Homepage
AGING Analysis Report
Jun 18, 2026
9 days ago · 100% complete · +8 refreshed

Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc.

FBIN NYSE Categories PDF
Industrials · Construction
Deerfield, IL 60015-5611, United States IPO 2011 fbin.com Updated Jun 18, 3:00am
Price
$40.59
Market Cap
$4.8B
Employees
11,000
Beta
1.45
Avg Volume
2,771,295
CEO
David V. Barry
Business Description

Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc. specializes in providing a diverse array of water, outdoor, and security-focused products. Their extensive offerings encompass solutions for water management, smart connected devices, outdoor living enhancements, material transformation, sustainability efforts, safety, and overall well-being. The company's brand portfolio features well-known names such as Moen, House of Rohl, Aqualisa, Therma-Tru, Larson, Fiberon, Master Lock, and SentrySafe. Established in 1988, Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc. is headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois.

Business History
Generated: Jun 18, 2026 3:02am
Price Overview
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)
$40.59
-1.90 (-4.46%)
Day Range
$40.46 – $43.58
52-Week Range
$32.34 – $64.84
50-Day MA
$39.29
200-Day MA
$48.48
Volume
1,837,449.00
Analyst Price Targets
Low $41.00
Consensus $52.57
High $64.00
(45 analysts)
Share Structure
Outstanding 119,293,417.00
Float 116,705,057.00
Free Float 97.8%
High free float — 97.8% of shares trade freely, ~2.2% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
API Direct from provider CALC Derived from statements
Industry comparison last run: Jun 18, 2026 3:01am
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
API
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
17.99
Stock Price: $40.59
EPS (Diluted): 2.47
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
API
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
2.61
Stock Price: $40.59
Total Equity: $2.39B
Shares: 121,200,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
API
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
12.20
Market Cap: $4.84B
Total Debt: $2.54B
Cash: $264.00M
EBITDA: $714.60M
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
API
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$8.5B
Market Cap: $4.84B
Total Debt: $2.54B
Cash: $264.00M
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
API
Gross Profit / Revenue
44.6%
Gross Profit: $1.99B
Revenue: $4.46B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
API
Operating Income / Revenue
13.9%
Operating Income: $621.40M
Revenue: $4.46B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
API
Net Income / Revenue
6.7%
Net Income: $298.80M
Revenue: $4.46B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
API
Net Income / Total Equity
11.5%
Net Income: $298.80M
Total Equity: $2.39B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
API
NOPAT / Invested Capital
6.4%
Operating Income: $621.40M
Tax Rate: 26.2%
Equity: $2.39B
Total Debt: $2.54B
Cash: $264.00M
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
API
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1.84
Current Assets: $1.97B
Current Liabilities: $1.07B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
CALC
Total Debt / Total Equity
1.07
Short-Term Debt: $0.00
Long-Term Debt: $2.54B
Total Debt: $2.54B
Total Equity: $2.39B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
CALC
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$36.83
Revenue: $4.46B
Shares: 121,200,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
CALC
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$19.71
Total Equity: $2.39B
Shares: 121,200,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
CALC
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$3.03
Operating CF: $478.60M
CapEx: -$111.80M
Shares: 121,200,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
API
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
1.9%
Last Dividend: N/A
Stock Price: $40.59
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
Dividends Paid / Net Income
—
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $298.80M
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Jun 18, 2026 3:01am
Compares FBIN against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Three separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-06-18 03:08:46
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality-lite — starter position, scale on weakness 6/10
Solid-but-slipping cash generator that's only modestly cheap — interesting, not urgent, and the price needs to come to me.
The cruxWhether revenue stabilizes in the next 2-3 quarters — if the top-line bleed stops, the 10-15% discount becomes real; if it continues, deserved value drifts down to meet price.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from FBIN's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityHigh Earnings Quality
The three lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+15
Solid
edge √Σ 128 · risk √Σ 113 · conf 6/10

FBIN is a mature_earner that throws off real cash — FCF of $367M in 2025 against $299M net income (OCF/NI 1.47x, accruals -2.5% of assets, Beneish -2.61) — so the reported numbers are clean. Capital allocation favors per-share holders: diluted share count has fallen from 139.5M (2021) to 121.2M (2025), a -3.5% CAGR, with buyback/SBC at 855%. Gross margin has actually expanded from 40.8% to 44.6% across the window, suggesting genuine mix/pricing discipline in a tough housing environment.

The concerns are operational and structural. Revenue has declined four years in a row (4.80B → 4.46B), operating margin slipped from 16.9% to 13.9%, and net income has nearly halved from $772M (2021) to $299M (2025) despite the gross margin expansion — meaning SG&A/below-the-line costs are eating the gains. Net debt of ~$2.28B against only $264M liquid cash and $367M FCF makes the balance sheet a constraint (Altman Z 2.54, grey zone); it's self-funding but not a fortress.

The standout signal is Edward Garden's open-market buying — ~$28.7M across four prints in May–June 2026. That's a Trian-affiliated director putting serious personal capital in at a time when the trajectory looks weakest, which is either conviction in a turn or activist accumulation. Either way it's a real directional vote, not noise.

Strengths 5
m70
Clean earnings quality
OCF/NI of 1.47x, accruals -2.5% of assets, Beneish M -2.61. Cash conversion is real; no mechanical red flags.
m65
Disciplined share count reduction
Diluted shares down from 139.5M to 121.2M (-3.5% CAGR) with SBC only 0.5% of revenue and buyback/SBC at 856% — per-share value is being concentrated.
m60
Large insider open-market buying
Director Edward Garden purchased ~$28.7M across four P-coded prints in May–June 2026 — sizable directional conviction from a board-level operator.
m45
Gross margin expansion despite top-line decline
GM% rose from 40.8% (2021) to 44.6% (2025) even as revenue fell — indicates pricing/mix discipline, not just cost-cutting.
m40
Self-funding FCF generation
Consistent positive FCF ($367M in 2025, $475M avg over 5yrs) covers capex and buybacks without needing external capital.
Concerns 4
m70
Net income nearly halved in 4 years
Net income fell from $772M (2021) to $299M (2025) — a -21% CAGR. Operating margin compressed 300bps from 16.9% to 13.9%, and the deceleration accelerated in 2025.
m60
Four straight years of revenue decline
Revenue: $4.80B → $4.72B → $4.63B → $4.61B → $4.46B. Top line has not stabilized; durability of the franchise in current housing cycle is unproven.
m55
Net debt is ~7.6x FCF
Net debt of $2.28B vs $367M FCF and only $264M cash. Altman Z 2.54 (grey). Not distressed, but balance sheet is a constraint if earnings keep sliding.
m35
SG&A leakage
Gross margin up 380bps since 2021 but operating margin down 300bps — overhead/opex is eating the mix gains.
This is a decent business with clean books and shareholder-friendly capital allocation, but it's clearly past peak earnings in this cycle. The earnings quality is genuinely good — I trust the cash flow and the buyback math is real — and Garden dropping ~$29M of his own money is the kind of signal you don't ignore. But I can't call it a fortress when revenue has fallen four years running, net income is down 61% from 2021, and the company is sitting on $2.3B of net debt with shrinking earnings. It's a Solid mature_earner with cyclical/operational pressure, not a great compounder, and the housing-cycle answer matters more than anything in the forensic modules.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • Segment-level revenue/margin breakdown (Water, Outdoors, Security) to identify which is dragging
  • Debt maturity ladder and interest coverage on the $2.28B net debt position
  • Whether Garden's buying is personal or fund-affiliated (Trian) and any 13D activist filing
  • Customer concentration with big-box retailers (Home Depot/Lowe's) and pricing power evidence
  • Restructuring/M&A charges sitting in opex that explain the SG&A creep
  • FX and housing-cycle exposure underlying the four-year revenue decline
Valuation / Mispricing
+29
Modestly Cheap
edge √Σ 91 · risk √Σ 62 · conf 5/10
Price $40.59 vs deserved ~$45-48 — roughly 10-15% discount, modest margin of safety but not decisive. attractive below $35.00

FBIN at $40.59 carries a ~$4.8B market cap on a business doing ~$4.4B revenue with double-digit operating margins and real free cash flow. The e2e synthesis lands at 'Reasonable Premium' — meaning fair value sits modestly above price, not multiples above. Earnings quality is genuinely high (score 2), so I don't need to haircut the cash flows, and the buyback is real, which mechanically lifts per-share deserved value even on flat revenue. That argues the stock is somewhat cheap, not richly priced.

The offset: revenue has declined four years running, the business is housing-cycle exposed, and debt is heavy — all of which compress the multiple the market is willing to pay. A solid-but-slipping mid-cycle industrial typically deserves ~10-12x EBITDA / mid-teens P/E, and FBIN is roughly there. So the gap is real but narrow — call it 10-20% of deserved value, not a 'back up the truck' setup.

Net: this is the textbook 'modestly cheap quality compounder where the market already knows the story.' Insider buying (~$29M from Garden) is the most interesting non-price datapoint pushing me off 'fairly valued.' I'd want it closer to $35 before leaning in hard.

Cheap signals 4
m55
e2e synthesis says Reasonable Premium to price
Composite fair value sits above $40.59 — consistent with a mid-single to low-double-digit discount on a high-earnings-quality cash generator.
m50
Insider has real skin in the game
Garden putting ~$29M of personal capital in is a meaningful vote that the inside view of deserved value exceeds today's price.
m40
Aggressive buyback at depressed price
Real cash flow being deployed into share repurchases at a cyclically-compressed multiple mechanically raises per-share intrinsic value.
m35
High earnings quality means no haircut needed
EQ score 2 — the reported cash flow is trustworthy, so the implied yield on $40.59 is real, not accrual-flattered.
Rich / priced-in 3
m45
Four straight years of revenue decline
Top-line shrinkage caps the multiple the market will pay; cheap relative to a static fair value is not cheap if fair value is drifting down.
m35
Heavy debt load amplifies cycle risk
Leverage on a housing-exposed cyclical means equity deserves a higher discount rate, trimming deserved value.
m25
No catalyst priced in beyond housing recovery
Bull case requires a cycle turn that isn't in management's control — 'priced for muddle-through' is closer to fair than cheap.
Modestly cheap but not screaming. At $40.59 I'm getting maybe a 10-15% discount to what this clean cash-generative business deserves, which is fine but not a fat pitch — especially with revenue still drifting down and leverage non-trivial. I'd want it sub-$35 to feel I'm being paid for the cyclical and debt risk. The insider buy is the only thing keeping me off 'Fairly Valued.'
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Latest quarterly organic revenue trend — is the four-year decline bottoming?
  • Net debt / EBITDA and interest coverage at current rates
  • FCF conversion vs reported EPS to confirm earnings quality holds
  • Buyback pace and remaining authorization
  • Segment-level margins — is Moen/Water still carrying the mix?
General Sentiment
-70
Headwind
tail √Σ 36 · head √Σ 106 · conf 6/10

FBIN sits in an awkward sentiment pocket. The macro tape is technically neutral but tilting defensive: VIX elevated, 10y at 4.49%, and the S&P backing off highs. With a 1.45 beta and direct exposure to housing and DIY via Moen, Master Lock, and Therma-Tru, this name absorbs more of any risk-off impulse than the market-neutral score suggests, and higher-for-longer rates directly pressure the housing turnover thesis that underwrites the brands. There is no AI, energy-transition, or smart-home story carrying it; the archetype is steady-compounder with minimal intensity and low cult coefficient, meaning no narrative bid to offset macro drag. Analyst tone is a tepid Hold (15 holds vs 10 buys, 2 sells) with zero target revisions this month and a $52.57 target sitting well above a $41.43 tape that keeps drifting lower (-1.8% CAGR, momentum negative). That is classic stale-bullish coverage diverging from a fading tape, which historically resolves through downward revisions rather than price catching up. Net: modest but persistent headwind, driven by rate-sensitive sector positioning, a dormant narrative, and analysts who have not yet capitulated.

Tailwinds 2
m30
Defensive brand mix limits downside
Diversified, recession-resistant brands and consistent FCF mean sentiment damage tends to be a grind rather than a crash; durable narrative provides a soft floor.
m20
Quiet news flow, no narrative break
No fresh negative catalyst or story crack — pressure is ambient macro/sector drift, not active de-rating, which keeps the headwind moderate rather than severe.
Headwinds 4
m55
High beta into a jittery tape
Beta 1.45 with VIX at the 56th percentile and the index off highs means even a neutral regime transmits amplified pressure to this name on any risk-off day.
m60
Rates pinch the housing channel
10y at 4.49% directly suppresses housing turnover and remodel demand, which is the cash-flow engine behind Moen and Therma-Tru — sentiment toward housing-adjacent industrials stays cautious.
m50
No narrative shield
Steady-compounder archetype with minimal intensity and low cult means there is no story bid to defend the stock when the tape sours; it trades on flows, not faith.
m45
Stale-bullish analyst setup
Targets average $52.57 vs $41.43 with zero revisions this month while momentum is negative — that gap typically closes via cuts, a slow drip of negative tone.
I read this as a moderate, grinding headwind rather than a dramatic one. The tape is neutral but the transmission into a 1.45-beta housing-linked name is asymmetric, rates keep the sector narrative defensive, and there is no story-driven bid to offset drift. Analysts are still carrying a $52 target into a $41 tape with no revisions — that is exactly the setup that bleeds via slow downgrades, not a crash. Until either rates ease or a fresh narrative angle emerges, sentiment leans against this name even though the business is fine.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Watch for downward target revisions from the 9 Buys — first cut would confirm the stale-bullish unwind
  • Housing data (existing home sales, mortgage rates) — any further rate backup amplifies the headwind
  • Sector rotation signals: if defensives bid and cyclicals sell, FBIN trades with the cyclical bucket despite its 'defensive brand' framing
  • Any M&A or capital return announcement that could re-ignite the compounder narrative
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
Please log in to view trade setups
The Augustus trade-setup read is a members feature.
Log in
Three lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), and General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Deep Analysis
Last run: Jun 18, 2026 3:06:08 am

Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.

0 Company Classification — What type of company is this?
1 Industry Landscape — Where is the industry headed?
2 Company Momentum — Where is this company trending?
3 Forward Projection — 1Y & 2Y projected metrics (requires Layer 1 + 2)
4a DCF Valuation — Present value of future cash flows
4b Earnings Power Value — Floor value — worth with zero growth
4c Anchored PE — Industry PE adjusted for growth differential
4d Reverse DCF — What growth is the market pricing in?
4e Revenue-Based DCF — For growth/narrative companies (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4f Anchored P/S — Price-to-Sales peer comparison (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4g Scenario Analysis — Bull / Base / Bear (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4h Dividend Discount Model — For dividend/income stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4i Book Value Analysis — For deep value / turnaround stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4j Insider Activity — Are insiders buying or selling?
4f Cash Flow Quality — How trustworthy is the FCF?
4g Debt Maturity Risk — Can it handle its debt?
4h Macro Environment — Rates, market valuation, volatility
4i Sector Intelligence — How does this company compare within its sector?
4j Revenue Confidence — How reliable is the growth projection?
4k Sensitivity Analysis — How fragile is the fair value estimate?
4l Sector Demand Cycle — Is the sector in a boom, steady state, or contraction?
5 AI Investigation — Adaptive research engine (Claude)
5b Thesis Evaluation — What does the market believe? (narrative/platform stocks only)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
6 Valuation Synthesis — Weighted verdict from all methods (requires Layer 4)
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $4.8B $4.7B $4.6B $4.6B $4.5B
Cost of Revenue $2.8B $2.8B $2.7B $2.5B $2.5B
Gross Profit $2.0B $1.9B $1.9B $2.1B $2.0B
Operating Expenses $1.1B $1.2B $1.3B $1.3B $1.4B
Operating Income $811.1M $774.3M $614.9M $737.9M $621.4M
Net Income $772.4M $686.7M $404.5M $471.9M $298.8M
EBITDA $999.8M $977.9M $803.2M $919.6M $714.6M
EPS $5.72 $5.36 $3.20 $3.78 $2.47
EPS (Diluted) — — — — —
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $425.6M $642.5M $366.4M $381.1M $264.0M
Total Current Assets $2.7B $2.5B $2.0B $2.0B $2.0B
Total Assets $7.9B $6.1B $6.6B $6.6B $6.5B
Current Liabilities $2.0B $1.5B $1.2B $1.6B $1.1B
Long-Term Debt $2.3B $2.1B $2.7B $2.2B $2.5B
Total Liabilities $4.9B $4.0B $4.3B $4.1B $4.1B
Total Equity $3.1B $2.1B $2.3B $2.4B $2.4B
Retained Earnings $2.8B $2.3B $2.6B $3.0B $3.1B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $688.7M $566.3M $1.1B $667.8M $478.6M
Capital Expenditure -$214.2M -$246.1M -$256.5M -$193.3M -$111.8M
Free Cash Flow $474.5M $320.2M $799.3M $474.5M $366.8M
Acquisitions (net) $5.2M -$217.6M -$784.1M -$135.4M $0
Debt Repayment — — — — —
Dividends Paid — — — — —
Stock Buybacks -$447.7M -$580.1M -$150.0M -$240.4M -$247.8M
Net Change in Cash $51.1M $172.2M -$252.8M -$10.0M -$117.0M
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)
Metric 2025 2026 2027 2028
Revenue $4.5B
$4.5B – $4.5B
 $4.4B
$4.3B – $4.5B
 $4.5B
$4.4B – $4.6B
 $4.7B
$4.7B – $4.7B
EBITDA $857.8M
$854.0M – $861.6M
 $829.7M
$822.2M – $850.5M
 $852.3M
$837.0M – $871.3M
 $892.0M
$892.0M – $892.0M
Net Income $455.0M
$450.8M – $459.3M
 $386.4M
$375.4M – $397.4M
 $422.9M
$399.9M – $488.4M
 $514.5M
$497.8M – $531.2M
EPS — — — —
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth -1.6% -2.0% -0.4% -3.2%
Gross Profit Growth -1.4% -1.1% +8.1% -3.7%
Operating Income Growth -4.5% -20.6% +20.0% -15.8%
Net Income Growth -11.1% -41.1% +16.7% -36.7%
EBITDA Growth -2.2% -17.9% +14.5% -22.3%
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:06am (9d ago)
Type codes PPurchase SSale AAward / grant MOption exercise FIn-kind (tax) CConversion GGift DReturn to issuer
All SEC Form 4 codes
Open market
P Purchase
Open-market or private purchase of shares.
S Sale
Open-market or private sale of shares.
Compensation (Rule 16b-3)
A Award / grant
Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
D Return to issuer
Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
F In-kind (tax)
Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
I Discretionary
Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
M Option exercise
Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
Derivatives
C Conversion
Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
E Short expiration
Expiration of a short derivative position.
H Long expiration
Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
O OTM exercise
Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
X ITM exercise
Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
Other exempt
G Gift
Bona fide gift of securities.
L Small acquisition
Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
W Inheritance
Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
Z Voting trust
Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
Other
J Other
Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
K Equity swap
Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
U Tender / buyout
Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.

Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.

Date Insider Type Shares Price Value
2026-06-10 GARDEN EDWARD P P-Purchase 320,067.00 $40.60 $13.0M
2026-05-20 GARDEN EDWARD P P-Purchase 57,400.00 $34.89 $2.0M
2026-05-20 GARDEN EDWARD P P-Purchase 5,900.00 $33.28 $196,352
2026-05-19 GARDEN EDWARD P P-Purchase 403,000.00 $33.40 $13.5M
2026-05-19 GARDEN EDWARD P J-Other 373,741.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 PUGLIESE STEPHANIE L. A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 Perry Jeffery S. A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 MACKAY A D DAVID A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 Kilsby Susan S A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 HACKETT ANN F A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 GARDEN EDWARD P A-Award 4,765.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 Foley Brendan M A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 Finan Irial A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-05 Chande Amee A-Award 4,191.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-04 George Ashley E. A-Award 6,829.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-16 George Ashley E. 0.00 $0.00 $0
2021-02-28 George Ashley E. 1,513.00 $61.12 $92,475
2020-02-28 George Ashley E. 1,867.00 $42.30 $78,974
2022-02-28 George Ashley E. 1,270.00 $76.63 $97,320
2023-02-28 George Ashley E. 2,187.00 $76.60 $167,524
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 3:00am (9d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2026-05-22 $0.26 2026-05-04 2026-05-22 2026-06-10
2026-02-20 $0.26 2025-12-11 2026-02-20 2026-03-11
2025-11-21 $0.25 2025-09-29 2025-11-21 2025-12-10
2025-08-22 $0.25 2025-07-16 2025-08-22 2025-09-10
2025-05-27 $0.25 2025-05-13 2025-05-27 2025-06-11
2025-02-21 $0.25 2024-12-10 2025-02-21 2025-03-12
2024-11-22 $0.24 2024-09-23 2024-11-22 2024-12-11
2024-08-23 $0.24 2024-07-22 2024-08-23 2024-09-11
2024-05-23 $0.24 2024-05-07 2024-05-24 2024-06-12
2024-02-22 $0.24 2023-12-12 2024-02-23 2024-03-13
2023-11-22 $0.23 2023-09-18 2023-11-24 2023-12-13
2023-08-24 $0.23 2023-07-31 2023-08-25 2023-09-13
2023-05-25 $0.23 2023-05-15 2023-05-26 2023-06-14
2023-02-23 $0.23 2022-12-13 2023-02-24 2023-03-15
2022-11-23 $0.28 2022-09-28 2022-11-25 2022-12-14
2022-08-25 $0.28 2022-07-22 2022-08-26 2022-09-14
2022-05-26 $0.28 2022-05-02 2022-05-27 2022-06-15
2022-02-24 $0.28 2021-12-14 2022-02-25 2022-03-16
2021-11-24 $0.26 2021-09-27 2021-11-26 2021-12-15
2021-08-26 $0.26 2021-07-26 2021-08-27 2021-09-15
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for FBIN — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent analyst synthesis · Delvantic - Cairn AI · generated 2026-06-18 03:06:42
Reviews the pipeline's own verdicts
Verdict Fairly valued at $40 with deteriorating trajectory unconfirmed as trough — wait for Q2 2026 margin stabilization or a pullback to $34-35 before committing; insider buying is interesting but not yet a buy signal.

The raw numbers tell a deteriorating story that the prior models are partially sugarcoating. Revenue has slid from $4.80B (2021) to $4.46B (2025), a -1.8% CAGR, but the earnings collapse is the real signal: NI went from $772M in 2021 to $299M in 2025, a 61% peak-to-trough drop. Operating margin compressed from 16.9% to 13.9%, and the most recent quarter (Q1 2026) printed $1.01B revenue with NI of just $24.2M — a 2.4% net margin, down from 5.0% in the year-ago quarter. That's not stabilization; that's acceleration of the bleed. FCF dropped from a peak run-rate to $367M in 2025, a -32% CAGR. The TTM P/E of 17.9x looks reasonable until you realize the "E" is shrinking ~37% YoY on the most recent comp.

The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" and the Pre-Flight framing of a "cyclical at trough" need pushback. A trough call requires either (a) a housing turn visible in leading indicators or (b) margin stabilization. Neither is in the data — Q1 2026 margin of 2.4% is the worst print in the series, suggesting we may not be at trough yet. The Market Forces model's "value trap / structural decline" read is more honest about what the numbers actually show. The two prior verdicts contradict each other, and Market Forces has the better grip on the trajectory. The "steady compounder" narrative archetype is frankly wrong — compounders don't see EPS halve in four years. This is a housing-cyclical with brand equity, full stop.

The insider buying is the one genuinely interesting signal and deserves more weight than the models gave it. 786,000+ shares purchased in May–June 2026, concentrated in a tight window with one 403,000-share and one 320,067-share buy, is not routine — at ~$40, that's $30M+ of insider capital deployed within weeks. That tends to either mark a bottom or mark a value trap where insiders are early/wrong (think regional banks in early 2023). The contrarian argument: branded distribution moats (Moen, Master Lock, Therma-Tru) don't actually erode in two years; if housing turns in 2026-2027 on rate cuts, normalized earnings of ~$3.50-4.00 EPS on a 15-16x multiple gets you to $55-65. The bull case isn't insane — it's just unconfirmed by Q1 2026 data. The balance sheet disclosure is thin (no total debt shown), which matters enormously for a levered cyclical; without that, I can't size downside properly, and that's a real gap.

Where I land: the synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict is too generous given Q1 2026's 2.4% margin print, and Market Forces' "value trap" verdict is too dismissive given the credible insider conviction and durable brand portfolio. Fair value on normalized mid-cycle earnings of ~$3.25 EPS at 15x is ~$49 — modestly above spot. But you're buying ahead of a housing recovery that hasn't shown up in the data, against a 5-quarter deceleration with the worst margin print being the most recent one. The risk/reward is roughly symmetric at $40: ~20% upside to normalized fair value, ~20% downside if Q2/Q3 2026 prints look like Q1. I'd want either (a) the next quarterly print showing margin stabilization above 5%, or (b) entry closer to $34-35 (where the insider buying clusters and downside is better contained). The models that call this clearly mispriced in either direction are overconfident given the inflecting trajectory.

GPT Critique
Second-opinion review · gpt-4o · generated 2026-06-18 03:06:50
Reviews the Opus findings above
Verdict I agree largely with Opus — fairly valued at $40, but I'd peg fair value slightly higher at $45 based on brand strength and potential for market recovery, though a cautious approach is warranted until margins stabilize.

Fortune Brands Innovations, Inc. presents an interesting case when evaluated independently. The raw data reveals a clear trend of revenue and net income decline over the past few years. From a revenue standpoint, the company has seen a steady decrease from $4.80 billion in 2021 to $4.46 billion in 2025, indicating a negative CAGR of -1.8%. More concerning is the steep decline in net income from $772.4 million in 2021 to $298.8 million in 2025, reflecting a significant loss in profitability. This is further evidenced by the shrinking margins, which compressed from 16.9% in 2021 to 13.9% in 2025, and an alarming drop to a 2.4% margin in Q1 2026. The company's free cash flow has also suffered, down to $366.8 million, a 32% CAGR decline, underscoring the challenges it faces in maintaining cash efficiency.

Opus argues that the company is fairly valued at $40, suggesting a deteriorating trajectory unconfirmed as a trough and thus advises waiting for either margin stabilization or a price pullback before commitment. I concur with Opus on the notion that the current performance trajectory does not indicate a stabilization. The Q1 2026 figures, particularly the net margin of 2.4%, reinforce the argument that the company has not yet hit bottom. Where I diverge slightly is in the emphasis on insider buying. While Opus regards the insider purchases as potentially significant, I remain cautious; such transactions, though notable, do not guarantee a turnaround and might reflect misplaced optimism, particularly in light of a still-declining margin trajectory.

Additionally, I disagree with Opus's dismissal of the "steady compounder" narrative. While the earnings collapse suggests this isn't a classic compounder, the brand equity associated with its products, such as Moen and Master Lock, could suggest a more resilient long-term outlook if market conditions improve. However, I acknowledge Opus's valid point regarding the absence of definitive housing market recovery indicators, which casts doubt on any immediate turnaround.

A skeptic might argue that both analyses overlook the potential implications of the company's balance sheet, which lacks transparency on total debt. This omission is critical for a leveraged cyclical, as it could significantly affect downside risk. Additionally, skeptics would point out the reliance on insider buying as a signal might be overemphasized without clear data on debt levels and future cash flow potential.

Community AI Feedback
No community reviews yet for FBIN. Be the first — hit How to Contribute, have any AI review this page, and paste its take back here.
My Notes personal — only you see this
Data via Financial Modeling Prep · Cached for performance · fmp
v1.1.352 · d1100787 · 2026-06-26 11:39:30