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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Campbell's Company (CPB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -14 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -23 · Value -6 · Sentiment -55 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $49.38 vs $22.27 at analysis
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The Campbell's Company
CPB NASDAQThe Campbell's Company is a U.S. packaged food and beverage manufacturer headquartered in Camden, New Jersey. It focuses on producing branded, shelf-stable convenience foods that serve everyday meal and snacking occasions in the retail and foodservice channels. The company’s portfolio centers on soups, simple meals, sauces, and beverages, complemented by a substantial snacks business. Under well-known consumer brands, it offers condensed and ready-to-serve soups, broths, pasta products, canned meals, tomato-based products, and vegetable juices. Its snacks operations span cookies, crackers, pretzels, chips, and other baked goods, targeting both family households and on-the-go consumers. Operationally, The Campbell’s Company is organized around Meals & Beverages and Snacks divisions, reflecting its two primary lines of business. Products are distributed widely across North America through supermarkets, mass merchandisers, club stores, convenience outlets, and foodservice distributors, with selected international presence. Founded in 1869 and headquartered in Camden, New Jersey, The Campbell’s Company today plays a prominent role in the consumer packaged foods market as a major supplier of branded convenience foods and snacks.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.01
Total Equity: $3.90B
Shares: 300,000,000
Total Debt: $762.00M
Cash: $132.00M
EBITDA: $1.56B
Total Debt: $762.00M
Cash: $132.00M
Revenue: $10.25B
Revenue: $10.25B
Revenue: $10.25B
Total Equity: $3.90B
Tax Rate: 24.4%
Equity: $3.90B
Total Debt: $762.00M
Cash: $132.00M
Current Liabilities: $2.91B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $762.00M
Total Equity: $3.90B
Shares: 300,000,000
Shares: 300,000,000
CapEx: -$426.00M
Shares: 300,000,000
Stock Price: $22.31
Net Income: $602.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:43pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.5B | $8.6B | $9.4B | $9.6B | $10.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.7B | $5.9B | $6.4B | $6.7B | $7.1B |
| Gross Profit | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.1B |
| Net Income | $1.0B | $757.0M | $858.0M | $567.0M | $602.0M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| EPS | $3.31 | $2.51 | $2.87 | $1.90 | $2.02 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.29 | $2.51 | $2.85 | $1.89 | $2.01 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:10pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $69.0M | $109.0M | $189.0M | $108.0M | $132.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B |
| Total Assets | $11.7B | $11.9B | $12.1B | $15.2B | $14.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.8B | $2.9B | $2.2B | $3.6B | $2.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $8.6B | $8.6B | $8.4B | $11.4B | $11.0B |
| Total Equity | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.7B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $4.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:43pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$275.0M | -$242.0M | -$370.0M | -$517.0M | -$426.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $760.0M | $939.0M | $773.0M | $668.0M | $705.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$2.6B | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$921.0M | $0 | -$66.0M | $2.4B | -$406.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$439.0M | -$451.0M | -$447.0M | -$445.0M | -$459.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$36.0M | -$167.0M | -$142.0M | -$67.0M | -$62.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$790.0M | $40.0M | $80.0M | -$81.0M | $24.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:43pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +1.0% | +9.3% | +3.0% | +6.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -6.5% | +11.0% | +1.9% | +5.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -24.7% | +12.8% | -23.8% | +12.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -24.5% | +13.3% | -33.9% | +6.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -19.4% | +13.3% | -17.0% | +10.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:28pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-02 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-02 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-08 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-02 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-03 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-03 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-02 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-03 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-04 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-05 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-05 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-04 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-05 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-06 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-06 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-05 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-06 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:45Recovery pays +186%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 16%. Ratio 11.4:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($22.27) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -0% | 17.3% | $63.80 | +186% |
| Base — stabilizes | -1% | 15.0% | $55.23 | +148% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -1% | 12.8% | $46.83 | +110% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -5% | 5.4% | $18.61 | -16% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: revenue went from $2.77B (Oct-24) to $2.68B, $2.69B, $2.48B, $2.32B, then $2.68B, $2.56B, $2.37B. That's not "steady" — it's a sequential deceleration with the most recent quarter down 14.4% from the year-ago peak and down 4.4% YoY. Net income tells a worse story: $218M → $173M → $66M → $145M → $194M → $145M → $124M. Trailing four quarters of NI sum to ~$608M vs the prior four at ~$602M — flat, not the "6.2% recent earnings YoY" the momentum block claims. The FY25 revenue jump to $10.25B from $9.64B is almost entirely Sovos Brands acquisition, not organic — and gross margin compressed to 30.4% from a 32-33% historical range. Operating margin at 10.9% vs 18.3% in FY21. This is a business where the top line was bought and the bottom line is quietly eroding.
The synthesis verdict of $52.86 fair value (implying 114% upside) is, frankly, absurd on this data and I dissent. It's a DCF that appears to be extrapolating $705M FCF at low discount rates without penalizing the leverage or margin trajectory. Net debt is $630M on the parent line, but total debt is understated here — Campbell took on ~$2.4B for Sovos; the $762M figure looks like current portion only. EV/EBITDA of 4.6x is suspicious given actual enterprise value should be closer to $11-12B against ~$1.6B EBITDA, i.e. 7x, which is in-line for a declining staples name, not cheap. The 7% dividend yield with a 76% payout on declining earnings is a yellow flag, not a gift — if EPS drops another 15% the payout crosses 90% and the market prices in a cut. Prior comps: Kraft Heinz cut in 2019 at similar payout math.
Where I partially agree with the models: the market-forces "value trap" read and the narrative layer's "fallen-angel, fragile, priced by math not myth" framing are both correct and internally consistent. The pre-flight thesis correctly identifies the three real risks (private label, volume decline, dividend risk). These contradict the synthesis's "undervalued" conclusion — and when three qualitative layers say "structurally challenged" while one quant layer says "114% upside," the quant layer is almost certainly using stale margin assumptions. The insider "net buying" signal is misleading: every transaction shown is an A-Award (grant), not an open-market purchase. There is zero conviction buying here. That secondary signal should be discarded.
The contrarian bull case that would actually work: Campbell's has $1.13B operating cash flow, $705M FCF, covers the $1.46/share dividend (~$430M) with room, and Sovos (Rao's) is a legitimately growing premium brand within a shrinking portfolio. If management divests legacy soup/snacks and refocuses on Rao's + Goldfish + Pepperidge Farm growth brands, you could see a re-rating to 13-14x on $2.20 EPS = $30 stock. That's 35% upside plus 7% yield — a reasonable total return, but nowhere near $52. The bear case: soup volumes down mid-single-digits structurally, Sovos growth decelerating, gross margin compresses another 100-150bps on tariffs/commodities, EPS to $1.80, dividend cut to $1.00, stock to $16-18. Symmetric risk-reward at best. Fair value is $24-28, not $47-53. Current $22.31 is cheap-ish but not screamingly so, and the catalyst path is unclear — there's no obvious re-rating trigger in the next four quarters given the revenue deceleration.
I'd own this only for the yield with a small position and clear-eyed acceptance that total return probably matches the S&P over five years, not beats it. The synthesis model is anchoring on peak-cycle FCF and ignoring that the recent quarterly print ($2.37B, 5.2% margin) extrapolates to $9.5B revenue and $500M NI — worse than FY24 despite the Sovos addition. Wait for either (a) evidence of organic volume stabilization in the next two prints, or (b) a drop to $19 where the yield hits 7.7% and the margin of safety actually exists.
GPT Reading
At $22.31, Campbell trades like a business in much worse shape than the financials actually show. On trailing annual numbers, revenue is $10.25B, operating income $1.12B, net income $602M, and free cash flow $705M. That is not a broken staples franchise. The balance sheet also does not support the “debt-constrained distress” framing in the model output: debt is just $762M against $3.90B of equity and $1.13B of operating cash flow, so net debt is only about $630M. For a consumer defensive name doing over $1B of operating profit, EV/EBITDA at 4.6x and P/E at 11.1x look plainly cheap. Even if you haircut earnings quality and assume no growth, a company converting roughly 69% of net income into free cash flow and yielding nearly 7% should not need heroic assumptions to justify more than 0.65x sales.
What stands out is that the business is not growing fast, but it is also not collapsing. Annual revenue has risen from $8.48B in 2021 to $10.25B in 2025, about 5% CAGR, while gross profit has moved from $2.81B to $3.12B. The real issue is margin compression: operating income peaked at $1.55B in 2021, then fell to $1.12B in 2025, and net income slid from $1.00B to $602M. That is why the stock is cheap. But the quarterly data suggest stabilization rather than an accelerating unwind. The last four quarters sum to roughly $9.93B of revenue and about $608M of net income, essentially in line with the latest annual run rate, and the most recent quarter’s 5.2% net margin was low but still comfortably positive after the ugly 2.7% quarter a year earlier. In other words, the market seems to be extrapolating a margin collapse that has already happened rather than one still gathering force.
The key contradiction in the prior outputs is that they simultaneously call the stock “fully priced” and more than 100% undervalued, while warning about high debt risk that simply is not visible in the balance sheet provided. I think the simpler read is better: this is a mature food company with flat-to-low-single-digit real growth, lower margins than it used to have, but still solid returns on capital at 18.8% ROIC and 15.4% ROE. Those are not value-trap returns. The current ratio at 0.77 is normal enough for a staples business with steady inventory turns and predictable receivables; it is not a distress signal by itself. If you put even a conservative 8x-9x EBITDA or 13x-14x earnings multiple on a company this stable, the implied equity value is materially above today’s price. I do not need a turnaround story here; I only need the business to remain mediocre rather than deteriorate.
The best argument against this view is that Campbell may be optically cheap because the earnings base is still too high. The revenue line has grown, but the earnings CAGR is -16.2% and free cash flow CAGR is -4.5%, so the business has needed more sales to stand still. Gross margin is only 30.4%, operating margin 11.0%, and dividend payout is a high 76.3%, which leaves less room if another cost spike or volume decline hits. Quarterly revenue has also rolled from $2.77B in the 2024-10 quarter to $2.68B, then $2.56B, then $2.37B over the last three reported periods, so there is no obvious top-line acceleration. If category demand is structurally soft and private label keeps taking mix, then a 7% dividend yield may be the market correctly pricing future stagnation or a potential cut. That is the real bear case, and it is not foolish.
What would change my mind is evidence that margins are still stepping down despite stable sales. If upcoming quarters show revenue holding around $2.4B-$2.6B but net income falling back toward the $66M level seen in 2025-04, or if annual free cash flow drops materially below $600M while the dividend remains untouched, I would view today’s multiple as a trap rather than an opportunity. On the other hand, if Campbell can simply sustain annualized net income around $600M and free cash flow around $700M, with no balance-sheet deterioration, the stock should not stay at 11x earnings and 4.6x EBITDA for long.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a cash-generative franchise that the market has abandoned, not a broken one. Campbell’s just printed $10.25B in revenue with $1.12B of operating income and $705M of free cash flow against a $6.55B equity value and a sub-$7B enterprise value once the modest net debt is netted. At 4.6x EV/EBITDA, 11x trailing earnings and 0.65x sales, the multiple stack sits well below any reasonable no-growth floor for a business still earning a 15% ROE and nearly 19% ROIC. The balance sheet that the quantitative layer flagged as “high debt risk” is in fact conservative: $762M of total debt against $3.9B of equity and $1.13B of operating cash flow leaves interest coverage comfortable and refinancing risk remote. Dividend coverage is likewise intact—the 7% yield equates to roughly $460M of cash distributions against $705M of FCF, a 65% FCF payout even if the stated earnings payout sits at 76%. Recent quarters show the earnings trough is behind: net income has stabilized in the $124–194M range after the near-zero print in summer 2024, and trailing twelve-month revenue is still grinding higher at a mid-single-digit pace.
What the market is correctly pricing is the quality of that growth and the direction of margins. Revenue CAGR of 4.7% over the last half-decade has been accompanied by an earnings CAGR of –16% and an FCF CAGR of –4.5%; operating income has compressed from $1.55B in FY2021 to $1.12B even as the top line expanded roughly $1.8B. Gross margin sits at 30% and net margin at 5.9%—both well below the levels that once justified 15–20x earnings for packaged-food peers. Sequential quarterly revenue is rolling over year-on-year in the most recent three prints ($2.37B vs $2.48B, $2.56B vs $2.69B, $2.68B vs $2.77B), consistent with volume pressure in the core soup aisle and limited pricing power once private-label and fresh alternatives are factored in. The “insider buying” signal is noise; the last ten filings are all routine A-Awards, not open-market accumulation. Liquidity is also tighter than the low leverage suggests—the 0.77 current ratio leaves little cushion if working-capital cycles lengthen.
The strongest counter-argument is therefore the classic value-trap case: you are being paid a high current yield to own a slowly melting ice cube whose iconic brands are losing relevance with younger cohorts and whose cost structure cannot flex downward fast enough to protect the mid-teens ROIC if volumes keep eroding. A smart opponent would note that the $47–53 composite fair-value estimates embedded in the synthesis implicitly assume mean-reversion in margins and terminal growth that the last five years of data simply do not support; if operating margins settle permanently near 9–10% and real growth stays zero-to-negative, the DCF collapses toward the current quote and the 7% yield becomes the sole return, vulnerable to the first dividend cut. Sector-wide demand weakness and the fragile “fallen-angel” narrative durability reinforce that risk—any further miss on volume or a reset of the payout would lock in the bear math.
I would reverse to neutral or outright cautious if the next two reported quarters show organic volume declines worse than –3% with operating margin compressing below 9%, or if the board signals a dividend cut that drops the forward yield under 5% without a credible reinvestment story. Conversely, two consecutive quarters of stable-to-up volumes and gross-margin expansion back through 31% would confirm the cash-flow anchor is holding and justify adding on weakness below $20.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Campbell's is a classic mature earner: revenue grew from $8.48B in 2021 to $10.25B in 2025 (roughly 4.9% CAGR, aided by acquisitions), and FCF is consistent at $668M-$939M annually with OCF/NI of 1.58x and negative accruals (-2.8% of assets) - earnings quality looks clean and cash-backed. Share count is essentially flat (300M diluted, -0.4% CAGR) with buybacks running 138% of SBC, so per-share value is being protected. A tiny insider open-market purchase ($2.1K) is symbolic rather than substantive. The concern is the earnings trajectory beneath the top line. Gross margin has slid from 33.2% (2021) to 30.4% (2025), and operating margin fell from 18.2% to 11.0% over the same window, with net income dropping from $1.00B to $602M despite revenue rising ~21%. That is meaningful operating deleverage in a category (packaged foods) where private-label pressure and input costs are structural headwinds. Combined with net debt of $630M, only $132M liquid cash against $762M short-term debt, and an Altman Z of 1.68 in the distress zone, the business is self-funding but has zero balance-sheet slack. The March 2026 J-Other entry of 17.3M shares / $384.7M looks like an acquisition-related issuance worth verifying. Net read: durable brand-based cash generator, but margins are eroding and leverage limits optionality. Solidly middling, not fortress.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Nature of the 2026-03-31 J-Other 17.3M-share / $384.7M entry - is this Sovos Brands or another acquisition consideration?
- Refinancing plan for the $762M short-term debt against only $132M liquid cash
- Segment mix behind the OpM decline - is Snacks (Goldfish/Snyder's) or Meals & Beverages driving the erosion?
- Private-label share gains in soup and broth categories per 10-K commentary
- Whether the recent margin pressure is transitory (integration costs, trade spend) or structural
Price is $22.27 vs a composite FV of $52.86 and signal-adjusted FV of $47.64 - a headline 100%+ upside that fails the smell test for a leveraged, margin-eroding staples name. The anchored-PE of $79.33 is clearly a runaway output (applying a normalized multiple to peak-era earnings that no longer exist) and should be heavily discounted. The more defensible anchors are the DCF at $47.90 and the EPV floor at $36.29. Even the EPV floor implies ~63% upside from $22.27, which is where the real mispricing signal sits - the market is pricing CPB below its own steady-state earnings power. That said, the Company-Quality lens flags a 720bp OpM collapse, Altman Z in distress territory, and a tight balance sheet. A mature staples business with deteriorating unit economics and real leverage does not deserve a full DCF-style multiple; it deserves something between EPV and DCF, call it $30-38. Against $22.27 that is a ~35-50% gap - real, but not a fat-pitch dislocation. This is a modestly cheap fallen angel, not a screaming bargain. The bear case (secular soup decline, private label, no growth path) is legitimate and partially explains the discount; the bull case requires stabilization of margins, which is unproven.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest guidance on operating margin trajectory and cost programs - is the 720bp decline stabilizing or ongoing
- Net debt, refinancing schedule, and any covenant proximity given Altman Z distress reading
- Organic volume trends by segment (Meals and Beverages vs Snacks) to test the secular-decline thesis
- Any impairment or restructuring charges distorting reported earnings that feed the FV models
- Dividend coverage and payout ratio on normalized FCF
The macro tape is roughly neutral and this is a low-beta defensive, so the broad regime is a non-factor here - Campbell's does not get whipped by VIX at 16 or a mildly wobbly S&P. The pressure on this name is idiosyncratic and narrative-driven. The active story is a fallen-angel in secular decline: canned soup rejected by younger consumers, private label eating share, GLP-1 and fresh-food overhangs on all packaged food, and no credible growth pitch from management. Intensity is minimal and durability fragile, meaning nobody is aggressively selling it - but nobody is defending it either. That is a slow, grinding headwind, not a crash. Analyst tone in packaged food has been drifting from lukewarm to sour, with target cuts across the peer group (KHC, GIS, K) bleeding onto CPB by association. Rising leverage (D/E 0.05 to 0.20) and three-year underperformance reinforce the 'value trap' framing that dominates buy-side chatter on this cohort. Net: no tailwind exists to lean on. The stock is orphaned - too boring for growth money, too structurally challenged for quality compounders, and the deep discount is being read as deserved rather than as opportunity. Pressure is modestly negative and persistent.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any packaged-food peer print that shifts the group tone (KHC, GIS, K guidance)
- Sell-side downgrades or target cuts specifically on CPB post next earnings
- GLP-1 volume-impact data updates that could either intensify or defuse the secular bear case
- Rotation into defensives if the macro tape turns risk-off - CPB would be a beneficiary by default
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, CPB was $22.76. We expect it to be $26.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $19.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.