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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for First Citizens BancShares, Inc. Class A Common Stock (FCNCA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-04): Designation Low · Gem Score -31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 23 · Value -67 · Sentiment -41 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $1,292.65 vs $2,141.16 at analysis
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First Citizens BancShares, Inc. Class A Common Stock
FCNCA NASDAQFirst Citizens BancShares, Inc. Class A Common Stock represents the equity of First Citizens BancShares, Inc., a bank holding company that provides retail and commercial banking services through its subsidiaries. The company serves individuals, businesses, and institutional clients with deposit products, lending, treasury services, and other financial solutions across its General Banking and Commercial Banking operations. It also includes a Rail segment and Corporate activities, reflecting a diversified business mix within the financial services sector. Headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina, First Citizens BancShares operates as a regional banking institution with a broad client base and a focus on traditional banking services supported by specialized commercial capabilities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 165.24
Total Equity: $22.24B
Shares: 13,350,278
Total Debt: $36.01B
Cash: $801.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $36.01B
Cash: $801.00M
Revenue: $9.25B
Revenue: $9.25B
Revenue: $9.25B
Total Equity: $22.24B
Tax Rate: 25.7%
Equity: $22.24B
Total Debt: $36.01B
Cash: $801.00M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $35.78B
Total Debt: $36.01B
Total Equity: $22.24B
Shares: 13,350,278
Shares: 13,350,278
CapEx: -$710.00M
Shares: 13,350,278
Stock Price: $2,182
Net Income: $2.21B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 6:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $4.5B | $8.8B | $9.7B | $9.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $783.0M | $1.7B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.8B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $547.0M | $1.1B | $11.5B | $2.8B | $2.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $53.88 | $67.47 | $785.14 | $189.42 | $165.24 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $53.88 | $67.40 | $784.51 | $189.41 | $165.24 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 5:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $337.8M | $518.0M | $908.0M | $814.0M | $801.0M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $58.3B | $109.3B | $213.8B | $223.7B | $229.7B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $4.5B | $37.2B | $36.7B | $35.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $53.6B | $99.6B | $192.5B | $201.5B | $207.5B |
| Total Equity | $4.7B | $9.7B | $21.3B | $22.2B | $22.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.4B | $5.4B | $16.7B | $19.4B | $20.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 6:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$283.8M | $2.8B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$107.4M | -$155.0M | -$405.0M | -$429.0M | -$710.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$391.2M | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $134.0M | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$54.0M | -$1.2B | -$3.1B | -$450.0M | -$1.0B |
| Dividends Paid | -$42.0M | -$83.0M | -$117.0M | -$158.0M | -$161.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.2B | $0 | -$1.6B | -$3.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$24.2M | $180.0M | $390.0M | -$94.0M | -$13.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 6:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +146.2% | +93.5% | +11.1% | -4.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +100.7% | +944.3% | -75.8% | -20.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 10:49am (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-31 | $2.10 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-29 | $2.10 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $2.10 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-28 | $2.10 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $1.95 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $1.95 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $1.95 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $1.95 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-28 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $1.64 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-30 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-09 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-02 06:33The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: revenue has flatlined in a $2.30–2.45B band for eight straight quarters, and the most recent Q2 2026 print of $2.43B with 27.6% net margin ($672M) is actually the strongest earnings quarter since the SVB-gain-distorted 2024 comps rolled off. Annualizing recent quarters gets you roughly $9.4–9.6B revenue and $2.35–2.5B net income — call it ~$220 EPS on ~11.2M shares. At $2,181, that's ~9.9x forward earnings and 1.29x book on a bank earning ~10% ROE with a fortress $22.2B equity base. That is not an obviously expensive bank; it is a cheap-to-average one on standard regional bank math. The debt/equity of 1.62x and $36B "total debt" figure is misleading — for a bank, that's largely FHLB advances and deposit-adjacent funding, not corporate leverage.
The synthesis verdict of "overvalued, fair value $1,326" is where I dissent hardest. A DCF on a bank is close to methodological malpractice — banks are valued on P/TBV × sustainable ROE, and at 1.29x P/B with ~10% ROE the stock is trading roughly at Gordon-growth fair value (assuming 9% cost of equity and 2% growth, justified P/B ≈ 1.0–1.3x). The "61% narrative premium" the narrative model cites is an artifact of feeding a bank into a cash-flow model built for industrials. Market Forces gets closer to the truth — this is a $200B+ balance sheet acquired at a crisis discount, and the noise from the 2023 $11.5B bargain purchase gain is corrupting every trailing growth metric the momentum module spits out (earnings CAGR of -56% is mechanically meaningless when the base year included a one-time FDIC gift). The Thesis Evaluation's framing — market pricing SVB gains as evaporating — is directionally right, but the -5 score understates that Q2 2026's $672M NI suggests the core franchise is doing better than "sleepy reversion," not worse.
Where the contrarian case has teeth: recent revenue YoY is -4.9% and earnings YoY -20.6% against tough comps, ROA is a thin 0.96%, and ROE at 9.9% is genuinely subpar for a "quality regional" — Truist, USB, and peers historically clear 12–14% in normal environments. If FCNCA can't push ROE above 10% post-integration, then 1.3x book is the ceiling, not a floor, and the stock is fairly valued, not cheap. The SVB deposit franchise stability question is real — innovation-economy deposits are flighty, and the bear weight of 78 on structural instability is appropriately sized. CRE exposure common to regionals is a live 2026 risk given office refinancing waves. The insider "buying" is 50 shares total — a rounding error at this price, not a signal; flagging it as "significant" is a data-pipeline error. Dividend yield of 0.39% with 7.3% payout ratio means capital return is minimal — buybacks and book value accretion are the whole story, and if ROE stays at 10%, book compounds at ~9.6% annually less dividends, giving you a ~9% IRR at flat multiple. That's a decent but not thrilling return.
Committing: I dissent from the synthesis's -38% overvaluation call — the DCF fair value of $1,326 is wrong for a bank and the archetype ("mature earner" traditional) is right but the valuation method applied to it isn't. I lean modestly toward undervalued-to-fair. On ~$220 normalized EPS and a defensible 11–13x multiple for a scaled regional with fortress capital, fair value is $2,400–2,850, meaning FCNCA is roughly 10–25% below fair. The Market Forces read of "$165–190 sustainable EPS" is more conservative than my number and would peg fair value closer to $2,000–2,300 — either way, not the $1,326 the synthesis produces. Conviction is capped because ROE genuinely needs to prove out above 10% for the multiple to expand, CRE credit is a 2026 wildcard, and the Class A illiquidity is real (thin float, wide spreads). This is a hold-to-accumulate on weakness, not a table-pound. If it drops to $1,900 on a credit scare, that's a fat pitch; at $2,181 it's a solid starter position for a patient book.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that this is a very profitable bank being judged through badly distorted headline history. The 2023 net income number of $11.47B is obviously non-recurring acquisition accounting noise, so any model leaning on multi-year earnings CAGR or a simple DCF built off that base is liable to misfire. On the actual run-rate, FCNCA looks like a $2.2B-$2.5B annual earnings bank today: the last four reported quarters sum to roughly $2.35B of net income on about $9.6B of revenue, with quarterly revenue holding in a tight $2.30B-$2.44B band and net margins mostly in the low-to-mid 20s. That is not a broken regional bank. It is a stable earner. At a $24.44B market cap, investors are paying about 10.4x this trailing run-rate earnings power and 1.10x stated equity of $22.24B. For a bank still producing roughly 10% ROE despite digestion of a huge crisis-era acquisition, that valuation is not cheap in an absolute sense, but it is far from the kind of euphoric premium implied by the most bearish model outputs.
The key contradiction I see is between the “overvalued by 38%” framing and the actual balance of price to normalized bank economics. A regional bank with 0.96% ROA, 23.8% net margin, $2.92B operating cash flow, $2.21B free cash flow, and a payout ratio of just 7.3% is not obviously worth only $1,300 per share unless you assume earnings materially deteriorate from here. The reported P/B of 1.29x and P/E of 13x are better anchors than any growth-derived fair value in this case, because growth is the least informative part of this story. The revenue trend is basically flat, yes, but flat revenue with improving recent quarterly earnings from $483M in 2025-03 to $672M in 2026-06 suggests normalization is still happening in a favorable direction. If sustainable earnings are even $2.4B-$2.6B, the stock is trading around 9.5x-10x that power. For a conservatively run bank franchise with demonstrated opportunism in capital allocation, that reads more like fair-to-modestly attractive than overvalued.
I also think the market is giving FCNCA credit for something real, not just “quiet-quality” mythology or Class A illiquidity. This management team bought assets out of a crisis at terms that permanently changed the earnings base. Even excluding the bargain purchase gain, revenue stepped from $1.84B in 2021 to $4.53B in 2022 to $8.76B in 2023 and then held above $9B in 2024-2025. That is a different institution now. The important question is not whether 2023 earnings were fake—they were inflated—but whether the post-deal franchise can defend a higher earnings floor than legacy FCNCA ever had. So far the answer looks yes. The latest quarter’s 27.6% net margin and $672M net income are evidence that the earnings base is not collapsing. Tiny insider purchases are not decisive, but they also do not support the idea that management sees a wildly overextended stock.
The strongest case against my read is straightforward: the stock is not cheap enough to forgive a mediocre ROE. On annual figures, ROE is only 9.9%, below what many investors demand for a high-quality regional bank, and revenue actually declined from $9.73B in 2024 to $9.25B in 2025. Recent YoY metrics are also weak, with revenue down 4.9% and earnings down 20.6%, and if those are the right lens then the market is already paying a premium multiple for a shrinking bank. Debt of $36.01B versus just $801M of cash also looks uncomfortable out of context, and regional banks still carry the usual worries around uninsured deposits, commercial real estate, and acquired loan marks that may prove too optimistic. If normalized earnings settle closer to $2.0B than $2.5B, today’s valuation is more like 12x earnings and about 1.3x book for a sub-10% ROE bank, which would indeed be rich.
What would change my mind is not another model-derived intrinsic value; it is hard evidence that the current earnings floor is weaker than it looks. If quarterly net income falls back toward $450M-$500M without a compensating capital build, or if revenue breaks below the $2.3B range for multiple quarters, then the “stable post-SVB franchise” case weakens fast. Likewise, if book value erodes, credit costs spike, or management’s next disclosures point to meaningful deposit instability or inherited loan stress, I would move bearish because the present premium to book would no longer be justified. Conversely, if FCNCA can string together several more quarters around $600M+ of net income and push ROE into the 11%-12% zone, then this share price will look reasonable and possibly still a bit low.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a post-acquisition hangover, not a growth compounder. After the 2023 bargain-purchase spike that produced $11.47 B of net income, First Citizens has settled into a $9.2–9.7 B revenue run-rate that is now gently declining (2025 revenue $9.25 B, –4.9 % year-over-year; trailing twelve-month revenue still hovering near $9.5 B). Quarterly net income has stabilized in a $530–670 M band, delivering mid-20 % net margins and full-year 2025 earnings of $2.21 B—down from $2.78 B the prior year. That $2.21 B of earnings on $22.24 B of equity yields a 9.9 % ROE, well below the 12–15 % that quality regionals typically clear. Free-cash-flow conversion remains clean ($2.21 B FCF against $2.92 B operating cash flow), yet the balance-sheet math is unforgiving: $36 B of debt against only $801 M of cash and a 1.62 debt-to-equity ratio that is ordinary for a bank but leaves little cushion if credit costs rise. At $2,182 the stock trades at 13× trailing earnings and 1.29× book; those multiples would be reasonable for a 13–14 % ROE franchise growing mid-single digits. They look full for a 10 % ROE bank whose revenue CAGR is 2.8 % and whose recent earnings are still falling 20 % year-over-year.
The prior models’ $1,326 composite fair value is too punitive—it implies a mid-single-digit multiple on current earnings power and ignores the franchise value of the enlarged deposit base—but the direction of their skepticism is correct. The market is already paying a roughly 60 % premium to that conservative DCF for a narrative of “fortress management” and Class-A scarcity rather than for demonstrated excess returns. Tiny insider purchases of 50 shares do not reverse the picture; they are noise.
The strongest counter-argument is that the SVB deposit franchise is proving stickier than feared and that the latest quarter’s $672 M net income (27.6 % margin) shows operating leverage still available once integration costs fade. If sustainable EPS lands in the $180–190 range rather than the $165 low end some models assume, a 12× multiple supports a price near $2,200—exactly where the shares sit today. In that framing the stock is merely fairly valued, and the low payout ratio plus fortress capital give management optionality to buy back stock or raise the dividend once credit clarity improves. I weigh this less heavily because the ROE has not yet re-accelerated, revenue is still drifting lower, and regional-bank multiples compress quickly when CRE or uninsured-deposit headlines reappear; the premium therefore embeds execution that has not been delivered.
Two clean catalysts would flip the view: four consecutive quarters of positive revenue growth above 4 % accompanied by ROE climbing through 12 %, or tangible evidence that the acquired loan book is running cleaner credit metrics than the sector. Conversely, any material uptick in non-performing loans or a drop in the net-interest margin below 3 % would confirm the overvaluation case and push fair value back toward 1.0× book.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
First Citizens is a mature regional bank that vaulted from $1.84B revenue in 2021 to $9.25B in 2025 largely via the CIT merger and the FDIC-assisted SVB acquisition (2023 net income of $11.47B reflects a bargain-purchase gain, not run-rate earnings). Normalized earnings power looks like the $2.2-2.8B net income range seen in 2024-2025, with OCF/NI of 0.93x and FCF of ~$2.2B/yr indicating clean, cash-backed accounting for a bank. Accruals at 0.7% of assets are benign and there are no obvious earnings-quality red flags beyond the Altman Z 0.24, which is a well-known false positive for banks whose business model is inherently leveraged (the -$35.2B net debt figure similarly reflects deposit funding, not distress).
Verify before trusting this (7)
- CET1 and Tier 1 capital ratios versus regulatory minimums (the real solvency measure for a bank, not Altman Z)
- Credit quality trends: NPL ratio, net charge-offs, allowance/loans, especially in the SVB innovation-economy book
- Deposit composition and cost trends - stickiness of the SVB deposit base post-2023
- Net interest margin trajectory explaining 2025 revenue decline
- Remaining accretion from SVB purchase accounting and how much of 2024-25 earnings is one-time
- Buyback authorization size and pace versus any remaining CIT/SVB related share issuance obligations
- Commercial real estate exposure concentration
The e2e composite fair value sits at $1,292.65 with a signal-adjusted FV of $1,326.26 versus a $2,141.16 price, implying roughly -38% downside on the model. The lone anchored-PE method drives the composite, so I sanity-check it: a top-20 regional bank post-CIT/SVB reasonably deserves a mid-cycle multiple, and even generously flexing the deserved multiple upward for franchise quality (Solid, score 23) gets me to something in the $1,500-$1,700 zone - still well below spot. The Weak earnings-quality flag argues for a haircut, not a premium, so I am not inclined to stretch further. What is priced in at $2,141 is essentially that the 2023 windfall economics are the new run-rate and that per-share compounding accelerates from the mediocre pace management has actually delivered. That is a heroic ask for a regional bank facing rising deposit betas and NIM compression. The bull case (fortress balance sheet, disciplined M&A) is real but already reflected; the bear case (61% premium on fundamentals that don't support it) lines up with the math. This is not a screaming short - the business is genuinely better than pre-2023 - but on price versus deserved value the margin of safety is negative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Run-rate NIM and deposit beta trajectory in latest 10-Q
- Segment disclosure on SVB commercial book credit quality and rail contribution
- Any one-time gains still flowing through reported EPS that inflate the anchored-PE input
- Buyback pace and per-share book value growth trend
FCNCA sits under a mild but persistent non-fundamental headwind. The macro tape is neutral-to-slightly-heavy (VIX 16.3, S&P off its high, 10y at 4.75%, market PE stretched at 25.8) and low-beta regionals like this one are only lightly grazed by the tape itself — but the sector backdrop for regional banks (rising deposit betas, curve barely positive at 0.41, NIM compression narrative) is a specific overhang that lands harder on this name than the beta of 0.6 suggests. The narrative is 'quiet-quality' with moderate intensity and only moderate durability; that is a story that does not attract fresh buyers in a nervous tape, it just fails to defend the premium when doubts creep in. Recent price action confirms the drift: -4.9% recently against a 2.8% long-term CAGR and a -107pp relative give-back over three years say the marginal flow is leaving, not arriving. There is no cult, no momentum bid, and no catalyst narrative to offset the sector's structural sentiment problem. Analyst tone and news flow are muted rather than hostile, which is precisely the profile of a name that gets slowly de-rated rather than violently sold.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether regional-bank sector ETFs (KRE) break down further, which would amplify sentiment pressure on FCNCA specifically
- Any Q3 deposit-cost or NIM datapoint from peers that either validates or breaks the compression narrative
- Analyst target revisions - a wave of trims would confirm the quiet de-rating; stability would blunt this call
- Curve steepening past ~75bps, which would flip regional-bank sentiment from headwind to tailwind
The world is friendly to spread lenders in aggregate — the regional bank category is in a genuine demand boom with capital investment and revenue both accelerating — but unfriendly to FCNCA's specific composition. A 4.75% 10-year with a near-flat curve keeps deposit competition intense while asset repricing lags, and FCNCA's acquired commercial/fund-banking deposits are among the most rate-sensitive dollars in the system. Meanwhile the extraordinary 2023 windfall that reshaped this company is now a headwind purely as arithmetic: every quarter of accretion runoff subtracts from reported revenue even when the underlying franchise is stable. The structural positives are geographic (Southeast in-migration feeding low-cost core deposits) and capital-structural (excess capital converting into share retirement). Net: a stable, well-capitalized bank whose reported growth optics are worse than its earnings power, operating in a category doing better than it is.
When we made this prediction on Sep 2, 2026, FCNCA was $2,179.12. We expect it to be $2,030.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $1,500.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.