Business Description
Cencora, Inc. sources and distributes pharmaceutical products in the United States and internationally. The company's U.S. Healthcare Solutions segment distributes generic and injectable pharmaceuticals, over-the-counter healthcare products, home healthcare supplies and equipment, and related services to acute care hospitals and health systems, independent and chain retail pharmacies, mail order pharmacies, medical clinics, long-term care and alternate site pharmacies, and other customers; distributes plasma and other blood products, vaccines, and other specialty pharmaceutical products; provides pharmacy management, staffing, and other consulting services; supply management software to retail and institutional healthcare providers; packaging solutions to institutional and retail healthcare providers; clinical trial support, product post-approval, and commercialization support services; data analytics, outcomes research, and other services for biotechnology and pharmaceutical manufacturers; pharmaceuticals, vaccines, parasiticides, diagnostics, micro feed ingredients, and other products to the companion animal and production animal markets; sales force services to manufacturers; and offers other services to physicians who specialize in various disease states, such as oncology, as well as to other healthcare providers, including hospitals and dialysis clinics. Its International Healthcare Solutions segment provides international pharmaceutical wholesale and related service, and global commercialization services; distributes pharmaceuticals, other healthcare products, and related services to pharmacies, doctors, health centers, and hospitals; and offers specialty transportation and logistics services for the biopharmaceutical industry. The company was formerly known as AmerisourceBergen Corporation and changed its name to Cencora, Inc. in August 2023. Cencora, Inc. was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:46pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.02
Total Equity: $1.51B
Shares: 195,214,000
Total Debt: $9.33B
Cash: $4.39B
EBITDA: $3.74B
Total Debt: $9.33B
Cash: $4.39B
Revenue: $321.33B
Revenue: $321.33B
Revenue: $321.33B
Total Equity: $1.51B
Tax Rate: 30.6%
Equity: $1.51B
Total Debt: $9.33B
Cash: $4.39B
Current Liabilities: $57.82B
Long-Term Debt: $8.96B
Total Debt: $9.33B
Total Equity: $1.51B
Shares: 195,214,000
Shares: 195,214,000
CapEx: -$667.98M
Shares: 195,214,000
Stock Price: $263.64
Net Income: $1.55B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Cencora is exactly what the modules say it is: a self-funding cash machine with very clean earnings quality (OCF/NI 2.07x, accruals -2.6%, Beneish -2.54, Altman Z 4.8) and a shrinking share count (-1.6% CAGR, buyback/SBC 789%). On $321B of revenue it produces $3.21B FCF and is buying back stock aggressively — per-share economics are improving even as net income is flat ($1.54B → $1.55B over five years). This is a real business, not a financial engineering story.
The catch is price and margin geometry. Operating margin is 1.1% — razor-thin and stable, not expanding. Revenue grew ~50% over five years (213→321B) but net income went nowhere because every dollar of incremental revenue earns roughly nothing at the operating line. So the bull thesis ('AI-driven margin expansion, structural monopoly') is asking a 1% margin business to behave like a 5% margin business. The pipeline's DCF pegs fair value at $160; the AI synthesizer softens that to $210-220; the stock is $264. Either way, you're paying above any reasonable intrinsic anchor.
The insider tape confirms it's not a screaming buy: one real open-market purchase (Durcan, $1.1M in May 2026) against a steady drip of F-InKind tax withholdings and awards — that's normal compensation mechanics, not a conviction cluster. The upstream 'net insider buying' label overstates the signal; in dollar terms, real sales/withholdings outweigh real buys ~10:1.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:33pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $214.0B | $238.6B | $262.2B | $294.0B | $321.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $207.7B | $231.0B | $254.4B | $285.3B | $311.2B |
| Gross Profit | $6.3B | $7.6B | $7.8B | $8.7B | $10.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.6B | $4.8B | $5.3B | $5.7B | $6.5B |
| Operating Income | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.6B |
| Net Income | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| EBITDA | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B |
| EPS | $7.48 | $8.15 | $8.62 | $7.60 | $8.02 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:28pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.5B | $3.5B | $2.7B | $3.2B | $4.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $38.8B | $39.6B | $42.8B | $47.7B | $52.2B |
| Total Assets | $57.3B | $56.6B | $62.6B | $67.1B | $76.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $41.4B | $43.5B | $48.8B | $54.3B | $57.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.3B | $5.5B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $9.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $56.8B | $56.5B | $61.9B | $66.3B | $74.8B |
| Total Equity | $223.4M | -$211.6M | $522.0M | $645.9M | $1.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.7B | $3.0B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $6.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:33pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.7B | $2.7B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $3.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$438.2M | -$496.3M | -$458.4M | -$487.2M | -$668.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.2B | $2.2B | $3.5B | $3.0B | $3.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$5.7B | $120.3M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$82.2M | -$483.7M | -$1.2B | -$1.5B | -$435.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.5B | $523.4M | -$840.7M | $545.0M | $1.1B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:28pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$356.8B $349.8B – $364.2B
|
$378.8B $377.2B – $380.3B
|
$403.3B $395.8B – $411.2B
|
$384.6B $377.4B – $392.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$4.5B $4.4B – $4.6B
|
$4.8B $4.7B – $4.8B
|
$5.1B $5.0B – $5.2B
|
$4.8B $4.7B – $4.9B
|
| Net Income |
$3.9B $3.8B – $4.0B
|
$4.4B $3.9B – $4.8B
|
$4.9B $4.8B – $5.0B
|
$6.1B $5.9B – $6.2B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:33pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.5% | +9.9% | +12.1% | +9.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.2% | +2.1% | +12.2% | +16.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +2.9% | -11.1% | +24.3% | +20.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +10.3% | +2.7% | -13.5% | +3.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +7.0% | +9.5% | -1.3% | +11.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:33pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | Tyler Lauren M | P-Purchase | 550.00 | $270.23 | $148,627 |
| 2026-06-18 | DURCAN DERMOT MARK | P-Purchase | 4,000.00 | $274.19 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-28 | DURCAN DERMOT MARK | P-Purchase | 4,000.00 | $266.26 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-01 | Tyler Lauren M | A-Award | 99.00 | $304.00 | $30,096 |
| 2026-05-01 | Cooper Ellen | A-Award | 99.00 | $304.00 | $30,096 |
| 2026-05-01 | NALLY DENNIS M | A-Award | 116.00 | $304.00 | $35,264 |
| 2026-04-01 | Krikorian Lazarus | A-Award | 3,936.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Battaglia Silvana | M-Exempt | 8,415.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Battaglia Silvana | F-InKind | 3,673.00 | $350.30 | $1.3M |
| 2026-03-11 | Battaglia Silvana | M-Exempt | 8,415.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Campbell Elizabeth S | M-Exempt | 12,623.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Campbell Elizabeth S | F-InKind | 5,842.00 | $350.30 | $2.0M |
| 2026-03-11 | Campbell Elizabeth S | M-Exempt | 12,623.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Cleary James F | M-Exempt | 12,623.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-11 | Cleary James F | F-InKind | 5,409.00 | $350.30 | $1.9M |
| 2026-03-11 | Cleary James F | M-Exempt | 12,623.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-05 | Cooper Ellen | A-Award | 557.00 | $359.28 | $200,119 |
| 2026-01-30 | Cooper Ellen | A-Award | 66.00 | $359.22 | $23,709 |
| 2026-01-30 | Cooper Ellen | A-Award | 69.00 | $359.22 | $24,786 |
| 2026-03-05 | NALLY DENNIS M | A-Award | 557.00 | $359.28 | $200,119 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:28pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $0.60 | 2026-05-05 | 2026-05-15 | 2026-06-01 |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.60 | 2026-02-04 | 2026-02-13 | 2026-03-02 |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.60 | 2025-11-04 | 2025-11-14 | 2025-12-01 |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.55 | 2025-08-06 | 2025-08-15 | 2025-09-03 |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.55 | 2025-05-07 | 2025-05-16 | 2025-06-02 |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.55 | 2025-02-05 | 2025-02-14 | 2025-03-03 |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.55 | 2024-11-05 | 2024-11-15 | 2024-11-29 |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.51 | 2024-07-31 | 2024-08-09 | 2024-08-26 |
| 2024-05-09 | $0.51 | 2024-05-01 | 2024-05-10 | 2024-05-24 |
| 2024-02-08 | $0.51 | 2024-01-31 | 2024-02-09 | 2024-02-26 |
| 2023-11-10 | $0.51 | 2023-11-01 | 2023-11-13 | 2023-11-27 |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.49 | 2023-08-02 | 2023-08-11 | 2023-08-28 |
| 2023-05-11 | $0.49 | 2023-05-02 | 2023-05-12 | 2023-05-30 |
| 2023-02-09 | $0.49 | 2023-02-01 | 2023-02-10 | 2023-02-27 |
| 2022-11-10 | $0.49 | 2022-11-02 | 2022-11-14 | 2022-11-28 |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.46 | 2022-08-03 | 2022-08-15 | 2022-08-29 |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.46 | 2022-05-04 | 2022-05-16 | 2022-05-31 |
| 2022-02-11 | $0.46 | 2022-02-02 | 2022-02-14 | 2022-02-28 |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.46 | 2021-11-04 | 2021-11-15 | 2021-11-29 |
| 2021-08-13 | $0.44 | 2021-08-04 | 2021-08-16 | 2021-09-07 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw tape first: trailing four quarters of revenue ($78.4B + $85.9B + $83.7B + $80.7B = $328.7B) imply ~9% growth over the FY25 $321B print, so the topline story is intact. But the earnings trajectory is ugly and lumpy — NI of -$340M in Sep-25, $560M in Dec-25, then a $1.64B pop in Mar-26 that single-handedly carries the TTM. Net margins bounce between negative and 2.1% in a four-quarter window. For a distributor that should print metronomic 0.5% margins, that volatility is a red flag: it screams legal accruals, opioid settlement true-ups, or PharmaLex/Alliance acquisition noise rather than operating improvement. Strip the Mar-26 outlier and TTM NI is closer to $2.5B, putting real P/E north of 20 on a 0.5%-margin business.
The synthesis verdict ($160 fair value, -39% to current) leans hard on DCF and the Market Forces "value trap" framing. I partially agree on direction but think the magnitude is overstated. FY25 FCF of $3.21B against a $51B market cap is a 6.3% FCF yield — not cheap for a distributor, but not absurd either given COR, MCK, and CAH all trade as defensive bond proxies. EV/EBITDA of 15x is the actual problem: historically this group traded 10-12x, and McKesson at ~16x suggests the whole oligopoly has re-rated on GLP-1 volume tailwinds and specialty drug mix shift. So $160 assumes mean-reversion to a multiple regime that may not return while the big three keep taking share in specialty/biosimilars. I'd anchor fair value closer to $200-215 (12-13x EV/EBITDA on normalized $4B EBITDA), still implying ~20% downside, not 40%.
The contrarian case the models underweight: revenue CAGR of 10.7% is genuinely strong for a "mature" distributor, and the recent 9.3% YoY isn't decelerating meaningfully — Dec-25's $85.9B was a record. If you believe GLP-1s are a volume tailwind (more scripts, higher ASPs) rather than a headwind, COR is the cleanest pure-play. The Market Forces "disintermediation by Amazon" thesis has been wrong for a decade — DSCSA track-and-trace requirements and manufacturer contracts make the three-distributor oligopoly genuinely hard to disrupt. The insider purchase on 5/28 (4,000 shares, ~$1M at current prices) is small but directionally bullish and the only open-market buy in the list — everything else is awards and tax-withholding. The narrative model's "platform-monopoly" framing is overcooked but the underlying moat is real. Also: the pre-flight reasoning references a $377 high and 30% drawdown — that drawdown already prices in meaningful pessimism.
Where I dissent from the synthesis: calling this "overvalued by 39%" treats a regulated oligopoly cash-cow like a broken growth story. Where I agree: at 20x earnings and 15x EBITDA, you're not getting paid to wait, and the Q4/Q1 earnings volatility suggests either legal overhangs or working-capital games that warrant a discount. The B/S is a black box here — total debt and equity both listed as "—" is a real data gap for a company that historically carries $5-6B net debt and runs a 0.9 current ratio, meaning leverage analysis is genuinely thin. ROE of 1.16 (116%?) and P/B of 40 confirm the equity base is tiny from buybacks, which juices ROIC of 11.9% but makes the book-value-anchored multiples meaningless. I'd want to see the next print confirm the Mar-26 NI wasn't a one-off before underwriting normalized earnings power above $10/share.
Net: the models are directionally right (overvalued) but the bear case is overstated. This is a $210-220 stock masquerading as a $160 stock masquerading as a $264 stock. No edge to short — too much carry, too much oligopoly protection, possible GLP-1 upside. No edge to buy here either — wait for a multiple reset or a clean quarter that proves the Mar-26 margin wasn't accounting noise.
GPT Critique
Upon examining Cencora's raw data, several key factors stand out. The company demonstrates impressive revenue growth, with an annual CAGR of 10.7%, notably robust for a distributor in a mature industry. Revenue for the trailing four quarters totals $328.7 billion, reflecting a continued upward trajectory. However, net income volatility is concerning, with margins swinging dramatically from -0.4% to 2.1% over recent quarters, pointing to potential one-off impacts like legal settlements or acquisition-related noise. The company's operating cash flow remains strong at $3.88 billion, supporting its cash generation narrative. Notably, the price-to-book ratio at 40.1683 signals potentially inflated stock value, possibly due to low book equity from aggressive buybacks. This high P/B ratio, coupled with a modest ROE of 1.1593%, raises questions about the sustainability of current valuations.
Opus asserts that Cencora is "modestly overvalued, not a value trap," pegging fair value at $210-220. I agree with the overvaluation call but differ slightly in the valuation range due to the company's revenue momentum and oligopoly positioning. The narrative suggesting a severe 39% overvaluation seems excessive given Cencora's strong cash flow and revenue growth, which implies a more moderate downside. Opus highlights the volatility in net income, attributing it to potential legal or acquisition impacts, which aligns with my interpretation of the data. However, I diverge on the implications of the EV/EBITDA multiple; while Opus suggests historical mean-reversion, I posit that the current 15x multiple reflects the sector's defensive re-rating and potential structural shifts, such as GLP-1 drug dynamics.
I concur with Opus's skepticism towards the "platform-monopoly" narrative, which appears overstated. The fundamental moat of Cencora remains robust due to regulatory barriers and entrenched industry positions, yet the 64% premium to fair value based on narrative alone seems exaggerated. The insider buying activity, although minor, supports a cautiously optimistic view, indicating internal confidence. Opus's caution regarding the balance sheet transparency is valid; the absence of total debt and equity figures is a significant oversight that complicates leverage analysis, suggesting a need for clearer financial disclosures.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my analyses underestimate the risks associated with potential regulatory changes or accelerated shifts towards direct-to-consumer models, which could erode Cencora's distribution moat more rapidly than anticipated. They might also question the reliance on GLP-1 volume tailwinds, highlighting uncertainties in drug adoption rates and pricing pressures.