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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Doximity Inc. (DOCS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-09): Designation Watch · Cairn score +35 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 66 · Value 10 · Sentiment -55 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $25.11 vs $21.24 at analysis
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price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Doximity Inc. operates a leading digital platform tailored for U.S. medical professionals, serving as the largest online community with verified members including over 80% of physicians, 50% of nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. Its cloud-based software enables secure collaboration among colleagues, coordination of patient care, virtual patient visits via telehealth tools like Dialer and Dialer Video, access to curated medical news and research, and career management features. The platform includes mobile-friendly tools such as electronic faxing, e-signatures, on-call scheduling through Amion, and AI-powered clinical references for evidence-based decision-making. Doximity Inc. enhances clinician productivity by connecting care teams, streamlining workflows, and providing personalized newsfeeds and job matching services. Founded in 2010 and headquartered in San Francisco, California, it plays a vital role in the healthcare technology sector by fostering efficient communication and reducing administrative burdens for medical providers nationwide.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 9| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 6, 2026 | $0.30 | $0.29 -3.3% | — | — |
| May 13, 2026 | $0.28 | $0.26 -7.1% | — | — |
| Feb 23, 2026 | $1.01 | $0.59 -41.6% | — | — |
| Feb 5, 2026 | $0.45 | $0.46 +2.2% | — | — |
| Jan 23, 2026 | $1.61 | $1.87 +16.1% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 7, 2026 | 144 | View |
| Aug 6, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Aug 6, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jul 24, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 24, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 20, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | 144 | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | ARS | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | DEFA14A | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | DEF 14A | View |
| Jul 14, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Jul 14, 2026 | 4 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.98
Total Equity: $950.84M
Shares: 199,048,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $219.18M
EBITDA: $229.30M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $219.18M
Revenue: $644.86M
Revenue: $644.86M
Revenue: $644.86M
Total Equity: $950.84M
Tax Rate: 21.6%
Equity: $950.84M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $219.18M
Current Liabilities: $154.97M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $950.84M
Shares: 199,048,000
Shares: 199,048,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 199,048,000
Stock Price: $21.24
Net Income: $196.05M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:48pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $343.5M | $419.1M | $475.4M | $570.4M | $644.9M |
| Cost of Revenue | $39.8M | $53.5M | $50.7M | $55.9M | $70.3M |
| Gross Profit | $303.8M | $365.6M | $424.8M | $514.5M | $574.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $190.2M | $240.5M | $260.9M | $286.7M | $359.6M |
| Operating Income | $113.5M | $125.1M | $163.9M | $227.8M | $214.9M |
| Net Income | $154.8M | $112.8M | $147.6M | $223.2M | $196.1M |
| EBITDA | $118.6M | $135.4M | $174.1M | $238.5M | $229.3M |
| EPS | $0.82 | $0.58 | $0.78 | $1.19 | $1.05 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.70 | $0.53 | $0.72 | $1.11 | $0.98 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:26pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $112.8M | $158.0M | $96.8M | $209.6M | $219.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $904.1M | $975.5M | $912.9M | $1.1B | $944.3M |
| Total Assets | $991.4M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $111.3M | $139.5M | $147.3M | $156.3M | $155.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $112.8M | $170.8M | $178.0M | $181.7M | $172.9M |
| Total Equity | $878.6M | $966.1M | $901.4M | $1.1B | $950.8M |
| Retained Earnings | $191.1M | $217.9M | $80.0M | $186.9M | -$51.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:48pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $126.6M | $179.6M | $184.1M | $273.3M | $326.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.9M | -$1.7M | $-147,000 | $0 | $0 |
| Free Cash Flow | $124.7M | $177.9M | $183.9M | $273.3M | $326.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$53.5M | $0 | $0 | -$26.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.7M | -$85.3M | -$280.7M | -$120.3M | -$431.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | $46.4M | $45.2M | -$61.2M | $112.8M | $9.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:48pm (9d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +22.0% | +13.5% | +20.0% | +13.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.3% | +16.2% | +21.1% | +11.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +10.2% | +31.0% | +39.0% | -5.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -27.1% | +30.8% | +51.2% | -12.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +14.2% | +28.6% | +36.9% | -3.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:36pm (9d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-22 | ZATZ STEVEN L | A-Award | 150,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-22 | Tangney Jeffrey | A-Award | 2,480,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | Sitaram Siddharth | C-Conversion | 4,800.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | Sitaram Siddharth | S-Sale | 1,732.00 | $22.02 | $38,139 |
| 2026-07-15 | Sitaram Siddharth | M-OptionExercise | 4,800.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-13 | Benjamin Regina M. | A-Award | 21,314.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-15 | Benjamin Regina M. | A-Award | 9,750.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The most important number in this file is the most recent quarter: Q4 FY26 (March 2026) revenue of $145.4M with net income of $19.1M and a 13.1% net margin. That is a violent break from the prior four-quarter margin band of 33–45%. Sequentially, revenue fell from $185.1M to $145.4M (-21%), and net income collapsed from $61.6M to $19.1M (-69%). Year-over-year, that same March quarter grew just 5.1% from $138.3M — a sharp deceleration from the ~20%+ prints earlier in the year. The full-year still looks respectable ($644.9M rev, +13% YoY, $196M NI), but the exit-run trajectory is materially worse than the annual composite suggests, and this is what the "fair value $25" DCF composite is quietly averaging away.
I disagree with the synthesis's "fair value" framing and lean closer to Market Forces' skeptical read — though not for its stated reason (Microsoft/Epic disruption is speculative). The concrete issue is that operating margin for FY26 fell to 33.3% from 39.9% in FY25 despite revenue growing 13%. That is negative operating leverage on a 89% gross margin business, which is genuinely alarming — it implies either aggressive reinvestment (fine), pricing/mix erosion (bad), or a step-up in comp/AI infrastructure spend that isn't yet productive (ambiguous). The models don't wrestle with this. Earnings CAGR of 15% and FCF CAGR of 33% are backward-looking artifacts; recent earnings YoY is already -12%, and the Q4 margin collapse means forward earnings power is closer to $150–170M annualized than the trailing $196M. At $170M forward NI, the P/E is ~22.5x on a decelerating business, not the bargain 21x the canonical metrics imply.
The contrarian long case: 89% gross margins and $326M FCF on zero capex is an extraordinary business model, debt-free with $219M cash, ROIC 23%. If the Q4 miss is one-time (sales force reset, a lumpy ad quarter — Doximity's pharma ad revenue IS seasonal and lumpy, which the models under-weight), then FY27 could reaccelerate and $21 becomes cheap. The narrative layer is right that there's no story premium to unwind — this is already priced as boring SaaS. Insider activity is genuinely neutral-to-slightly-negative (small sales, routine awards, no meaningful open-market buys), which for a founder-led company at multi-year lows is a mild tell that insiders don't see obvious mispricing either. The "traditional" company-type tag is correct; the "mature_earner" archetype with confidence 1 is honest about its own uncertainty.
Where the data is thin: we have one bad quarter, not a trend. The fiscal calendar (March year-end) means the Q4 March 2026 datapoint could reflect end-of-year true-ups, deferred revenue recognition quirks, or a genuine demand step-down — the file doesn't tell us. The pharma advertising cycle is exposed to biotech/pharma marketing budgets, which have been under pressure in 2025-26 with GLP-1 spend crowding out other categories. No debt is a real balance-sheet virtue that none of the models adequately credit — this company can survive a bad year without dilution. My verdict: the synthesis's $23–25 fair value is roughly right on trailing numbers but wrong on trajectory. If Q4 is the new baseline, fair value is $17–19; if Q4 is noise and FY27 shows $180–200M NI on $720M revenue, fair value is $28–32. At $21.24 you are paying for the optimistic case with weakening evidence. I dissent modestly from "fair value" toward "slightly overvalued pending Q1 FY27 confirmation" — this is a wait-and-watch, not a buy at $21. A starter position only makes sense sub-$18, where the margin-of-safety compensates for the Q4 signal. The market-forces "value trap" framing overstates the competitive threat but correctly identifies the direction of drift.
GPT Reading
At $21.24, Doximity looks more cheap-than-fair for a business the market is treating as ex-growth despite evidence it is still compounding at a respectable rate. Revenue rose from $570.4M to $644.9M in FY2026, up 13.1%, after 20.0% growth the prior year, so yes, this is no longer a hypergrowth story. But the important point is that the slowdown has happened into extraordinary economics, not because the model broke. Gross margin remains 89.1%, operating margin 33.3%, net margin 30.4%, and free cash flow was $326.5M—over 50% of revenue and well above net income of $196.1M. With no debt and $219.2M of cash, the enterprise is exceptionally clean. For a business with these returns—20.6% ROE, 23.0% ROIC—and what appears to be largely intangible, low-capex monetization, 5.6x EV/revenue and 15.7x EV/EBITDA are not demanding.
What stands out in the raw numbers is not a collapsing business but a normalization with some margin pressure. The quarterly revenue pattern is lumpy but healthy: $126.7M, $136.8M, $168.6M, $138.3M, then $145.9M, $168.5M, $185.1M, $145.4M across the last eight quarters. That says the business still has seasonality and campaign timing, but the annual run-rate is moving up. More concerning is earnings compression: quarterly net margin has gone from mid-40s a year ago to 36%-37% in the middle of FY2026 and then just 13.1% in the March quarter. Still, full-year operating income only slipped from $227.8M to $214.9M while revenue increased $74.5M, so this is margin giveback, not franchise destruction. The cash flow data actually argues against the most bearish interpretation: operating cash flow of $326.5M on $644.9M of revenue is elite and inconsistent with a business in economic freefall.
The market-headwinds read in the briefing overstates what the numbers actually prove. If moat erosion were already showing up sharply, I would expect weaker gross margins, clear top-line stagnation, balance-sheet stress, or deteriorating cash conversion. Instead, gross margin is still nearly 90%, annual revenue is still growing double digits, and free cash flow equals reported operating cash flow because this is an asset-light model needing effectively no capex. The “mature earner” label is directionally right, but the valuation being only slightly above “fair value” in the model feels too conservative because it treats this like an ordinary mature software name rather than one with unusually high incremental economics and no leverage. On roughly $3.82B market cap against $196.1M of net income and $326.5M of FCF, investors are paying about 19.5x earnings and under 12x FCF on the raw figures. For a debt-free healthcare information platform still growing 13%, that is attractive.
The best case against my view is that the margin deterioration is the real story and the revenue growth is flattered by a still-favorable base. Annual net income fell from $223.2M to $196.1M despite higher sales, and the latest quarter’s 13.1% net margin is ugly versus 45.2% in the year-ago March quarter. If that quarter is the new normal rather than a one-off investment or timing issue, the stock is not cheap at all; a business going from 40%+ margins toward the teens deserves a much lower multiple. There is also a legitimate argument that Doximity’s addressable market is structurally capped: $644.9M of revenue on a physician-focused platform may already represent a meaningful share of what can be monetized, so sustaining even low-teens growth could get harder from here. And while insider data here is mostly awards and small sales, there is no offsetting evidence of aggressive insider buying to signal management sees obvious undervaluation.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next few quarters show revenue growth slipping from 13% toward mid-single digits while net margin stays below 25%, then the bear case of a shrinking moat and maturing TAM is winning, and I would stop arguing for upside. Likewise, if FY2027 operating income declines again despite revenue growth, it would show the business is having to spend materially more to stand still. On the other hand, if Doximity can keep annual revenue growth around 10%-12% and restore net margin back into the 30% range, the current price is too low and a rerating toward the mid-to-high $20s would be justified.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a cash-compounding franchise that has fully exited its hypergrowth phase and is now being asked to prove it can still earn a growth multiple. Annual revenue climbed from $343.5M in FY2022 to $644.9M in FY2026—a clean 16.5% CAGR—yet the latest year delivered only 13.1% growth while operating income actually fell from $227.8M to $214.9M and net income dropped from $223.2M to $196.1M. The March 2026 quarter is the red flag inside that print: revenue of $145.4M was up modestly versus the year-ago $138.3M, but net income collapsed from $62.5M (45.2% margin) to $19.1M (13.1%). That single quarter accounts for most of the full-year earnings decline. Against this, free-cash-flow generation is pristine—$326.5M with zero capex, an 8.5% FCF yield on the $3.82B enterprise, and conversion well above 100% of net income. Gross margin remains 89%, the balance sheet carries no debt and $219M cash, ROIC sits at 23%, and trailing multiples (21.7x earnings, 5.6x EV/revenue, 15.7x EV/EBITDA) are those of a mature software business, not a disrupted one. The market has already performed the re-rating from the old $76 narrative; at $21.24 the stock is priced for continued mid-teens growth and stable-to-slightly-lower margins, not for collapse.
The sharpest contradiction is between the still-elite economics and the direction of travel. Revenue growth has decelerated in a straight line, the most recent quarter’s margin compression is severe enough to question whether the 33% operating margin is the new ceiling or merely a trough, and the competitive overlay (EHR-native tools, Microsoft/OpenAI healthcare pushes) is real even if it has not yet shown up as customer losses. A smart skeptic would argue that an 8.5% FCF yield is appropriate compensation for a business whose earnings just shrank 12% and whose physician-network moat is being commoditized from above and below. They would also note that the valuation-synthesis fair value of roughly $23–25 already embeds a modest re-acceleration that the latest quarter does not support; if FY2027 revenue growth slips into high-single digits and margins stay compressed, the stock is fairly valued to slightly rich at $21.
I weigh that case as secondary because the absolute level of cash generation and capital lightness still dominate. A debt-free business printing $326M of unlevered free cash flow on $645M of revenue, with 80%+ physician reach and essentially zero maintenance capex, is not a value trap until those cash flows actually erode. The March quarter looks more like a one-time cost or investment spike (or heavy SBC) than structural margin collapse, given that the three preceding quarters still delivered 33–37% net margins. Insider activity is noise—awards and routine option-related sales, no discretionary open-market dumping. The “quiet-quality” narrative is correctly anchored to fundamentals; there is no premium left to deflate.
What flips me is straightforward: two more quarters of sub-10% revenue growth combined with operating margins stuck below 30%, or explicit evidence that large health-system customers are migrating collaboration spend into Epic/Oracle bundles. Conversely, a return to 15%+ growth with operating margins re-expanding above 35% would make the stock clearly cheap into the high $20s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Fairly valued at $21.24 — Q4 margin shock is real but likely absorbed within a still-elite annual print; fair value $21–24, wait for Q1 FY27 before committing either direction
My colleagues both anchor to the annual composite — 13% revenue growth, $326M FCF, 89% gross margin, no debt — and treat the Q4 margin collapse as a single anomalous data point inside an otherwise pristine year. That framing is defensible, but I want to name specifically what did and didn't move me. GPT's observation that full-year operating income only slipped from $227.8M to $214.9M despite $74.5M of incremental revenue is the strongest counter to my read — it reframes Q4 as margin *giveback* absorbed by a still-profitable annual print, not franchise damage. Grok's point that the three quarters preceding Q4 still delivered 33–37% net margins is also material: this isn't a four-quarter deterioration trend, it's one quarter breaking a band. Both are right that I was implicitly annualizing the Q4 margin, which is aggressive given the seasonality of pharma ad revenue that I myself flagged.
What did *not* move me: the FCF-yield argument. Grok's 8.5% FCF yield is real, but FCF conversion above 100% of net income on a heavily SBC-using software company is partly a stock-based-comp artifact, not pure cash economics — neither colleague adjusts for this and it matters at Doximity's comp levels. GPT's "19.5x earnings, 12x FCF" also uses trailing NI that already embeds the Q4 hit; on a normalized ~$210M NI the multiple is closer to 18x, which is fair but not obviously cheap for a decelerating business. Neither colleague grappled with the FY26 operating margin compression from 39.9% to 33.3% on positive revenue growth — that's negative operating leverage on an 89% gross margin business and it predates Q4.
Net: I'm revising from "slightly overvalued" to closer to fairly valued. The annual composite is genuinely stronger than a Q4-anchored read suggests, and I was over-weighting one quarter. But I'm not going to their $26–29 fair value — that requires margin restoration I have no evidence for yet. Fair value $21–24, current price inside the range, no edge either way until Q1 FY27.
GPT — Second Response · undervalued revised
VERDICT: Modestly undervalued at $21.24, but only if FY26 Q4 proves temporary; fair value now looks closer to $24–26, with sub-$19 more compelling if margin pressure persists.
Claude’s pushback sharpened the main thing I underweighted: the FY26 exit rate is plainly weaker than the full-year average, and on a business with 89% gross margins, a drop in operating margin from 39.9% to 33.3% alongside 13% revenue growth is not something to hand-wave. His framing that the stock may only look cheap on trailing earnings, while forward earnings power could be closer to $150–170M if the March quarter reflects a new baseline, is the strongest bear argument in the set. That said, I’m not persuaded by taking one quarter and annualizing it. Grok’s counterpoint is more convincing to me here: the prior three quarters still showed healthy 33%–37% net margins, and the cash-generation profile did not crack. A business doing $326.5M of operating cash flow on $644.9M of revenue, with no debt and effectively no capex, still deserves credit that a normal decelerating software name would not.
So I am revising in degree, not direction. My original $26–29 fair-value range was too aggressive given the very real possibility that FY26 Q4 was not noise but the first sign of a lower-margin, lower-growth phase. Claude moved me on that specific point. But he did not move me all the way to “overvalued,” because the present valuation already reflects a lot of skepticism: about 19.5x trailing earnings and under 12x FCF for a debt-free platform still growing 13% annually is not paying a heroic price. The right interpretation now is narrower and more conditional: Doximity is modestly undervalued if margins normalize back toward the low 30s, but only slightly so, and the margin of safety is not large enough to ignore the Q4 warning. I’d tighten fair value to roughly $24–26 and admit this is now a prove-it story rather than a straightforward mispricing.
Grok — Second Response · undervalued revised
VERDICT: Modestly undervalued at $21.24; FCF fortress supports $24–26 once margins stabilize above 25%
Claude’s emphasis on negative operating leverage—operating margin falling to 33.3% from 39.9% even as revenue rose 13%, plus the sequential –21% revenue and –69% net-income drop into the 13.1% March quarter—correctly flags that I under-weighted the exit-run-rate risk. That single print does pull trailing $196 M NI toward a more cautious $160–180 M forward run-rate if margins do not rebound, which trims my prior $26–28 anchor. GPT’s counter that the same $326.5 M FCF (zero-capex, >50% of revenue) and still-double-digit annual growth remain inconsistent with franchise destruction keeps me from flipping; the balance-sheet fortress and 89% gross margin still dominate one ugly quarter whose seasonality Claude himself concedes could be lumpy pharma ads or true-ups.
I therefore hold the undervalued call but revise the magnitude downward: at $21.24 the 8.5% FCF yield already prices mid-teens growth and only partial margin recovery, not collapse. Confirmation that Q1 FY27 restores net margins above 25–30% would restore the higher target; sustained sub-10% growth plus sub-25% margins would validate Claude’s $18–20 zone. Until then the cash-compounding economics outweigh the trajectory warning.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Doximity runs an enviable financial profile: gross margin held near 89-90% across five years, operating margin expanded from 33% (2022) to 33-40% range recently, and revenue compounded from $343.5M to $644.9M (roughly 17% CAGR). FCF nearly tripled from $124.7M to $326.5M, and OCF/NI of 1.31x plus negative accruals (-4.4% of assets), a Beneish M of -2.93, and an Altman Z of 15.24 all signal clean, cash-backed earnings. Net cash of $219.2M with no debt drag means the business is entirely self-funding. Insider tape shows only programmatic sales tied to option exercises and RSU vesting — no open-market buys, but also no unusual dumping. The meaningful blemish is stock-based compensation at 18.9% of revenue (roughly $122M/yr), which is a real economic cost masked by 'adjusted' metrics. Buybacks at 283% of SBC have kept diluted share count roughly flat (1% CAGR, and down from 213.4M in 2023 to 199.0M in 2026), so per-share value is being defended, but a large slice of operating economics is being recycled to employees rather than shareholders. Net income also wobbled ($223.2M in 2025 to $196.1M in 2026) even as FCF kept climbing, hinting at some non-cash noise worth understanding. Durability read: the network-effect physician platform implied by these margins suggests a real moat, but I can't confirm customer/pharma concentration from the derived data alone. Overall this is a solidly healthy, well-run business — not a fortress-tier compounder because of the SBC drag and single-vertical exposure risk I can't verify away.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer/pharma advertiser concentration in the 10-K — top-customer revenue share
- SBC composition — RSU vs option, and whether grant pace is stable or accelerating
- Driver of 2026 net income dip vs 2025 despite higher revenue and FCF
- Deferred revenue / billings trends to confirm underlying demand growth
- Any pending regulatory or platform risk around physician data / HIPAA
- Segment mix — hiring solutions vs telehealth vs pharma marketing durability
The composite fair value of $25.11 and signal-adjusted $23.35 sit above the $21.24 price, implying a ~10% gap. DCF ($24.62) and the anchored P/E ($42.49) point higher, but the anchored multiple is clearly a runaway output — it back-solves off Doximity's premium historical multiple and should not be taken at face value. The EPV floor of $8.71 is a useful reality check: strip out growth and SBC-adjusted earnings power alone doesn't justify the current cap, meaning most of today's price is a bet on continued network compounding.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY guidance for revenue growth and margin trajectory — deceleration below mid-teens would compress DCF materially
- SBC as % of revenue trend and true diluted share count evolution
- Any commentary on Epic/EHR competitive encroachment on collaboration workflows
- Segment detail on newer products (Scheduling, Client Solutions) to test the compounding thesis
The macro tape is actively hostile: VIX 20.7 in the 97th percentile, S&P off recent highs, 10y at 4.61%, and market PE stretched at 26.2. With a beta of 1.29, DOCS mechanically absorbs more of that stress than the average name, and unlike mega-cap defensives it has no counter-narrative to lean on - the archetype is 'quiet-quality' at minimal intensity, meaning there is no cult bid, no AI-winner premium, no thematic sponsorship to offset a risk-off drawdown. When the tape sells growth-adjacent SaaS, DOCS gets sold with the cohort. The stock-specific overhang is the May 14 event: a 23% crash on weak FY27 guidance and multiple downgrades citing AI-spend cannibalization risk. That analyst tone has not been decisively reset - the bear case (EHR bundling, decelerating growth, AI displacing pharma ad budgets) is the live narrative on the sell side, while the bull case is quiet and fundamentals-only. News flow is thin and neutral (a small up day, a generic 'stocks under 50' mention) - nothing to reignite sponsorship. Net: a moderate, persistent headwind driven by tape plus unresolved post-earnings skepticism, not a narrative collapse. Not decisive, but clearly leaning down.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side estimate revisions on FY27 have stabilized or continue to drift lower
- VIX mean-reversion below 18 - would materially lift high-beta SaaS including DOCS
- Any incremental commentary on pharma ad-budget AI risk from peers (Veeva, WBA marketing partners)
- Next earnings print - a clean beat with in-line guide would reset the post-May narrative
Character & Durability Scorecard
Survivability 9/10
Fortress balance sheet with substantial net cash, self-funding operations, and proven ability to generate strong cash flow through multiple market cycles including pandemic and tech downturn.
- Net cash $219.2M with zero debt and strong FCF generation ($326.5M/yr)
- Maintained profitability through 2022-2026 with consistently positive FCF, navigating COVID disruption and tech downturn without financial stress
Adaptability 7/10
Demonstrated meaningful pivot from legacy model to digital SaaS platform and expanded product lines to capture pandemic telehealth shift, though not yet tested by major existential disruption.
- Successfully transitioned from print directory model to digital platform serving healthcare professionals
- Expanded product suite beyond core networking to telehealth, recruiting, and marketing solutions during COVID era
Moat Trajectory 8/10
Network effects strengthening as physician penetration approaches saturation and gross margins remain elite, though moat is stable-to-widening rather than rapidly expanding.
- Gross margins expanding from 87.2% (2023) to 90.2% (2025) then stable at 89.1% (2026), indicating strong pricing power and network effects
- Network of over 80% of US physicians creates powerful two-sided marketplace with rising switching costs as engagement deepens
Capital Allocation 8/10
Excellent capital discipline with aggressive share repurchases well exceeding SBC dilution, shrinking share count while compounding cash generation, and no evidence of empire-building acquisitions.
- Buyback/SBC ratio of 283.8% demonstrates shareholder-friendly capital return exceeding dilution by nearly 3x
- Share count declining from 213.4M (2023) to 199.0M (2026) while generating strong FCF growth, no value-destructive M&A evident
Pricing Power 9/10
Exceptional pricing power demonstrated by sustained 87-90% gross margins and dramatic operating margin expansion from 30% to 40%, showing ability to capture value without volume loss.
- Operating margins expanded from 29.9% (2023) to 39.9% (2025), demonstrating ability to raise prices faster than costs
- Gross margins consistently elite at 87-90% range and stable/rising despite revenue growth, indicating strong pricing leverage
Management Alignment 6/10
Mixed signals with high SBC burden and one-way insider selling tempered by aggressive shareholder-friendly buybacks that more than offset dilution and strong operational execution.
- SBC at 18.9% of revenue is high, indicating aggressive equity compensation that understates true economic profitability
- Insider selling of $569,566 across 7 transactions with zero buys in past 12 months, though offset by strong buyback program (283.8% of SBC)
Demand Durability 8/10
Strong secular tailwinds from healthcare digitization, pharma marketing channel shift, and persistent physician networking/recruiting needs create durable long-term demand backdrop.
- Healthcare sector digitization is multi-decade secular trend with physician networking and recruitment needs persistent regardless of cycles
- Pharma and medical device marketing shifting structurally from in-person reps to digital channels, a permanent tailwind accelerated by COVID
Growth Consistency 9/10
Exceptional consistency with uninterrupted revenue and FCF growth every single year over five-year period, steady margin expansion, and low volatility in business trajectory.
- Revenue grew every year: $343.5M (2022) to $644.9M (2026), a steady CAGR of ~17% with zero down years
- FCF compounded from $124.7M (2022) to $326.5M (2026) with consistent year-over-year increases, demonstrating reliable cash generation
Optionality / Runway 7/10
Clear runway to expand revenue per physician through additional product modules and services, plus latent international option, though core network approaching saturation in domestic market.
- Penetrated 80% of US physicians but can expand wallet share via telehealth, scheduling, recruiting, and marketing products beyond core networking
- International expansion opportunity remains largely untapped, though US market depth provides near-term runway
Concentration / Key-Person Risk —
Customer concentration data not provided in financials, and while business model suggests diversification across many pharmaceutical and recruiting clients, specific concentration metrics are unavailable to score confidently.