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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. Class A (EL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-14): Designation Low · Gem Score -50 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -14 · Value -74 · Sentiment 8 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $29.61 vs $101.94 at analysis
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The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. Class A
EL NYSEThe Estée Lauder Companies Inc. Class A represents common equity in a leading global prestige beauty manufacturer and marketer. The company focuses on developing, producing, and distributing a broad portfolio of premium skin care, makeup, fragrance, and hair care products for consumers worldwide. Skin care forms the largest share of its business, complemented by color cosmetics and fragrances, positioning Estée Lauder as a key player in the household and personal products segment of the consumer defensive sector. The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. Class A is associated with a diverse brand portfolio that includes Estée Lauder, Clinique, MAC, Bobbi Brown, La Mer, Jo Malone London, Aveda, Too Faced, and other prestige labels, addressing multiple price points and customer segments across the beauty market. Products are sold through department stores, multi-brand beauty retailers, perfumeries, pharmacies, travel retail, salons and spas, as well as company and third-party e-commerce platforms, giving the asset broad exposure to global retail and digital commerce trends. Founded in 1946 and headquartered in New York, New York, The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. today occupies a prominent position in the international cosmetics and personal care industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.50
Total Equity: $3.81B
Shares: 364,800,000
Total Debt: $503.00M
Cash: $3.50B
EBITDA: $1.58B
Total Debt: $503.00M
Cash: $3.50B
Revenue: $15.05B
Revenue: $15.05B
Revenue: $15.05B
Total Equity: $3.81B
Tax Rate: 64.8%
Equity: $3.81B
Total Debt: $503.00M
Cash: $3.50B
Current Liabilities: $6.23B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $503.00M
Total Equity: $3.81B
Shares: 364,800,000
Shares: 364,800,000
CapEx: -$457.00M
Shares: 364,800,000
Stock Price: $101.94
Net Income: $182.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 4:54am (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $17.7B | $15.9B | $15.6B | $14.3B | $15.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $4.3B | $4.6B | $4.4B | $3.7B | $3.7B |
| Gross Profit | $13.4B | $11.3B | $11.2B | $10.6B | $11.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $10.3B | $9.8B | $10.2B | $11.4B | $10.6B |
| Operating Income | $3.2B | $1.5B | $970.0M | -$785.0M | $780.0M |
| Net Income | $2.4B | $1.0B | $409.0M | -$1.1B | $182.0M |
| EBITDA | $3.9B | $2.3B | $1.8B | $44.0M | $1.6B |
| EPS | $6.64 | $2.81 | $1.09 | $-3.15 | $0.50 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $6.55 | $2.79 | $1.08 | $-3.15 | $0.50 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 4:00am (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.0B | $4.0B | $3.4B | $2.9B | $3.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $9.3B | $9.1B | $7.9B | $7.1B | $7.6B |
| Total Assets | $20.9B | $23.4B | $21.7B | $19.9B | $19.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.8B | $6.2B | $5.7B | $5.4B | $6.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $14.5B | $17.0B | $16.4B | $16.0B | $16.0B |
| Total Equity | $6.4B | $6.4B | $5.3B | $3.9B | $3.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $13.9B | $14.0B | $13.4B | $11.7B | $11.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 4:54am (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.0B | $1.7B | $2.4B | $1.3B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$1.0B | -$919.0M | -$602.0M | -$457.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.0B | $728.0M | $1.4B | $670.0M | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$3.0M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$5.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$840.0M | -$925.0M | -$947.0M | -$618.0M | -$508.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.3B | -$271.0M | -$35.0M | -$35.0M | -$70.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.0B | $72.0M | -$634.0M | -$474.0M | $577.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 4:54am (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.3% | -1.9% | -8.2% | +5.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -15.5% | -1.4% | -5.2% | +7.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -52.4% | -35.7% | -180.9% | +199.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -58.1% | -59.5% | -377.0% | +116.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -42.2% | -20.3% | -97.5% | +3,481.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:15am (27d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-28 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-28 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-30 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-30 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -96%; a −1σ run costs 98%. Ratio -1.0:1 (μ 0.7%, σ 7.4% , 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($101.94) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +3% | 12.6% | $37.66 | -63% |
| Base — stabilizes | +2% | 10.9% | $31.57 | -69% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 9.3% | $25.88 | -75% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +8% | 1.1% | $4.47 | -96% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -7% | 0.6% | $1.75 | -98% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 05:04The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape tells a bleaker story than the "recovery underway" framing implies. Yes, FY2026 (June year-end) revenue of $15.05B beat FY2025's $14.33B by 5%, and operating income swung from -$785M to +$780M. But look at the sequential quarters: revenue went $3.48B → $4.23B → $3.71B → $3.63B, with the most recent quarter posting a $116M net loss on the lowest revenue in the sequence. That's not a recovery arc — that's a holiday quarter bump followed by two quarters of deterioration. Full-year net income of $182M on $15B in revenue is a 1.2% net margin for a company that used to run at 13.6% (FY2022 NI of $2.41B on $17.74B). To justify $102, you need to believe FY2022 margins are recoverable; the trajectory since Q2 says the opposite.
The synthesis fair value of ~$25-33 is directionally right but probably too harsh. Normalized FCF of $1.32B against a $36.9B market cap is a 3.6% FCF yield — not cheap, but not the 12%+ yield a $25 stock would imply. If you assume EL can grind back to a 10-12% operating margin over 3-4 years (below the 17.9% FY2022 peak but well above today's 5.2%), you get ~$1.6-1.9B in normalized operating income and a fair value in the $55-70 range at a 20-22x multiple appropriate for a slow-growth prestige brand. That's still 30-45% downside from $102, but the "$25 fair value" is a DCF that punishes the trough too literally. I'd land closer to the market-forces "value trap" framing than the synthesis point estimate — overvalued, but not by 75%.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: EL's gross margin held at 75.5% through the disaster, ROIC is a suspiciously strong 33.9% (though ROE is 4.8% — the gap flags asset writedowns compressing the equity base), and the balance sheet is fine ($3.5B cash vs $503M debt is net cash). This is not a company with existential risk; it's a company with a China/travel-retail demand problem and a bloated cost structure. Family control (Lauder voting shares) does block activist portfolio surgery, as market-forces flagged, but it also means patient owners aren't forced to sell into weakness. The insider "A-Awards" are just RSU grants — not signal. What would flip me bullish: two consecutive quarters of revenue >$3.8B with margins re-expanding above 8%, ideally paired with any concrete China commentary showing sequential improvement. Neither is visible in the current print.
I agree with the synthesis direction but dissent on magnitude. The 203x PE anomaly flag is correct — that number is mechanically useless. The narrative layer nails it: this is a fallen-angel story trading on China-recovery optionality and takeout-premium hope, and the fragility rating is right because either disappointment collapses the multiple. The pre-flight framing of EL as "traditional" is more accurate than the rule-based "high-growth profitable" tag, which is just wrong — revenue CAGR is -1.8%, this is not growth. Momentum is negative, sector benchmarks unfavorable, macro unfavorable, and the most recent quarter is the worst of the last four on both revenue and margin. There's no catalyst visible in the data that supports paying 200x earnings or 21.5x EV/EBITDA for a business whose next quarter looks worse than the one before it. Wait for either a $65-70 print or evidence that Q1 FY2027 breaks the deceleration.
GPT Reading
The core fact pattern here is not “high-growth profitable”; it is a bruised premium consumer franchise with still-excellent gross margins, sharply impaired operating economics, and a valuation that already assumes a fairly substantial earnings repair. Revenue has only crawled back from $14.33B in FY2025 to $15.05B in FY2026, still below $15.61B in FY2024, $15.91B in FY2023, and far below the $17.74B peak in FY2022. More important than the sales line is what happened underneath it: operating income collapsed from $3.17B in 2022 to $1.51B in 2023, $970M in 2024, then negative $785M in 2025, with only a partial rebound to $780M in 2026. That is not a normal cyclical wobble; it says the old model has lost a lot of margin resilience. Yes, gross margin remains elite at 75.5%, but operating margin is now 5.2% versus roughly 17.8% in 2022. When a prestige beauty company keeps gross margin but loses two-thirds of operating margin, the issue is not product pricing power alone — it is channel mix, cost structure, and likely diminished scale efficiency.
The quarterly sequence does show some stabilization, but not enough to justify comfort. Latest four quarters sum to $15.05B revenue and just $182M net income, and the most recent quarter was back to a loss: $3.63B sales and -$116M net income, versus $3.41B and -$546M a year earlier. That’s an improvement, but it’s still a loss in a business that used to mint money. Net margins over the last eight quarters bounce between -16%, -14.7%, low-single-digit positive, and now -3.2%; that kind of volatility is unusual for a supposedly defensive staples name. The market cap is $36.9B, or about 2.5x sales, for a company earning just 1.2% net margin on an annual basis. The 204x P/E is mechanically distorted, but it still captures the central problem: current earnings are tiny, and the stock only makes sense if investors underwrite a return to something much closer to historical profitability. I don’t think the present data give that confidence.
What keeps this from being an outright disaster call is the balance sheet and cash generation. Estée Lauder has just $503M of debt against $3.50B of cash, so this is not a financing stress story. Free cash flow of $1.32B on $182M of net income is also a real positive and suggests the accounting earnings trough may overstate underlying earning power, probably because of restructuring, working capital normalization, and non-cash charges. On an enterprise basis the stock is less stretched than the headline P/E suggests: EV/revenue of 2.26x and EV/EBITDA of 21.5x are expensive for a turnaround but not absurd for a quality branded asset. Still, “not absurd” is not the same as cheap. If I take FY2026’s $780M operating income as a base and assume a healthy recovery to even $1.5B-$1.8B EBIT — still well below 2022’s $3.17B — today’s equity value is already discounting much of that comeback. At $102, you are paying for restoration before restoration has actually occurred.
The best argument against my bearish lean is straightforward: this could be a classic fallen angel where earnings are troughing while cash flow and brand equity survive. Revenue did grow 5% in FY2026, operating income swung from -$785M to +$780M, and the company still posts a 75% gross margin that most consumer businesses would envy. With net cash, a 1.4% dividend yield, and no leverage overhang, management has time to restructure. If quarterly net income merely normalizes from low single digits to high single digits as volumes recover, EPS could rebound violently and make the current multiple look far less demanding in hindsight. A smart bull would also say that prestige beauty franchises often look most broken just before the operating model snaps back, because fixed costs make the income statement lag demand. I weigh that less heavily because the recovery has already lasted a year and still hasn’t produced consistent profitability; the latest quarter being negative again matters.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2026 was not just a bounce from a disastrous 2025 but the start of a real earnings restoration. Specifically, I would want to see two or three consecutive quarters with revenue above 5% YoY and net margin sustainably above 6%, not 1%-4% with intermittent losses. On a full-year basis, if Estée Lauder can push revenue back above $16B and operating income above $1.5B while preserving the current cash profile, then the stock around $100 would look much more defensible and I’d move toward neutral or constructive. Without that, this remains a premium multiple on a subscale earnings base. The business is better than the most apocalyptic models imply, but the stock still looks priced for a recovery that the numbers have not yet earned.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a prestige beauty franchise that has stopped the bleeding but has not restored the earnings power the market is still capitalizing. Revenue trough-to-recovery is real: fiscal 2026 printed $15.05B, up from $14.33B the prior year and the first annual uptick after three consecutive declines from the $17.74B 2022 peak. Operating income swung from a $785M loss to $780M profit, and free cash flow of $1.32B on only $457M of capex confirms the model still throws off cash when the P&L is not absorbing restructuring and channel shocks. Gross margin held at 75.5 percent—evidence the brand stack (La Mer, MAC, Clinique and the rest) has not been commoditized. Yet net income of $182M and a 5.2 percent operating margin are a fraction of the $3.17B operating profit and mid-teens margins of 2022. Trailing P/E near 204x is an artifact of earnings near zero; the cleaner lenses are 2.47x sales, 21.5x EV/EBITDA, and roughly 28x FCF on a $36.9B equity value. For a business with a −1.8 percent revenue CAGR, −33 percent earnings CAGR, and a latest quarter that slipped back to a $116M loss on $3.63B of sales, those multiples price a full mean-reversion that the income statement has not delivered.
What the quantitative models underweight is the quality of the balance sheet and the cash conversion. With $3.50B of cash against $503M of debt and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.13, EL is a net-cash compounder that can fund the dividend, buybacks, or portfolio surgery without stress. ROIC at 33.9 percent (even as ROE sits at a meager 4.8 percent and ROA at 0.9 percent) shows the core capital base still earns; the drag is volume and operating leverage, not structural destruction of invested capital. The 5.1 percent recent revenue bounce and the return to positive annual free cash flow argue against the pure liquidation or permanent-impairment case embedded in a ~$25 composite fair value. That said, a payout ratio above 2.7x earnings is unsustainable until net income rebuilds, and low revenue confidence with a decelerating quarterly trend keeps the recovery fragile rather than V-shaped.
The strongest case against an overvalued call is that the market is rationally paying an option premium on China and travel-retail normalization plus margin recapture from restructuring. If operating margin even halfway backtracks toward the 2023–2024 zone (roughly 6–10 percent) on a stabilized $15–16B revenue base, EBITDA and FCF expand fast enough that 15–18x forward cash flow supports equity value well above the ultra-bear $25 print—potentially into the $60–80 zone before any strategic premium. Bulls will also note that 2.3x EV/revenue is not outrageous for a high-gross-margin brand portfolio if you believe indie disruption is cyclical noise and that family control plus rumored strategic interest puts a floor under the stock. I weigh that differently because three years of eroded earnings power, structural share loss risk in China to domestic competitors, and a narrative durability the briefing itself flags as fragile mean the $102 price requires near-flawless execution on every recovery lever simultaneously. At current levels you are not buying the cash flows you can see; you are buying the story that 2022 economics return.
I would flip toward fair or undervalued if two consecutive quarters deliver operating margins sustainably above 8–10 percent with China/travel retail commentary that confirms volume recovery rather than destocking relief, or if fiscal 2027 guidance implies net income rebuilding toward $800M–$1B+ while FCF holds above $1.2B. A credible strategic transaction or activist-led portfolio break-up at a clear premium would also re-anchor the multiple. Absent that, the gap between $1.32B of FCF and a $37B capitalization is too wide for a low-growth defensive name still printing sub-2 percent net margins.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Estee Lauder's balance sheet and earnings integrity are genuinely strong. Net cash of about 3.0B, FCF of 1.32B in the latest year, OCF/NI of 3.47x, accruals at -7.1% of assets, Beneish M of -2.89 and Altman Z of 3.17 all point to reported numbers that are backed by cash and free of mechanical red flags. Share count is essentially flat (diluted share CAGR near 0%, buybacks running 177% of SBC), so per-share value is being protected. Gross margin has actually recovered to 75.5%, near the 2022 peak of 75.7%, indicating the premium pricing architecture and brand mix are intact.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment/regional detail on China and travel-retail exposure - the swing factor behind the OpM collapse
- Status and run-rate savings of the Beauty Reimagined / PRGP restructuring program
- Inventory levels and channel sell-through vs sell-in to confirm the top-line stabilization is real demand
- Debt maturity ladder and covenant headroom given the swing to operating losses in 2025
- Whether the FY2026 gross margin recovery is mix/pricing or transient promo pullback
The composite fair value of $32.70 and signal-adjusted $24.98 imply the market is paying roughly 3-4x deserved value, and even the more generous DCF at $36.29 sits ~65% below the $101.94 price. I discount the EPV floor of $12.96 as a punitive trough-earnings snapshot (operating income is down ~two-thirds from 2022), but the DCF is the ceiling of reasonable, not the midpoint - and it still says rich. Quality is genuinely mixed: clean books, fortress liquidity, elite brands (which raises deserved value) but net income 92% off peak and no convincing operating inflection. That combination does not justify a ~$37B market cap. What is priced in at $102: a full margin normalization back toward 2021-22 peaks, a China/travel-retail rebound, and credit for brand equity as if the earnings power were already restored. That is the bull case fully cashed - with no discount for execution risk or the structural bear thesis (indie disruption, permanent travel-retail impairment). Even blending DCF with a quality premium, I get a deserved value in the $40-55 range, not triple digits. Margin of safety is negative. This is a fallen angel where the angel part is intact but the fall has not been priced.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Operating margin trajectory in the next two quarters - any real inflection vs guidance
- China Prestige Beauty and travel-retail run-rate versus company commentary
- Restructuring charge cadence and whether normalized EPS is being credibly rebuilt
- Any guidance reset that would recalibrate the DCF's revenue/margin path
EL sits in an unusual sentiment pocket: a fragile fallen-angel narrative is getting a live test right now via Q4 results, and the early read from the news flow is favorable (margin improvement, organic sales growth, broad regional gains). That is exactly the kind of incremental proof point that turns a broken-story stock's tape from persistent selling into short-covering and re-rating attempts. Recent momentum has already flipped positive (5.1% vs -1.8% long-term), consistent with sentiment thawing rather than a fundamental re-rating. The offsets are real. The tape is only mildly risk-on (+32, nascent, 1 day old) and 10y at 4.69% with a 25.8 market PE is a background headwind for any name with a 1.25 beta and a discretionary-adjacent consumer profile. The narrative is tagged fragile with low cult coefficient, meaning there is no loyal holder base to defend the stock if the next China datapoint disappoints; sentiment can whip either way on a single print. Analyst tone implied by the coverage is cautiously constructive ('should you buy, sell or hold') rather than capitulatory or euphoric - a neutral-to-slightly-positive drift, not a stampede. Net: the acute headwind phase (China derating, founder loss, travel retail collapse narrative) has passed its peak intensity, and a mild tailwind from earnings-driven narrative repair is offsetting an ordinary macro crosswind. Balanced, leaning faintly positive on pressure - not on merit.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether sell-side target revisions follow the Q4 beat with actual upgrades, or just tone shifts
- China / travel-retail commentary in the next 1-2 datapoints - the swing factor for narrative repair vs relapse
- Whether the risk-on regime persists beyond a few days or reverses (VIX 15.1 is not stressed but not sleepy)
- Any activist or strategic-review headline that would inject a hard catalyst into a fragile narrative
- Positioning/short-interest data - a crowded short into improving prints is asymmetric fuel
Prestige beauty's post-COVID Asia distortion is finally out of the base, but the global pool it returns to is smaller and flatter: Chinese consumers are trading toward local brands, travel retail is structurally lighter, and growth has migrated to India, the Middle East, and US marketplace channels where EL is a challenger rather than an incumbent. Macro is a mild headwind (rates elevated, tariff/sourcing cost friction), which pressures discretionary prestige more than the 'defensive' sector label suggests. The winners in this world are cost-disciplined portfolio owners who can redeploy from legacy makeup into fragrance and clinical skincare — EL is doing that, from behind.
When we made this prediction on Aug 24, 2026, EL was $103.39. We expect it to be $85.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.