For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Devon Energy Corporation (DVN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 24 · Value 1 · Sentiment -40 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $69.16 vs $45.04 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Devon Energy Corporation
DVN NYSEDevon Energy Corporation is an independent energy company focused on the exploration, development, and production of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids across key U.S. basins. Its primary operations center in the Delaware Basin in southeast New Mexico and west Texas, with significant activities in the Eagle Ford in South Texas, the Anadarko Basin in western Oklahoma, the Williston Basin in North Dakota, and the Powder River Basin in Wyoming. The company leverages advanced drilling and completion techniques to extract hydrocarbons from prolific shale plays, emphasizing high-quality acreage positions in these resource-rich regions. Devon Energy Corporation plays a vital role in the U.S. onshore energy sector, contributing to domestic oil and gas supply through efficient reservoir management and operational expertise. Founded in 1971 and headquartered in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, it maintains a portfolio diversified across multiple top-tier shale formations, supporting the broader energy market's demand for reliable production.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.17
Total Equity: $15.53B
Shares: 633,573,141
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $1.43B
EBITDA: $7.47B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $1.43B
Revenue: $17.19B
Revenue: $17.19B
Revenue: $17.19B
Total Equity: $15.53B
Tax Rate: 22.6%
Equity: $15.53B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Cash: $1.43B
Current Liabilities: $4.09B
Long-Term Debt: $7.59B
Total Debt: $8.59B
Total Equity: $15.53B
Shares: 633,573,141
Shares: 633,573,141
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 633,573,141
Stock Price: $45.04
Net Income: $2.64B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:41am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.2B | $19.2B | $15.3B | $15.9B | $17.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $8.5B | $10.8B | $9.9B | $11.2B | $12.8B |
| Gross Profit | $3.7B | $8.4B | $5.4B | $4.7B | $4.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $433.0M | $449.0M | $457.0M | $567.0M | $535.0M |
| Operating Income | $3.2B | $7.9B | $4.9B | $4.1B | $3.9B |
| Net Income | $2.8B | $6.0B | $3.7B | $2.9B | $2.6B |
| EBITDA | $5.5B | $10.3B | $7.5B | $7.4B | $7.5B |
| EPS | $4.20 | $9.15 | $5.86 | $4.58 | $4.18 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.19 | $9.12 | $5.84 | $4.56 | $4.17 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:14am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $1.5B | $875.0M | $846.0M | $1.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.2B | $3.9B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $4.0B |
| Total Assets | $21.0B | $23.7B | $24.5B | $30.5B | $31.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.1B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $4.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.7B | $6.4B | $6.0B | $8.7B | $7.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $11.6B | $12.4B | $12.3B | $15.8B | $16.1B |
| Total Equity | $9.3B | $11.2B | $12.1B | $14.5B | $15.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.7B | $4.3B | $6.2B | $8.2B | $10.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:41am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.9B | $8.5B | $6.5B | $6.6B | $6.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.2B | $0 | $242.0M | $3.7B | $485.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.3B | -$3.4B | -$1.9B | -$937.0M | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$589.0M | -$718.0M | -$979.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | $34.0M | -$817.0M | -$579.0M | -$29.0M | $588.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:41am (27d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +57.0% | -20.4% | +4.5% | +7.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +127.5% | -35.9% | -12.2% | -6.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +144.0% | -38.0% | -15.6% | -6.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +113.8% | -37.7% | -22.8% | -8.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +88.8% | -27.2% | -1.7% | +1.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 26, 2026 1:20pm (28d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-09 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-09 | $1.37 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-10 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-11 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-10 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:49Recovery pays +229%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 17%. Ratio 13.3:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($45.04) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 19.2% | $148.40 | +229% |
| Base — stabilizes | +16% | 16.7% | $103.00 | +129% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 14.2% | $69.55 | +54% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -14% | 16.7% | $37.28 | -17% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Devon's quarterly trajectory tells a clear margin-compression story that the "steady revenue" tag obscures. Revenue climbed from $3.45B (Q2'23) to $4.45B (Q1'25) — a genuine 29% expansion — but net margin collapsed from 27.8% (Q4'23) to 11.1% (Q1'25). NI dropped from $1.15B to $494M over the same window while revenue rose. That's not commodity price weakness alone; that's cost per boe rising faster than realizations, likely a combination of WCX acquisition dilution, higher LOE, and mix shift. The 2025 annual figures confirm: revenue up 7.8% YoY to $17.19B, but gross profit *fell* from $4.71B to $4.39B and NI fell from $2.89B to $2.64B. Growth is buying shrinking dollars.
On the balance sheet, $8.59B debt against $1.43B cash and a 0.98 current ratio isn't fortress — it's leveraged-normal for E&P but leaves little cushion if WTI drops to $60. FCF of $3.12B on $51.95B market cap = 6% FCF yield, respectable but not the 10%+ that would make this a screaming buy in a commodity trough. ROIC of 13.1% is fine, ROE 17% is fine — but both are declining from 2022-2023 peaks and will keep declining if the margin trend persists. EV/EBITDA of 4.77x looks cheap, but E&P cyclicals routinely trade 3-4x at cycle peaks and 8-10x at troughs; the multiple alone doesn't tell you where you are in the cycle.
The prior models are directionally reasonable but internally contradictory in ways nobody flagged. Synthesis says fair value $55 (+23% upside) while Market Forces calls it a "melting ice cube... fairly valued." Both can't be right. The Narrative layer splits the difference by calling the discount "risk-adjusted" — which is a nice way of saying the DCF is probably using too-optimistic terminal assumptions for a commodity in secular question. The classification as "mature_earner" with confidence 1 is wrong — this is a commodity-cyclical, and the pre-flight got that right. Earnings CAGR of -16% against revenue CAGR of +6% is the definitional signature of a cyclical rolling over, not a mature earner. A contrarian would note: if you strip out 2022's $6.02B NI (Russia-invasion oil spike), Devon's "normalized" earnings power looks more like $2.5-3B, putting normalized P/E closer to 18-20x — not cheap.
The bear case nobody in the prior models pressed hard enough: Devon just bought Grayson Mill for $5B in 2024, adding Bakken exposure at what may prove to be a cycle-top price, and margin compression suggests integration is dilutive to unit economics. If WTI averages $65 in 2026 (strip is drifting lower), FCF could compress to $2-2.5B, dividend coverage tightens, and the "6% FCF yield" narrative evaporates. Conversely, the bull ignores that Delaware Basin inventory depth is Devon's actual moat and at $75+ WTI this prints $4B+ FCF easily. I disagree with the synthesis's clean $55 fair value — the range is genuinely $38-$62 depending on your two-year oil deck, and picking a midpoint pretends to precision the commodity doesn't allow. I lean closer to Market Forces' "fairly valued" read than to synthesis's 23% upside claim, but I'd push back on "melting ice cube" — Devon has 10+ years of tier-1 Delaware inventory, that's not melting, that's depleting on a schedule.
Net: at $45, Devon is priced roughly correctly for a $70 WTI world with modest decline. It's not a value trap, but it's also not a 23% mispricing. The margin trajectory is the single most important data point and every prior model underweighted it. Buy it for the ~5-7% total yield (base + variable dividend) if you want commodity exposure with a solid operator; don't buy it expecting multiple re-rating, because the -16% earnings CAGR is telling you the multiple probably shouldn't re-rate until margins stabilize. I'd want to see Q2/Q3 2025 prints showing margin stabilization above 15% before adding aggressively.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is not that Devon is “steady,” but that it has become a lower-quality revenue story in exchange for higher scale. Quarterly sales rose from $3.60B in Q1’24 to $4.45B in Q1’25, a healthy 24% increase, yet quarterly net income slid from $596M to $494M and net margin fell from 16.6% to 11.1%. The annual picture says the same thing more cleanly: 2025 revenue of $17.19B was up 7.8% from $15.94B, but gross profit fell from $4.71B to $4.39B, operating income fell from $4.14B to $3.86B, and net income fell from $2.89B to $2.64B. So the business is not shrinking, but incremental barrels are clearly less profitable than the legacy base. That matters more than the headline 10.8x P/E. At $45, the market is not paying for growth; it is paying for a company that can still convert $6.71B of operating cash flow into $3.12B of free cash flow despite weaker unit economics.
I also read the balance sheet as acceptable rather than stressed. Net debt is roughly $7.2B after subtracting $1.43B of cash from $8.59B of debt, against $15.53B of equity and $6.71B of operating cash flow. That is not “fortress” balance sheet language, but it is also not fragile for a $17B-revenue E&P with 13.2% ROIC and 17.0% ROE. The current ratio of 0.98 is irrelevant noise in this context; for an upstream producer, solvency is about leverage versus cash-generation through the cycle, not inventory-rich working capital. The more important valuation fact is this: enterprise value is only about 2.1x revenue and 4.8x EBITDA, while free cash flow yield on market cap is about 6%. That is not cheap enough to call distressed, but it is cheap enough that a mid-cycle oil deck does not need heroic assumptions to justify the stock.
On Opus specifically, I agree with the core claim that “the quarterly trajectory tells a clear margin-compression story.” That is plainly right, and the annual gross margin drop from 29.5% in 2023 to 25.6% in 2024 to 25.5% in 2025, alongside net margin compressing from 24.6% in 2023 to 18.1% in 2024 to 15.4% in 2025, confirms it. I also agree with Opus that the prior model’s $55 “fair value” is too precise for a commodity producer. Where I disagree is the leap from that observation to “fairly valued near $45” as the base case. Opus argues normalized earnings are “more like $2.5-3B,” implying a normalized P/E of 18-20x and therefore not cheap. I think that framing overstates the problem because this is a capital-intensive cash-flow equity, not a business best judged on trough-ish EPS normalization. On 2025 numbers, Devon generated $3.12B of FCF after $3.59B of capex. Even if you haircut that to $2.5B in a softer oil scenario, you still get a near-5% FCF yield; in a $75 WTI environment, the business likely moves back toward something beginning with a 7 or 8. That makes $45 closer to mildly discounted than dead-on fair.
I also disagree with Opus’s suggestion that the current setup is mainly a warning against multiple expansion. The stock does not need much multiple help. If Devon simply stabilizes margins around current annual levels—say net margin in the mid-teens rather than the 11.1% seen in Q1’25—and holds revenue around $17B, then earnings power around $2.6B-3.0B and FCF around $3B are enough to support something above today’s price. Even a conservative 7% FCF yield on $3.1B implies equity value around $44B before balance-sheet adjustments, and a somewhat less punitive 6% yield gets you above the current market cap. That is why I reject Opus’s effective equivalence between “not a screaming buy” and “fairly valued.” The stock is not screamingly cheap, but there is a meaningful difference between a fair value of $45 and a fair value in the low-to-mid $50s under a reasonable mid-cycle oil assumption. I do agree with Opus that the “melting ice cube” framing is wrong; 2025 revenue growth, still-solid $6.71B operating cash flow, and continued double-digit ROIC do not describe a business in secular financial decay.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both still giving too much credit to one year of cash generation and too little to the direction of profitability. They would point out that Q1’25’s 11.1% net margin is not a blip but the latest point in a steady slide from 21.5% and 20.2% in mid/late 2024, and that if this is the new run-rate rather than temporary compression, then annual earnings power is lower than either of us wants to admit. They would also argue that commodity equities deserve wide discount rates precisely because a 6% trailing FCF yield can become 3% very quickly. That is fair. But based on the actual numbers here, I come out more constructive than Opus: the deterioration is real, yet the stock already reflects a lot of it.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Devon is a mature E&P generating real cash: FCF of $6.71B on the trailing lens and $3.12B in the latest year, with OCF/NI of 1.95x and accruals of -11.4% of assets, both signalling that reported earnings are backed by cash. Beneish M of -3.09 and Altman Z of 3.34 corroborate clean books, and there are zero mechanical earnings-quality flags. Capital discipline is real: diluted shares fell from 665M (2021) to 633M (2025), a -1.4% CAGR, with buybacks running 919% of SBC (SBC only 0.6% of revenue) - per-share value is being concentrated. Profitability trajectory is the softer story. Revenue rose from $12.2B (2021) to $17.2B (2025) but net income compressed from a $6.02B peak in 2022 to $2.64B in 2025 as commodity prices normalised - classic E&P cyclicality, not a business defect, but a reminder that earnings are price-taker output. Balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion: net cash is -$7.15B against $1.43B liquid, meaning survival depends on continued strip-price cash generation. Altman Z of 3.34 says that's currently fine. This is a well-run, self-funding operator in a structurally cyclical, capital-intensive commodity business - the ceiling on quality is set by the industry, not by execution.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity ladder and average coupon - how quickly does the $7.15B net debt need refinancing
- Hedge book coverage for oil and gas over next 12-24 months
- Breakeven WTI price for maintenance capex plus base dividend
- Reserve life and PDP mix - is production being sustained or harvested
- Grayson Mill / any recent M&A integration status and pro-forma leverage
- Variable dividend policy vs fixed - what share of payout is committed
Price is $45.04 against a composite FV of $54.65 and signal-adjusted FV of $55.42, implying roughly 20-23% upside if the blended methods are right. The EPV floor at $68.33 looks generous for a commodity operator and I would not lean on it; the anchored-PE at $40.97 argues the stock is already close to fair on normalized earnings power. Splitting the difference lands me in the low-$50s as deserved value, so the gap to $45 is meaningful but not decisive. Quality is strong (score 39) with clean earnings and real buybacks, which supports the higher end of the FV range, but operating margin compression flagged by the quality lens is exactly the kind of cyclical fade that caps how far I will extend the multiple. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted. Net: a modest margin of safety on a well-run E&P, priced for a normal-to-softening oil tape rather than for perfection.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Realized oil/gas price assumptions embedded in the DCF/EPV inputs
- Lease operating expense and well-cost trajectory in latest 10-Q
- Guidance on 2025 capex and free cash flow breakeven WTI
- Pace and average price of buyback execution
- Any hedging book that would cap downside or upside
The macro tape is mildly hostile (VIX in the 82nd percentile, S&P off its high, 10y at 4.71%, market PE 26.6), which typically punishes cyclicals. But DVN's 0.43 beta means the market-wide risk-off does NOT hit this name the way it hits high-beta growth or story stocks - the mechanical drag is muted. The heavier weight sits on the narrative side: E&P is stuck in a 'cyclical-late-stage / sunset industry' frame with low cult coefficient, and the stock's ~19% discount to DCF is itself a sentiment tell - the market is applying a structural skepticism discount tied to energy transition and demand-destruction fears rather than to fundamentals.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- DVN's own Q2 print and any guide on volumes vs the TTE read-through
- Whether analyst target revisions across E&P turn negative post-TTE miss
- Any shift in crude tape or OPEC signaling that would reset the cyclical narrative
- VIX rolling back under 16 to release risk-off pressure on cyclicals
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 27, 2026, DVN was $45.04. We expect it to be $51.50 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $40.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.