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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for General Mills Inc. (GIS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Low · Gem Score -30 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 0 · Value -50 · Sentiment -59 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $31.71 vs $38.29 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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General Mills Inc.
GIS NYSEGeneral Mills Inc. is a global packaged food company that develops, manufactures, and markets a broad portfolio of branded consumer foods for households, retailers, foodservice operators, and pet owners. Its product lineup includes breakfast cereals, snacks, baking mixes, refrigerated and frozen dough, meals, yogurt, ice cream, soups, and pet food, supported by well-known brands across North America and international markets. The company also serves the foodservice segment with products designed for restaurants, institutions, and commercial kitchens. General Mills Inc. focuses on everyday food occasions, combining brand recognition, manufacturing scale, and distribution reach to maintain a strong presence in consumer staples. Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the company remains a significant participant in the packaged foods market through its diversified portfolio and multi-channel sales strategy.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.16
Total Equity: $7.38B
Shares: 537,700,000
Total Debt: $13.54B
Cash: $453.80M
EBITDA: $1.44B
Total Debt: $13.54B
Cash: $453.80M
Revenue: $18.42B
Shares: 537,700,000
Revenue: $18.42B
Revenue: $18.42B
Revenue: $18.42B
Total Equity: $7.38B
Tax Rate: 102.2%
Equity: $7.38B
Total Debt: $13.54B
Cash: $453.80M
Current Liabilities: $6.77B
Long-Term Debt: $12.42B
Total Debt: $13.54B
Total Equity: $7.38B
Shares: 537,700,000
Shares: 537,700,000
CapEx: -$539.90M
Shares: 537,700,000
Stock Price: $38.29
Net Income: -$87.60M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 4:08am (32d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $19.0B | $20.1B | $19.9B | $19.5B | $18.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $12.6B | $13.5B | $12.9B | $12.8B | $12.2B |
| Gross Profit | $6.4B | $6.5B | $6.9B | $6.7B | $6.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $5.3B |
| Operating Income | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $885.8M |
| Net Income | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.3B | -$87.6M |
| EBITDA | $4.0B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $1.4B |
| EPS | $4.46 | $4.36 | $4.34 | $4.12 | $-0.16 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.42 | $4.31 | $4.31 | $4.10 | $-0.16 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 4:00am (32d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $569.4M | $585.5M | $418.0M | $363.9M | $453.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.1B | $5.2B | $4.6B | $5.3B | $4.6B |
| Total Assets | $31.1B | $31.5B | $31.5B | $33.1B | $30.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.0B | $7.5B | $7.0B | $7.9B | $6.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $9.1B | $10.0B | $11.3B | $12.7B | $12.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $20.3B | $20.8B | $21.8B | $23.9B | $22.6B |
| Total Equity | $10.8B | $10.7B | $9.6B | $9.2B | $7.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $18.5B | $19.8B | $21.0B | $21.9B | $20.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 4:16am (32d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.3B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $2.9B | $2.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$568.7M | -$689.5M | -$774.1M | -$625.3M | -$539.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.7B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $1.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$937.2M | $902.7M | $1.2B | $1.1B | -$817.5M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.4B | -$1.3B | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$876.8M | -$1.4B | -$2.0B | -$1.2B | -$500.3M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$935.8M | $16.1M | -$167.5M | -$54.1M | $127.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 4:08am (32d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.8% | -1.2% | -1.9% | -5.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +2.2% | +5.9% | -2.9% | -8.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -1.2% | -0.1% | -3.7% | -73.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -4.2% | -3.8% | -8.1% | -103.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -1.6% | +0.1% | -3.5% | -62.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 11:10am (36d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-10 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-10 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-09 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-10 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-10 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-09 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-06 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-07 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-06 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-07 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-07 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-04 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -106%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -1.1:1 (μ -3.3%, σ 4.7% , 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($38.29) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -3% | 9.2% | $30.64 | -20% |
| Base — stabilizes | -5% | 8.0% | $24.08 | -37% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -8% | 6.8% | $18.45 | -52% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +1% | -0.5% | $-2.10 | -106% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -8% | -0.5% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-05 04:21The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a specific story that the models are partly missing. FY2026 revenue of $18.42B is down 7.4% from FY2024's $19.86B peak, and operating income collapsed from $3.43B to $885.8M — that's an 74% op income decline on a 7% revenue decline, which is catastrophic operating deleverage for a "stable CPG." Net income swung to -$87.6M from +$2.50B. But peel the quarters: Q1 FY2026 (Aug 2025) showed $1.20B net income on $4.52B revenue (26.7% margin — clearly a one-time gain, likely the North American Yogurt divestiture to Lactalis/Sodiaal announced in 2024), and Q4 FY2026 shows a -$2.01B loss on $4.61B revenue, which is almost certainly a goodwill/intangibles impairment charge rather than operating cash burn. Strip both and underlying quarterly NI is running $300-400M, i.e., ~$1.4B normalized annual — not the headline loss. Operating cash flow of $2.17B and FCF of $1.63B corroborate this: the business isn't broken, it's re-based.
That reframes the valuation debate. At $20.47B market cap and $1.63B FCF, GIS trades at 12.6x FCF — not expensive for a business throwing off cash with a 6.4% dividend yield. The synthesis verdict of $28.55 signal-adjusted fair value implies the market should pay ~9x FCF, which is distressed-CPG multiple territory (think Kraft Heinz post-2019). The Market Forces model calling this a "deteriorating value trap" with an "unaffordable dividend" is overreaching: dividend payout against $1.63B FCF at a 6.4% yield on $20.47B cap = ~$1.31B dividends, which is 80% of FCF — tight, but covered. Not unaffordable, though not comfortable. The $13.54B debt against $7.38B equity and 0.68 current ratio is genuinely concerning, and EV/EBITDA of 23.4x is rich if you believe EBITDA is structurally impaired — but that multiple is inflated by the same impairment-driven earnings depression.
Where I side with the bears: revenue CAGR of -3.7% and the -5.5% recent YoY are real, and this isn't cyclical — it's Ozempic, private label share gains at Walmart/Costco, and generational rejection of center-aisle brands. The "accelerating quarterly trend" secondary signal is misleading; quarters are seasonal and the sequential comparison is noise. Insider activity is entirely awards and in-kind — zero open-market buying with the stock down 24% from highs is a tell. Management doesn't think it's cheap here either. The Narrative Economics layer nails it: the $38.29 price is doing yield-proxy work in a falling-rate environment, not reflecting operational strength. If the 10-year backs up or the dividend gets cut to fund debt paydown (leverage is 6.2x net debt/FCF), the yield support evaporates fast.
A careful contrarian would argue two things the models miss. First, the FY2026 GAAP loss is almost entirely non-cash impairment — using it to anchor a P/E or "earnings collapse" narrative is analytically lazy; normalized earnings power is closer to $2.00-2.20/share, putting the stock at ~18x normalized, which is fair-to-slightly-rich for no-growth CPG. Second, at 12.6x FCF with a covered (if tight) 6.4% yield, downside from $38 is bounded — you'd need FCF to drop below $1.2B for the dividend to be at real risk, and that requires another leg down in volume. I partially agree with the synthesis "overvalued" verdict but reject the $28.55 target as too aggressive — that's pricing in a dividend cut that hasn't happened. Fair value is $33-35, roughly 10-11x normalized FCF with a haircut for secular decline. The stock isn't a value trap yet, but it's not a bargain either; the 34% narrative premium the market-narrative layer identifies is more like 10-15% in my read.
GPT Reading
The key question on GIS is whether 2026 represents a broken earnings model or a one-time accounting reset layered onto a still-solid cash generator. The raw numbers lean strongly to the latter. Revenue fell from $19.49B to $18.42B, a 5.5% decline, and that is not good for a staples company, but the headline collapse from $2.30B of net income to an $87.6M loss is wildly disproportionate to the revenue move. Operating income did not disappear; it fell from $3.30B to $885.8M, which is severe, but the most recent quarter’s -$2.01B net loss on $4.61B of sales is clearly not a normal run-rate margin outcome for cereal and pet food. Against that, operating cash flow was still $2.17B and free cash flow $1.63B in 2026. A business generating 8.8% FCF margin in a “loss” year is not economically impaired in the way the negative P/E and near-zero ROIC screens imply. At $20.5B market cap, the stock is trading around 12.6x trailing FCF and about 1.1x sales, which is not demanding for a branded staples franchise even with weaker growth.
What stands out more negatively is that this is not just a clean one-off with healthy underlying momentum. The business has been shrinking for several years: revenue was $20.09B in 2023, $19.86B in 2024, $19.49B in 2025, and now $18.42B. Gross profit similarly slipped from $6.93B to $6.20B in two years. Even if I normalize away the apparent impairment or unusual charge depressing 2026 earnings, GIS is still a lower-volume, lower-margin company than it was. The quarterly sequence reinforces that pressure: excluding the anomalous August 2025 quarter with 26.7% margin, net margins were mostly mid-single to low-teens before the big loss quarter. That says this is no longer the sleepy 15%-plus net margin staple investors may remember. Debt is also real at $13.54B against just $453.8M cash and a 0.68 current ratio, so management does not have much balance-sheet flexibility if category weakness persists. But that leverage cuts differently when FCF remains above $1.6B; it is uncomfortable, not existential.
That is why I think the model outputs calling the stock plainly overvalued are too mechanical. EV/EBITDA at 23.4x and negative P/E look awful because they capitalize a depressed, likely distorted earnings base. If I instead anchor on the pre-2026 earnings power, GIS was producing roughly $2.3B-$2.7B of net income and over $3.3B of operating income on a fairly consistent basis. I do not assume a full snapback to that level, because the top line is clearly eroding, but even a partial recovery toward, say, $2.5B-$2.8B of operating income would make the current price look closer to fair-to-cheap than expensive. The 6.4% dividend yield is also too high for a company whose cash generation has truly collapsed; either the payout is at risk, or the market is over-discounting temporary damage. Given $1.63B of FCF in the trough year, I lean toward the latter. At $38, the market is not paying for growth; it is paying for a declining but still cash-rich franchise, and that seems broadly reasonable.
The best case against my view is straightforward: maybe 2026 is not a one-time ugly year but the first honest year. Revenue is down 3.7% CAGR over the period shown, recent revenue fell 5.5% year over year, FCF has compounded down nearly 20%, and gross margin is now 33.6% with operating margin just 4.8% on the annual print. If those are the new economics rather than noise, then this is a classic dividend trap: a mature food company with secular volume decline, private-label pressure, and too much debt trying to maintain shareholder distributions while its brands slowly de-rate. In that framework, even 12.6x FCF is not cheap because the “F” is drifting down, and the $13.5B debt load absorbs any strategic room to reinvest or buy back stock. A smart bear would also say that if normalized earnings power were really intact, we would not be seeing such a dramatic annual operating profit collapse from $3.30B to $885.8M. I take that objection seriously; it is the main reason I am not outright bullish.
What would change my mind is evidence on normalization versus structural decay. If the next two to three quarters show revenue still down mid-single digits and net margins stuck below 7%-8% absent another obvious special charge, then I would conclude 2026 was not a blip and fair value is probably low $30s or worse. Likewise, any dividend cut would confirm that the cash-flow resilience is weaker than it looks. On the other hand, if GIS can stabilize quarterly sales around $4.5B-$4.8B, restore quarterly net income to a $350M-$500M range, and show annual operating income rebuilding above $2B while maintaining FCF north of $1.5B, then today’s price will look too low for a defensive franchise with a 6%-plus yield. Right now, I think the market is pricing in too much permanence to one ugly year, but only modestly so.
Grok Reading
General Mills is a shrinking cash machine being priced like a stable one. Annual revenue has marched steadily lower—from $20.09B in FY2023 to $19.86B, $19.49B, and now $18.42B in FY2026—a −3.7% CAGR that accelerated to −5.5% in the latest year. That is not noise; it is share and category erosion. Operating income collapsed from a multi-year plateau near $3.3–3.5B down to $885.8M, pushing operating margin to 4.8% from the mid-teens historically. The FY2026 net loss of $87.6M was driven by a single quarter that booked −$2.01B, but the damage is not merely below-the-line theater: gross profit fell to $6.20B from $6.73B, and the full-year operating drop of roughly $2.4B fully explains the earnings wipeout. Free cash flow of $1.63B still looks serviceable against a $20.5B equity value, yet FCF itself is compounding at −19.8%. At $38.29 the stock trades at 1.12× sales and 23.4× EV/EBITDA—multiples that assume a durable franchise, not a top-line in structural retreat with net debt near $13.1B, a 0.68 current ratio, and debt-to-equity of 1.83.
The 6.4% dividend yield is doing almost all of the valuation work. DCF-style anchors near $28–32 imply the market is paying a ~25–34% narrative premium for “Cheerios-as-bond.” That premium only holds if FCF stays large enough to cover roughly $1.3B of annual dividends and service $13.5B of debt without further margin decay. Coverage is already thin; another year of mid-single-digit revenue decline and the payout becomes the problem rather than the buffer. Insider activity is administrative awards and withholdings, offering no signal of conviction. The quantitative models’ overvalued call at a composite near $28.55 is directionally right: the raw income statement and balance sheet show a levered, lower-growth CPG whose earnings power has stepped down hard, not a temporary accounting accident.
The strongest counter-case is that FY2026 contains a kitchen-sink operating hit and that the underlying brand economics remain intact. Gross margin held at 33.6%, trailing three quarters before the loss still produced hundreds of millions in net income, and $2.17B of operating cash flow demonstrates the portfolio still converts. In a risk-off tape, income funds and dividend ETFs will keep bid under a 6%-plus yield on household names, and a clean FY2027 guide back toward $2.5B-plus of operating income would re-rate the stock faster than the models allow. Private-label and better-for-you pressure is real industry-wide, yet General Mills has defended price/mix before; if volumes stabilize and the company uses FCF to cut net debt rather than stretch the dividend, the “value trap” label fades. I weigh this lightly because the multi-year revenue and FCF trajectories are already negative before any single charge, leverage leaves little room for error, and EV/EBITDA in the low-20s is not a distressed entry for a business shrinking at 4%.
I would flip to neutral or constructive on two or three consecutive quarters of flat-to-up organic sales, operating margin back above 12%, and explicit FCF guidance that restores comfortable dividend coverage above $2B while net debt falls. A credible mid-teens ROIC recovery or a bolt-on that re-accelerates the top line would also break the thesis. Absent that, $38 is paying for a story the income statement has stopped telling.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
General Mills is a classic staple: gross margins have held in a tight 32.6-34.9% band and operating margin ran 17-18% from 2022-2025, throwing off $2.0-2.75B of FCF annually. The buyback program is genuine — diluted share count fell from 612.6M to 537.7M (a -3.2% CAGR), and buyback/SBC of 1255% shows capital returned dominates equity issuance. Earnings-quality mechanicals are clean (Beneish -2.92, accruals -2.9% of assets, no red flags). The concern is the FY2026 print: revenue fell to $18.42B (down from $19.86B peak), operating margin collapsed to 4.8%, and net income swung to -$87.6M. FCF still came in at $1.63B, so the loss appears driven by non-cash items (impairment/restructuring likely) rather than operating cash erosion — but the top-line has now declined two years running, suggesting real category/volume pressure. Balance sheet is a constraint: net debt of ~$13B against $454M liquid cash, with $1.12B short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. Altman Z of 2.12 (grey zone) reflects that leverage. This is a going-concern-safe business thanks to reliable FCF, but it has no cushion and is fighting a visible growth problem.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 10-K disclosure of what drove FY26 op margin collapse — impairment, restructuring charge, or true operating deterioration?
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing plan for the $1.12B short-term debt
- Volume vs. price decomposition of the revenue decline — is this private-label share loss or pricing rollback?
- Segment-level performance (North America Retail, Pet, Foodservice) to locate where the pressure sits
- Any goodwill/intangible impairment tied to prior acquisitions (Blue Buffalo etc.)
The composite fair value of $32.37 and signal-adjusted $28.55 sit meaningfully below the $38.29 price, implying roughly 15-25% downside to deserved value. The DDM ($22.42) and EPV floor ($19.01) both anchor well under the market, and only the DCF ($59.01) argues for upside — but that DCF looks like a runaway output given FY26 showed two years of revenue decline plus a margin collapse and a reported net loss. Weighting the more conservative, cash-and-dividend-based methods is the honest read for a mature staple whose growth optionality is thin. The bull case rests on the 3.5%+ dividend and brand durability, but you are paying a premium for that yield at a moment when the earnings base is visibly softening. The quality lens confirms a solid, cash-generative business (FCF ~$1.63B), which supports a deserved value modestly above the DDM/EPV floor — but not above spot. Margin of safety here is negative, not positive.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Is the FY26 net loss driven by non-cash impairments/goodwill writedowns (confirms FCF is the truer earnings signal)
- Management FY27 guidance on organic sales and operating margin trajectory
- Volume vs price/mix split in recent quarters to gauge whether the top-line decline is structural
- Leverage and buyback pace given the balance sheet
The macro backdrop is mildly risk-on with a tame VIX at 14.5, which normally would be neutral-to-positive for a low-beta defensive like GIS (beta -0.05 means the tape itself barely touches this name). But the sector-specific narrative is doing the damage: Campbell's just cut its dividend 36% and missed on sales, dragging GIS down 4% in sympathy and reigniting the 'packaged food is slowly dying' bear case. That is the dominant force on the tape right now, and it hits GIS directly because the entire 34% premium to DCF is a story about safe, growing dividends - the exact story Campbell's just undermined.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether GIS's next earnings print confirms or refutes the CPB read-across on volume/margin
- Any hint of a GIS dividend policy change or guidance cut - would be catastrophic for the premium
- Whether 10y yields fall enough to restore the bond-proxy bid
- Sector rotation flows into vs out of staples ETFs (XLP) over the next 2-4 weeks
The world is moving against mid-tier packaged staples on three axes at once: value-seeking consumers routing spend to private label and discounters, appetite-suppression and fresh/protein preference shifts reducing cereal, baking and snack occasions, and retailers using own-brand to reclaim shelf economics. Macro headwinds (10y at 4.77) matter less to GIS's demand than to its cost of capital and its bond-proxy identity; the operating problem is share, not the cycle. The structural offset is real but partial — a reshaped portfolio tilted to pet, snacking and foodservice can eventually match category growth, but that argues for a flat earnings-power plateau rather than a return to growth. Nothing in the inputs points to a mechanism that reverses the -8.1pp share gap within the next two years.
When we made this prediction on Sep 5, 2026, GIS was $38.29. We expect it to be $42.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $32.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.