For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Copart Inc. (CPRT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +17 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 85 · Value -38 · Sentiment -4 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $27.81 vs $29.12 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Copart Inc.
CPRT NASDAQCopart Inc. is a global provider of online vehicle auction and remarketing services, headquartered in Dallas, Texas. The company operates a digital marketplace that connects institutional and individual vehicle sellers with a broad base of buyers, primarily serving the automotive and insurance industries. Copart specializes in the sale of salvage and used vehicles, many of which originate from auto insurance companies, rental car firms, financial institutions, and dealerships. Its proprietary virtual bidding platform enables real-time auctions and supports buyers such as dismantlers, rebuilders, used car dealers, exporters, and private individuals across multiple countries. In addition to auctions, Copart offers complementary services including vehicle transportation and logistics, storage, title processing, and damage and value assessment. By providing an efficient, technology-driven infrastructure for handling damaged and low-value vehicles, Copart plays a significant role in the automotive secondary and salvage markets, facilitating liquidity, recovery, and reuse within the broader vehicle lifecycle.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.59
Total Equity: $9.21B
Shares: 977,563,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
EBITDA: $1.91B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
Revenue: $4.65B
Revenue: $4.65B
Revenue: $4.65B
Total Equity: $9.21B
Tax Rate: 18.3%
Equity: $9.21B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.78B
Current Liabilities: $683.28M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $9.21B
Shares: 977,563,000
Shares: 977,563,000
CapEx: -$568.99M
Shares: 977,563,000
Stock Price: $29.12
Net Income: $1.55B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:26pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.7B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Net Income | $936.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| EPS | $3.96 | $4.59 | $1.30 | $1.42 | $1.61 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.90 | $4.52 | $1.28 | $1.40 | $1.59 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:00pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.0B | $1.4B | $957.4M | $1.5B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7B | $2.2B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $5.8B |
| Total Assets | $4.6B | $5.3B | $6.7B | $8.4B | $10.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $421.0M | $440.9M | $492.8M | $628.6M | $683.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $400.0M | $0 | $11.0M | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.0B | $683.3M | $750.4M | $879.2M | $883.4M |
| Total Equity | $3.5B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $7.5B | $9.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.9B | $4.0B | $5.2B | $6.5B | $8.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:26pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $990.9M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$463.0M | -$337.4M | -$516.6M | -$511.0M | -$569.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $527.9M | $839.2M | $847.6M | $961.6M | $1.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$5.0M | -$106.6M | $0 | — | -$1.2M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | -$416.8M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $570.5M | $336.0M | -$426.8M | $556.7M | $1.3B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:26pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +30.0% | +10.5% | +9.5% | +9.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +21.0% | +8.1% | +5.7% | +7.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +16.4% | +13.5% | +10.1% | +13.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.2% | +8.8% | +7.0% | +8.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:02pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014-06-11 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2014-06-05 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-20 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-16 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2014-04-02 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:40Even the bull case prices 40% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 59%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($29.12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +6% | 35.0% | $17.47 | -40% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 33.5% | $15.83 | -46% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 28.5% | $12.97 | -55% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -4% | 31.7% | $11.90 | -59% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Working from the raw numbers first: CPRT is doing $4.65B TTM-ish revenue with net margins that have oscillated between 30-35% for eight straight quarters — that's remarkable consistency. But the quarterly trajectory tells a subtler story than the "steady compounder" label suggests. Q1 FY26 (Oct 2025) rev of $1.16B was actually *down* from Q4 FY25's $1.21B, and the most recent Q3 FY26 print of $1.24B on 32.5% margin represents margin compression from the 35%+ prints in mid-2025. Recent YoY revenue growth of 9.7% is meaningfully below the 13-14% pace implied earlier in the dataset, and net income growth is decelerating alongside it. The 5-year revenue CAGR of 9.6% is flattered by the 2021→2022 print (29% jump — clearly the used-vehicle price bubble). Strip that out and normalized growth looks more like 7-9%.
The balance sheet is genuinely fortress-grade: $2.78B cash, zero debt reported, $9.21B equity, current ratio 8.4. FCF of $1.23B on $1.55B NI is fine but the ~$570M capex line (against historical ~$300-400M) suggests Copart is spending real money on land/yards for international expansion — that's the growth engine, and it's compressing FCF conversion. ROIC of 21.6% remains elite. At $29.12 and 18.3x earnings, this isn't demanding for the quality, but it's also not cheap for a business decelerating from 14% to ~10% growth with margins ticking down 200-300bps in the last two quarters.
Where I part ways with the prior models: the synthesis calls this "slight upside" at fair value $30.52 with a +4.8% signal — that's within noise, effectively fairly-valued, and I'd argue the composite is being generous by extrapolating peak-cycle margins. The pre-flight thesis frames the market as pricing in "meaningful growth deceleration or margin pressure" as if that's speculative — but the actual quarterlies confirm it's already happening. The 32.5% margin in the most recent quarter versus 35.2% two quarters prior is a real signal, not noise. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as anchored/minimal-intensity, but that cuts both ways: with no cult premium to deflate, there's also no sentiment cushion when growth disappoints. Insider activity leans mildly negative — three sales including a 80K share block in July 2026 and no offsetting open-market buys — the "neutral" tag understates this modestly.
The contrarian case a skeptic should press: Copart's moat depends on insurance-totaled vehicle volume, which is structurally tied to (a) miles driven, (b) accident frequency, and (c) insurer decisions to total vs. repair. ADAS adoption is a slow-moving headwind on (b); rising used-vehicle values from 2021-2023 pushed total-loss ratios higher, but that tailwind is reversing as used-car prices normalize. If total-loss frequency mean-reverts, CPRT loses volume growth on top of decelerating pricing. International expansion (UK/Germany) is real but lower-margin and capex-heavy — hence the capex creep. A bear could argue fair value is closer to 15-16x on normalized $1.5B earnings = $22-24B market cap, or roughly $24-26/share, i.e., 10-15% downside. Conversely, the bull needs either (a) margin re-expansion back to 35%, or (b) growth re-acceleration to low-teens — neither is visible in the last three quarters.
Net verdict: I dissent modestly from the synthesis's "slight upside" framing. Price and fair value are close enough that this is a fair-value call, not an upside call, and the risk skew is asymmetric to the downside given decelerating growth, compressing margins, capex-heavy international push, and mild insider selling. The quality is undeniable — 21.6% ROIC, zero debt, $2.78B cash — but paying 18x for a business that just posted its lowest margin in eight quarters and slowest YoY growth is not "upside." I'd want $25-26 to build a position, hold if already long, and would not chase at $29. If Q4 FY26 shows margin recovery back above 34% and revenue reaccelerates above 12% YoY, revisit — that's the specific catalyst, measured by the July 2026 print.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not “mature earner” so much as “exceptionally efficient compounder that the market is oddly valuing like a plain industrial service business.” Copart has taken revenue from $2.69B in 2021 to $4.65B in 2025, a 73% increase in four years, while operating income rose from $1.14B to $1.70B and net income from $936.5M to $1.55B. That is not a business limping into maturity; it is a business sustaining 36.5% operating margins and 33.4% net margins at multi-billion-dollar scale. The quarterly run-rate remains solid: the latest quarter did $1.24B of revenue, up from $1.21B a year earlier, and net income of $402.4M versus $406.6M, which looks softer only because Copart has been comping against unusually strong profitability. Across the last eight quarters, revenue has moved from $1.07B to $1.24B and net margins have mostly stayed in a 30%-35% band. That consistency matters more than the slight quarter-to-quarter wobble.
The valuation is where the contradiction sits. A company with zero debt, $2.78B of cash, 21.6% ROIC, 16.9% ROE on an overcapitalized balance sheet, and $1.23B of free cash flow is rarely available at 18.3x earnings and 12.6x EV/EBITDA unless the market thinks the business is near a ceiling. But the numbers do not yet show a ceiling. Annual revenue growth was 9.6% CAGR over the provided period, earnings CAGR 12%, and recent quarterly growth is still roughly 10% on sales and 14% on earnings. Even after hefty capex of $569M, free cash flow remains substantial. On an enterprise basis, EV/revenue of 5.2x for a 33% net margin franchise is not demanding. If I annualize the latest two quarters, earnings power is roughly $1.5B-$1.6B, which implies the market is paying a high-teens multiple for a business that still compounds in low double digits and carries no balance-sheet risk. That usually deserves more like low-20s earnings, especially given the resilience of margins.
The key to the story is that Copart behaves more like an infrastructure marketplace than a cyclical scrap-yard operator, and the market still seems to haircut it for the latter. The evidence is in the durability of profitability through growth: operating margin was 42% in 2021, then 39%, 38%, and 36.5% in 2025—some compression, yes, but from extraordinary levels and still among the best in the market. Meanwhile, cash generation is real, not optical: operating cash flow of $1.80B exceeded net income of $1.55B in the latest year. The 8.4x current ratio and debt-free capital structure give management enormous flexibility. At $29.12, with a $26.96B market cap and roughly $24B enterprise value after net cash, I think the market is underwriting a normalized, slower-growth future too aggressively. My bias is that fair value is comfortably above the current quote, closer to what you’d pay for a dominant network business with visible volume, pricing power, and elite returns—roughly $34-$36.
The best bear case is straightforward and not stupid. Quarterly revenue growth has moderated from the stronger post-2021 expansion phase to high single digits, and net margin in the latest quarter fell to 32.5% from 33.6% a year ago and 35%+ in several intervening quarters. Annual operating margin has drifted down from 42% in 2021 to 36.5% in 2025, suggesting the franchise may already be past peak incremental profitability. If the true steady-state is 8%-10% revenue growth with mild margin erosion and capex staying elevated near $569M, then 18x earnings is not especially cheap for a business tied to auto claims volumes, salvage supply, and international execution. The insider tape also leans more toward routine monetization than aggressive confidence, with option exercises and sales but no obvious open-market accumulation. A smart skeptic would say this is a wonderful business, but a wonderful business already priced for its current quality with limited re-rating potential.
What would change my mind is not one soft quarter, but evidence that the compounding machine is actually flattening. If revenue growth slips below 7% for several quarters while net margins settle closer to 28%-30%, the case for a premium multiple weakens materially. Likewise, if capex remains high without supporting a return to low-teens revenue growth, then free cash flow yield matters more and today’s valuation would look merely fair. On the other hand, if Copart keeps posting $1.2B+ quarters with 32%-35% net margins and converts that into another year of $1.6B+ net income and $1.3B+ FCF, the stock should not stay at this multiple for long.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a cash-compounding machine that the market is treating like a utility. Copart just printed $4.65B in fiscal 2025 revenue and $1.55B in net income at a 33.4% net margin and 36.5% operating margin, with ROIC at 21.6% and zero debt against $2.78B in cash. Free cash flow of $1.23B after $569M of capex converts earnings cleanly, and the multi-year trajectory is unambiguous: revenue has compounded at roughly 9.6% from the $2.69B base in 2021 while earnings have grown faster at 12% and FCF at 20.5%. The most recent quarter ($1.24B revenue, $402M net income, 32.5% margin) sits comfortably above the prior-year period and keeps the trailing run-rate near $4.7–4.8B. At 18.3x trailing earnings, 12.6x EV/EBITDA and 5.2x EV/sales, the market is assigning almost no premium for a business that generates mid-30s margins, double-digit returns on capital, and a fortress balance sheet with a current ratio above 8. That multiple is the story: the price assumes growth simply grinds lower and never re-accelerates.
Quarterly progression reinforces durability rather than peak-and-fade. Margins have stayed inside a tight 30–35% band across eight quarters even as revenue oscillated between $1.07B and $1.24B; there is no evidence of structural compression. The $1.80B operating cash flow figure for fiscal 2025, paired with still-elevated but productive capex, shows the model continues to throw off cash after land and technology investments. Insider activity is noise—option exercises and modest sales totaling well under 1% of float—and does not signal distribution. Against this backdrop the 18x P/E looks like a discount to quality, not a fair clearing price for a 22% ROIC compounder still growing high-single to low-double digits.
The strongest counter-case is that the multiple is already correct for a mature earner whose top line is tethered to insurance total-loss frequency and used-vehicle supply. Revenue CAGR has decelerated from the pandemic-era surge, recent year-over-year growth of 9.7% is unspectacular, and the valuation synthesis only clears $30.50—barely 5% above the current $29.12. If volumes normalize further or international expansion (UK, Germany, Canada) absorbs more capital than it returns, the 12% earnings growth rate could slip into high-single digits and the stock would sit dead money at 18x. Skeptics will also note that EV/revenue of 5.2x still embeds an assumption of durable pricing power; any sustained compression in auction fees or salvage ASPs would justify a lower multiple. I weigh this less heavily because the margin stability and FCF conversion have already survived several cycles, the balance sheet eliminates refinancing or leverage risk, and 18x remains inexpensive relative to the ROIC and net-margin profile even if growth settles at 8%.
What flips the view is straightforward: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth below 5% accompanied by net-margin erosion below 30%, or a clear peak in U.S. total-loss frequency that management cannot offset with international volume. Conversely, a re-acceleration above 12% revenue growth with stable margins would force multiple expansion and make the current price look like a clear mispricing.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Copart runs a genuinely outstanding business: revenue compounded from $2.69B (2021) to $4.65B (2025), operating margins have sat between 36.5% and 42.2% every year, and net income grew from $937M to $1.55B. Free cash flow rose from $528M to $1.23B, with OCF/NI of 1.1x and accruals of -1.7% of assets - the mechanical earnings-quality checks are clean and Altman Z of 21.05 is deep in the safe zone. Net cash of $2.78B with zero apparent leverage means survival is not a question in any scenario. The apparent 42% diluted share CAGR flagged by the module is a data artifact from a stock split (share count jumps from 241M in 2022 to 967M in 2023, then only 977M by 2025) - true underlying dilution is roughly 1% per year, consistent with SBC at just 0.8% of revenue. Operating margin has drifted down modestly from 42.2% to 36.5% over five years, which is the one soft spot in an otherwise pristine trajectory - worth understanding whether that reflects mix (growth in insurance/whole-car adjacencies), reinvestment in yards/technology, or genuine competitive/pricing pressure. Insider activity is neutral-to-mildly negative (five sales, no open-market buys) but modest in size relative to compensation and does not signal anything material.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Confirm the 2022-2023 share count jump was a stock split (typically 2-for-1) and not a genuine issuance
- Root cause of the operating margin decline from 42.2% to 36.5% - mix shift, wage/facility costs, or competitive pricing
- Customer concentration among insurance carriers (top-5 % of revenue) given the salvage auction model
- International segment growth and margin profile vs. mature US business
- Capital allocation policy - why no buybacks or dividend given $2.78B net cash and $1.23B FCF
- Land/yard capex trajectory and whether reinvestment explains part of the margin compression
The composite fair value of $30.06 and signal-adjusted $30.52 sit within 5% of the $29.12 price - the definition of fair. The method spread is wide and telling: DCF says $18.76 and EPV floor $15.89, while an anchored-PE bootstraps to $66.84. The truth is between - the low methods reflect a business whose operating margin has slipped ~570bps and whose growth is capped by insurance claim cycles; the high PE anchor reflects duopoly economics and fortress cash generation. Averaging into ~$30 is a reasonable read. There is no margin of safety here. To justify materially higher, you need international scale (UK, Germany, Canada) to reaccelerate revenue and margins to reinflect - plausible but not underwritten by current trajectory. To justify the bear case toward EPV/DCF ($16-19), insurance volumes would need to structurally soften. Neither is imminent. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so no haircut - deserved value stays near composite. Net: a Fortress business trading at Fortress-appropriate price. Interesting, not cheap.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- International segment revenue growth and margin trajectory (UK, Germany, Canada) in latest 10-Q
- Insurance claim volume commentary and total loss frequency trends on last earnings call
- Operating margin bridge - is the 570bps slip cyclical (mix, fuel, transport costs) or structural
- Capex intensity as international facility buildout continues - free cash conversion
- Any buyback acceleration given the fortress balance sheet
Copart is the archetype of a name the sentiment lens has almost nothing to say about. The narrative intensity is minimal and the cult coefficient is low - there is no active story being bid up or torn down, just a quiet steady-compounder framing that the market broadly accepts. With price tracking DCF within about 5%, there is no visible sentiment premium or discount to fade or ride. That mutes both tailwind and headwind potential on this specific name. The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16, S&P barely off highs), and with beta near 1.0 CPRT neither amplifies nor dampens it meaningfully. Higher rates and a stretched market PE are a generic drag on all equities, but a profitable, low-volatility, asset-light compounder in specialty business services is exactly the profile that absorbs that pressure best - it is not the kind of high-beta story stock that gets mauled in a wobble. The one recent news item is a single down day (-4.07%) with no thematic driver attached - noise, not a narrative crack. Analyst tone is not flagged as diverging. Net: the forces on this ticker right now are ordinary crosswinds, roughly cancelling.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether insurance-claims volume commentary or used-vehicle price data starts driving a fresh bear narrative
- Any analyst downgrades or target cuts that would introduce tone divergence where none currently exists
- A sector rotation out of quality-compounders into higher-beta cyclicals that would leave CPRT flat while the tape rallies
- VIX breakout above 20 which would start to matter even for beta-1 names
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.