Business Description
DigitalBridge Group, Inc., known on the NYSE as DBRG, operates as a specialized investment firm focused on infrastructure. Its core business involves both deploying capital into and actively managing companies throughout the extensive digital ecosystem. This encompasses a broad spectrum of critical assets, including mobile communication towers, data centers, fiber optic networks, small cell deployments, edge infrastructure, broader digital infrastructure components, and related real estate holdings. Established in 2009, the company's corporate headquarters are located in Boca Raton, Florida. DigitalBridge also maintains a global presence with additional offices in Los Angeles, California; New York, New York; Boston, Massachusetts; Denver, Colorado; London, United Kingdom; Senningerberg, Luxembourg; and Singapore.
Business History
Generated: Jun 18, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:58am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.46
Total Equity: $2.11B
Shares: 175,733,000
Total Debt: $308.67M
Cash: $382.51M
EBITDA: $30.04M
Total Debt: $308.67M
Cash: $382.51M
Revenue: $470.13M
Revenue: $470.13M
Revenue: $470.13M
Total Equity: $2.11B
Tax Rate: -33.5%
Equity: $2.11B
Total Debt: $308.67M
Cash: $382.51M
Current Liabilities: $9.86M
Long-Term Debt: $298.80M
Total Debt: $308.67M
Total Equity: $2.11B
Shares: 175,733,000
Shares: 175,733,000
CapEx: -$1.35M
Shares: 175,733,000
Stock Price: $15.80
Net Income: $141.87M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $366.1M | $694.8M | $821.4M | $607.0M | $470.1M |
| Cost of Revenue | $73.1M | $44.3M | $36.7M | $144.7M | $58.9M |
| Gross Profit | $293.0M | $650.5M | $784.7M | $462.4M | $411.2M |
| Operating Expenses | $260.1M | $474.4M | $479.9M | $330.5M | $88.2M |
| Operating Income | $32.9M | $176.1M | $304.9M | $131.9M | $323.1M |
| Net Income | -$310.1M | -$321.8M | $185.3M | $70.5M | $141.9M |
| EBITDA | $648.8M | $575.5M | $875.7M | $219.0M | $30.0M |
| EPS | $-3.14 | $-2.47 | $0.82 | $0.07 | $0.46 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.6B | $855.6M | $345.3M | $302.2M | $382.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.8B | $9.5B | $464.4M | $442.0M | $607.2M |
| Total Assets | $14.2B | $11.0B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.4B | $5.6B | $99.2M | $60.2M | $9.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.9B | $569.4M | $371.8M | $296.4M | $298.8M |
| Total Liabilities | $8.9B | $6.5B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $969.0M |
| Total Equity | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$6.6B | -$7.0B | -$6.8B | -$6.8B | -$6.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $248.2M | $262.6M | $233.6M | $60.1M | $259.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$3.6M | -$1.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $248.2M | $262.6M | $233.6M | $56.5M | $258.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $104.6M | $11.6M | -$102.5M | -$7.9M | -$123.6M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$55.0M | $0 | -$9.8M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $803.2M | -$729.5M | -$686.5M | -$44.0M | $89.2M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$492.7M $471.3M – $519.6M
|
$581.3M $566.6M – $596.0M
|
$635.1M $607.6M – $669.8M
|
$689.5M $659.6M – $727.2M
|
| EBITDA |
$320.5M $306.6M – $338.1M
|
$378.2M $368.6M – $387.8M
|
$413.2M $395.3M – $435.8M
|
$448.6M $429.2M – $473.1M
|
| Net Income |
$203.9M $182.0M – $225.7M
|
$163.4M $77.2M – $249.7M
|
$198.6M $187.4M – $212.7M
|
$228.5M $215.6M – $244.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +89.8% | +18.2% | -26.1% | -22.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +122.0% | +20.6% | -41.1% | -11.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +435.7% | +73.1% | -56.7% | +145.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -3.8% | +157.6% | -61.9% | +101.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -11.3% | +52.2% | -75.0% | -86.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Mayrhofer Thomas B | A-Award | 127,470.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Ganzi Marc C | A-Award | 229,764.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | REISS DALE ANNE | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Brown James Keith | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Jenkins Benjamin J. | A-Award | 101,976.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Stewart Liam | A-Award | 101,976.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Diefenderfer Jeannie | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Curtin Nancy Ann | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Goldschein Geoffrey | A-Award | 60,548.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | WINTROB JAY S | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | McCray Gregory James | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Rasheed Shaka | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Teh Tracey | A-Award | 25,494.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Tolley David | A-Award | 11,190.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Ganzi Marc C | C-Conversion | 2,358,601.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-28 | Ganzi Marc C | C-Conversion | 2,358,601.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | Rasheed Shaka | J-Other | 36.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | Curtin Nancy Ann | J-Other | 79.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-15 | Brown James Keith | J-Other | 27.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-15 | Teh Tracey | F-InKind | 4,967.00 | $15.37 | $76,343 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 12:21am (7h ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.01 | 2026-04-24 | 2026-06-30 | 2026-07-15 |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.01 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-04-15 |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.01 | 2025-10-30 | 2025-12-31 | 2026-01-15 |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.01 | 2025-08-07 | 2025-09-30 | 2025-10-15 |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.01 | 2025-04-25 | 2025-06-30 | 2025-07-15 |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.01 | 2025-02-20 | 2025-03-31 | 2025-04-15 |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.01 | 2024-10-25 | 2024-12-31 | 2025-01-15 |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.01 | 2024-08-06 | 2024-09-30 | 2024-10-15 |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.01 | 2024-04-30 | 2024-06-30 | 2024-07-15 |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.01 | 2024-02-16 | 2024-03-31 | 2024-04-15 |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.01 | 2023-10-27 | 2023-12-31 | 2024-01-16 |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.01 | 2023-08-01 | 2023-09-30 | 2023-10-16 |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.01 | 2023-04-27 | 2023-06-30 | 2023-07-17 |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.01 | 2023-02-17 | 2023-03-31 | 2023-04-17 |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.01 | 2022-11-03 | 2022-12-31 | 2023-01-17 |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.01 | 2022-09-14 | 2022-09-30 | 2022-10-17 |
| 2020-03-30 | $0.11 | 2020-02-28 | 2020-03-31 | 2020-04-15 |
| 2019-12-30 | $0.11 | 2019-11-08 | 2019-12-31 | 2020-01-15 |
| 2019-09-27 | $0.11 | 2019-08-09 | 2019-09-30 | 2019-10-15 |
| 2019-06-27 | $0.11 | 2019-05-10 | 2019-06-28 | 2019-07-15 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a messier story than any of the prior models acknowledge. Annual revenue collapsed from $821M (2023) to $607M (2024) to $470M (2025) — a -24% CAGR — yet net income went from $185M to $70M to $142M. That's not a "mature earner" trajectory; that's an asset manager whose top line is being reshaped by the divestiture of operating subsidiaries (the old Colony/BRSP balance-sheet businesses) into a pure fee-stream model. The Q2 2024 print of $390M revenue versus Q1 2025 at $45M isn't a business collapse — it's a structural reclassification. The classification engine calling this a "mature earner" with 0.7 confidence is wrong; this is mid-transition, and applying mature-earner heuristics to a company that just shed two-thirds of its reported revenue base will mislead you on every multiple.
Look at the quarterly trajectory post-transition: Q1'25 $45M → Q2'25 $112M → Q3'25 $124M → Q4'25 $133M → Q1'26 $117M. That's a real fee-stream business growing sequentially with one soft quarter, and margins running 17-49%. Annualizing the last four quarters gets you ~$485M revenue and ~$148M NI — so the trailing P/E near 19x is roughly accurate, not the 34x the thesis-eval model cites. FCF of $258M on a $2.87B market cap is an 9% FCF yield, which is genuinely cheap for an asset manager *if* the fee streams are durable. EV/EBITDA of 61x is the anomaly flag working — it's pulled from TTM during the transition and is not meaningful. The synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is directionally fair but for the wrong reason: the conviction isn't about whether digital infrastructure is real (it is, and Brookfield/KKR/Blackstone all confirm the thesis with their own fundraising), it's about whether DBRG can compete for LP capital at sub-scale (~$100B AUM vs. $1T+ for the majors).
The contrarian case the models underweight: DBRG is structurally subscale in alternatives. Fee-related earnings depend on raising successively larger funds, and the digital infrastructure category is now crowded with better-resourced sponsors. The -22.6% recent revenue YoY can be explained away as deconsolidation, but underlying FRE growth has been mid-single-digits, not the 15-20% the "secular winner" narrative requires. The June 2026 insider activity is entirely A-Awards (RSU grants) — zero open-market buying despite the stock at $15.71, well off prior highs. For a management team that should believe in its own re-rating story, the absence of insider purchases is a tell. The "Sector Leader" tag is generous; DBRG is a specialist, not a leader, and the narrative model correctly notes the theme is "diffuse across better-positioned peers."
I dissent mildly from the "High Conviction Required" framing — that's analyst-speak for "we couldn't decide." On the numbers, DBRG at 9% FCF yield with a clean post-transition fee business growing sequentially and $382M cash is closer to fair-to-cheap than richly valued. The honest read: if FRE compounds 10%+ and they raise a Fund III/IV at scale, this is a $20-22 stock; if fundraising stalls and fee compression hits, it's a $12 stock. The asymmetry favors the long at $15.71, but only as a sized-appropriately position, because the sub-scale risk is real and the lack of insider buying is uncomfortable. The market-forces "Neutral" call is the most honest model output here. I'd buy a starter and add on either a fundraising announcement or a pullback to $13.
GPT Critique
In my independent analysis of DigitalBridge Group, Inc. (DBRG), the data presents a company undergoing significant structural change as it transitions from a traditional balance sheet-driven business to a fee-based asset manager. This transition is evident in the sharp decline in revenue from $821.4M in 2023 to $470.1M in 2025, a clear indication of the divestiture of operating subsidiaries and reclassification of its business model. Despite the revenue drop, net income experienced a rebound from a loss of $321.8M in 2022 to a profit of $141.9M in 2025, highlighting an effective transition to a more profitable, if smaller, revenue base. The consistent free cash flow generation of $258M suggests strong operational efficiency and a 9% FCF yield is attractive for an asset manager. However, the high EV/EBITDA ratio of 61x flags a potential concern, though it may be skewed by the transition and not representative of future performance.
I agree with Opus's assessment that DBRG's transition to a fee-based model is reshaping its financials. Opus rightly criticizes the classification of DBRG as a "mature earner," noting that the company is mid-transition, and the mature earner label is misleading given the recent restructuring. The sequential quarterly revenue growth post-transition supports Opus's view that DBRG is establishing a stable fee-stream business. I also concur with his point that the 9% FCF yield presents a compelling valuation if fee streams prove durable. However, I diverge from Opus's "modestly undervalued" verdict primarily due to concerns about the company's competitive positioning. Opus acknowledges the risk of DBRG being subscale and facing fee pressure in a crowded digital infrastructure sector, which I believe warrants a more cautious stance.
Opus argues that the lack of insider buying, despite a stock price of $15.71, is a negative signal, and I agree. It suggests a lack of confidence from management in the company's re-rating potential, which is concerning given the transition's reliance on attracting new LP capital. Additionally, the market narrative portrays DBRG as a steady, income-plus-growth play, but Opus notes that the sector's competitive landscape could limit its narrative appeal, a sentiment I share.
A careful skeptic might argue that both our analyses underestimate the risks associated with the company's transition and competitive landscape. While DBRG's narrative of digital infrastructure growth is appealing, the lack of scale compared to industry giants could cap its growth prospects. Furthermore, the insider activity suggests that even those closest to the company are hesitant to increase their stakes, indicating potential internal skepticism about future performance.