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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for D.R. Horton, Inc. (DHI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -36 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 21 · Value -83 · Sentiment -84 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $109.43 vs $146.76 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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D.R. Horton, Inc.
DHI NYSED.R. Horton, Inc. is a U.S.-based homebuilding company focused on the construction and sale of single-family homes across a broad range of price points. The company operates through geographically diversified segments, including the Northwest, Southwest, South Central, Southeast, East, and North regions, covering numerous states from Colorado and Texas to Florida and New Jersey. D.R. Horton designs and builds homes primarily for entry-level, move-up, and active adult buyers, serving both urban and suburban markets. Its operations typically encompass land acquisition, land development, home design, construction, and sales, often supported by in-house mortgage and title services provided through affiliated businesses. By concentrating on residential housing, D.R. Horton plays a significant role in the U.S. housing market, helping meet demand for new homes in high-growth and established communities. Founded in 1978 and headquartered in Arlington, Texas, the company is recognized as a major participant in the consumer durables and homebuilding industry today.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.57
Total Equity: $24.19B
Shares: 309,870,354
Total Debt: $6.03B
Cash: $2.99B
EBITDA: $4.53B
Total Debt: $6.03B
Cash: $2.99B
Revenue: $34.25B
Revenue: $34.25B
Revenue: $34.25B
Total Equity: $24.19B
Tax Rate: 23.6%
Equity: $24.19B
Total Debt: $6.03B
Cash: $2.99B
Current Liabilities: $1.96B
Long-Term Debt: $6.03B
Total Debt: $6.03B
Total Equity: $24.19B
Shares: 309,870,354
Shares: 309,870,354
CapEx: -$137.40M
Shares: 309,870,354
Stock Price: $146.76
Net Income: $3.59B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:46am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $27.8B | $33.5B | $35.5B | $36.8B | $34.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $19.9B | $23.0B | $26.1B | $27.3B | $26.1B |
| Gross Profit | $7.9B | $10.5B | $9.4B | $9.5B | $8.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.7B |
| Operating Income | $5.3B | $7.6B | $6.1B | $5.9B | $4.4B |
| Net Income | $4.2B | $5.9B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $3.6B |
| EBITDA | $5.4B | $7.7B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $4.5B |
| EPS | $11.56 | $16.65 | $13.93 | $14.44 | $11.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.41 | $16.51 | $13.82 | $14.34 | $11.57 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:35am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.2B | $2.5B | $3.9B | $4.5B | $3.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $23.2B | $28.8B | $31.2B | $34.7B | $34.1B |
| Total Assets | $24.0B | $30.4B | $32.6B | $36.1B | $35.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $5.4B | $6.1B | $5.1B | $6.0B | $6.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $8.8B | $10.6B | $9.4B | $10.3B | $10.7B |
| Total Equity | $14.9B | $19.4B | $22.7B | $25.3B | $24.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $13.6B | $19.2B | $23.6B | $28.0B | $31.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:46am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $534.4M | $561.8M | $4.3B | $2.2B | $3.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$93.5M | -$148.2M | -$148.6M | -$165.3M | -$137.4M |
| Free Cash Flow | $440.9M | $413.6M | $4.2B | $2.0B | $3.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$24.5M | -$271.5M | -$212.9M | -$40.4M | -$53.1M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.5B | $4.3B | $711.0M | $2.1B | $3.3B |
| Dividends Paid | -$289.3M | -$316.5M | -$341.2M | -$395.2M | -$494.8M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$874.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.8B | -$4.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | $197.1M | -$664.3M | $1.3B | $643.9M | -$1.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:46am (27d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.5% | +5.9% | +3.8% | -6.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +33.4% | -11.0% | +2.0% | -14.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +42.3% | -19.4% | -2.7% | -25.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +40.3% | -19.0% | +0.2% | -24.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +41.6% | -19.1% | -2.7% | -24.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 25, 2026 3:18am (29d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-07 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-05 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-13 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-07 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-02 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-07 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-01 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-01 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-05 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-02 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-06 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-01 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-03 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-06 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-16 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-03 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-09 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:48Even the bull case prices 50% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 66%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($146.76) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -1% | 10.5% | $73.68 | -50% |
| Base — stabilizes | -3% | 9.2% | $62.51 | -57% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -4% | 7.8% | $52.25 | -64% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -10% | 9.2% | $50.21 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a clear cyclical rollover story. FY2025 revenue of $34.25B is down 6.9% from FY2024's $36.80B, and net income collapsed 24.6% to $3.59B from $4.76B — a two-year decline from the FY2022 peak of $5.86B. More importantly, quarterly margins have compressed from 12.8% in Sep-2024 to 9.4% in Sep-2025, with the most recent quarter showing the lowest net margin in the eight-quarter window despite the highest sequential revenue ($9.68B). That's the signature of incentive-driven volume — buying down mortgage rates and cutting price to move inventory. Gross margin at the annual level fell from 25.9% (FY24) to 23.7% (FY25); operating margin from 16.1% to 12.9%. This is textbook late-cycle homebuilder behavior, not a stabilizing business.
That said, the balance sheet is not broken. $6.03B debt against $2.99B cash and $24.19B equity gives net debt/equity of ~13% — Horton is not the "debt-laden" builder the bear narrative implies. FCF of $3.28B on a $41.2B market cap is a 7.9% FCF yield; P/E of 12.7x and EV/EBITDA of 10.0x are not demanding on trailing numbers. The synthesis verdict of "overvalued by 30%" with a $102 fair value strikes me as overconfident given a business earning $3.59B on $24.2B of equity (14.8% ROE) trading at 1.7x book. The composite is likely anchoring too heavily on normalized/mid-cycle EPS assumptions that penalize a builder mid-decline; the market-forces model piling on "avoid until earnings stabilize" is the classic mistake of selling cyclicals at trough margins.
The contrarian read: DHI is not priced for a soft landing — it's priced roughly at trend earnings power. If FY25's $3.59B NI is the trough (or near it), $146 is ~11.5x trough earnings, which is not where you short quality builders. The Sep-2025 quarter showed revenue re-accelerating sequentially ($7.61B → $7.73B → $9.23B → $9.68B) even as margins bled — that's demand responding to lower absolute rates and builder incentives. If the 10-year holds sub-4.5% and existing-home inventory stays constrained (locked-in low mortgages), Horton's entry-level exposure that everyone hates becomes the exposure you want. The Narrative Economics module calling the story "fragile" and citing a 43% premium contradicts the Valuation Synthesis's 30% overvaluation figure — the models aren't even internally consistent on magnitude. Meanwhile the insider table is uninformative (all awards and in-kind tax withholdings, no open-market activity either direction), so "No Insider Transactions" being flagged as a signal is noise.
Where I disagree with the stack: the models correctly identify the cyclical downturn but wrongly conclude that means "sell at trough." A homebuilder trading at 11.5x trough earnings, 1.7x book, 7.9% FCF yield, with net debt/equity of 13% and 14.8% trough ROE is not obviously overvalued — it's fairly valued at the trough with option value on rate normalization. The bear case requires either (a) margins compressing another 300-400 bps from here, which starts breaking the entry-level model entirely, or (b) a genuine credit-cycle recession where orders fall 20%+. Neither is my base case given the sequential revenue acceleration already visible. Where the models are right: buying at $146 does require believing rates cooperate over the next 12-18 months; there is no margin of safety if the 10-year backs up to 5%+. The prior peak margins (13.6% in Jun-2024) are not coming back soon — competitive incentives are structural for 2026. Fair value on normalized $4.0-4.5B NI at 12x is $125-140, so I'd call this fairly valued to modestly rich, not 30% overvalued. I'd want $125 or lower to add with conviction, but I would not short here and I dissent from the "avoid" framing.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is not “trough earnings” so much as a business still profitable but clearly de-rating from an unusually favorable housing backdrop. D.R. Horton’s FY2025 revenue fell to $34.25B from $36.80B, which by itself is manageable, but the more important signal is the earnings sensitivity underneath that top-line slippage: net income dropped from $4.76B to $3.59B, and operating income fell even harder from $5.94B to $4.42B. That says the company is giving up price and/or incentives materially faster than it is losing volume. The quarterly pattern reinforces it. Revenue recovered from $7.61B in Dec-2024 to $9.68B in Sep-2025, but net margin slid from 11.1% to 9.4% over that same span, with the latest quarter producing lower profit dollars than the year-ago Sep quarter despite nearly similar revenue ($905M on $9.68B versus $1.28B on $10.00B). That is not stabilization; it is a volume-supported margin unwind. I see a very good builder with strong scale and cash generation, but also one whose earnings power is still moving down faster than headline revenue suggests.
The balance sheet and cash flow do matter, and here Horton is plainly sturdier than the bearish machine output implies. Net debt is only about $3.0B after backing out $2.99B cash from $6.03B debt, against $24.19B of equity. Free cash flow of $3.28B versus net income of $3.59B is solid conversion for a homebuilder, and capex is trivial at $137M because the real capital intensity sits in land and working capital rather than plant. At $41.2B market cap, the stock is around 11.5x FY2025 earnings and about 1.7x book, which is not expensive in absolute terms for a company still earning roughly 14.8% on equity. But neither is it a distressed cyclical multiple. My read is that the market is already acknowledging a downcycle, just not a severe one. At $146.76, investors are paying a fair, not bargain, price for a high-quality builder whose normalized earnings are likely below the 2023-2024 run-rate and above the latest exit margin if rates ease.
I agree with Opus on several important points. When Opus argues the company is not “debt-laden,” that is plainly right; the raw balance sheet does not support the dramatic bear framing. I also agree that the insider-activity signal is noise: awards, tax withholdings, and tiny option exercises say nothing. And I agree with Opus that the synthesis target of $102 looks too punitive. To justify $102 on a $41.2B company that just generated $3.59B of net income and $3.28B of FCF, you need either a much deeper profit recession or a much lower deserved multiple than the current facts support. Where I part company is with Opus’s “fairly valued at trough” framing. Opus says “If FY25’s $3.59B NI is the trough (or near it), $146 is ~11.5x trough earnings.” That conditional is doing too much work. The latest quarter’s 9.4% net margin was the weakest in the full eight-quarter set, and annual operating margin has already compressed from 18.4% in FY2022 to 12.9% in FY2025. I do not think the data yet let you declare FY2025 trough earnings with any confidence. They show ongoing compression, not a floor.
I also disagree with Opus’s use of sequential revenue improvement as evidence that demand is turning. Opus points to revenue moving $7.61B to $7.73B to $9.23B to $9.68B and infers demand responding to lower rates and incentives. For a homebuilder, that sequence is heavily seasonal; the better test is year-over-year and margin-retentive profitability, and both worsened. Sep-2025 revenue was still below Sep-2024 ($9.68B vs $10.00B), while net income was down roughly 29% ($905M vs $1.28B). So yes, demand can be bought, but that does not mean economics are stabilizing. I also disagree with the statement that the market is pricing DHI “roughly at trend earnings power.” If trend earnings power were truly just FY2025’s $3.6B, the stock is fine; but FY2021-2025 earnings ran $4.18B, $5.86B, $4.75B, $4.76B, and $3.59B, so the trend is still descending into the current year, not settled. I do agree with Opus that the stock should not be shorted on these numbers alone. This is not a broken balance sheet story. It is a decent franchise facing a still-unfolding margin reset, and that combination usually deserves caution, not aggression.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both overfitting a tiny slice of cycle data. The skeptic would argue that without orders, average selling price, cancellation rates, community count, and land position detail, neither the “trough” call nor the “still falling” call is fully earned. They would also note that trailing FCF in homebuilding can flatter reality when working capital unwinds, while book-value multiples can understate risk if land was accumulated at optimistic prices. That skeptic is right to resist precision. Still, based on the numbers here, the cleanest conclusion is that DHI is not dangerously overvalued, but it also has not yet earned a bullish “trough multiple” defense at $146.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
DHI is a mature, cash-generative homebuilder running at $34.25B revenue with $3.28B FCF in 2025. The balance sheet is sound: Altman Z near 6 (safe zone), $2.99B liquid cash, and modest net debt of $3.05B against $41B market cap - a constraint, not a threat, given consistent FCF. Earnings quality is adequate but not pristine: OCF/NI of 0.51x and accruals at 8.3% of assets reflect the working-capital-heavy nature of inventory-driven homebuilding rather than aggressive accounting, and Beneish M at -2.4 shows no manipulation flags.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Backlog trends, cancellation rates, and average selling price disclosed in the 10-K to gauge whether the margin compression stabilizes or deepens
- Mortgage rate buydown and incentive cost disclosures - the main driver of the gross margin erosion from 31.4% to 23.7%
- Land inventory composition (owned vs optioned) - key to survival math if the cycle worsens
- Debt maturity schedule against the $3.05B net debt to confirm no refinancing wall
- Geographic and price-point exposure to confirm resilience across housing sub-cycles
- Whether the 8.3% accruals figure is entirely inventory-driven or contains receivables/other build-ups
The valuation stack is unusually tight and all pointing the same direction: composite FV $118.95, signal-adjusted FV $102.29, EPV floor $122.86, anchored P/E $115.03. Price at $146.76 sits above every single one, with implied downside of roughly 19% to the highest anchor (EPV) and 30% to the signal-adjusted number. That is not a runaway model - four independent methods clustering in a $102-$123 band is a credible deserved-value range, and price is meaningfully outside it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward order book and cancellation rate trends in next 10-Q
- Incentives/mortgage rate buydowns as % of ASP - key margin tell
- Land spend and lot count guidance - capital discipline through the cycle
- Management commentary on 2025 community count and delivery growth
The tape is neutral-to-negative (VIX elevated, S&P off its high, 10y at 4.71%) and DHI's 1.36 beta means it takes the punch harder than the index. More importantly, the sector narrative is actively cracking in real time: NVR just missed on margin pressure, PulteGroup is flagging affordability and margin slide, and the media frame ('the starter home is a unicorn') is reinforcing an affordability-crisis story. That is exactly the bear narrative for DHI, and it is landing on the tape this week. Momentum confirms it: recent -6.9% vs a -1.7% long-term trend, so the stock is under distribution, not accumulation. The narrative archetype is 'cyclical-late-stage' with fragile durability - the market is quick to de-rate the whole cohort when peer prints crack, and DHI cannot easily separate itself from PHM/NVR read-throughs. Offsetting that, there is a modest tailwind from the buyback completion and an 'undervalued' framing article, plus a latent 'rate cuts eventually help housing' call option. But with rates still 4.71% and the curve barely un-inverted, that optionality is not being paid for right now. Net: non-fundamental pressure leans clearly negative, though not catastrophic - this is a headwind, not a rout.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- DHI's own next earnings print - does it confirm the peer margin crack or break from it?
- 10y yield direction; a decisive move under 4.25% would flip the sector tape
- Sell-side target revisions across the builder cohort in the next 2 weeks post NVR/PHM prints
- New home sales and mortgage application data - either stabilization or a fresh leg down
- Whether the 'affordability crisis' media frame intensifies or fades
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 27, 2026, DHI was $146.76. We expect it to be $128.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $115.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.