Business Description
Copart, Inc. provides online auctions and vehicle remarketing services in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Finland, Oman, the Republic of Ireland, and Bahrain. It offers a range of services to process and sell vehicles over the internet through its virtual bidding third generation internet auction-style sales technology. The company's services include online seller access, salvage estimation, estimating, end-of-life vehicle processing, transportation, vehicle inspection stations, on-demand reporting, title processing and express, loan payoff, flexible vehicle processing programs, buy it now, sales process, and dealer services. Its services also comprise services to sell vehicles through BluCar, CashForCars.com, CashForCars.ca, CashForCars.de, CashForCars.co.uk, and Cash-for-cars.ie; Copart Recycling service, which allows the public to purchase parts from salvaged and end-of-life vehicles; and copart 360, a proprietary technology that captures clear 360-degree views of interiors and exteriors of cars, trucks, and vans. In addition, it provides IntelliSeller, an automated tool leveraging its vehicle and sales data to assist its sellers in making vital auction decisions; Purple Wave Inc., that offers wholesale construction, agriculture, and fleet remarketing services through no-reserve online auctions; wholesale powersport vehicle remarketing services through live and online auction platforms. The company sells its products to licensed vehicle dismantlers, rebuilders, repair licensees, used vehicle dealers, and exporters, as well as to the public. Copart, Inc. was incorporated in 1982 and is headquartered in Dallas, Texas
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:11pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:08pm (19d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.61
Total Equity: $9.19B
Shares: 977,563,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
EBITDA: $2.11B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
Revenue: $4.65B
Revenue: $4.65B
Revenue: $4.65B
Total Equity: $9.19B
Tax Rate: 18.3%
Equity: $9.19B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
Current Liabilities: $683.28M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $9.19B
Shares: 977,563,000
Shares: 977,563,000
CapEx: -$568.99M
Shares: 977,563,000
Stock Price: $30.96
Net Income: $1.55B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:12pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.7B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.5B |
| Gross Profit | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $206.7M | $231.2M | $250.4M | $335.2M | $402.9M |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Net Income | $936.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| EPS | $0.99 | $1.15 | $1.30 | $1.42 | $1.61 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:08pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.0B | $1.4B | $957.4M | $1.5B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | $2.2B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $5.6B |
| Total Assets | $4.6B | $5.3B | $6.7B | $8.4B | $10.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $421.0M | $440.9M | $492.8M | $628.6M | $683.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $397.6M | $2.0M | $10.9M | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $1.0B | $683.3M | $750.4M | $879.2M | $883.4M |
| Total Equity | $3.5B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $7.5B | $9.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.9B | $4.0B | $5.2B | $6.5B | $8.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:12pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $990.9M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$463.0M | -$337.4M | -$516.6M | -$511.0M | -$569.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $527.9M | $839.2M | $847.6M | $961.6M | $1.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$5.0M | -$109.2M | -$2.7M | $17.7M | $31.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $570.5M | $336.0M | -$426.8M | $556.7M | $1.3B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:09pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$4.7B $4.6B – $4.7B
|
$4.7B $4.6B – $4.7B
|
$4.8B $4.7B – $5.1B
|
$5.1B $5.0B – $5.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.1B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
$2.2B $2.2B – $2.3B
|
| Net Income |
$1.5B $1.5B – $1.5B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.6B $1.6B – $1.7B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.8B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:12pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +30.0% | +10.5% | +9.5% | +9.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +19.6% | +8.1% | +9.8% | +10.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +21.0% | +8.1% | +5.7% | +7.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +16.4% | +13.5% | +10.1% | +13.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.2% | +8.8% | +7.0% | +19.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 6:11pm (19d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 43,166.00 | $8.70 | $375,544 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 809.00 | $8.70 | $7,038 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 1,277.00 | $8.70 | $11,110 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 809.00 | $6.78 | $5,485 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 43,166.00 | $8.70 | $375,544 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | S-Sale | 23,870.00 | $33.18 | $792,007 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | S-Sale | 2,343.00 | $33.17 | $77,717 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 4,523.00 | $6.78 | $30,666 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 4,523.00 | $6.78 | $30,666 |
| 2026-04-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 1,277.00 | $6.78 | $8,658 |
| 2026-01-20 | ADAIR A JAYSON | G-Gift | 7,761.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-20 | ADAIR A JAYSON | G-Gift | 21,200.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-20 | ADAIR A JAYSON | G-Gift | 21,200.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 43,166.00 | $8.70 | $375,544 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 1,277.00 | $8.70 | $11,110 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 1,277.00 | $8.70 | $11,110 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 809.00 | $6.78 | $5,485 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 43,166.00 | $8.70 | $375,544 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | S-Sale | 2,444.00 | $40.17 | $98,175 |
| 2026-01-15 | Liaw Jeffrey | S-Sale | 22,693.00 | $40.17 | $911,578 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: revenue went from $4.24B (FY24) to $4.65B (FY25), a 9.7% bump, with NI from $1.36B to $1.55B (+14%). Quarterly trajectory is more interesting — the latest Q (Apr 2026) shows $1.24B revenue but margin compressed to 32.5% from a peak of 35.2% two quarters earlier. NI of $402M is fine but the four-quarter sequence ($396M → $404M → $351M → $402M) is essentially flat. The Jan-26 quarter showing 31.3% margin and only $350M NI was a real wobble. So earnings have plateaued around $1.55B annualized while the prior trend implied $1.65–1.70B by now. That matters because at $30.96 and ~926M shares, you're paying ~19x trailing for an asset-light platform whose earnings growth has decelerated to single digits in the most recent prints. Cash is $2.78B, debt effectively zero, current ratio 8.2 — fortress balance sheet, but that's been true for years and is already in the multiple.
On the prior models: I think the Valuation Synthesis's $19–$23 fair value is too aggressive on the downside. A DCF that spits out $19 for a business doing $1.23B FCF, growing high-single-digits, with 33% net margins and zero leverage is using a punitive discount rate or assuming terminal decay that isn't visible in the data. Conversely, the Pre-Flight narrative ("market priced in mid-teens growth") is stale — the most recent two quarters argue the market is *already* repricing toward high-single-digit growth, which is why CPRT has de-rated from ~30x to ~19x. The Market Forces "Tailwinds + hold" framing is closer to right than the synthesis "fully priced/sell" framing. Worth noting the contradiction the models don't resolve: Market Forces calls it tailwinds, Synthesis cites "sector in contraction." Both can't be right. The truth is that totaled-vehicle volume has softened as used-car values stayed elevated (fewer cars declared total losses), but Copart's revenue and unit economics held up — that's evidence of pricing power, not weakness.
The contrarian short case the bulls should sweat: insurance carriers (State Farm, Progressive, Allstate, GEICO) collectively represent the bulk of seller-side volume and have every incentive to push back on Copart's take rate as their own loss ratios have normalized. IAA/Ritchie Bros is a credible #2 that didn't exist as a unified threat five years ago. And the EV salvage thesis cuts both ways — EV totals are more frequent due to battery damage economics, but EV salvage values are lower and recycling pathways less mature, compressing per-unit revenue. Also worth flagging: the insider activity shows only sales/exercises, no opens. That's standard for a comp-heavy executive team, but there's zero conviction buying visible. The cash pile keeps growing with no buyback urgency and no dividend — a mild capital-allocation criticism for a company at this maturity.
My verdict: I dissent from the Synthesis "fully priced at $22" call as too bearish and side with Market Forces' "hold near fair value" read, but with a tighter range. At 19x earnings for a business compounding NI at low-double-digits with 33% margins, no debt, and a genuine moat, fair value is roughly $28–$32 — basically where it trades. The recent margin wobble (Jan-26 quarter at 31.3%) is the legitimate concern and explains the de-rating; if the next two quarters reaffirm 33%+ margins and re-accelerate revenue toward 11–12%, the stock re-rates to mid-$30s. If margins drift to 30% and growth settles at 7%, $24–$26 is the floor. The asymmetry isn't compelling either way at $30.96. I would not be a buyer here without either a print confirming margin recovery or a pullback to ~$26 that gives a real margin of safety against the insurance-carrier pricing-pressure scenario the bears correctly flag.
GPT Critique
In examining Copart's financial data, the company presents a notable growth trajectory with a revenue increase from $4.24 billion in FY24 to $4.65 billion in FY25, marking a 9.7% rise, while net income grew 14% in the same period. However, the quarterly data reveals a more complex picture. Revenue for the latest quarter (April 2026) reached $1.24 billion, but net margins have compressed to 32.5% from a peak of 35.2% in the previous quarters. This margin contraction is a critical point, as it suggests potential headwinds in maintaining pricing power or managing costs. The company's cash position is strong with $2.78 billion and zero debt, indicating solid financial health, but the recent plateau in net income growth raises questions about future growth prospects.
Opus suggests that the valuation synthesis's fair value of $19–$23 is overly bearish, pointing instead to a fair value range of $28–$32, which aligns more closely with the current trading price of $30.96. I agree with Opus that the synthesis appears too harsh, given Copart's cash flow generation, net margins, and asset-light business model. However, I diverge from Opus's assertion that the company is "fairly valued" at current levels, considering the recent margin compression and deceleration in earnings growth. The market's apparent shift from a premium valuation near 30x P/E to approximately 19x suggests a recalibration in growth expectations, which may not yet fully account for potential macroeconomic pressures or competitive threats, as highlighted by Opus.
I concur with Opus's criticism of the valuation synthesis's pessimistic outlook, pointing out the contradiction between the "market tailwinds" and "sector in contraction" narratives. The reality may lie somewhere between, with Copart's pricing power and unit economics providing some resilience against sector headwinds. However, the threat from insurance carriers and competitors like IAA/Ritchie Bros represents a legitimate risk to Copart's market position and pricing strategies. The insider selling activity, while typical for executive compensation, coupled with the absence of buybacks or dividends, signals a cautious approach to capital allocation, which might not satisfy investors seeking more aggressive growth or shareholder returns.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential for Copart's margins to be further squeezed by competitive pressures and macroeconomic factors, such as fluctuating used-car values and insurance carrier dynamics. Additionally, the EV market's impact on salvage economics introduces an element of uncertainty that could alter growth trajectories in unforeseen ways.