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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Deere & Company (DE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 37 · Value -59 · Sentiment -24 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $339.73 vs $617.37 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Deere & Company
DE NYSEDeere & Company is a global manufacturer of agricultural, construction, and forestry equipment, best known for its John Deere-branded machinery. Headquartered in Moline, Illinois, the company focuses on providing equipment and technology solutions that support food production, infrastructure development, and land management worldwide. Deere & Company operates through key segments including Production and Precision Agriculture, Small Agriculture and Turf, Construction and Forestry, and Financial Services, offering tractors, combines, sprayers, loaders, excavators, and turf care equipment, as well as integrated precision agriculture technologies and data-driven tools to optimize operations. Its Financial Services arm provides financing and leasing solutions that support equipment purchases and dealer inventory, facilitating access to its products across diverse markets. Today, Deere & Company plays a central role in the broader capital goods and industrials space, serving farmers, contractors, governments, and commercial clients seeking durable equipment and integrated technology for mission-critical operations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 18.50
Total Equity: $26.01B
Shares: 271,700,000
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $8.28B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $8.28B
Revenue: $45.68B
Revenue: $45.68B
Revenue: $45.68B
Total Equity: $26.01B
Tax Rate: 20.1%
Equity: $26.01B
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $8.28B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $13.80B
Total Equity: $26.01B
Shares: 271,700,000
Shares: 271,700,000
CapEx: -$1.36B
Shares: 271,700,000
Stock Price: $617.37
Net Income: $5.03B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 3:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $44.0B | $52.6B | $61.3B | $51.7B | $45.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $8.0B | $9.5B | $13.0B | $9.0B | — |
| Net Income | $6.0B | $7.1B | $10.2B | $7.1B | $5.0B |
| EBITDA | $10.1B | $11.4B | $15.0B | $11.2B | — |
| EPS | $19.14 | $23.42 | $34.80 | $25.73 | $18.55 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $18.99 | $23.28 | $34.63 | $25.62 | $18.50 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:04am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $8.0B | $4.8B | $7.5B | $7.3B | $8.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $84.1B | $90.0B | $104.1B | $107.3B | $106.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $32.9B | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $65.7B | $69.7B | $82.2B | $84.4B | $80.0B |
| Total Equity | $18.4B | $20.4B | $21.9B | $22.9B | $26.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $36.4B | $42.2B | $50.9B | $56.4B | $59.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 3:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.7B | $4.7B | $8.6B | $9.2B | $7.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$848.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B | -$1.4B |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.9B | $3.6B | $7.1B | $7.6B | $6.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$244.0M | -$498.0M | -$82.0M | — | -$101.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.5B | $5.8B | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.0B | -$1.3B | -$1.4B | -$1.6B | -$1.7B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.5B | -$3.6B | -$7.2B | -$4.0B | -$1.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | $953.0M | -$3.2B | $2.7B | $13.0M | $900.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 3:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +19.4% | +16.5% | -15.6% | -11.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.7% | +36.3% | -30.2% | — |
| Net Income Growth | +19.6% | +42.6% | -30.2% | -29.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +13.3% | +31.2% | -25.4% | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:04am (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $1.62 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $1.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $1.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $1.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $1.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-29 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $1.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $1.13 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:48Even the bull case prices 70% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 80%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($617.37) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -0% | 11.6% | $188.20 | -70% |
| Base — stabilizes | -1% | 10.1% | $164.96 | -73% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -1% | 8.6% | $142.11 | -77% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -9% | 10.1% | $125.24 | -80% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: quarterly revenue went from $13.15B (Jul-24) to $8.51B (Jan-25) to $13.37B (May-26) — that's not a business in freefall, that's Deere's typical fiscal-Q1 seasonality (agricultural buying patterns). The synthesis models are treating the -13.6% revenue CAGR as if it's a linear decline, but the most recent print ($13.37B in May 2026) is actually *above* the year-ago comparable ($12.76B, +4.8% YoY) with margins re-expanding to 13.3% from 14.1%. The Jan-26 quarter at $9.61B was also up 13% YoY vs Jan-25's $8.51B. So the "sequential -25% decline" framing in the thesis evaluation is misreading seasonal fiscal-Q1 weakness. Annual FY25 revenue of $45.68B was indeed down 12% from FY24's $51.72B and down 25% from FY23's peak $61.25B — that's real cyclical compression, but the two most recent quarters suggest the trough is behind, not ahead.
That said, the synthesis fair value of $305 vs $617 price is not crazy — it's the right question framed slightly wrong. Trailing NI of ~$5.5B (annualizing recent quarters) against a $166B market cap is 30x, which is a full-cycle premium multiple on what may or may not be trough earnings. Peak FY23 earnings were $10.17B; at 15x peak that's $153B market cap — you're already paying more than peak-cycle fair value on peak-cycle earnings. The bull case requires either (a) precision ag actually structurally lifts through-cycle margins from historical ~10% to sustained 13-15%, or (b) the next up-cycle takes NI meaningfully above $10B. Neither is impossible; both are speculative. ROE of 19% and ROA of only 4.7% remind you this is still a capital-heavy finance-arm-laden industrial, not a software company — the P/B of 6.4x is aggressive for that asset intensity.
The contrarian case against the bear synthesis: farmer credit conditions, while stressed, haven't cracked; John Deere Financial hasn't shown credit loss escalation in the data provided; FCF held at $6.10B in a "trough" year, implying ~3.7% FCF yield at current price — not screaming cheap but not disastrous for a franchise with pricing power and 60%+ North American large-ag share. Debt/equity of 0.53 (ex-finance-arm this is manageable) and $8.28B cash provide runway. The insider data is uninformative — just routine March award grants and one small in-kind tax withholding, no signal either way (the models correctly flagged neutral). The market forces module failed entirely, which the synthesis should have weighted lower.
Where I land: the synthesis verdict of "overvalued to $305" is directionally right but the magnitude is overstated because it's extrapolating a cyclical trough at the exact moment quarterly data suggests trough is passing. The narrative layer's "story carrying half the valuation" is the most honest framing here. A fair value band of $420-480 seems more defensible: 20x normalized mid-cycle EPS of ~$22-24, which credits some (not all) of the precision-ag margin uplift thesis while refusing to pay peak multiples on peak earnings. At $617, you're paying ~28x normalized and betting the up-cycle re-accelerates by FY27 with structurally higher margins — that's a coin flip, not a bargain. I partially agree with the synthesis (overvalued, yes) but dissent on the $305 anchor as too draconian; the models are over-indexing on the trailing decline and under-indexing on the May-26 quarter's inflection. Conviction is moderate because the swing factor — whether 13% margins are the new mid-cycle floor or a peak — is genuinely unknowable from this data. Waiting for a pullback into the $450-500 zone or clearer evidence of margin persistence into FY27 is the disciplined move; no need to short a quality franchise, no need to chase it either.
GPT Reading
Deere’s stock price is asking investors to believe that the business has structurally escaped its own history just as the numbers are saying the opposite. Annual revenue has fallen from $61.25B in 2023 to $51.72B in 2024 and then to $45.68B in 2025, a two-year drop of 25%. Net income has gone from $10.17B to $7.10B to $5.03B, down roughly 50% from the peak. That is not a business in a temporary air pocket being valued cheaply on trough earnings; at $166.7B market cap, the stock trades at 33.4x trailing earnings, 3.7x sales, and 6.4x book for a company whose latest annual net margin is 11% and whose current revenue trajectory is still negative. Even if you annualize the most recent quarter’s $1.77B of net income to about $7.1B, you are still paying around 23-24x a cyclical machinery company during a downturn that is not yet clearly over. The core fact pattern is simple: the stock has held onto a premium multiple while the income statement has already rolled over hard.
What stands out, though, is that the business itself is better than the valuation. Deere is still producing real cash: $7.46B of operating cash flow and $6.10B of free cash flow in 2025, with only $1.36B of capex. The balance sheet is not distressed, with $13.8B of debt against $8.28B of cash and $26.01B of equity, and debt/equity of 0.53 is manageable. Profitability also appears to be stabilizing off the lows: quarterly net margin troughed at 6.8% in the January quarter and recovered to 13.3% in the April quarter, almost back to the 14.1% seen a year earlier. That says Deere is an excellent operator with strong cost control and pricing discipline, not a broken cyclical. But excellent operator does not equal excellent stock at any price. At today’s valuation, the market is capitalizing Deere more like a premium industrial platform with recurring, less cyclical economics than like a farm and construction equipment maker whose revenue can swing by double digits.
The hardest contradiction for bulls is between the magnitude of the earnings reset and the stubbornness of the multiple. If Deere earned $10.17B again, today’s market cap would imply roughly 16.4x peak-ish earnings, which is not absurd. But that recovery is exactly what investors are prepaying for, and they are doing so before there is evidence that revenue has bottomed. The last four quarters were $13.15B, $11.14B, $8.51B, and $12.76B a year ago versus $12.02B, $12.40B, $9.61B, and $13.37B recently: mixed sequencing, but on a year-over-year basis still down in three of four comparisons and down 11.7% on the latest read. Meanwhile annual FCF of $6.10B gives the stock an FCF yield of only about 3.7%, which is thin compensation for a cyclical exposed to farm income, dealer inventories, and construction activity. Deere may deserve a premium to old-line industrial averages because of precision agriculture, software attach, and aftermarket resilience, but the current premium looks much too large relative to what has actually shown up in reported results.
The best case against my view is that the market is not valuing Deere on 2025 trough earnings at all; it is valuing normalized earnings power after a short, inventory-led correction. The most recent quarter supports that argument better than the annual numbers do: net income of $1.77B on $13.37B of revenue was only modestly below the $1.80B on $12.76B a year prior, and margin of 13.3% was actually close to prior-cycle highs despite lower volume. That suggests mix, pricing, and cost structure are materially better than in prior downturns. Add ROE of 19.3%, strong cash conversion, and a modest payout ratio of 34%, and bulls can reasonably say Deere has become a scarcer, higher-quality asset than the historical “12-15x cyclical” label implies. If earnings recover to $8-9B over the next two years and the market is willing to hold a 20x multiple on that cleaner earnings base, the stock would not look outrageously expensive. I weigh that less heavily because the revenue line still hasn’t proven it, and machinery makers do not usually get to declare secular transformation before the cycle turns back up and confirms it.
What would change my mind is evidence that Deere can hold margins while returning to top-line growth, not just defend profits on shrinking sales. Specifically, I would want to see at least two consecutive quarters of year-over-year revenue growth, annual revenue stabilizing back above $50B, and net income running at an $8B+ annualized pace without balance-sheet stretch or working-capital gimmicks. If the next few quarters show revenue inflecting positive while quarterly margins remain around 12-13%, then the case for a structurally higher multiple gets much stronger. Until then, the stock looks priced for a recovery that may happen, but with too little room for disappointment.
Grok Reading
Deere’s financials tell a straightforward late-cycle story that the $617 price simply refuses to acknowledge. Revenue has collapsed from the $61.25B peak in FY2023 to $51.72B in 2024 and $45.68B in 2025—a 25% cumulative drop—while net income has been cut nearly in half from $10.17B to $5.03B. The trailing P/E of 33.4x is therefore being applied to already-depressed earnings, not peak ones; on 2023 earnings the multiple would still sit near 16x, and on any mid-cycle normalization around $7B of net income it remains a rich 24x. Free cash flow held up better at $6.10B on only $1.36B of capex, and the balance sheet is clean (net debt roughly $5.5B, debt-to-equity 0.53, ROE still 19%), but that quality does not justify a 3.67x sales multiple or a 6.45x book multiple for a capital-goods franchise whose revenue CAGR is –13.6% and earnings CAGR –29.7%. The most recent quarter ($13.37B revenue, 13.3% net margin) shows sequential bounce from the weak $9.61B winter quarter, yet it still sits well below the $13–14B run-rates of the prior upcycle and does nothing to reverse the multi-year volume destruction already visible in the annual numbers.
What stands out most is the valuation fragility. At $166B of enterprise value the market is capitalizing roughly $6B of FCF at a 3.6% free-cash-flow yield while simultaneously embedding the assumption that margins and volumes will not only recover but permanently exceed the prior cycle. That is the precision-ag narrative doing half the work: believers are paying for a software-and-autonomy overlay that has yet to appear at material scale in the reported P&L. Until recurring high-margin revenue is large enough to flatten the cycle, Deere remains a classic mature earner whose earnings power is still tethered to farmer cash receipts, used-equipment values, and commodity prices—all of which have been rolling over.
The strongest counter-argument is that the latest quarter’s margin recovery to 13.3% and the still-elevated order commentary from dealers could mark an earlier-than-expected trough, and that the installed base of connected machines really is converting into sticky aftermarket and subscription economics that historical multiples undervalue. A bull can also point to the fact that Deere has compounded through prior downcycles and that a return even to $55B of revenue at 12–13% net margins would produce $6.5–7B of earnings, making today’s price only ~23–25x forward—expensive but not absurd if the cycle is short. I weigh this lightly because the two-year revenue drawdown is already larger and faster than many prior mid-cycle corrections, farmer balance-sheet stress is visible in the secondary signals, and no disclosed segment data yet shows software or precision services large enough to justify a technology multiple. Paying 33x trailing for that optionality is simply too rich.
I would reverse stance if two consecutive quarters deliver revenue above $14B with net margins sustained above 14%, or if management begins breaking out precision-ag/recurring revenue at a run-rate exceeding 15% of total sales with demonstrably higher incremental margins. A clear bottoming in U.S. farm income and used-equipment prices would also matter. Until then the gap between $617 and any reasonable mid-cycle DCF remains too wide.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Deere threw off $6.10B of FCF in the most recent year against $5.03B of net income (OCF/NI 1.12x, accruals -0.4% of assets) — the reported profits are real cash. Diluted share count has compressed from 314.0M in 2021 to 271.7M in 2025 (a -3.6% CAGR), with buybacks running ~2,819% of SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated meaningfully. The balance sheet carries net debt of ~$5.52B and short-term debt of $13.80B exceeds $8.28B of liquid cash, but that structure is typical for a captive-finance industrial (Deere Financial) and FCF plus Altman Z of 2.47 (grey but stable) indicate no survival question. The cyclical picture is the softer part of the read: revenue peaked at $61.25B in 2023 and has fallen two straight years to $45.68B in 2025, with operating margin compressing from 21.2% at the 2023 peak to a reported 0% in 2025 (this last figure looks like a data artifact given $5.03B of net income on $45.68B of revenue implies real operating profit — flagged to verify). Net income roughly halved from the $10.17B peak. This is classic ag-equipment cyclicality, not a broken business — FCF actually rose year over year through the downcycle ($6.10B vs prior mixed trajectory), which is the tell of a disciplined mature earner. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: zero open-market buys and $32.5M of sales over 12 months, but the recent activity is dominated by option exercises and routine award/withholding entries, not conviction selling. Nothing here changes the quality read.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2025 operating margin — the reported 0% conflicts with $5.03B net income on $45.68B revenue and appears to be a data artifact
- Composition of $13.80B short-term debt — how much is Deere Financial receivables funding vs corporate obligations
- Order book / backlog and dealer inventory levels to gauge depth of ag-equipment downcycle
- Segment mix: PPA, Small Ag, Construction, Financial Services — where margin compression is concentrated
- SBC and buyback cadence continuation through the trough
The composite fair value sits at $277 with a signal-adjusted $305 and an EPV floor of $336 — even the most generous of those inputs implies the stock is ~45% above deserved value. DCF at $247 looks harsh but is directionally consistent with a mid-cycle earnings normalization. I sanity-check the FV: the methods cluster in a tight $247-$336 band, so this is not a runaway model, it's a coherent signal that $617 embeds peak-cycle margins extrapolated forward. What has to be true to justify today's price: precision-ag software materially re-rates the multiple, the ag downcycle is shallow and short, and the 3.6% buyback keeps compounding per-share value. That is plausible but not conservative — it is the bull case fully in the price. Earnings quality is high and the business is Strong, which lifts deserved value toward the top of the FV range (call it ~$335-$360 on a quality-adjusted basis), but even that leaves ~45% downside to fair. Margin of safety is negative.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Mid-cycle EPS assumption used in DCF vs management's through-cycle guide
- Order book duration and cancellation trends in latest 10-Q
- Precision-ag recurring revenue disclosure and attach rates
- Ag segment margin trajectory vs prior downcycles
- Pace and price of ongoing buyback
The macro tape is mildly supportive: VIX 16.5, S&P at highs, risk-on regime. But DE's beta is only 0.9, so the tailwind lands softly on this name. The bigger pressure is narrative: the precision-ag / autonomous-equipment story is running strong but flagged fragile, and at $617 vs a $305 fair-value anchor the stock is priced for that story to hold. That is a lot of narrative risk sitting on a late-cycle industrial. Near-term news flow is a genuine tailwind: CNH's Q2 beat on Monday explicitly dragged DE higher, and industry write-ups are grouping DE with peers set to benefit from ag demand. That is a live, positive read-through and it is why momentum-into-print sentiment is currently constructive. Against that, 3y momentum is negative (-13.6% CAGR, -5.6pp), suggesting the tape has been quietly de-rating the cohort even as the bull story persists. Net: a supportive short-term news/macro backdrop is roughly cancelling a fragile, stretched narrative. No decisive force in either direction right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- DE's own next earnings print and order-book/backlog commentary vs the CNH read-through
- Farmer income and ag commodity prices (corn, soy) - the crack point for the bull narrative
- Analyst target revisions post-CNH: are estimates being raised into DE's print or fading
- Whether the risk-on regime holds past its current 2-day nascent read
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, DE was $617.37. We expect it to be $560.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $380.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.