Business Description
fuboTV Inc. operates a live television streaming service specializing in real-time sports, news, and general entertainment content. Its operations extend across the United States and into various international territories. Through its proprietary fuboTV platform, subscribers can access this programming on a wide array of devices, including smart televisions, dedicated streaming hardware, computers, mobile phones, and tablets. The company's corporate headquarters are situated in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 18, 2026 10:29pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:01am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.24
Total Equity: $275.49M
Shares: 29,091,399
Total Debt: $639.30M
Cash: $452.41M
EBITDA: $216.56M
Total Debt: $639.30M
Cash: $452.41M
Revenue: $2.72B
Revenue: $2.72B
Revenue: $2.72B
Total Equity: $275.49M
Tax Rate: 1.4%
Equity: $275.49M
Total Debt: $639.30M
Cash: $452.41M
Current Liabilities: $1.16B
Long-Term Debt: $265.35M
Total Debt: $639.30M
Total Equity: $275.49M
Shares: 29,091,399
Shares: 29,091,399
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 29,091,399
Stock Price: $9.91
Net Income: $155.62M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
fuboTV has clearly improved as an operator: gross margin went from -1.6% in 2021 to ~11-13% in 2024-2025, operating margin from -51% to -2.6%, and revenue jumped from $1.62B (2024) to $2.72B (2025) — a 68% step-up that almost certainly reflects the Disney/Hulu+Live TV transaction rather than pure organic growth. Reported 2025 net income of $155.6M flipped positive for the first time, but OCF/NI is only 0.22x and FCF was still -$166.4M, so the GAAP profit is dominated by non-cash items (likely a gain/remeasurement tied to the deal). The business itself has not yet proven it can self-fund.
The balance sheet is the binding constraint: $452M liquid cash but net debt of -$187M, Altman Z of 0.97 in the distress band, and ~11 quarters of runway at current burn. Diluted share count has compounded at 26.2%/yr (11.5M → 29.1M, a 2.5x increase in four years), which is a structural per-share value leak even as the underlying business scales. Insider tape is one-directional: 22 sells / 0 buys over the trailing year, with the CEO and other officers exercising options and selling into the market.
The charitable read is a turnaround narrative platform finally reaching scale via a strategic deal, with margins inflecting. The forensic read is a still-cash-burning streamer that depends on capital markets, prints accounting profits its cash flow doesn't support, and has a Beneish M-score (-1.25) flagging elevated manipulation indicators. Both reads can be true; quality is mid-tier at best.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Source of 2025 net income: is the $155.6M driven by a one-time gain on the Disney/Hulu+Live TV transaction or remeasurement, vs. operating earnings?
- Exact terms of any debt, convertibles, or preferred issued in connection with the Disney transaction (affects true net cash and future dilution overhang)
- Subscriber count and ARPU trajectory pre- vs. post-deal — is organic growth still positive or is reported revenue growth purely M&A?
- Content cost commitments and minimum guarantees (sports rights especially) that constrain gross margin durability
- Whether 26%/yr share growth includes deal-related issuance vs. ongoing SBC — and forward SBC run-rate as a % of revenue
- Covenant terms and maturity schedule of the debt creating the $187M net debt position
The e2e synthesis labels FUBO a 'Reasonable Premium,' which is generous given the underlying numbers. The business still burns ~$166M/yr in cash, the 2025 'profit' is non-cash, and the share count has grown 2.5x in four years — meaning the $1B market cap is a moving target that gets larger by ~26% annually before fundamentals even move. Deserved value on a quality-adjusted basis should sit meaningfully below $9.22; I'd anchor closer to $6.50-$7.50 to compensate for ongoing dilution and the earnings-quality haircut flagged here.
What's priced in at $9.22: continued subscriber growth, ad monetization ramping, and a clean path to real (cash) profitability — essentially the bull case. None of that is yet evidenced by free cash flow. The bear's point — that live sports rights are structurally expensive and churn is chronic in a market dominated by YouTube TV/Disney/Netflix — is not reflected in the price. There is no margin of safety here; you're paying for the inflection before it has shown up in cash.
This isn't a screaming short — operational progress is real and the narrative could carry the stock — but it is not cheap. A skeptical valuation lens says modestly rich, not deeply mispriced.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2026 cash flow guidance — is FCF breakeven actually in sight or still 2+ years out?
- Subscriber ARPU trend and churn disclosure in the next 10-Q
- Content cost commitments (sports rights renewals) buried in filings
- Share-based comp run-rate and any signal of slowing dilution
- Disney/Hulu Live TV settlement terms and any recurring payments affecting earnings quality
Sentiment pressure on FUBO is net negative despite a strong 12-month price run. The tape is only mildly cautious (VIX 17, S&P off 1.8%), but with beta 2.39 and no profitability cushion, FUBO sits exactly in the bucket the market sells first when risk appetite wobbles - high-beta, story-driven, cash-burning small-cap streaming. The active narrative is 'fallen-angel' with fragile durability and only moderate intensity, meaning there is no cult bid to defend the name on red days. That is a structurally weak sentiment setup. The bull story (only pure-play live-sports streamer, path to profitability, potential strategic takeout) is real but unproven, while the bear story (commodity service, brutal competition from YouTube TV/Disney/Netflix, chronic churn, twice-failed hockey-stick) is the default skeptical frame the market reverts to whenever sentiment turns. With rates at 4.46% and macro classified as a headwind for equities broadly, long-duration unprofitable names get punished disproportionately. Offsetting tailwinds: momentum is strong (67% recent vs 41% long-term CAGR), and analyst tone is a clear divergence - 7 Buys vs 8 Holds and an average target of $39 against an $8.67 price implies sell-side still carries a constructive bias that has not been marked down (zero revisions this month suggests stale rather than enthusiastic). Net: the macro/beta exposure and fragile narrative outweigh the momentum and stale-bullish analyst file.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any subscriber or ad-revenue print that either validates the path-to-profitability bull leg or confirms churn/competition bear leg
- Sell-side target revisions - the $39 consensus is stale; a wave of cuts would crack the last analyst support
- VIX move above 20 or further S&P drawdown - would amplify the beta-2.4 headwind sharply
- Status of Disney/Hulu Live TV settlement/combination news flow - the takeout optionality lives here
- Sports-rights cost headlines (NBA, NFL packages) that reinforce the unsustainable-rights bear frame
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 2:02am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $638.4M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $648.8M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.4B |
| Gross Profit | -$10.4M | -$41.1M | $86.1M | $203.9M | $302.8M |
| Operating Expenses | $317.8M | $370.8M | $375.5M | $399.9M | $374.7M |
| Operating Income | -$328.3M | -$411.9M | -$289.4M | -$196.0M | -$71.9M |
| Net Income | -$382.8M | -$561.5M | -$287.5M | -$172.3M | $155.6M |
| EBITDA | -$287.5M | -$370.2M | -$238.1M | -$113.7M | $216.6M |
| EPS | $-33.36 | $-36.96 | $-12.48 | $-6.48 | $-0.24 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 2:02am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $371.0M | $337.1M | $245.3M | $161.4M | $452.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $428.5M | $436.9M | $386.8M | $274.0M | $982.8M |
| Total Assets | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $4.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $337.3M | $438.8M | $517.3M | $515.3M | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $316.4M | $394.1M | $391.7M | $332.4M | $265.4M |
| Total Liabilities | $698.9M | $874.4M | $948.8M | $896.6M | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | $682.1M | $413.3M | $295.6M | $196.4M | $275.5M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.0B | -$1.6B | -$1.8B | -$2.0B | -$6.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 2:02am (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$192.6M | -$316.7M | -$177.6M | -$79.5M | -$166.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.5M | -$6.0M | -$1.1M | -$15.8M | $0 |
| Free Cash Flow | -$206.1M | -$322.7M | -$178.7M | -$95.3M | -$166.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$22.9M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $243.2M | -$32.9M | -$91.8M | -$83.8M | $284.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:01am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$6.5B $6.4B – $6.6B
|
$6.8B $6.8B – $6.9B
|
$7.5B $7.4B – $7.6B
|
$7.9B $7.8B – $7.9B
|
| EBITDA |
-$1.3B -$1.3B – -$1.3B
|
-$1.3B -$1.3B – -$1.3B
|
-$1.5B -$1.5B – -$1.5B
|
-$1.5B -$1.6B – -$1.5B
|
| Net Income |
$-604,519 $-705,272 – $-503,766
|
$28.7M $28.4M – $29.1M
|
$51.9M $51.3M – $52.5M
|
$59.7M $59.0M – $60.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 2:02am (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +58.0% | +35.6% | +18.6% | +67.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -293.9% | +309.6% | +136.7% | +48.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -25.5% | +29.7% | +32.3% | +63.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -46.7% | +48.8% | +40.1% | +190.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -28.8% | +35.7% | +52.2% | +290.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-11 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 10,756.00 | $5.88 | $63,245 |
| 2026-06-11 | Horihuela Alberto | S-Sale | 141,074.00 | $10.38 | $1.5M |
| 2026-06-11 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 10,756.00 | $5.88 | $63,245 |
| 2026-01-05 | Gandler David | M-Exempt | 434,890.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-05 | Gandler David | M-Exempt | 434,890.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-05 | Gandler David | S-Sale | 170,279.00 | $2.55 | $434,722 |
| 2025-11-21 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 149,970.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Horihuela Alberto | S-Sale | 138,753.00 | $3.16 | $438,737 |
| 2025-11-21 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 94,913.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 149,970.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Horihuela Alberto | M-Exempt | 94,913.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 149,970.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 149,970.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 94,913.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 94,913.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | S-Sale | 170,585.00 | $3.16 | $539,390 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 56,180.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-21 | Janedis John | M-Exempt | 56,180.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-11-24 | Janedis John | S-Sale | 130,478.00 | $3.12 | $407,091 |
| 2025-11-06 | Headley Jonathan Scott | A-Award | 86,773.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The quarterly revenue series here is broken and the models seem to have papered over it. Q1 2026 at $1.57B and Q4 2025 at $1.55B versus Q3 2025 at $377M and Q2 2025 at $380M is not "accelerating" — it's almost certainly a reporting artifact (likely the closed Disney/Hulu+Live TV merger consolidating subscribers, or a restated/combined entity figure). Annual 2025 revenue of $2.72B versus 2024's $1.62B is a 68% jump that doesn't reconcile to organic streaming growth; FuboTV pre-merger was tracking ~$1.6–1.7B run-rate. The Q1 2025 "net income" of +$188.5M is the Disney litigation settlement, not operating performance — strip that out and 2025 is still deeply unprofitable on an operating basis (op income -$71.9M annual, with the four most recent quarters all printing GAAP losses of -$2M to -$19M). The synthesis verdict calling this "reasonable premium" and the pre-flight calling it a "profitability inflection" are both swallowing accounting noise as signal.
That said, the market-forces "headwinds / value trap" framing is also too cute. At $1.01B market cap, $452M cash, and presumably modest debt (the field is blank but Fubo's converts are ~$170M), EV is roughly $750M on $2.7B revenue — 0.28x EV/sales. Even if you believe gross margin caps out at the current 11.1% (~$300M gross profit run-rate), the business doesn't need much operating leverage to justify the cap. The merger with Hulu+Live TV (closed 2025, Disney took 70%) materially changes the competitive math the bear narrative leans on: Fubo is no longer a sub-scale aggregator getting squeezed on sports rights — it's now operationally entangled with Disney, which is the very entity the bear case said would crush it. Every model in the stack appears to have missed or underweighted this. The "fallen angel / fragile narrative" framing is stale.
The contrarian read cuts both ways. Bull contrarian: post-merger Fubo is a 6M+ subscriber platform with Disney as 70% owner and a $220M cash injection from the settlement; at 0.28x EV/sales it's priced for liquidation, not for a strategic asset inside Disney's bundle architecture. Bear contrarian: if Disney owns 70%, minority holders at $9.22 are price-takers on whatever squeeze-out or restructuring Disney engineers, and insider M-exempt-then-sale patterns (six S-Sales in seven months alongside option exercises) suggest management is monetizing on schedule rather than signaling conviction. The operating cash flow of -$166M with zero capex is the genuinely worrying number — this business still burns cash, and the "profitability" the pre-flight engine celebrates is GAAP NI inflated by a one-time settlement.
I dissent from the synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict because the framing is wrong — this isn't a premium question, it's a control/structure question now that Disney owns the majority. I partially dissent from the market-forces "value trap" call because it's analyzing a pre-merger entity. The honest read: at 0.28x EV/sales with a strategic majority owner and $452M cash cushion, downside is bounded to maybe $6–7 (0.2x sales, cash-floor logic), and upside requires either Disney buying in the minority (historical premiums 25–40%, implying $11.50–13) or a genuine margin inflection in the standalone Fubo segment that the data does not yet support. Revenue CAGR of 41% is real but mechanically merger-aided; organic growth is probably mid-teens. Gross margin at 11% versus Netflix's 46% tells you this is structurally a thin-margin reseller of sports rights, not a platform. Insider selling, negative FCF, and the absence of a clean standalone profitability print all argue against chasing. Asymmetric but not compelling — the risk/reward is roughly $7 down / $12 up from $9.22, which is a coinflip dressed up as a thesis.
GPT Critique
In analyzing fuboTV Inc., the data reveals a perplexing picture. The revenue surge from $1.62 billion in 2024 to $2.72 billion in 2025 is staggering, but likely not indicative of organic growth. The quarterly revenue data, with a dramatic leap to $1.57 billion in Q1 2026, suggests an external factor, possibly consolidation with Disney/Hulu+Live TV. The net income spike to $188.5 million in Q1 2025 seems tied to a settlement, not operational prowess, as operating income remained negative at -$71.9 million for 2025. This backdrop of inconsistent profitability, alongside cash flow issues with -$166.4 million in operating cash flow, paints a picture of a company struggling to maintain financial stability despite its revenue growth.
I find myself in agreement with Claude Opus's assertion that the quarterly revenue figures are misleading, likely influenced by the consolidation effect rather than reflecting true business growth. The "profitability turn" is indeed an artifact of accounting rather than a sustainable achievement, as evidenced by the continued GAAP losses and negative operating cash flow. The perceived profitability is a one-time occurrence, not a trend. Opus's view that the market's skepticism is justified due to this artificial profitability is compelling, as is their critique of the "reasonable premium" classification, which fails to account for the structural changes post-merger.
However, I diverge from Opus's dismissal of the market-forces "value trap" narrative. While they rightly note that Fubo's strategic alignment with Disney alters competitive dynamics, they understate the ongoing risks. The company's thin gross margin of 11.1%, compared to industry leaders like Netflix, underscores its vulnerability in the high-cost sports streaming market. Furthermore, insider selling patterns and cash burn without capex investment highlight ongoing operational distress. The market's valuation reflects profound investor doubt about FuboTV's ability to carve out a sustainable niche, even with Disney's backing.
A careful skeptic might argue that both analyses are too bearish, considering the potential synergies and scale benefits from the Disney merger, which could stabilize operations and improve margins over time. They might also posit that the market is over-penalizing Fubo for past results rather than considering future strategic opportunities.