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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Walt Disney Company (DIS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -20 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 45 · Value -73 · Sentiment 22 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $52.32 vs $98.18 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
The Walt Disney Company
DIS NYSEThe Walt Disney Company is a global entertainment and media conglomerate operating across three primary business segments: Entertainment, Sports, and Experiences. In Entertainment, the company produces and distributes film and television content through networks including ABC, Disney, Freeform, FX, and National Geographic, while also operating streaming services Disney+ and Hulu. The Sports segment encompasses the ESPN family of television networks and digital platforms. The Experiences segment includes Disney's theme parks, cruise lines, vacation destinations, and merchandise licensing operations. The company leverages its portfolio of iconic franchises and characters—including Disney, Pixar, Marvel, Lucasfilm, and National Geographic properties—across all three segments. Disney's content strategy increasingly emphasizes direct-to-consumer distribution alongside traditional broadcasting partnerships. Founded in 1923 and headquartered in Burbank, California, The Walt Disney Company serves diverse audiences across the Americas, Europe, and the Asia Pacific region, maintaining a significant presence in global entertainment and media markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.85
Total Equity: $114.61B
Shares: 1,811,000,000
Total Debt: $42.03B
Cash: $5.70B
EBITDA: $22.88B
Total Debt: $42.03B
Cash: $5.70B
Revenue: $94.43B
Revenue: $94.43B
Revenue: $94.43B
Total Equity: $114.61B
Tax Rate: -11.9%
Equity: $114.61B
Total Debt: $42.03B
Cash: $5.70B
Current Liabilities: $34.16B
Long-Term Debt: $35.32B
Total Debt: $42.03B
Total Equity: $114.61B
Shares: 1,811,000,000
Shares: 1,811,000,000
CapEx: -$8.02B
Shares: 1,811,000,000
Stock Price: $98.14
Net Income: $12.40B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:13am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $67.4B | $82.7B | $88.9B | $91.4B | $94.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $63.8B | $76.0B | $79.9B | $79.4B | $80.6B |
| Operating Income | $7.8B | $12.1B | $12.9B | $15.6B | $17.6B |
| Net Income | $2.0B | $3.1B | $2.4B | $5.0B | $12.4B |
| EBITDA | $12.9B | $17.3B | $18.2B | $20.6B | $22.9B |
| EPS | $1.10 | $1.73 | $1.29 | $2.72 | $6.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.09 | $1.72 | $1.29 | $2.72 | $6.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:13am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $16.0B | $11.6B | $14.2B | $6.0B | $5.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $33.7B | $29.1B | $32.8B | $25.2B | $24.3B |
| Total Assets | $203.6B | $203.6B | $205.6B | $196.2B | $197.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $31.1B | $29.1B | $31.1B | $34.6B | $34.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $48.5B | $45.3B | $42.1B | $39.0B | $35.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $101.4B | $95.3B | $92.6B | $90.7B | $82.9B |
| Total Equity | $102.2B | $108.4B | $113.0B | $105.5B | $114.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $40.4B | $43.6B | $46.1B | $49.7B | $60.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:13am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | — | — | $9.9B | $14.0B | $18.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.6B | -$4.9B | -$5.0B | -$5.4B | -$8.0B |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | $4.9B | $8.6B | $10.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$3.7B | -$3.7B | -$1.6B | -$2.9B | -$2.7B |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$1.4B | -$1.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | $0 | -$3.0B | -$3.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$2.0B | -$4.3B | $2.6B | -$8.1B | -$303.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:13am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +22.7% | +7.5% | +2.8% | +3.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +56.1% | +6.1% | +21.3% | +12.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +57.6% | -25.2% | +111.2% | +149.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +34.2% | +5.5% | +12.9% | +11.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 1:59pm (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-24 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-08 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-08 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2019-12-13 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2019-07-05 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2018-12-07 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2018-07-06 | $0.84 | — | — | — |
| 2017-12-08 | $0.84 | — | — | — |
| 2017-07-06 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2016-12-08 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2016-07-07 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2015-12-10 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2015-07-01 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2014-12-11 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2013-12-12 | $0.86 | — | — | — |
| 2012-12-06 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2011-12-14 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-20 09:09Even the bull case prices 22% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 68%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($98.18) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 17.4% | $76.14 | -22% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 15.1% | $61.98 | -37% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 12.9% | $49.51 | -50% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -0% | 8.3% | $31.02 | -68% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read first: Disney's TTM revenue is roughly $97.3B (25.17+25.98+22.46+23.65) with TTM net income near $11.2B — that's ~11.5% net margin, running slightly below the FY25 print of 13.1% but well above FY24's 5.4%. The quarterly trajectory is genuinely accelerating on the top line (Q1'26 $25.98B and Q2'26 $25.17B both above the prior four quarters) but earnings quality is noisy: the June'25 quarter carried a $5.26B NI print at 22.2% margin that looks like a one-off (likely Hulu/DTC accounting or tax benefit), and stripping it out normalizes TTM NI closer to $9-10B, or ~$5.50 EPS on 1.74B shares — a real P/E closer to 17-18x, not 14.3x. FCF of $10.08B against a $170B market cap is a 5.9% FCF yield, which is genuinely attractive if durable. Balance sheet is fine: $42B debt on $114B equity, 0.37 D/E, EBITDA coverage comfortable.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: a $46-51 fair value implies Disney is worth ~0.5x sales and ~5x FCF, which is distressed-media pricing (think Paramount, not a company with $10B FCF, IP monopoly, and record parks margins). The DCF is almost certainly assuming terminal margin compression back to mid-single digits and/or aggressive linear-decline modeling — defensible as a bear case, but not as a base case for a company that just did $17.6B operating income and grew it 12.5% YoY. The synthesis engine and the narrative layer are essentially double-counting the bear case: DCF assumes low terminal margins, then the narrative layer says the 112% premium is unjustified faith — but the premium only exists because the DCF is punitive. I'd put honest fair value at 15-16x normalized $5.50 EPS = $82-88, or 12x EV/EBITDA on ~$16B EBITDA = ~$95-105 equity value. That makes $98 roughly fairly valued, not 53% overvalued.
Where the bears have a real point: revenue CAGR is only 3.1% over five years, and the recent 3.4% YoY is not a growth-stock trajectory — this is a GDP-plus business dressed up as a transformation story. Parks margins are cyclical and 2024-2025 experiences comps will get harder; ESPN's streaming transition is a genuine 2026-27 event risk with unknowable unit economics; the 129.6% earnings CAGR is entirely a recovery-from-trough artifact (FY21 was $2B NI post-COVID). The insider activity is pure option-exercise/tax-withholding mechanics — zero signal, and the "No Insider Transactions" tag is wrong on its face but directionally right (no open-market buying is the tell). Current ratio of 0.71 is worth noting but normal for media conglomerates with deferred revenue.
The contrarian argument even if all signals aligned bearish: Disney's IP library (Marvel, Star Wars, Pixar, ESPN rights, Disney vault) is genuinely irreplaceable and the market has repeatedly re-rated this company to 20-25x when narrative flips — you're being paid a 5.9% FCF yield to wait for either an ESPN DTC surprise, a parks re-acceleration, or an activist/breakup catalyst (Trian round two is not impossible). At $98, downside to a real $80 fair-value floor is ~18%; upside to a re-rating scenario at 18x $6 normalized EPS is $108, plus optionality on ESPN monetization. Asymmetry is roughly balanced, not the 53% downside the synthesis implies. My dissent from the synthesis is specifically about the DCF inputs, not the qualitative concerns — the qualitative concerns are real but already reflected at 14x reported / 17-18x normalized earnings, which is a discount to the S&P and to media peers, not a premium. Fair value $85-95, current $98, so mildly rich but not the screaming short the composite suggests. Starter position only makes sense below $85; trim above $110.
GPT Reading
At $98, Disney does not look like a stock that needs heroic assumptions. The raw numbers show a company that has already repaired far more of the income statement than the bear framing admits. Annual revenue went from $67.4B in 2021 to $94.4B in 2025, a 40% step-up, but the more important shift is profitability: operating income climbed from $7.8B to $17.6B and net income from $2.0B to $12.4B. Even allowing for one-offs in the quarterly path, this is not a business limping into relevance; it is a business reestablishing earnings power. The latest annual operating margin is 18.6% and net margin 13.1%, versus just 8.9% operating leverage back in 2021 on a much smaller base. Cash generation backs it up: $18.1B of operating cash flow and $10.1B of free cash flow after a hefty $8.0B of capex. On today’s $170.4B market cap, that is roughly a 5.9% FCF yield, and on enterprise value it is still respectable for a global branded asset with parks, sports, studios, and direct-to-consumer optionality.
What stands out most is that the quarterly earnings cadence is messy, but the floor is much higher than a few years ago. Revenue over the last eight quarters has largely held in a $22.5B-$26.0B range, so this is not a top-line rocket ship. But net income has normalized materially upward: excluding the standout $5.26B quarter, Disney still posted $2.25B, $2.40B, $3.28B, $2.55B, and $2.62B in five of the last eight quarters. That suggests a company finding margin through mix, pricing, and cost discipline despite only modest revenue growth. The 2024-09 quarter’s 2.0% net margin and the 2025-09 quarter’s 5.8% net margin are reminders that this remains a lumpy media conglomerate, but the annual trend says those weak quarters are the exception, not the norm. At 14.3x earnings and 9.2x EV/EBITDA, the stock is being valued more like a no-growth cyclically exposed incumbent than a company earning 13.0% ROIC with some self-help still available. I do not buy the extreme DCF-style conclusion that fair value is in the mid-$40s; that would imply the market should value Disney at about 4.6x free cash flow for a company with durable franchises and double-digit billions of annual operating cash flow, which is plainly too punitive.
The balance sheet is also better than the scarier versions of the narrative imply. Debt of $42.0B against $5.7B of cash is meaningful, but not oppressive for a company generating $18.1B in operating cash flow and carrying only 0.37x debt-to-equity. The current ratio of 0.71 is not pretty, yet for a company with recurring inflows and broad capital market access it is not the core issue. More important is whether Disney can keep converting its asset base into cash while funding parks and content. So far, yes: ROE is 10.8%, ROA 6.3%, and free cash flow covers the dividend many times over given a 14.5% payout ratio. This is why the “mature earner” label is directionally more useful than the dramatic transformation story. The market may still obsess over streaming inflection and ESPN transition, but the numbers increasingly read like a restored compounder with cyclical blemishes, not a broken turnaround.
The best case against my view is that the stock may already reflect most of the recovery while the underlying growth engine remains mediocre. Revenue CAGR of 3.1% is not exciting, and the extraordinary earnings CAGR is largely a rebound from depressed post-pandemic profitability rather than evidence of a structurally faster business. If margins stall around current levels, then 14x earnings is not obviously cheap for a company facing secular linear-TV erosion, content cost inflation, and parks exposure to consumer softness. The quarter-to-quarter volatility matters because Disney is still proving the quality of its earnings mix: one quarter at 22.2% net margin followed by one at 5.8% tells you there are still accounting, timing, and segment swings that can flatter annual snapshots. A bear would also point out that FCF of $10.1B against a $170B equity value is only “fine,” not a screaming bargain, especially if capex remains elevated and if a chunk of current cash flow resilience comes from price increases that may become harder to repeat. That is the serious objection, and it keeps me from calling this deeply mispriced.
What would change my mind is pretty specific. If annual revenue stalls below roughly $95B while operating income slips back toward $15B and free cash flow falls under $8B, then the current multiple would look full and I would move toward fair-value-at-best. Likewise, if upcoming quarters revert to the 2024-09 type margin profile without a clear one-off explanation, the “restored earnings power” thesis weakens fast. On the other hand, if Disney can show another year of even low-single-digit revenue growth with operating income above $18B and FCF sustainably above $10B while keeping leverage contained, then a stock under $100 is too cheap; that would support a valuation comfortably into the $110-$125 range without requiring any speculative streaming euphoria.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers show a company that has already executed the bulk of its earnings recovery, not one still waiting on a miracle. Annual net income climbed from $2.35B in FY2023 to $4.97B in FY2024 to $12.40B in FY2025, while operating income marched from $12.86B to $15.60B to $17.55B—an unbroken expansion that is far cleaner than the lumpy quarterly NI prints (the $5.26B June 2025 quarter was clearly inflated by one-timers; the more recent $2.25–2.40B quarters at 9% margins are the real run-rate). Free cash flow of $10.08B against an $8.02B capex load is high-quality, and the 18.6% operating margin plus 13.1% net margin put Disney back in the zone of a mature earner rather than a turnaround story. Revenue growth remains anemic at a 3.1% CAGR and only 3.4% recent YoY, so the entire re-rating case rests on margin durability and capital returns, not top-line acceleration. At $98 the stock trades at 14.3x trailing earnings, 9.2x EV/EBITDA, 1.9x sales and a roughly 5.9% FCF yield—multiples that sit well below Disney’s own 18–25x historical band and below pure-play streaming peers, even after the Fox acquisition hangover and linear-network erosion.
The valuation synthesis claiming a $46–51 fair value (implying the shares are 50%+ overvalued) is the clearest contradiction in the briefing. That DCF would capitalize the current $10B FCF at roughly 8x and the $12.4B NI at roughly 6–7x—levels that only make sense if one assumes a near-total collapse in parks pricing power and a reversion of streaming to heavy losses. Nothing in the recent operating trajectory supports that; ROIC is already 13% and ROE 10.8% on a still-conservative balance sheet (debt-to-equity 0.37, net debt ~$36B). The market is not pricing a “dramatic reinflation” so much as simply refusing to apply a distressed multiple to a business that has already delivered mid-teens margins and double-digit billion FCF. Insider activity is pure option exercises and tax withholdings—noise, not signal—while the current ratio of 0.71 is the only genuine balance-sheet soft spot, though it is typical for an experiences-heavy model with predictable cash conversion.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: revenue is barely growing, linear TV and ESPN cord-cutting are structural headwinds, streaming subscriber growth is plateauing globally, and parks margins have historically proved cyclical. A smart bear would note that the $12.4B NI and 13% net margin may already embed peak experiences pricing and favorable content amortization timing; any simultaneous softening in park attendance and renewed streaming content inflation could drop the earnings power back toward $7–8B, at which point 14x becomes 20x+ overnight. The narrative premium identified in the briefing—Disney’s cultural-moat story keeping the stock 100% above a harsh DCF—is real, and narratives reverse faster than cash flows. I weigh this less heavily because the operating-income ladder over three years is not a one-quarter fluke, FCF conversion is already strong, and even a partial mean-reversion in margins still leaves the shares at a mid-teens earnings multiple that is defensible for irreplaceable IP and a global parks oligopoly.
What would flip the view is two consecutive quarters of net income falling back below a $2B run-rate (implying sub-8% margins) accompanied by parks operating-margin compression of 200 bp or more, or free cash flow dropping under $7B on a trailing twelve-month basis. Either would validate the $46 DCF and force a re-rating lower.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has climbed from $67.4B (2021) to $94.4B (2025), with operating margin expanding every year from 11.5% to 18.6% and net income jumping from $2.0B to $12.4B. Free cash flow has flipped from -$3.6B in 2021/-$4.9B in 2022 to +$4.9B, +$8.6B, and +$10.1B - a genuine operating recovery, not an accounting artifact: OCF/NI is 2.82x and accruals are -3.7% of assets, both consistent with high earnings quality. Diluted share count actually shrank slightly (1.83B to 1.81B) with buybacks running 119% of SBC and SBC only 1.4% of revenue - per-share value is being protected. The soft spot is the balance sheet. Net debt is roughly $36B, liquid cash is only $5.7B (3.3% of market cap), and short-term debt of $6.7B exceeds cash, so Disney is dependent on rolling paper. Altman Z of 2.37 sits in the grey zone - not distressed, but not a fortress. Insider tape shows only routine option exercises, tax withholdings, and awards - no directional open-market buys or sells to read. Taken together this is a large, cash-generative, improving mature earner with clean accounting and disciplined share count, but carrying meaningful leverage and operating in a structurally challenged linear/streaming transition that the raw financials cannot fully speak to.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted-average cost - is the $6.7B short-term slice already termed out or a real 2026 refi risk?
- Segment mix: how much of the margin expansion is DTC (streaming) turning profitable vs Parks - durability differs sharply
- Linear networks trajectory and any impairment or restructuring charges baked into 2025 net income
- Content spend and capex commitments (parks/cruise ships) that could pressure the FCF ramp
- Whether the $12.4B net income includes one-time gains (Hulu remeasurement, tax items) versus underlying run-rate
The e2e composite fair value pegs DIS at $51 (signal-adjusted $46), with DCF at $48 and an EPV floor at $58 - all methods cluster in the mid-$40s to high-$50s versus a $98 price. Even granting the quality lens's 'Solid' grade a generous premium to the EPV floor, deserved value likely sits in the $60-$70 range, still a material step below spot. The market is capitalizing a full streaming-profitability ramp, sustained parks pricing, and ESPN's DTC transition as if all three are already de-risked.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- DTC segment operating margin trajectory and streaming subscriber ARPU in latest quarter
- Parks segment per-capita spend and attendance trends vs prior peak
- ESPN linear affiliate revenue erosion pace and DTC pricing plan
- Net debt paydown vs guidance and any buyback pace
- One-time restructuring/impairment items normalizing reported earnings
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive: a risk-on tape with VIX at 16.5 and the S&P at highs favors high-beta consumer-facing names, and DIS at 1.4 beta gets amplified upside from that. The active narrative is a strong platform-monopoly story (Marvel, Star Wars, Pixar, ESPN) with medium cult following - that story is currently intact, reinforced by Spider-Man tracking as the second-biggest domestic opening in history, which feeds the IP-moat conviction the bulls need. Analyst and press tone into tomorrow's fiscal Q3 print is constructive: multiple outlets flag an impressive earnings surprise history and 'right combination' for another beat, options are pricing a big move, and the A+E divestiture for $1.2B is being framed as portfolio-cleanup rather than distress. Counter-pressure is real but narrower - one prominent piece flags that DIS 'needs more than an earnings beat to get a boost,' hinting the bar is elevated and the story is running ahead of DCF. Net: narrative momentum + risk-on tape + pre-earnings positioning outweigh the elevated-bar risk, but only modestly given event risk in under 24 hours.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Fiscal Q3 print tomorrow AM - direct-to-consumer margins and ESPN subscriber/ad commentary
- Whether Spider-Man legs hold or fade in weeks 2-3 (narrative reinforcement vs decay)
- Any guidance revision that would separate this cohort from Netflix's compounding narrative
- Post-print analyst target revisions - direction and dispersion
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, DIS was $98.18. We expect it to be $90.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $70.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.