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OLDER Analysis Report
Aug 30, 2026
39 days ago · 100% complete
This report is 39 days old — newer filings and price moves since then are not reflected.
For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page

What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Dover Corp (DOV) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.

Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -17 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 62 · Value -70 · Sentiment 6 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $97.98 vs $198.68 at analysis

Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable reference-name attribute you can cite):

  • profile-header / price-overview — company profile, live quote, market cap
  • extended-analysis — the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memo
  • future-predictions — our forward price-band predictions
  • market-narrative / ai-findings / gpt-critique — narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)
  • Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers): price-history, income-trend, key-metrics, financials (statement tables), insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.

More for machine readers: site briefing at /llms.txt · any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER · raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds); every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.

Dover Corp

DOV NYSE
Industrials · Specialty Industrial Machinery
Downers Grove, IL 60515, United States dovercorporation.com Updated Aug 30, 3:00am
Price
$198.68
Market Cap
$26.8B
Employees
24,000
Beta
1.16
Avg Volume
1,141,646
Last Dividend
$2.08
CEO
Mr. Richard Joseph Tobin

Dover Corporation is a diversified global manufacturer and solutions provider that designs equipment, components, consumables, aftermarket parts, software, digital solutions, and support services for industrial customers. Dover Corporation serves a broad range of current end markets through five operating segments: Engineered Products, Clean Energy & Fueling, Imaging & Identification, Pumps & Process Solutions, and Climate & Sustainability Technologies. Its offerings support vehicle aftermarket, aerospace and defense, industrial winch and hoist, fluid dispensing, convenience retail, fueling, clean energy, cryogenic gas, vehicle wash, chemical, bioproduction, hygienic, energy, and other industrial applications. The company focuses on helping customers improve safety, reliability, productivity, and efficiency with specialized technologies and service support. Headquartered in Downers Grove, Illinois, Dover Corporation operates as a key industrial platform with a portfolio built around mission-critical products used across manufacturing, transportation, energy, and process industries.

Runs with full report Generated: Aug 30, 2026 3:10am
Price Overview
Price at report time
$198.68
as of Aug 30, 3:00am (39d ago)
Change · Aug 30
-3.14 (-1.56%)
Day Range
$197.41 – $202.68
52-Week Range
$158.97 – $237.54
50-Day MA
$210.81
200-Day MA
$209.78
Volume
1,231,100.00
Right now · live
Log in to get the live feed
Members see the real-time price and the move since this report (over 39d).
Share Structure
Outstanding 135,072,870.00
Float 133,707,834.00
Free Float 99.0%
High free float — 99.0% of shares trade freely, ~1% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:23am (39d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:10am (39d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
TD Twelve Data statement HEX SEC filing
Industry comparison last run: Aug 30, 2026 3:08am
P/E · trailing (TTM) (Price per dollar of earnings over the past year — not a run-rate or forward P/E)
HEX
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
25.02
Stock Price: $198.68
EPS (Diluted): 7.94
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
HEX
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
3.70
Stock Price: $198.68
Total Equity: $7.41B
Shares: 137,777,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
HEX
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
16.87
Market Cap: $26.76B
Total Debt: $4.04B
Cash: $1.68B
EBITDA: $1.75B
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
HEX
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$29.6B
Market Cap: $26.76B
Total Debt: $4.04B
Cash: $1.68B
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
HEX
Gross Profit / Revenue
39.8%
Gross Profit: $3.22B
Revenue: $8.09B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
HEX
Operating Income / Revenue
17.0%
Operating Income: $1.37B
Revenue: $8.09B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
HEX
Net Income / Revenue
13.5%
Net Income: $1.09B
Revenue: $8.09B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
HEX
Net Income / Total Equity
14.8%
Net Income: $1.09B
Total Equity: $7.41B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
HEX
NOPAT / Invested Capital
11.2%
Operating Income: $1.37B
Tax Rate: 20.1%
Equity: $7.41B
Total Debt: $4.04B
Cash: $1.68B
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
HEX
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1.79
Current Assets: $4.51B
Current Liabilities: $2.52B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
HEX
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.55
Short-Term Debt: $1.41B
Long-Term Debt: $2.63B
Total Debt: $4.04B
Total Equity: $7.41B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
HEX
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$58.74
Revenue: $8.09B
Shares: 137,777,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
HEX
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$53.75
Total Equity: $7.41B
Shares: 137,777,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
HEX
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$8.11
Operating CF: $1.34B
CapEx: -$220.26M
Shares: 137,777,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
TD
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
1.0%
Last Dividend: $2.08
Stock Price: $198.68
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
HEX
Dividends Paid / Net Income
25.9%
Dividends Paid: -$283.01M
Net Income: $1.09B
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Aug 30, 2026 3:07am
Compares DOV against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:10am (39d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $7.9B $8.5B $8.4B $7.7B $8.1B
Cost of Revenue $4.9B $5.4B $5.4B $4.8B $4.9B
Gross Profit $3.0B $3.1B $3.1B $3.0B $3.2B
Operating Expenses $1.7B $1.7B $1.7B $1.8B $1.8B
Operating Income $1.3B $1.4B $1.4B $1.2B $1.4B
Net Income $1.1B $1.1B $1.1B $2.7B $1.1B
EBITDA $1.6B $1.7B $1.7B $1.5B $1.8B
EPS $7.81 $7.47 $7.56 $19.58 $7.99
EPS (Diluted) $7.74 $7.42 $7.52 $19.45 $7.94
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:00am (39d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $385.5M $380.9M $398.6M $1.8B $1.7B
Total Current Assets $3.1B $3.4B $3.4B $4.5B $4.5B
Total Assets $10.4B $10.9B $11.3B $12.5B $13.4B
Current Liabilities $2.3B $2.8B $2.4B $2.2B $2.5B
Long-Term Debt $3.0B $2.9B $3.0B $2.5B $2.6B
Total Liabilities $6.2B $6.6B $6.2B $5.6B $6.0B
Total Equity $4.2B $4.3B $5.1B $7.0B $7.4B
Retained Earnings $9.4B $10.2B $11.0B $13.4B $14.2B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:23am (39d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow — $746.8M $1.2B $1.1B $1.3B
Capital Expenditure -$171.5M -$221.0M -$192.6M -$167.5M -$220.3M
Free Cash Flow — $525.8M $1.0B $920.3M $1.1B
Acquisitions (net) -$1.1B -$312.9M -$533.6M -$635.3M -$663.3M
Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) $0 — $0 $0 $231.2M
Dividends Paid -$286.9M -$287.6M -$284.3M -$283.1M -$283.0M
Stock Buybacks -$21.6M -$585.0M $0 -$500.0M -$540.7M
Net Change in Cash -$127.6M -$4.6M $35.0M $1.4B -$168.1M
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:10am (39d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +7.6% -0.8% -8.2% +4.5%
Gross Profit Growth +3.2% +0.7% -4.1% +8.8%
Operating Income Growth +7.6% -0.9% -11.7% +13.8%
Net Income Growth -5.2% -0.8% +155.2% -59.4%
EBITDA Growth +7.3% -0.2% -8.3% +13.5%
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 30, 2026 3:00am (39d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2026-05-29 $0.52 — — —
2026-02-27 $0.52 — — —
2025-11-28 $0.52 — — —
2025-08-29 $0.52 — — —
2025-05-30 $0.52 — — —
2025-02-28 $0.52 — — —
2024-11-29 $0.52 — — —
2024-08-30 $0.52 — — —
2024-05-31 $0.51 — — —
2024-02-28 $0.51 — — —
2023-11-29 $0.51 — — —
2023-08-30 $0.51 — — —
2023-05-30 $0.51 — — —
2023-02-27 $0.51 — — —
2022-11-29 $0.51 — — —
2022-08-30 $0.51 — — —
2022-05-27 $0.50 — — —
2022-02-25 $0.50 — — —
2021-11-29 $0.50 — — —
2021-08-30 $0.50 — — —
0Company Classification 1Industry Landscape 2Company Momentum 3Forward Projection 4aDCF Valuation 4bEarnings Power Value 4cAnchored PE 4dReverse DCF 4eRevenue-Based DCF 4fAnchored P/S 4gScenario Analysis 4hDividend Discount Model 4iBook Value Analysis 4jInsider Activity 4fCash Flow Quality 4gDebt Maturity Risk 4hMacro Environment 4iSector Intelligence 4jRevenue Confidence 4kSensitivity Analysis 4lSector Demand Cycle 5AI Investigation 5bThesis Evaluation 6Valuation Synthesis
computed not applicable 18 computed · 6 not applicable
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-04 02:02
-0.7 : 1 +1σ upside vs −1σ downside, from this company's own quarterly history
A +1σ run of quarters pays -48%; a −1σ run costs 71%. Ratio -0.7:1 (μ 3.9%, σ 7.4% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.9 : 1
CaseGrowthMarginFair valuevs price ($198.68)
Bull — recovery +6% 17.3% $99.28 -50%
Base — stabilizes +4% 15.0% $82.74 -58%
Bear — keeps slipping +2% 12.8% $67.79 -66%
Stress — last quarter repeats +5% 14.6% $83.34 -58%
Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) +11% 14.7% $102.70 -48%
Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) -4% 12.8% $57.32 -71%
The next quarters keep the trajectory of the worst recent matched quarter (ending 2025-09-30) — growth stays at 4.8% and margins bend by the same profit-vs-revenue ratio (×1.08). Stress is a trajectory, not a prediction — it answers "what if the ship's current heading simply continues," which history says is the case to respect.
Why this is appearing: this company files quarterly, so its recent trajectory could be measured rather than assumed — the engine matched Jun 2026, Mar 2026 against the same quarters one year earlier and found revenue +8.4% · operating income +7.2% · net income +8.0% year-over-year. That measured heading is what the stress case extends forward. Of those, the stress case extends the worst matched quarter — the one ending Sep 30, 2025 (revenue +4.8%, operating income +13.1% YoY) — not the average. Data measured through Jun 30, 2026 — this card recalculates automatically when the next quarterly filing is ingested. Companies without quarterly filings (many foreign listings) never show this card: with no measured trajectory, there is nothing honest to repeat.
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for DOV — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-30 03:33

The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.

Growing Dover's reshaped portfolio is compounding mid-to-high single digit revenue with margin expansion, modestly ahead of a steady 5%-growth category — but nowhere near the ~29% the price mathematically assumes. conf 7/10
Share gain Category growing · Specialty industrial machinery is in a steady phase with category median recent growth of ~5.0% and flat underlying industry revenue (2.4% CAGR). Dover's matched-quarter revenue growth of +8.4% runs roughly 300-350bps ahead of the category median, with operating income growth tracking close behind — so it is not merely riding the tide, though a meaningful part of the gap is portfolio mix (divesting slow units) rather than pure unit share capture.
Next 2 quarters
Growing
Momentum in the reshaped portfolio is intact (+8.4% revenue, +8.0% net income matched-quarter), backlog in cryogenics and thermal connection is shipping, and biopharma consumables comps remain easy. Nothing in the near-term data argues for a break — but the decelerating quarterly trend flag means I expect the growth rate to fade toward mid single digits rather than hold 8%+.
≈ inline with expectations
Year 1
Growing
Full-year math is mid-single-digit organic plus 1-3pts of bolt-on M&A, with operating leverage and mix pushing EPS growth into low double digits. Segment mix (Clean Energy & Fueling, Pumps & Process, Climate & Sustainability) is now weighted toward the growing half of the portfolio, and cash generation funds the M&A layer without strain.
≈ inline with expectations
Years 2–3
Holding
Structurally the earnings power grows, but slowly: a flat 2.4%-CAGR industry, a majority of revenue in mature cyclical niches, and secular platforms too small to re-rate group growth. Dover holds and slightly extends niche share and compounds cash — that is durable, but it is high-single-digit earnings power growth at best, decaying toward category rate as the easy portfolio-mix benefit annualizes out.
↓ below expectations
The creme: each rung's call measured against what's already printed (vs analyst estimates · vs guidance / FY consensus · vs price-implied growth) — expectations in print are already in the price, so only the variant margin can pay. Hover a rung's chip for the margin read.
Growth drivers
65 Portfolio reshaped toward faster-growing platforms — Multi-year revenue CAGR is negative (-2.1%) primarily because Dover sold slower, lower-margin businesses (environmental/waste handling, industrial automation assets) and redeployed into biopharma components, cryogenic/clean-energy equipment and thermal connectors. The matched-quarter print (+8.4% revenue, +7.2% OI) is what the remaining portfolio actually does; the negative long CAGR is a denominator artifact, not demand decay.
45 Two identifiable secular niches inside a mature conglomerate — Brazed-plate heat exchangers / thermal connection into data-center liquid cooling, and cryogenic components for CO2, hydrogen and LNG handling, are units where Dover holds dominant niche positions and where order books are expanding independent of the industrial cycle. These are small bases growing fast — enough to lift group growth 100-200bps above the category, not enough to transform the whole.
38 Earnings leverage above revenue — Operating income +7.2% and net income +8.0% on +8.4% revenue means growth is converting cleanly, with productivity and mix offsetting legacy cost pressure. FCF CAGR of +4.3% against negative revenue CAGR confirms the divested businesses were cash-dilutive — the cash engine is intact and funds continued bolt-on M&A.
24 Beating a well-modeled bar — Three of four recent prints landed at or above estimates (+1%, +1%, +14%); the -32% miss came in the seasonally tiny Q1 EPS base where cents-level variance distorts percentages. Suggests underlying execution is at least tracking the consensus path.
Growth risks
79 Price-implied growth is untethered from the business — The reverse-DCF requires ~28.8% growth; the achievable structural rate for a diversified industrial in a 2.4%-CAGR industry with a 5% category median is mid single digits organic plus M&A — call it high single digits at best. That ~25pt gap is the single largest fact in this file and it lands squarely on the structural rung.
54 Majority of revenue sits in mature, cyclical end-markets — Engineered Products (vehicle aftermarket, winch/hoist, aerospace parts), fueling/convenience retail and marking & coding are share-defense businesses in a flat industry. Growth here is price plus GDP; the secular niches are too small a share of group revenue to carry the whole if the cyclical majority rolls over.
40 Macro headwinds constrain industrial capex — 10y at 4.67 with a 0.47 curve keeps the cost of customer equipment financing high; short-cycle industrial orders and retail fueling capex are rate-sensitive. Quarterly trend is flagged 'decelerating' and revenue volatility is 6.3% with not all years positive — the base rate for clean sequential compounding here is weak.
28 Growth partly bought, not generated — Bolt-on acquisitions are a structural part of the growth algorithm. That works while the balance sheet and multiple cooperate, but it makes reported growth less repeatable than organic growth and raises integration/price-paid risk if the pipeline thins.
The world Dover sells into is not booming, and that is the point: a steady industrial capex environment with elevated long rates favors the incumbent in fragmented, mission-critical niches where the customer replaces on failure and specifies by brand. Two genuine secular currents cut through the flatness — heat rejection for compute (liquid cooling heat exchangers) and the molecule-handling build-out for CO2/hydrogen/LNG cryogenics — and Dover owns real product positions in both, which is why its growth sits above a 5% category. But these are single-digit shares of group revenue. The rest of the world's read is prosaic: vehicle aftermarket volumes, convenience-store refresh cycles, packaging line marking, biopharma restocking after the destocking hangover. That mix produces reliable mid-single-digit compounding with margin drift upward, not a step-change. The bear's structural claim (mature conglomerate) and the bull's claim (hidden secular compounder) are both partially right; the arithmetic sits closer to the bear on rate, closer to the bull on durability.
Growth position composite -16
ShrinkingStallingHoldingGrowingAccelerating
70Next 2 quarters · Growing
70Year 1 · Growing
50Years 2–3 · Holding
-16Composite (−100…+100)
A research prediction, not advice. Forward-graded: each rung is scored against the prints that follow it. Not an input to the GEM designation — track record first.
Claude Reading
Independent analyst synthesis · claude-opus-4-7 · generated 2026-08-30 03:22:13
Verdict Modestly overvalued — fair value $170-180 range on normalized 19-21x $8.75 EPS; synthesis $104 target is DCF over-penalization, but no reason to chase at $198.

Looking at the raw quarterlies first: Dover is running at roughly $8.3B annualized revenue (2026 H1 sum ~$4.24B implies ~$8.4-8.5B full year), versus $8.09B in 2025 and $8.51B in 2022 — so four years of essentially flat top line with a dip in between. Net income the last four quarters totals ~$1.13B, so trailing net margin is ~13.5% and trailing EPS on 135M shares is ~$8.40, putting the real (ex-2024-gain) P/E closer to 23.6x, not the "25x" headline. The 2024 net income of $2.70B is a divestiture gain (Environmental Solutions Group sale to Terex) — stripping it, underlying earnings growth is barely positive. FCF at $1.12B on a $26.8B cap is a 4.2% yield; adequate, not cheap. ROIC of 11.2% is fine for an industrial but nothing that justifies premium multiples on its own.

The synthesis model's $103.76 fair value strikes me as too punitive. A DCF that anchors a diversified industrial with 11% ROIC, 14% incremental margins Q/Q (Q2 2026 margin of 14.3% vs. Q1's 11.6% and Q1 2025's 12.4% shows real operating leverage returning), and $1.12B FCF at ~$104 implies roughly 12x earnings — that's a recessionary trough multiple for a business that isn't in a recession. Peer group (ITW at ~26x, EMR at ~22x, ROP at ~32x, IEX at ~26x) trades in the 22-28x band. A more defensible fair value using 19-21x normalized EPS of ~$8.75 gets you to $166-184, meaning DOV is 8-20% overvalued, not 48%. The synthesis is directionally right (overvalued) but the magnitude is a modeling artifact of DCF assumptions that penalize negative revenue CAGR without weighting the margin recovery underway.

The narrative layer is more honest: 91% premium to DCF anchored by a decarbonization/platform story. I'd push back on "platform-monopoly" archetype — Dover is a mini-ITW at best, not a platform. Clean Energy & Fueling is ~19% of revenue and grew modestly; it's not enough to rerate the whole company. The bear case that this is "a mature conglomerate masquerading as a growth platform" fits the -2.1% revenue CAGR and 1.7% earnings CAGR far better than the bull case. That said, the sequential Q2 2026 acceleration (revenue up 6.8% YoY, margin up 70bps YoY) suggests the destocking cycle in bio-pharma pumps and heat exchangers may finally be ending — this is the swing factor. If Q3/Q4 confirm mid-single-digit organic growth with margin expansion, the current multiple survives; if they don't, this compresses toward $170.

Contrarian read the models miss: Dover has a legitimate capital-return story that DCF undersells. $1.34B OCF, ~$220M capex, $280M dividends leaves ~$840M for buybacks/M&A annually; at current cap that's ~3% share reduction potential. Debt/equity 0.55 and net debt/EBITDA ~1.5x is underlevered for an industrial roll-up — they have dry powder. The insider signal is a nothingburger (one F-InKind of 173 shares is a tax withholding, not a sell). Where the data is genuinely thin: quarterly revenue confidence is flagged low, and the segment mix shift post-ESG divestiture makes YoY comparisons noisy through mid-2025 — the models are working with a portfolio that just changed shape. I dissent from the synthesis magnitude but agree with direction. This is overvalued by ~10-15%, not 48%; the narrative premium is real but bounded because Dover is boring enough that speculative capital never fully embraces it. No margin of safety at $198, but calling it a $104 stock is wrong. Wait for a $170-175 print (either from a soft Q3 or industrial-sector drawdown) and this becomes interesting; short thesis is weak because quality and buybacks provide a floor.

GPT Reading
Independent reading · gpt-5.4 · generated 2026-08-30 03:22:29
Verdict Overvalued at $198.68 — Dover is a high-quality industrial, but the business trajectory supports more like $140-$165 unless 2026 delivers a real step-up in growth and cash flow.

Dover looks like a good business priced like a better one. Strip out the obvious accounting distortion in 2024 net income and the earnings power is fairly stable rather than rapidly compounding: annual revenue was $8.51B in 2022, $8.44B in 2023, $7.75B in 2024, and $8.09B in 2025. That is basically flat to slightly down over a four-year span, not the profile of a premium industrial grower. Operating income tells a similar story: $1.38B in 2022, $1.37B in 2023, $1.21B in 2024, and back to $1.37B in 2025. So the company has recovered margins well, but it has not broken into a higher earnings orbit. The latest two quarters are decent — Q1 2026 revenue of $2.05B up from $1.87B a year earlier and Q2 2026 revenue of $2.19B up from $2.05B, with net margins improving from 12.4% to 14.3% year over year — yet that only gets you to a run-rate of roughly $8.5B-$8.7B revenue and maybe $1.1B-$1.2B of normalized net income. Against a $26.8B market cap, that is expensive.

The valuation metrics are the central issue. At 25.0x earnings, 16.9x EV/EBITDA, 3.38x sales, and 3.65x EV/revenue, the market is paying a substantial premium for a company with low single-digit organic-looking growth, mid-to-high teens operating margins, and ROIC of 11.2%. Those are solid industrial quality numbers, but not rare enough to justify nearly 17x EBITDA unless growth is set to accelerate or the portfolio is about to rerate structurally. Free cash flow of $1.12B on a $26.76B equity value is only about a 4.2% FCF yield. That is acceptable for a business with a long runway to compound, but Dover’s own history here shows resiliency more than compounding. Balance sheet risk is manageable — $4.04B debt against $1.68B cash and $7.41B equity is fine, and a 1.79 current ratio is healthy — so this is not a solvency short. It is simply a case where the stock embeds a best-version multiple on merely good fundamentals.

What stands out to me is that the market seems to be rewarding the “quality diversified industrial with energy-transition optionality” narrative much more than the reported operating arc. If I annualize the first half of 2026 net income, I get about $551M through six months, pointing to perhaps $1.1B-$1.2B for the year if the back half is normal. On that basis the stock is still around 22x-24x earnings. There is nothing in the revenue history to say Dover has escaped the mature industrial gravity that keeps most peers in the mid-to-high teens multiple range. Even the gross margin at 39.8% and operating margin at 17.0% are good but not explosively improving. The dividend yield at just 1.05% also tells you shareholders are not being paid much to wait if growth disappoints. My read is that the stock deserves a premium to a generic cyclical machinery name, but not this much of one. A fairer range is closer to 17x-19x normalized earnings, which on roughly $8.00-$8.75 of sustainable EPS implies something like $140-$165, not $199.

The strongest pushback is that Dover may deserve to be judged on quality and durability rather than top-line growth alone. Free cash flow conversion is real: $1.34B of operating cash flow and $1.12B of free cash flow in 2025 against $1.09B of net income is clean. Return metrics are healthy, leverage is controlled, and the recent quarters do show reacceleration after a softer 2024. If Q2 2026’s 14.3% net margin is closer to the new normal than the old one, then incremental revenue growth can drop through attractively. A bull would also argue the annual revenue line is muddied by portfolio moves and that the better way to look at Dover is as a curated set of niche franchises with recurring aftermarket and exposure to cleaner-energy capex, where 25x earnings is not absurd. I take that seriously. But even giving credit for quality, the current price already assumes sustained execution, continued margin strength, and no cyclical air pocket. That is too little room for error for an industrial at this stage.

What would change my mind is simple: I would need to see growth and cash flow step up enough to earn the multiple. Specifically, if 2026 revenue can clear $8.6B, operating income can move toward $1.5B, and free cash flow can approach $1.3B-$1.4B without relying on one-offs, then the premium case becomes much more defensible. I would also want evidence that the Q1/Q2 2026 acceleration is broad and durable, not just easy comps. Conversely, if revenue slips back toward the $8.1B-$8.3B band or margins retreat from the mid-teens net level, the current valuation should compress.

Grok Reading
Independent reading · grok-4.5 · generated 2026-08-30 03:23:06
Verdict Overvalued at $199 — quality mature earner worth ~$120–140 on 14–16× normalized ~$8 EPS; clean-energy narrative does not yet support 25×

Dover’s own books undercut the multiple the market is assigning. Normalized earnings power sits near $1.09B on $8.09B of 2025 revenue—net margin 13.5%, operating margin 17.0%, FCF $1.12B after only $220M of capex—yet the stock clears $198.68 for a $26.8B enterprise that has delivered a −2.1% revenue CAGR and a 1.7% earnings CAGR over the measured window. The 2024 NI spike to $2.70B (Q4 margin 74%) is an obvious one-time distortion; strip it and you have a steady mid-teens ROE business growing mid-single digits at best. Recent quarters show sequential recovery—$1.87B → $2.05B → $2.08B → $2.10B → $2.05B → $2.19B—but that merely restores revenue toward the 2022–23 peak of ~$8.5B, not a new growth regime. At 25× trailing earnings, 16.9× EV/EBITDA and a 4.2% FCF yield, the price embeds the assumption that this portfolio will compound like a growth platform rather than a mature industrial earner with 0.55× debt-to-equity and a 1.05% dividend. The numbers describe competence and cash conversion, not acceleration.

The cleanest contradiction is between the “platform compounder / energy-transition” story and the actual trajectory. Gross margin has held near 40% and free-cash-flow quality is genuinely good, but revenue confidence is flagged low and the quarterly trend is still decelerating on a longer view. Diversification across Engineered Products, Clean Energy & Fueling and the rest reduces single-cycle risk; it does not manufacture the multi-year volume inflection required to justify a full turn above typical specialty-machinery multiples. A 14–16× earnings framework on current run-rate NI already implies a $120–140 zone; 25× only works if Clean Energy, Imaging and aftermarket software deliver the secular re-rating the narrative promises. So far the P&L has not.

The strongest counter-case is that Dover is exactly the kind of high-quality industrial the market should pay up for: durable 11% ROIC, fortress balance sheet ($1.68B cash against $4.04B debt), low payout ratio leaving room for buybacks or tuck-ins, and genuine exposure to electrification and cryogenic/fueling capex that could re-accelerate once energy-transition spending firms. Sell-side and ESG baskets already treat it as a barbell between legacy manufacturing and green infrastructure; if that cohort is right and segments re-rate inside three years, today’s premium compresses via earnings growth rather than multiple contraction. I weigh that lightly because the same thesis has been available for several years while revenue CAGR stayed negative and the DCF-to-price gap remains ~90%. Optionality is real; it is not yet earned in the reported figures, and paying nearly two times fundamental value for it leaves no margin of safety if the capex cycle slips.

I would flip if trailing-twelve-month revenue growth sustains above 6–7% with operating margin expanding through 18%, or if Clean Energy & Fueling discloses segment-level growth and margins that clearly outrun the corporate average for two consecutive years. A decisive drop in the multiple toward 16–17× on flat earnings without a deterioration in FCF would also force a reassessment toward fair value. Until one of those arrives, the stock is priced for a story the income statement has not written.

Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Each AI above independently stated a direction (undervalued, fairly valued, or overvalued) and how strongly it believes it (conviction, 0–5). We combine those into a Bull-Bear Index on a 0–10 scale: 5 is neutral, 10 is maximum bullish (undervalued at full conviction), 0 is maximum bearish. We compute the score ourselves with the same arithmetic for every seat — the models never grade their own bullishness — so the three are directly comparable. Δ shows how far each seat sits from the panel average of 1.3; a large Δ marks the dissenting voice, usually the one worth reading.
Claude claude-opus-4-7 2.0
overvalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ +0.7 vs panel · self: 4.0
GPT gpt-5.4 1.0
overvalued · conviction 4/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 3.0
Grok grok-4.5 1.0
overvalued · conviction 4/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 2.0
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-08-30 03:35:40
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality — pass at tape, wait for a dip 8/10
Great business, wrong price — quality is real but $198 is paying a platform multiple for a company whose revenue hasn't grown in five years.
The cruxWhether the electrification/clean-energy narrative finally shows up in the top line; without organic growth, the gap between ~$115 deserved value and $198 tape can't close in the buyer's favor.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from DOV's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityGood Earnings Quality
The four lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+62
Strong
edge √Σ 125 · risk √Σ 53 · conf 8/10

Dover shows the profile of a mature, high-quality industrial. Revenue is essentially flat over five years (7.91B to 8.09B), but the mix and execution have improved: gross margin has stepped up meaningfully from 37.6% in 2021 to 39.8% in 2025, and operating margin sits at 17.0%, a cycle high. FCF has recovered from a negative 171M in 2021 to a run-rate above 1.0B for three consecutive years (1.03B, 920M, 1.12B), and OCF/NI of 0.87x with accruals at 3.1% of assets and Beneish M of -2.56 point to clean, cash-backed earnings. Altman Z of 5.27 places the balance sheet firmly in the safe zone despite 2.36B of net debt. Per-share discipline is a real strength: diluted share count has fallen from 145.3M to 137.8M (-1.3% CAGR), SBC is only 0.5% of revenue, and buybacks run at nearly 10x SBC, meaning management is a genuine net repurchaser, not a dilution engine. The 2024 net income spike to 2.70B reflects a divestiture gain rather than operating step-up (FCF that year was actually lower than 2023), so 2025's 1.09B is the cleaner run-rate. What keeps this from being fortress-tier is modest: net debt rather than net cash, no revenue growth to speak of over five years, and margin gains that are real but not extraordinary. Insider tape is empty of directional signal (only a routine F-InKind withholding), so no read there either way.

Strengths 4
m70
Margin expansion on flat revenue
GM up 220 bps (37.6% to 39.8%) and OpM at a five-year high of 17.0% with revenue essentially unchanged - evidence of real mix/pricing/operating leverage discipline.
m65
Clean earnings quality
Beneish M -2.56, Altman Z 5.27, accruals 3.1% of assets, OCF/NI 0.87x - no mechanical red flags; 2024's 2.70B net income is a one-time divestiture, not manipulation.
m60
Per-share value protected
Diluted shares down from 145.3M to 137.8M, SBC just 0.5% of revenue, buyback-to-SBC 927% - management is compounding for owners, not diluting them.
m55
Durable FCF generation
FCF at 1.12B in 2025, 14% of revenue; three consecutive years above 900M after the 2021 working-capital drag.
Concerns 2
m35
Net debt, not net cash
Net debt of 2.36B versus 1.68B liquid cash - balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion, though FCF easily services it.
m40
No organic revenue growth
Revenue 7.91B in 2021 to 8.09B in 2025 is a ~0.6% CAGR; the quality story is entirely margin- and per-share-driven, not top-line.
This is a good business run by adults. Margins are quietly grinding higher on flat revenue, earnings convert to cash, and share count is actually falling with negligible SBC leakage - that combination is rarer than it sounds. The knocks are honest but not damning: it carries net debt, the top line hasn't grown in five years, and I can't see anything in the data that screams moat rather than competent execution. It clears the 'solidly healthy' bar comfortably but doesn't reach into elite territory.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Segment-level organic growth versus M&A/divestiture contribution to isolate underlying demand
  • Customer/end-market concentration disclosed in the 10-K
  • Debt maturity ladder and interest coverage detail on the 2.36B net debt
  • Composition of the 2024 net income spike (divestiture gain quantified)
  • Backlog and book-to-bill trend for cyclical exposure
Valuation / Mispricing
-70
Rich
edge √Σ 20 · risk √Σ 106 · conf 6/10
Price $198.68 vs deserved ~$115-130 for a quality-but-flat compounder — roughly 35-45% overpay, no margin of safety. attractive below $135.00

The e2e composite fair value lands at $115.55 and the signal-adjusted figure at $103.76, implying roughly 42-48% downside from $198.68. The DCF ($94) and EPV floor ($54) both sit well below price; only the anchored-PE method ($219) supports the tape, and that method essentially ratifies whatever multiple peers happen to trade at rather than judging deserved value. On a strong-but-not-growing business (five years of flat revenue, margins grinding up, share count down modestly), a mid-$100s deserved price is defensible; $198 is not without believing the electrification/clean-energy narrative delivers real top-line acceleration.

Cheap signals 1
m20
Quality justifies some premium
Strong quality score (62), clean earnings, buybacks, and margin expansion legitimately raise deserved value above the mechanical DCF - but not to $198.
Rich / priced-in 4
m70
Composite FV far below price
Composite $115.55 and signal-adjusted $103.76 vs $198.68 imply -42% to -48%. Even generous adjustments for quality don't close a gap this wide.
m55
DCF and EPV both flag overvaluation
DCF at $94.42 and EPV floor at $54 say the cash-generating reality of the business supports roughly half the current price; the anchored-PE of $219 is the lone outlier and reflects peer-multiple drift, not intrinsic value.
m50
Priced for growth that isn't in the numbers
Revenue has been flat for five years; the bull case leans on secular themes (electrification, EV fueling, cryo) that haven't yet shown up in the top line. Paying a growth multiple for a flat compounder is the classic overpay setup.
m30
Cyclical industrial dressed as platform
Bear framing is fair: mission-critical niches are real, but end-markets are still cyclical machinery. Multiple compression on any industrial slowdown would be brutal from here.
I like the business and I do not like the price. A composite fair value in the $105-115 range against a $198 tape is not a rounding error - it is the market paying a platform-compounder multiple for a company whose revenue line has done nothing for five years. Quality earns a premium, sure, but not a doubling. I would want this closer to $135 before it interests me, and I would get genuinely excited under $115. Today it is a hold-your-nose-or-pass, not a buy.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Organic revenue growth trajectory in clean-energy/EV/cryo segments - is the mix shift actually inflecting?
  • Segment margin walk to test whether margin expansion is structural or mix/cost-out that has a ceiling
  • Backlog and book-to-bill by segment
  • Capital allocation split between M&A multiples paid and buyback pace
General Sentiment
+6
Balanced
tail √Σ 58 · head √Σ 51 · conf 6/10

The tape is modestly risk-on (VIX 14.4, S&P near highs) and DOV's 1.16 beta means it participates in up-tape moves, so the macro backdrop is a light tailwind rather than a threat. Recent 4.5% momentum vs a -2.1% longer trend confirms the tape is currently working in the stock's favor, and the Innovation Lab news adds a small, on-narrative data point (electrification, precision components) that feeds the 'hidden compounder' story without materially changing it.

Tailwinds 3
m30
Risk-on tape, high-beta name
With beta 1.16 and a calm VIX at 14.4, DOV gets a modest lift from the constructive equity tape. Not decisive, but a persistent light push.
m45
Platform-compounder narrative still intact
Strong-intensity, moderate-durability story around clean energy, EV fueling, cryogenic and climate exposure keeps a bid under the multiple. Cult coefficient is only medium, so the narrative supports but does not stampede the stock.
m20
On-narrative news flow
Precision Components Innovation Lab headline reinforces the 'mission-critical niches' framing. Small in size but directionally supportive.
Headwinds 3
m40
Narrative running ahead of fundamentals
Market pricing a 14-16x multiple against fundamentals supporting 10-12x leaves the story exposed to any crack in the secular-growth thesis; a rotation out of industrial compounders would hit DOV harder than defensives.
m25
Higher-rate macro drag on long-duration industrial stories
10y at 4.67% and market PE 25.9 create a persistent low-grade press on names whose valuation leans on out-year electrification/decarbonization cash flows.
m20
Peer tape softness
ITW weakness post-earnings signals investors are willing to punish specialty-industrial names on any disappointment, raising the beta of narrative disappointment for DOV.
Net pressure is close to neutral with a faint positive lean. The risk-on tape and an intact platform-compounder narrative are giving DOV a light bid, but the story is priced richly and rate-sensitive, so any narrative wobble or rotation would flip this quickly. I read it as Balanced - the tape helps, the narrative holds, but there is no dominant force pushing this name hard either way right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Whether sell-side target revisions post next print lean up or down on Clean Energy / Climate segment growth
  • Any rotation signal out of quality-industrial compounders into cyclicals or defensives
  • Follow-through in DOV's short-term momentum vs the broader XLI
  • Cracks in the 'secular electrification' narrative from peer commentary (ITW, ROP, AME)
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
Growth Outlook
-16
Growing
edge √Σ 91 · risk √Σ 107 · conf 7/10

The world Dover sells into is not booming, and that is the point: a steady industrial capex environment with elevated long rates favors the incumbent in fragmented, mission-critical niches where the customer replaces on failure and specifies by brand. Two genuine secular currents cut through the flatness — heat rejection for compute (liquid cooling heat exchangers) and the molecule-handling build-out for CO2/hydrogen/LNG cryogenics — and Dover owns real product positions in both, which is why its growth sits above a 5% category. But these are single-digit shares of group revenue. The rest of the world's read is prosaic: vehicle aftermarket volumes, convenience-store refresh cycles, packaging line marking, biopharma restocking after the destocking hangover. That mix produces reliable mid-single-digit compounding with margin drift upward, not a step-change. The bear's structural claim (mature conglomerate) and the bull's claim (hidden secular compounder) are both partially right; the arithmetic sits closer to the bear on rate, closer to the bull on durability.

Growth drivers 4
m65
Portfolio reshaped toward faster-growing platforms
Multi-year revenue CAGR is negative (-2.1%) primarily because Dover sold slower, lower-margin businesses (environmental/waste handling, industrial automation assets) and redeployed into biopharma components, cryogenic/clean-energy equipment and thermal connectors. The matched-quarter print (+8.4% revenue, +7.2% OI) is what the remaining portfolio actually does; the negative long CAGR is a denominator artifact, not demand decay.
m45
Two identifiable secular niches inside a mature conglomerate
Brazed-plate heat exchangers / thermal connection into data-center liquid cooling, and cryogenic components for CO2, hydrogen and LNG handling, are units where Dover holds dominant niche positions and where order books are expanding independent of the industrial cycle. These are small bases growing fast — enough to lift group growth 100-200bps above the category, not enough to transform the whole.
m38
Earnings leverage above revenue
Operating income +7.2% and net income +8.0% on +8.4% revenue means growth is converting cleanly, with productivity and mix offsetting legacy cost pressure. FCF CAGR of +4.3% against negative revenue CAGR confirms the divested businesses were cash-dilutive — the cash engine is intact and funds continued bolt-on M&A.
m24
Beating a well-modeled bar
Three of four recent prints landed at or above estimates (+1%, +1%, +14%); the -32% miss came in the seasonally tiny Q1 EPS base where cents-level variance distorts percentages. Suggests underlying execution is at least tracking the consensus path.
Growth risks 4
m79
Price-implied growth is untethered from the business
The reverse-DCF requires ~28.8% growth; the achievable structural rate for a diversified industrial in a 2.4%-CAGR industry with a 5% category median is mid single digits organic plus M&A — call it high single digits at best. That ~25pt gap is the single largest fact in this file and it lands squarely on the structural rung.
m54
Majority of revenue sits in mature, cyclical end-markets
Engineered Products (vehicle aftermarket, winch/hoist, aerospace parts), fueling/convenience retail and marking & coding are share-defense businesses in a flat industry. Growth here is price plus GDP; the secular niches are too small a share of group revenue to carry the whole if the cyclical majority rolls over.
m40
Macro headwinds constrain industrial capex
10y at 4.67 with a 0.47 curve keeps the cost of customer equipment financing high; short-cycle industrial orders and retail fueling capex are rate-sensitive. Quarterly trend is flagged 'decelerating' and revenue volatility is 6.3% with not all years positive — the base rate for clean sequential compounding here is weak.
m28
Growth partly bought, not generated
Bolt-on acquisitions are a structural part of the growth algorithm. That works while the balance sheet and multiple cooperate, but it makes reported growth less repeatable than organic growth and raises integration/price-paid risk if the pipeline thins.
vs expectations: ~6m inline · 1y inline · 2-3y below
The forward growth verdict — is the business itself likely to grow (next 2 quarters / year 1 / years 2–3), judged against its category and against printed expectations. The full horizon ladder + creme renders on the Growth Outlook card above. Not a call on the price (Valuation owns that) or the tape (Sentiment owns that).
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Lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure), and Growth Outlook (the forward growth verdict). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Price Prediction
Lower -7.6% v0.6.0 View full prediction →

When we made this prediction on Aug 30, 2026, DOV was $198.68. We expect it to be $183.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $135.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 30, 2026.

Price when predicted$198.68
Our estimate for Mar 2027$183.50-7.6%
Great value below$135.00
Price history shown (6 Months)

Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.

Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
The report is written. This is what its valuation stands on.
Analyzed Oct 4, 2026 · 02:02 4d ago
Read epv-floor ext-gem-composite anchored-pe · FY income statement, balance sheet
1 finding · 1 material · $0, re-derived on each view

Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.

anchored-pe — the "fair value above price" reading turns on 2 inputs MATERIAL found by sensitivity, not by rule
Published $200.23 vs price $198.68. Nudging `trailing_eps` (down 5%), `adjusted_pe` (down 5%) moves the fair value to the other side of the price. This does not say those inputs are wrong — it says they are where to look first.
trailing_eps flips down 5% adjusted_pe flips down 5%
Price at analysis $198.68. This is where an investigation should start — it is not where one ends. Nothing here was checked against the filings, the tape, or the news; that is the investigator's job.
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My Notes personal — only you see this
v1.1.760 · f4b58a28 · 2026-10-07 20:07:48