M |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $816.8M | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.3B |
| EPS | $3.38 | $1.70 | $3.09 | $2.39 | $3.04 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.32 | $1.68 | $3.05 | $2.37 | $3.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 11:30pm (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $240.6M | $270.3M | $344.5M | $964.1M | $409.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.2B | $1.6B |
| Total Assets | $8.0B | $8.3B | $8.6B | $8.9B | $8.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.6B | $2.6B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.8B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $4.9B |
| Total Equity | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $4.4B | $4.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $5.4B | $5.5B | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 12:15am (33d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $993.8M | $885.2M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$118.8M | -$178.8M | -$223.5M | -$179.8M | -$122.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $875.0M | $706.4M | $807.1M | $976.4M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$556.0M | -$546.8M | $0 | -$19.9M | -$656.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $499.2M | $298.8M | -$200.0M | -$204.6M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | -$247.5M | -$255.0M | -$266.5M | -$277.0M | -$287.2M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$500.0M | $0 | -$300.1M | $0 | -$900.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $57.5M | $29.7M | $74.2M | $619.6M | -$555.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 11:42pm (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.6% | +9.2% | +4.1% | +1.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -0.6% | +15.0% | +7.8% | -0.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -44.6% | +76.9% | -23.7% | +33.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -50.0% | +82.6% | -22.5% | +25.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -37.1% | +57.0% | -18.4% | +26.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 5:45pm (37d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-14 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-15 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-15 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-14 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-14 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-14 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-14 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-14 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-05 02:00A +1σ run of quarters pays -51%; a −1σ run costs 70%. Ratio -0.7:1 (μ 2.5%, σ 3.0% floored by absolute, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($98.59) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +2% | 17.3% | $55.07 | -44% |
| Base — stabilizes | +1% | 15.0% | $47.22 | -52% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 12.8% | $39.72 | -60% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +0% | 11.8% | $36.24 | -63% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +5% | 13.2% | $47.83 | -51% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -1% | 9.5% | $29.24 | -70% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-04 00:29The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: CHD is doing $6.2B TTM revenue growing at ~2.8% CAGR over five years (5.19→6.20), with the most recent YoY quarters showing 1.3% (Q2'26: 1.53 vs 1.51) and essentially flat growth (Q1'26 1.47 vs Q1'25 1.47). This is not a growth company — it's a 2% top-line grower. Net income has actually decompressed: $827M in 2021, $737M in 2025, so trailing five-year earnings are negative. FCF is the one bright spot at $1.09B and improving, but on a $23.4B market cap that's a 4.7% FCF yield — thin for a no-growth staple with $2.21B gross debt and only $409M cash. At 32.6x earnings and 19.4x EV/EBITDA for a business compounding earnings at -1.3%, the math is ugly on its face.
The quarterly trajectory deserves scrutiny. Q4'25 margin collapsed to 8.7% ($143M NI on $1.64B) after a solid Q3'25 at 11.5% — that's not seasonal noise, that's evidence of the pricing/promo pressure the bear narrative describes. Q1-Q2'26 margins recovered to 13-15%, but revenue growth is decelerating (Q2'26 YoY: +1.3%; Q1'26 YoY: 0%). The Q3'24 -$75M NI print was a Flawless/vitamin business writedown, so the "25.9% recent earnings YoY" figure is a base-effect artifact — ignore it. Insiders are exercising and dumping (~36k shares across three days in late August) with zero open-market buys. That's not "neutral"; on a stock 65% above DCF fair value, insider behavior is quietly confirmatory of the overvaluation thesis.
I agree with the synthesis verdict's direction but want to push back on the pre-flight's framing that this is "priced at a 15-20% premium to peers." PG trades at ~26x with 3-4% organic growth and better scale/moat; CL at ~24x with pricing power in emerging markets; KMB at ~22x. CHD at 32.6x on 1.6% growth is a 25-50% premium to better-positioned peers, not 15-20%. The narrative layer nails it: this is story-driven pricing (dividend streak, defensive cult, "quality compounder" mythology) resting on a $60 DCF anchor. The bull retort — that Waterpik/TheraBreath/Hero acquisitions will re-accelerate growth — has to contend with the fact that they already own these and organic growth is still 1-2%. Where's the accretion?
The contrarian case worth entertaining: if we get a genuine recession, CHD's baking soda/condom/laundry portfolio is truly recession-proof, and a 4-5% FCF yield with a 25-year dividend raise streak becomes attractive as bond proxy competition weakens. Also, gross margin at 44.7% is defensible and operating leverage from Hero/Therabreath integration could surprise. But even generous assumptions — 4% revenue CAGR, 18% operating margins, terminal 2.5% — get to maybe $70-75, not $99. The synthesis DCF at $60 may be slightly punitive on FCF conversion (16.4% FCF CAGR is real), so I'd nudge fair value to $65-72 rather than $60. That's still 27-34% downside. The models are directionally right; if anything the market-forces layer failing to render and the narrative engine's "moderate" durability call are the softest links — I'd argue narrative durability is actually low-to-moderate because dividend-raise CPG names have de-rated sharply once growth stalls (see KMB 2015-2018, CL 2018-2020). CHD hasn't de-rated yet but the setup rhymes.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how little fundamental growth you are getting for a very expensive staple. Revenue has moved from $5.19 billion in 2021 to $6.20 billion in 2025, which looks fine at first glance, but that is only about 4.6% annualized over four years and the more recent run-rate is weaker: the last four quarters sum to about $6.23 billion, barely above 2025. Quarterly sales growth is essentially flat, with June 2026 revenue of $1.53 billion up just 1.6% from $1.51 billion a year earlier, and March 2026 at $1.47 billion was flat versus March 2025. For that, the market is paying 32.6x earnings, 19.4x EV/EBITDA, 3.9x sales, and 6.0x book. That is a premium multiple usually reserved for cleaner and more durable growth than CHD is showing today.
The income statement also tells a less pristine story than the “steady compounder” label suggests. Gross profit in 2025 was $2.77 billion versus $2.79 billion in 2024 despite higher revenue, implying gross margin slippage even as annual operating income rebounded to $1.08 billion from $807 million. That suggests the 2025 recovery was helped materially below gross profit, likely by lower charges or cleaner SG&A leverage, rather than a broad-based margin renaissance. Looking across the annual series, operating income was $1.08 billion in 2021, then $598 million in 2022, back to $1.06 billion in 2023, down to $807 million in 2024, and back to $1.08 billion in 2025. That is not the profile of a smooth, highly predictable earner deserving a top-shelf premium. Even the quarterly margins remain uneven: 15.0%, 12.7%, 11.5%, 8.7%, 14.7%, 13.3% over the last six quarters. A business with this much earnings lumpiness should not trade like a pristine compounding machine.
Cash flow is the strongest defense here, but even that does not bail out the valuation. Free cash flow of $1.09 billion on $23.39 billion of market cap is a 4.7% equity FCF yield before asking what growth is realistically sustainable. Net debt is manageable at roughly $1.8 billion, and ROIC of 14.3% is respectable, so this is clearly a good business. But good business is not the same as good stock at any price. If I capitalize roughly $1.1 billion of FCF at the kind of low implied return the market is accepting, I can see why the stock sits near $100; the problem is that this requires confidence in steady high-single-digit value compounding that the revenue line simply does not support. With sales growth around 2%-3%, a dividend yield of just 1.2%, and no evidence in these numbers of a new acceleration, I think the market is paying up for safety and brand mythology more than for current earning power.
The best case against my view is straightforward: CHD has shown an ability to convert a modest top line into excellent cash, and the latest reported quarters do show better year-on-year earnings, with June 2026 net income up to $202.8 million from $191.0 million and the trailing four-quarter total around $745 million versus $737 million for 2025. The 2024 negative quarter appears anomalous, and if you normalize for one-off charges, the business may be more stable than the GAAP path implies. Debt is not burdensome, the current ratio above 1x is adequate for a staple, and brands plus M&A have historically created value. In a market that prizes defensiveness, investors may rationally accept 30x-plus for a consumer staple with 44.7% gross margins, 17.4% operating margins, and dependable shelf presence. I weigh those points less heavily because the valuation already assumes them. A stable staple at 22x-25x earnings can work; a stable staple at 33x with 1%-2% recent sales growth leaves too little room for execution risk, integration missteps, or even a simple de-rating if bond yields stay elevated.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of EPS outperformance on cost control; it would be proof of durable organic acceleration. If CHD can push quarterly revenue growth from the current 0%-2% range to a sustained 4%-6% while keeping net margin in the 13%-15% band, then a premium multiple would have a firmer foundation. I would also revisit the bear case if annual free cash flow moves decisively above $1.25-$1.30 billion without a balance-sheet stretch, or if an acquisition clearly lifts the growth algorithm rather than just maintaining it. Absent that, a stock near $98 looks priced for a best-version outcome from a company currently producing merely decent staple performance.
Grok Reading
Church & Dwight at $98.59 is a textbook case of a high-quality compounder that the market has stretched past what the operating numbers can support. Revenue has crawled from $5.19B in 2021 to $6.20B in 2025 — a 2.8% CAGR — and the most recent year-over-year print is just 1.6%. Net income tells a worse story: $827.5M in 2021, a trough of $413.9M in 2022, a rebound to $755.6M in 2023, a slip to $585.3M in 2024, and $736.8M in 2025, producing a five-year earnings CAGR of −1.3%. The recent 25.9% earnings bounce is real but is largely a recovery from the −5% net margin quarter in September 2024 and a soft 2024 operating year ($807M op income versus $1.08B in both 2023 and 2025), not evidence of a new growth regime. At 32.6× trailing earnings, 19.4× EV/EBITDA, and 3.9× sales, CHD trades at a clear premium to PG (~26×), CL (~24×), and KMB (~22×) while growing slower than a mature staples peer should need to justify that gap. Free cash flow is the bright spot — $1.09B on $6.20B of sales, a ~17.6% FCF margin, and a 16.4% FCF CAGR — but strong cash conversion does not by itself underwrite a mid-30s multiple on a low-single-digit top line.
Quarterly run-rate is stuck in a $1.47–$1.64B band with net margins oscillating between roughly 9% and 15% and no visible acceleration; the June 2026 quarter at $1.53B and 13.3% margin looks like steady-state, not inflection. Balance sheet leverage is manageable (debt $2.21B, equity $4.0B, D/E 0.55) and the payout ratio of 39% on a 1.24% yield leaves room for the dividend streak, but the current ratio of 1.07 is tight for a company this size and cash of only $409M against that debt stack is not a fortress. Insider activity is noise — option exercises paired with matching sales and token awards — and adds nothing bullish. The valuation synthesis fair value near $60 is aggressive on the downside, but even a more generous anchor in the mid-to-high $70s (capitalizing ~$1.1B FCF at a mid-teens multiple appropriate for 2–3% growth plus modest M&A optionality) still leaves the stock 20–30% rich. The market is paying for brand permanence and bolt-on M&A magic; the reported numbers show neither organic acceleration nor consistently rising earnings power.
The strongest case against this read is the FCF engine and the defensive brand portfolio. Believers will correctly note that ARM & HAMMER, OxiClean, Trojan, Waterpik and the acquired oral-care names throw off durable cash, that operating margin has reclaimed 17.4% and gross margin holds near 45%, that ROE of 18.4% and ROIC of 14.3% are respectable for staples, and that in a risk-off tape this is exactly the kind of name that holds up. They will also argue that the 2022–2024 earnings mess was temporary (input costs, one-off charges) and that management’s serial-acquirer playbook can keep low-single-digit organic growth looking like mid-single-digit reported growth. I weigh that less because the premium already assumes the playbook works forever: at 33× you need sustained high-single-digit earnings growth and flawless capital allocation, yet revenue confidence is flagged as decelerating, sector intelligence is merely in-line, and macro headwinds are explicit. Paying growth multiples for a 2.8% revenue CAGR and negative earnings CAGR is the error; quality of cash flow justifies a fair multiple, not this one.
I would flip toward neutral or constructive if organic revenue growth sustained above 4–5% for two consecutive years, if operating margin pushed through 19–20% on a full-year basis without one-time help, or if a sizable bolt-on acquisition clearly added mid-single-digit accretion while keeping FCF margins above 17%. A decisive break of the peer P/E gap (CHD compressing toward 24–26× while earnings hold) without a growth collapse would also force a re-rating of the overvaluation call. Until one of those shows up in the print, the stock looks priced for a story the income statement is not telling.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Church & Dwight is a mature consumer-staples earner with steady top-line growth from $5.19B (2021) to $6.20B (2025), gross margins recovering to 44.7% and FCF stepping up to $1.09B. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.67x, accruals -4.6% of assets, Beneish M -2.73, Altman Z 5.03 all point to real cash-backed earnings with no manipulation flags. Capital discipline is intact - diluted share count drifted from 249.6M to 244.3M (-0.5% CAGR) with buybacks running 7.2x SBC and SBC only 0.9% of revenue. Balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion: net debt of ~$1.8B against $409M cash, though $1.09B FCF covers it comfortably. Operating margin has been volatile (20.8 to 11.1 to 18.0 to 13.2 to 17.4) suggesting periodic impairments or one-time charges rather than a clean margin trajectory - worth investigating. Net income also bounced ($827M to $414M to $756M to $585M to $737M), which does not match the smooth revenue and FCF lines. Insider tape is neutral-to-slightly-negative: five sales totaling $5.5M over 12 months, all tied to option exercises (M then S pattern), no open-market P buys. This is routine comp monetization, not a red flag but not a vote of confidence either. Overall a solidly run branded-goods business with predictable cash generation and shareholder-friendly capital allocation.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- What drove the 2022 and 2024 operating margin dips - impairments, restructuring, or acquisition costs?
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant terms behind the $1.8B net debt
- Brand/category concentration and exposure to private-label pressure
- Whether the 2022 net income drop reflects a specific write-down (e.g., FLAWLESS or WATERPIK impairment)
The composite fair value lands at $59.99 (signal-adjusted $59.62) against a $98.59 price, implying about -40% downside if the deserved value is right. Even leaning on the most generous of the three methods, the DCF at $70.63, price still runs ~40% above that anchor; the anchored P/E at $67.17 says the same, and the EPV floor at $31.54 flags real downside if growth stalls. Earnings quality is high and the business is Strong, which justifies paying above the EPV floor and probably somewhere between the DCF and anchored-PE - call deserved value ~$65-70 generously. That still leaves the stock ~30-50% too expensive. What's priced in: durable low-single-digit organic growth, continued accretive M&A, and no margin scare - essentially the bull case as base case. Margin of safety is negative; you are paying today for a decade of flawless execution in a category facing pod-driven laundry shifts and private-label pressure. Quality is real, but I do not pay 1.5x deserved value for staples-grade growth.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward organic growth guidance and any category-level softness in laundry/personal care
- M&A pipeline and deal multiples paid - is capital allocation still accretive?
- Operating margin bridge - what is causing the every-other-year volatility below gross profit
- Net debt trajectory and interest coverage vs buyback pace
CHD sits in a quiet spot on the tape. The market is nascent risk-on (VIX 14.3, S&P near highs), which is a modest positive for equities broadly but only lightly relevant to a 0.47-beta consumer defensive - CHD does not need risk appetite to hold its bid. Its narrative is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability 'boring fortress' story: essential brands, dividend streak, 'safe haven' framing. That story is intact and gets a small lift whenever investors want defensive ballast, but with cult coefficient low and the tape not stressed, there is no rush into the name. Momentum readings are quietly positive and volatility is low - classic sleep-well tape behavior. The pressing headwind is the 'priced like a luxury good' critique in the bear narrative, amplified by a 10y at 4.79% and market PE 25.8 - bond-proxy defensives with premium multiples are exactly the cohort where rate pressure lands hardest. The lone news item (PG Fabric & Home Care mixed, Tide innovation lifting growth) is a mild negative read-across on laundry competitive intensity, feeding the bear's pods/private-label thesis. Net: a low-beta defensive with an intact but unenergetic narrative, offset by rate-driven de-rating risk on premium multiples. Pressure is close to balanced with a faint defensive tilt.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 10y drifts higher and triggers a broader staples de-rating
- Any analyst target cuts citing valuation or laundry share loss
- Nielsen/scanner data on ARM & HAMMER laundry share vs Tide and private label
- Signs the 'safe haven' rotation intensifies (VIX spike) which would firm the bid
The world CHD operates in is a mature, no-growth staples market where volume is essentially demographic and the only real levers are pricing (now lapped), mix (working, slowly) and consolidation (working, but capital-dependent). Retail power is shifting toward marketplaces and private label, which compresses the mid-tier value positioning CHD occupies in laundry and cleaning. Macro headwinds with the 10y near 4.8% cut two ways: they pressure the discretionary tail of the portfolio (Waterpik, wellness) and raise the bar on acquisition math, while nudging trade-down toward CHD's value brands in laundry. Net: no external force plausibly accelerates this business over the next few years, and none obviously breaks it either. The dominant question is whether the base portfolio's ~1% run-rate is a soft patch or the new normal; the evidence — flat category, decelerating quarters, growth increasingly sourced from deals — leans toward the new normal.
When we made this prediction on Sep 4, 2026, CHD was $98.55. We expect it to be $90.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $70.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.