Business Description
Constellium SE, along with its various subsidiaries, specializes in the development, production, and distribution of high-performance rolled and extruded aluminum solutions. These solutions primarily serve the packaging, aerospace, and automotive industries. Its operations are structured into three distinct business segments: Packaging & Automotive Rolled Products, Aerospace & Transportation, and Automotive Structures & Industry. The Packaging & Automotive Rolled Products division manufactures rolled aluminum materials. This includes stock for beverage and food cans and closures, as well as foil for flexible packaging applications. Additionally, this segment provides crucial components for the automotive sector, such as body sheets and heat exchangers, alongside specialized reflective sheets. Within the Aerospace & Transportation segment, the company supplies an array of rolled aluminum products. These encompass plates, sheets, and extrusions specifically tailored for aerospace applications, including wing skins. Furthermore, it delivers plates and sheets for various transportation, industrial, and defense uses. The Automotive Structures & Industry division is responsible for advanced extruded products and structural components designed for the automotive sector. Its offerings include critical items like crash-management systems, body structures, side impact beams, and battery enclosures. It also produces both hard and soft alloy extruded profiles utilized across diverse industrial contexts, spanning automotive, engineering, rail, and other transport-related markets. Beyond manufacturing, this segment delivers value-added downstream services such as pre-machining, surface treatment, research and development, and comprehensive technical support. Constellium distributes its products either directly to customers or via a network of distributors. Its global footprint includes sales operations in European nations such as France, Germany, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, as well as in the United States, Shanghai, and Seoul. Established in 2010, Constellium SE maintains its corporate headquarters in Paris, France.
Business History
Generated: Jun 19, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.95
Total Equity: $951.71M
Shares: 141,941,220
Total Debt: $1.94B
Cash: $119.96M
EBITDA: $852.00M
Total Debt: $1.94B
Cash: $119.96M
Revenue: $8.45B
Revenue: $8.45B
Revenue: $8.45B
Total Equity: $951.71M
Tax Rate: 32.6%
Equity: $951.71M
Total Debt: $1.94B
Cash: $119.96M
Current Liabilities: $1.80B
Long-Term Debt: $1.90B
Total Debt: $1.94B
Total Equity: $951.71M
Shares: 141,941,220
Shares: 141,941,220
CapEx: -$329.90M
Shares: 141,941,220
Stock Price: $34.00
Net Income: $273.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Constellium is a mature, capital-intensive aluminum products business running on structurally thin margins (gross 10–13%, operating 4–8%) typical of metals conversion. Revenue has bounced between $7.0–8.5B over five years with no real secular growth, and net income is highly volatile ($54M in 2024 → $273M in 2025), reflecting cyclical pass-through and operating leverage rather than a durable moat. 2025 looks like a recovery year, but the 2024 trough (FCF of -$108M, OpM 3.7%) shows how little cushion exists when conditions soften.
The balance sheet is the central quality issue: net debt of roughly $1.82B against just $120M cash and $159M of normalized FCF means leverage is meaningful and deleveraging would take many years of cycle-average cash generation. Earnings-quality mechanics look clean (Beneish -2.19, accruals -4%, OCF/NI 2.63x, Altman Z 2.71 grey) and the diluted share count has actually shrunk (-0.9% CAGR, buybacks 12.75x SBC), so per-share value isn't being eroded by stock issuance — a genuine positive for a company in this industry.
Insider tape is unambiguously net selling in dollar terms ($12.2M sold vs $167K bought across 26 sells and 6 small buys), despite the headline framing it as 'net buying.' The two P-purchases are tiny token buys (~$84K and $41K) alongside large S-sales by multiple officers including ~$1.6M each from Hoffmann and Jurkovic. That's a mild negative signal on management conviction, not a scandal.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant structure — when do the ~$1.8B of obligations come due and at what rates?
- Customer concentration in aerospace, packaging, and automotive segments (10-K disclosure)
- Pension and other post-employment obligations, which can be material at European industrials
- Whether the 2024 FCF burn was working-capital driven or structural margin compression
- Hedging policy on aluminum and energy — how much of margin volatility is pass-through vs. mistimed hedges
- Capex intensity vs. depreciation — is reported FCF sustainable or under-investing in plant
Constellium is a thin-margin aluminum converter (~3-5% EBIT margins through cycle) carrying meaningful leverage (~11x FCF in debt). At $34, the market cap is ~$4.6B against a business that just got stressed in 2024 and whose mid-cycle EBITDA runs roughly $500-650M. Slap a sober 5-6x EV/EBITDA multiple on mid-cycle EBITDA and back out net debt, and equity value lands in the $20-28 range. The e2e synthesis flagging 'Disconnected from Fundamentals' lines up with that — the stock is trading on the EV/lightweighting narrative, not on what the converter spread economics actually deserve.
Earnings quality is clean and capital allocation is disciplined (buybacks), which I'll credit toward deserved value — but not enough to bridge a 20-30% gap. The bull case requires sustained automotive recovery, packaging margin expansion, AND deleveraging simultaneously; that's the heroic path embedded at $34. The bear case — that this is a commodity-adjacent converter with customer concentration getting a cyclical-growth multiple — is the more honest read of the current tape. No deep mispricing either way, but the risk/reward skews to 'priced ahead of fundamentals.'
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2025 EBITDA guidance and packaging vs automotive segment mix — confirms whether mid-cycle EBITDA is $500M or $650M
- Net debt trajectory and any refinancing terms — leverage is the swing factor on deserved equity value
- Automotive customer concentration disclosures — pricing power vs OEMs determines whether margin recovers or compresses
- Aerospace contribution and contract length — the one segment where multiple expansion would be justified
- Any guidance on through-cycle ROIC vs WACC — currently looks marginal
The market regime is neutral with VIX in the upper-middle of its range, so the tape itself is not actively pushing CSTM either way. But CSTM carries a 1.55 beta and sits in a cyclical aluminum-converter cohort, which means any drift toward risk-off would land harder here than on defensives. For now, that risk is latent, not active. The dominant non-fundamental force is the live narrative: a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability EV-lightweighting and sustainable-packaging story that the market is willing to underwrite, evidenced by 19.3% recent price action well above the 9% long-term CAGR. Cult coefficient is low, so this is not a meme-style euphoria - it is a more durable industrial-thematic bid that tends to hold unless the macro tape breaks. Analyst tone reinforces this: 13 Buys, 4 Holds, zero Sells, with a consensus target ($36.25) sitting just 7.5% above spot. That is constructive but not stretched, and notably there were zero target revisions this month - tone is stable but stale, lagging the recent run. No divergence flashing red yet, but the upside from sell-side is largely spent at current levels.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the neutral regime tips risk-off (VIX through 20) - would punish this beta hard
- Any target revisions in the next 4-6 weeks; stale tone needs to catch up or it becomes a ceiling
- Aluminum price action and LME inventories - the commodity tape can override the EV narrative quickly
- EV demand data points or OEM production cuts that would crack the lightweighting story
- Aerospace order flow as a secondary narrative pillar
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.0B | $7.9B | $7.1B | $7.1B | $8.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $6.2B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $6.2B | $7.6B |
| Gross Profit | $751.8M | $894.9M | $958.7M | $905.8M | $857.0M |
| Operating Expenses | $203.8M | $576.1M | $607.9M | $643.2M | $383.0M |
| Operating Income | $548.0M | $318.7M | $350.8M | $262.7M | $474.0M |
| Net Income | $291.0M | $286.2M | $138.1M | $54.1M | $273.0M |
| EBITDA | $802.7M | $500.9M | $580.7M | $523.4M | $852.0M |
| EPS | $1.82 | $2.00 | $0.84 | $0.37 | $1.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:02am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $167.2M | $177.2M | $180.0M | $141.0M | $120.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.2B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.3B |
| Total Assets | $5.3B | $5.3B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $5.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.9B | $4.5B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.4B |
| Total Equity | $311.6M | $780.2M | $843.0M | $706.0M | $951.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$174.0M | $158.0M | $420.0M | $203.0M | $353.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $357.0M | $472.9M | $432.0M | $290.7M | $488.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$232.0M | -$286.9M | -$366.0M | -$398.8M | -$329.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $125.0M | $186.0M | $66.0M | -$108.2M | $159.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $9.4M | $2.1M | $49.0M | $9.7M | $11.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$76.3M | -$115.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$292.0M | $10.0M | $45.8M | -$79.2M | -$21.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$10.6B $10.1B – $11.1B
|
$10.5B $10.3B – $10.8B
|
$10.2B $9.9B – $10.6B
|
$10.9B $10.5B – $11.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$923.8M $879.1M – $968.5M
|
$916.7M $898.5M – $934.9M
|
$891.2M $863.4M – $919.9M
|
$946.7M $917.1M – $977.2M
|
| Net Income |
$375.0M $362.1M – $415.5M
|
$416.8M $409.2M – $424.4M
|
$0 | $0 |
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:07am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.8% | -10.3% | -0.4% | +19.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +19.0% | +7.1% | -5.5% | -5.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -41.8% | +10.0% | -25.1% | +80.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -1.6% | -51.7% | -60.8% | +404.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -37.6% | +15.9% | -9.9% | +62.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:06am (8d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | Ormerod John | S-Sale | 8,000.00 | $35.01 | $280,080 |
| 2026-05-28 | Becker Marcus | S-Sale | 10,391.00 | $34.93 | $362,958 |
| 2026-05-14 | Soultz Bradley Lee | P-Purchase | 2,500.00 | $33.84 | $84,600 |
| 2026-05-14 | Jarrett Martin | S-Sale | 4,716.00 | $33.46 | $157,797 |
| 2026-05-12 | Piquier Ludovic | S-Sale | 1,000.00 | $33.57 | $33,570 |
| 2026-05-11 | Brun Nicolas | S-Sale | 26,661.00 | $33.85 | $902,475 |
| 2026-05-08 | Corre Stephane | S-Sale | 5,000.00 | $33.52 | $167,600 |
| 2026-05-05 | Brandjes Michiel | S-Sale | 10,400.00 | $31.25 | $325,000 |
| 2026-05-05 | Guo Jack Q. | S-Sale | 25,201.00 | $32.62 | $822,057 |
| 2026-05-01 | Hoffmann Philippe | S-Sale | 50,000.00 | $31.92 | $1.6M |
| 2026-05-01 | Jurkovic Philip Ryan | S-Sale | 48,784.00 | $32.01 | $1.6M |
| 2026-05-01 | Corre Stephane | S-Sale | 5,000.00 | $32.04 | $160,200 |
| 2026-05-01 | Deslarzes Jean-Christophe | P-Purchase | 1,325.00 | $31.13 | $41,247 |
| 2026-04-01 | Jarrett Martin | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-16 | Becker Marcus | S-Sale | 10,000.00 | $25.09 | $250,900 |
| 2026-03-02 | Deslarzes Jean-Christophe | P-Purchase | 1,665.00 | $24.77 | $41,242 |
| 2026-03-12 | Walters Stephen Charles | A-Award | 5,834.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | Weiler Wiebke | A-Award | 625.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | Brun Nicolas | A-Award | 4,376.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-12 | Jurkovic Philip Ryan | A-Award | 10,210.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly tape is the most important thing here and the synthesis model is underweighting it. Revenue went from $1.51B in Q4'24 to $2.46B in Q1'26 — a 63% jump in five quarters — and net margin expanded from -2.8% to 8.1% over the same window. Q1'26 NI of $199M annualizes to ~$800M, putting forward P/E near 6x at $34, not the 17x trailing figure the thesis model anchored to. The earnings_yoy of 405% and the margin curve (1.7% → 4.1% → 5.1% → 8.1% across four sequential quarters) is not a "cyclical recovery to 2021 levels" — it's an acceleration past them. 2021 peak NI was $291M annually; Q1'26 alone did 68% of that. Either the Q1 number contains a one-timer (metal lag gain, insurance, divestiture mark) or the operating leverage in rolled aluminum is materially better than the synthesis assumes.
The synthesis verdict ("Disconnected from Fundamentals," reverse-DCF implies "impossible 60% FCF growth") is doing math against a stale denominator. 2025 FCF of $159M was depressed by $330M capex against a still-recovering revenue base; with Q1'26 revenue running 36% above Q4'24, normalized FCF on flat capex should be $400-500M, not $159M. EV/EBITDA of 6.4x TTM is cheap for a converter showing this trajectory, and EV/Sales of 0.53x is in the bottom decile for the industry. The pre-flight call of "deep-value cyclical" is closer to right than the synthesis "disconnected" framing — but even deep-value undersells it if the Q1 margin holds. The market thesis (Boeing/Airbus build rates normalizing by 2027-28) is plausible and Constellium's A&T segment is the highest-margin piece; aerospace plate is genuinely supply-constrained through 2027.
The contrarian case I'd actually take seriously: (1) the Q1'26 8.1% margin is a metal-price tailwind that reverses — aluminum LME ran hard into Q1, and converter spreads often compress on the way down; (2) insider activity is overwhelmingly selling (137k sold vs. 2,500 bought across May 2026), and the "Net Insider Buying" tag in secondary signals contradicts the raw transaction list — somebody mislabeled it, and the real read is insiders distributing into the rally; (3) balance sheet is a black box here — total debt and equity are blank, and Constellium historically carries $1.8-2.0B net debt, meaning true EV is closer to $6.5B and EV/EBITDA closer to 7-8x on normalized, not 6.4x; (4) the stock is up 168% off the 52-week low, so the easy money on multiple re-rating is gone. FCF quality flag ("Poor") is legitimate — $159M FCF on $273M NI is a 58% conversion, and working capital absorbed cash as revenue ramped, which will continue if growth persists.
Net: the synthesis model is wrong to call this "disconnected." It anchored on TTM P/E and a depressed FCF base while ignoring that quarterly earnings have quadrupled and margins doubled in 12 months. The pre-flight "deep-value" read is directionally correct but the price has already moved. At $34, you're paying ~6x forward earnings if Q1'26 run-rate holds, ~10-11x if margins mean-revert to the 4-5% range (mid-cycle), and ~15-18x if 2024's trough returns. The insider selling and the missing balance sheet data argue against sizing up aggressively. The market narrative model's "anchored / cyclical-late-stage / moderate durability" framing is the most honest of the prior outputs — this is a late-cycle cyclical where the next print determines whether the multiple compresses or the E catches up. I dissent from the synthesis "disconnected" verdict; I agree this is cheap on trajectory but the entry is no longer asymmetric. Fair value $38-42 on mid-cycle $500M normalized earnings at 8-9x; upside $50+ if A&T margins prove structural; downside $22-25 if Q1 was the peak and aluminum rolls over.
GPT Critique
Constellium SE's recent performance suggests a robust recovery and potential growth trajectory. The company’s quarterly revenue has increased from $1.51 billion in Q4 2024 to $2.46 billion in Q1 2026, marking a 63% rise over five quarters, with net income margins improving from -2.8% to 8.1%. This indicates a strong operational rebound, possibly driven by favorable market conditions and effective cost management. The annualized net income based on Q1 2026 figures is approximately $800 million, which is significantly higher than the $291 million peak in 2021. This suggests that Constellium is not merely recovering to past levels but potentially exceeding them. The current P/E ratio of 10.7, alongside a price-to-sales ratio of 0.31, suggests that the stock may be undervalued relative to its revenue-generating capabilities.
Opus argues that the synthesis model has underestimated the company's momentum by focusing on stale data, particularly the depressed FCF figures from 2025. I agree that the forward-looking metrics, based on the most recent quarterly performance, present a more favorable investment case. The significant margin expansion and revenue growth indicate that the company may be operating with better cost efficiency and market positioning than previously assumed. Opus’s assertion that the reverse DCF model mistakenly suggests impossible growth rates due to a low FCF base year aligns with my interpretation that the company's recent performance should be the focus for valuation.
However, I diverge from Opus regarding insider activity. While Opus mentions that insider selling contradicts a "Net Insider Buying" tag, I observe that the majority of recent insider transactions are indeed sales. This could imply a lack of confidence from those within the company, potentially signaling a plateau in stock price growth. Moreover, the absence of detailed balance sheet data, such as total debt and equity, adds uncertainty to the valuation, potentially obscuring the company’s true enterprise value.
A careful skeptic might argue that the recent financial performance could be driven by temporary market conditions, such as favorable aluminum prices, rather than sustainable operational improvements. The significant insider sales could be interpreted as a cautionary signal, suggesting that insiders might expect near-term challenges or believe the stock's price has peaked. Additionally, the lack of comprehensive balance sheet data might obscure financial risks, including leverage levels that could affect the company’s stability in adverse market conditions.