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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Fastenal Co. (FAST) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 84 · Value -54 · Sentiment 28 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $25.32 vs $51.44 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Fastenal Co.
FAST NASDAQFastenal Co. is a wholesale distributor of industrial and construction supplies headquartered in Winona, Minnesota, founded in 1967 in the United States. The company’s core business centers on fasteners such as bolts, nuts, screws, studs, and related washers, which are used in manufactured products, construction projects, and maintenance and repair operations. Beyond fasteners, Fastenal Co. offers a broad range of industrial and construction materials, including safety equipment and services, tools, cutting tools, material handling products, janitorial items, electrical components, and general maintenance supplies. Fastenal Co. serves a diversified customer base spanning manufacturing, non-residential construction, maintenance, repair and operations (MRO), transportation, energy, agriculture, and government entities. It operates through an extensive network of branches, onsite locations, distribution centers, and industrial vending solutions that integrate directly into customer facilities to support inventory management and supply chain efficiency. Today, Fastenal Co. plays a significant role in the industrial distribution market by acting as a one-stop partner for businesses seeking reliable access to mission-critical components and consumable supplies.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.09
Total Equity: $3.94B
Shares: 1,150,334,204
Total Debt: $125.00M
Cash: $276.80M
EBITDA: $1.83B
Total Debt: $125.00M
Cash: $276.80M
Revenue: $8.20B
Revenue: $8.20B
Revenue: $8.20B
Total Equity: $3.94B
Tax Rate: 24.0%
Equity: $3.94B
Total Debt: $125.00M
Cash: $276.80M
Current Liabilities: $715.60M
Long-Term Debt: $100.00M
Total Debt: $125.00M
Total Equity: $3.94B
Shares: 1,150,334,204
Shares: 1,150,334,204
CapEx: -$245.30M
Shares: 1,150,334,204
Stock Price: $51.27
Net Income: $1.26B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 5:28pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $7.5B | $8.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.2B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.5B |
| Gross Profit | $2.8B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B |
| Net Income | $925.0M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | — | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| EPS | $1.61 | $1.89 | $2.02 | $2.01 | $1.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.60 | $1.89 | $2.02 | $2.00 | $1.09 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:27pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $236.2M | $230.1M | $221.3M | $255.8M | $276.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.5B |
| Total Assets | $4.3B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $5.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $682.2M | $789.8M | $661.3M | $687.1M | $715.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | $330.0M | $353.2M | $200.0M | $125.0M | $100.0M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Total Equity | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 5:28pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $770.1M | $941.0M | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$156.6M | -$173.8M | -$172.8M | -$226.5M | -$245.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $613.5M | $767.2M | $1.3B | $946.8M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$15.0M | $165.0M | -$295.0M | -$60.0M | -$75.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$643.7M | -$711.3M | -$1.0B | -$893.3M | -$1.0B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$237.8M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$9.5M | -$6.1M | -$8.8M | $34.5M | $21.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 5:28pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.1% | +5.2% | +2.7% | +8.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +15.8% | +4.3% | +1.4% | +8.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +19.4% | +5.2% | -1.2% | +9.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +17.5% | +6.3% | -0.4% | +9.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | +4.6% | -1.2% | +8.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:26pm (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-28 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-28 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-29 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-28 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-29 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-25 | $0.44 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-31 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-25 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-26 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-24 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-31 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-05 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-25 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-26 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-26 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-01 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-26 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-26 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-26 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-01 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 17:41Even the bull case prices 52% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 63%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($51.44) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +16% | 17.8% | $24.64 | -52% |
| Base — stabilizes | +10% | 15.5% | $18.44 | -64% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 13.1% | $13.50 | -74% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +11% | 15.5% | $18.91 | -63% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 17:39The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: FAST posted $2.39B in Q2 2026, up 14.9% YoY from $2.08B, with net margin expanding to 16.0% from 15.9%. That's an acceleration, not a deceleration — the trailing four quarters run $8.75B in revenue vs. the $8.20B FY2025 print, so run-rate growth is closer to 10-11% than the 5.7% five-year CAGR the momentum module cites. Earnings are compounding faster: TTM NI is roughly $1.35B versus $1.15B in FY2024, ~17% growth. ROIC of 33%, debt/equity of 3%, current ratio 4.85, and $1.05B FCF on $245M capex — this is a pristine balance sheet with genuine operating leverage showing up right now. The synthesis model's "growth slowing, margins plateaued" bear framing is contradicted by the last two quarters of actual data.
That said, the valuation is still uncomfortable. At $51.27 and ~$1.35B TTM earnings, the P/E is ~43x; EV/EBITDA at 32x is genuinely rich for a distributor. Even generously assuming FAST sustains 10% revenue growth and margins hold at 16%, you're looking at ~$1.55B NI in 2027, putting the forward multiple around 38x. Grainger (GWW) trades at ~25x. The synthesis DCF pinning fair value at $25-28 is, however, absurd on its face — that implies FAST should trade below book-value-adjusted replacement cost for a business earning 33% ROIC. Whoever ran that model almost certainly used a punitive terminal growth or discount rate that ignores the reinvestment economics. Fair value is more plausibly in the $38-45 range on a 28-32x forward multiple — expensive, but not the 45% haircut the composite claims.
The insider activity flag deserves scrutiny. Every single "sale" in the last ten transactions is paired 1:1 with an option exercise on the same day — this is mechanical cashless-exercise behavior, not conviction selling. The secondary signals module correctly flagged "Net Insider Buying" while the market-forces model called it "47:1 insider selling" — those two are looking at the same tape and reaching opposite conclusions. The secondary read is correct; there is no meaningful discretionary selling here. Market-forces is overweighting a non-signal. The narrative layer's framing — "82% premium sits entirely in narrative" — also overstates it once you correct the fundamental anchor upward.
A careful contrarian's real argument isn't that FAST is a bad business; it's that (a) industrial distribution is late-cycle and the 14.9% Q2 print may be capturing tariff-driven pull-forward or inventory restocking that reverses, (b) the 5.7% five-year CAGR is what you get across a full cycle and 10% is the peak, and (c) at 43x TTM, any reversion to trend growth plus multiple compression to peer levels (25-28x) implies 30-40% downside even without any operational stumble. The FCF CAGR of -8.7% is the one genuinely worrying number in the file — it suggests working capital investment (onsite/vending buildout) is consuming reinvestment dollars faster than accounting earnings admit, and warrants a look at inventory days trend that isn't in this file. I'd note the file is missing segment onsite/vending disclosure and the 2026 dates suggest this is forward-simulated data, which further reduces my conviction on the acceleration read.
My verdict: I partially dissent from the synthesis. FAST is overvalued, but not by 45% — the DCF anchor is broken. This is a genuine ~33% ROIC compounder trading at a ~50-60% premium to fair value, not a 100% premium. Fair value is $38-42; current $51.27 offers negative expected returns over 12-24 months absent multiple expansion, but the downside is bounded by business quality and cyclical resilience. I would not short it, would not buy it here, and would be a starter buyer in the low $40s or on a cycle-driven pullback to $35. The market-forces "priced for perfection at cyclical peak" framing is directionally right; the synthesis fair value is directionally wrong in magnitude.
GPT Reading
Fastenal is exactly the sort of business the market loves to overpay for: a genuinely excellent operator with fortress finances, high returns, and unusually stable profitability for an industrial name. The operating record is hard to argue with. Revenue rose from $6.01B in 2021 to $8.20B in 2025, about 8% annualized over that span, while net income climbed from $925M to $1.26B. Gross margin has held around 45%, operating margin around 20%, and net margin around 15%, which is elite for distribution. The latest quarterly run-rate is even better: 2026 Q2 revenue of $2.39B and net income of $382.8M imply 16.0% net margin, up from 15.9% a year earlier, and the last four quarters sum to roughly $8.75B of revenue and $1.35B of net income. Add a balance sheet with just $125M of debt against $276.8M of cash, plus 33% ROIC and 32% ROE, and you have a real quality compounder, not a story stock pretending to be one.
But the stock price is still asking for too much. At $51.27, the market cap is $58.8B, which is about 6.7x trailing annualized revenue on the recent run-rate and roughly 43-47x earnings depending on whether you use 2025 reported EPS power or annualize the last two quarters. That is an extreme multiple for a company whose longer-run revenue CAGR is 5.7%, earnings CAGR is 4.4%, and free cash flow has actually shrunk over the measured period. Even if I give full credit for the recent acceleration—Q2 revenue up roughly 15% year over year versus Q2 2025, and Q1 up about 12%—the valuation already embeds a continuation of unusually strong execution with no cyclical wobble. For a distributor, 32x EV/EBITDA and 7.2x sales are not “premium quality” numbers; they are near-perfection numbers. If this were a software business with incremental margins expanding off a sticky recurring base, maybe. For an industrial supply chain business, even a best-in-class one, that is a dangerous starting point.
What stands out most is the mismatch between business quality and shareholder yield at this valuation. Free cash flow was $1.05B in 2025, so the stock trades at about a 1.8% FCF yield. The dividend yield is 1.86%, and the payout ratio is nearly 80%, which means a large portion of the return case depends on continued multiple support rather than internally compounding retained cash at a high rate. Yes, the company earns high returns on capital, but if investors are paying 15x book and more than 7x sales, much of that quality is already capitalized into the stock. The recent margin improvement is real, but it is incremental improvement on an already mature base, not a step-change economics story. I do not see enough growth in the raw numbers to justify paying a multiple usually reserved for businesses with double-digit long-duration organic growth and significantly larger reinvestment runways.
The best argument against this view is that Fastenal is not a generic distributor and deserves to be valued as a structurally superior model. The evidence is there: margins have not compressed despite scale, ROIC above 30% is extraordinary, the balance sheet is pristine, and recent quarterly growth has clearly reaccelerated. If the company can sustain something like a $1.45B-$1.55B net income run-rate over the next year while holding 15.5%-16.0% net margins, then today’s P/E falls faster than the backward-looking metrics suggest. A smart bull would also note that the insider “selling” here is mostly option exercise-related rather than obvious discretionary dumping, so I do not read much signal into it. And in a market starved for dependable industrial compounders, scarcity itself can support a durable premium for much longer than valuation purists expect.
Still, I weigh those bullish points as reasons the stock should trade at a premium, not at this premium. I would change my mind if the next few quarters show that the 2026 acceleration is not just cyclical recovery but a new earnings level: specifically, if revenue can hold above $2.35B per quarter, net margins stay at or above 15.8%, and full-year free cash flow pushes toward $1.35B-$1.45B without balance-sheet leverage, then the current price becomes more defensible. Absent that, I think the likely outcome is not business disappointment but valuation compression: a great company still can be a mediocre stock when bought at 40x-plus earnings. My fair value range is closer to the low-to-mid $30s, and I would need a pullback toward roughly $35 before the quality and price start to line up.
Grok Reading
Fastenal’s numbers describe a genuinely excellent industrial distributor that the market has decided to price like a software franchise. Revenue climbed from $6.01B in 2021 to $8.20B in 2025, a roughly 5.7% CAGR, with a recent acceleration to 8.7% year-over-year and a latest quarter of $2.39B that keeps the sequential step-up intact. Net income followed a similar path to $1.26B, margins holding near 15% net and 20% operating while gross sits at a durable 45%. ROIC of 33% and ROE of 32% on a balance sheet carrying only $125M of debt against $277M cash and $3.94B equity is the profile of a high-quality compounder, not a cyclical metal-bender. Free cash flow of $1.05B against $245M of capex confirms the model converts earnings cleanly. None of that is in dispute. What is in dispute is the 47x trailing P/E, 7.2x sales, and 32x EV/EBITDA attached to mid-single-digit historical growth and a payout ratio already at 80%. At $51.27 the equity is capitalizing roughly $59B of enterprise value on a business that, even granting premium economics, is still an industrial distributor whose earnings power grows high-single-digits in a good year.
The contradiction with the quantitative fair-value work is therefore not subtle. A composite intrinsic estimate near $28 implies the stock is embedding an 80%+ narrative premium for the vending-machine stickiness story and multi-decade execution track record. Recent quarterly prints ($2.20B then $2.39B) and 9.4% earnings growth show the flywheel is still turning, but they do not re-rate the growth algorithm into double digits on a sustained basis. Insider activity is almost entirely option exercise followed by immediate sale of the same share counts—classic liquidity events, not accumulation—so the “net buying” secondary signal is noise. FCF CAGR of –8.7% over the measured window is an additional soft spot beneath the steady revenue line. The stock is being valued for perpetual quality compounding at a rate the income statement has not yet delivered outside of short bursts.
The strongest counter-argument is that quality of this consistency is rare and the market has spent a decade correctly paying up for it. Gross margin has not compressed, ROIC remains elite, the onsite/vending model does create switching costs that pure catalog peers lack, and the fortress balance sheet plus $1B-plus FCF gives management decades of optionality to keep buying back stock and raising the dividend. A skeptic of the under-valuation call would note that applying a 30x multiple—still a fat premium to industrial distributors—to something like $1.35–1.40B of forward earnings already gets you into the low-to-mid $30s, and any sustained 10%+ growth regime plus modest margin creep could justify mid-30s without requiring heroics. In a world that systematically overpays for predictable compounders, Fastenal’s 50-year record is the exact asset that keeps the multiple from mean-reverting quickly. That case is coherent; it simply requires believing the current 47x is the new normal rather than late-cycle quality froth.
I would reverse course if the next four quarters delivered sustained revenue growth above 12% with operating margin expansion past 22%, or if a market drawdown brought the shares into the $32–36 range where a 28–32x earnings multiple on demonstrated earnings power would restore an asymmetric reward-to-risk profile. Until one of those arrives, the data say the story has outrun the cash flows.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Fastenal shows the profile of a high-quality mature earner: revenue compounded from 6.01B in 2021 to 8.20B in 2025 (about 8% CAGR), gross margin held in a tight 45-46% band, and operating margin sat at roughly 20% every year. Net income rose from 925M to 1.26B and FCF ran 613M to 1.05B, with OCF/NI at 1.0x and accruals at -0.1% of assets. Beneish M of -2.4 and Altman Z of 36.25 corroborate that reported earnings are cash-backed and solvency risk is negligible. Net cash of 151.8M against 1.05B annual FCF means the business is self-funding with ample optionality. The dilution module's 18.8% diluted share CAGR flag looks mechanical: share count was flat at 573-577M from 2021-2024, then printed 1.15B in 2025 - almost exactly a 2-for-1 change, consistent with a stock split, not real dilution. SBC is only 0.1% of revenue and buyback/SBC is 651%, both indicating strong per-share discipline. Insider tape is routine option-exercise-and-sell behavior with no meaningful open-market buying or selling; the 'net insider buying' framing in the context module is not supported by the tape.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Confirm the 2025 share count jump from 574M to 1.15B is a stock split (likely 2-for-1) rather than an issuance
- Customer and end-market concentration disclosures in the 10-K
- Onsite/FMI (vending) program growth rates and contribution to revenue mix
- Any changes in inventory turns or DSO that could presage the GM% drift continuing
- Actual buyback vs dividend cash returned to shareholders per share on a split-adjusted basis
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $25.32 and signal-adjusted at $28.18 versus a $51.44 price, implying roughly 45% downside. The DCF ($21) and EPV floor ($12.54) are almost certainly too harsh for a business with Fastenal's returns on capital, steady same-store growth, and vending-machine flywheel - EPV in particular ignores reinvestment value entirely. The anchored-PE at $46.43 is the most credible read and lands only about 10% below spot, suggesting the honest gap is 'modestly rich,' not 'deeply overvalued.'
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 18.8% share CAGR is truly a stock split (confirm via 10-K share count) - a real dilution would materially cut deserved value
- Forward same-store daily sales trajectory and vending device net adds
- Gross margin trend vs the plateau bear thesis
- Any FY guidance revision that would reset the anchored-PE base earnings
FAST is riding a clean positive news cycle: a well-received Q2 update, a 14% one-month rally, and headlines framing it as an outperformer within industrial products. The steady-compounder narrative is strong and durable, and in a mildly risk-on tape with neutral macro that kind of story tends to get rewarded with sticky flows even without a cult following. Low beta (0.71) means the S&P being 1.4% off highs barely registers here. Against that, the dominant media framing has shifted to 'is it pricey?' and 'fully valued despite the run' - not a narrative break, but a ceiling. Analyst tone in the flow leans cautious on upside from here even while acknowledging execution. Net, the pressure still leans up because the story is intact and momentum is fresh, but the tailwind is losing thrust as valuation chatter grows louder.
Verify before trusting this (3)
- Whether next monthly sales update sustains the beat cadence or shows deceleration
- Analyst target revisions after the Q2 rally - if targets do not chase the price, the ceiling hardens
- Any rotation out of defensive industrials into higher-beta cyclicals if the risk-on tape strengthens
Neutral macro (10y 4.72%, curve +0.53) with reshoring capex and tariff-driven input inflation both working in a domestic industrial distributor's favor: higher realized fastener prices, plus a customer incentive to consolidate onto a supplier with inventory depth and on-site replenishment. The risk in the world is the same one that helps — this is a factory-activity-levered consumables business, so any industrial deceleration or tariff normalization hits volume and price simultaneously. Nothing in the world backdrop supports the ~41% growth the price embeds.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, FAST was $51.44. We expect it to be $46.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $42.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.