Business Description
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS) operates as a prominent global financial services firm, offering an extensive array of services to corporations, financial institutions, governmental bodies, and individuals worldwide. The company's operations are organized into four primary divisions: Investment Banking, Global Markets, Asset Management, and Consumer & Wealth Management. The Investment Banking segment furnishes strategic advisory services covering intricate transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, corporate defense strategies, restructurings, and spin-offs. It also extends various lending facilities, including middle-market, relationship, and acquisition financing, in addition to transaction banking services. This division further specializes in underwriting, assisting clients with equity offerings for common, preferred, and convertible securities, as well as debt offerings encompassing investment-grade, high-yield, bank/bridge loans, and emerging market debt instruments, alongside the creation of structured securities. Within its Global Markets division, Goldman Sachs engages in client execution activities for both cash and derivative instruments, provides solutions for credit and interest rate products, and offers comprehensive equity intermediation, financing, clearing, settlement, and custody services. This segment also transacts in products linked to mortgages, foreign exchange, commodities, and equities. The Asset Management segment is responsible for managing assets across a diverse spectrum of classes, including equities, fixed income, hedge funds, credit funds, private equity, real estate, currencies, and commodities. It delivers tailored investment advisory solutions and makes direct investments in corporate entities, real estate ventures, and infrastructure projects. The Consumer & Wealth Management segment provides individual clients with wealth advisory and banking services. These include financial planning, investment management, deposit-taking, and lending. It also offers private banking services, unsecured loans, and accepts savings and time deposits. Founded in 1869, the company's corporate headquarters are located in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 25, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:57am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 51.95
Total Equity: $124.97B
Shares: 317,600,000
Total Debt: $607.36B
Cash: $164.26B
EBITDA: $24.03B
Total Debt: $607.36B
Cash: $164.26B
Revenue: $125.10B
Revenue: $125.10B
Revenue: $125.10B
Total Equity: $124.97B
Tax Rate: 21.4%
Equity: $124.97B
Total Debt: $607.36B
Cash: $164.26B
Current Liabilities: $1,226.81B
Long-Term Debt: $296.21B
Total Debt: $607.36B
Total Equity: $124.97B
Shares: 317,600,000
Shares: 317,600,000
CapEx: -$2.06B
Shares: 317,600,000
Stock Price: $1,020
Net Income: $17.18B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $65.0B | $68.7B | $108.4B | $126.9B | $125.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $6.0B | $24.1B | $63.2B | $74.7B | $65.7B |
| Gross Profit | $59.0B | $44.7B | $45.2B | $52.2B | $59.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $31.9B | $31.2B | $34.5B | $33.8B | $37.5B |
| Operating Income | $27.0B | $13.5B | $10.7B | $18.4B | $21.9B |
| Net Income | $21.6B | $11.3B | $8.5B | $14.3B | $17.2B |
| EBITDA | $29.1B | $15.9B | $15.6B | $20.8B | $24.0B |
| EPS | $60.35 | $30.57 | $23.05 | $41.22 | $51.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $261.0B | $241.8B | $241.6B | $182.1B | $164.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $948.9B | $869.0B | $1.1T | $1.1T | $1.0T |
| Total Assets | $1.5T | $1.4T | $1.6T | $1.7T | $1.8T |
| Current Liabilities | $975.8B | $972.2B | $1.1T | $1.2T | $1.2T |
| Long-Term Debt | $263.5B | $254.2B | $247.9B | $249.9B | $296.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.4T | $1.3T | $1.5T | $1.6T | $1.7T |
| Total Equity | $109.9B | $117.2B | $116.9B | $122.0B | $125.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $131.8B | $139.4B | $143.7B | $153.4B | $165.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 3:03am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.3B | $8.7B | -$12.6B | -$13.2B | -$45.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.7B | -$3.7B | -$2.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.6B | $5.0B | -$14.9B | -$15.3B | -$47.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $3.9B | -$2.1B | $487.0M | $3.6B | $1.5B |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$7.9B | -$3.5B | -$6.8B | -$10.2B | -$12.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $105.2B | -$19.2B | -$248.0M | -$59.5B | -$17.8B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 10:17am (21h ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$63.9B $61.7B – $65.4B
|
$67.0B $63.8B – $70.6B
|
$68.8B $68.6B – $69.0B
|
$69.2B $66.1B – $72.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$15.1B $14.5B – $15.4B
|
$15.8B $15.0B – $16.6B
|
$16.2B $16.2B – $16.3B
|
$16.3B $15.6B – $17.0B
|
| Net Income |
$18.1B $17.4B – $20.6B
|
$19.4B $19.3B – $23.3B
|
$23.5B $20.8B – $26.2B
|
$23.7B $22.3B – $25.0B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:03am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.7% | +57.8% | +17.0% | -1.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -24.3% | +1.3% | +15.3% | +13.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -50.1% | -20.4% | +71.3% | +18.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -48.0% | -24.4% | +67.6% | +20.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -45.1% | -2.2% | +33.3% | +15.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 2,509.00 | $972.29 | $2.4M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,560.00 | $973.19 | $1.5M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,360.00 | $974.53 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,428.00 | $975.21 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 437.00 | $933.08 | $407,756 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 479.00 | $934.04 | $447,405 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 481.00 | $934.76 | $449,620 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 837.00 | $936.24 | $783,633 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 203.00 | $936.70 | $190,150 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 814.00 | $938.42 | $763,874 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 2,671.00 | $939.33 | $2.5M |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 8,250.00 | $940.23 | $7.8M |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 120.00 | $941.25 | $112,950 |
| 2026-05-01 | SOLOMON DAVID M | S-Sale | 2,310.00 | $930.43 | $2.1M |
| 2026-05-01 | SOLOMON DAVID M | S-Sale | 1,160.00 | $931.25 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-01 | FREDMAN SHEARA J | S-Sale | 2,135.00 | $925.18 | $2.0M |
| 2026-05-01 | FREDMAN SHEARA J | S-Sale | 8,166.00 | $930.21 | $7.6M |
| 2026-05-01 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 135.00 | $928.85 | $125,395 |
| 2026-05-01 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 468.00 | $929.71 | $435,104 |
| 2026-05-01 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 80.00 | $930.35 | $74,428 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 6:36pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $4.50 | 2026-04-13 | 2026-06-01 | 2026-06-29 |
| 2026-03-02 | $4.50 | 2026-01-15 | 2026-03-02 | 2026-03-30 |
| 2025-12-02 | $4.00 | 2025-10-14 | 2025-12-02 | 2025-12-30 |
| 2025-08-29 | $4.00 | 2025-07-14 | 2025-08-29 | 2025-09-29 |
| 2025-05-30 | $3.00 | 2025-04-14 | 2025-05-30 | 2025-06-27 |
| 2025-02-28 | $3.00 | 2025-01-15 | 2025-02-28 | 2025-03-28 |
| 2024-12-02 | $3.00 | 2024-10-11 | 2024-12-02 | 2024-12-30 |
| 2024-08-30 | $3.00 | 2024-07-12 | 2024-08-30 | 2024-09-27 |
| 2024-05-30 | $2.75 | 2024-04-11 | 2024-05-30 | 2024-06-27 |
| 2024-02-28 | $2.75 | 2024-01-12 | 2024-02-29 | 2024-03-28 |
| 2023-11-29 | $2.75 | 2023-10-12 | 2023-11-30 | 2023-12-28 |
| 2023-08-30 | $2.75 | 2023-07-19 | 2023-08-31 | 2023-09-28 |
| 2023-05-31 | $2.50 | 2023-04-18 | 2023-06-01 | 2023-06-29 |
| 2023-03-01 | $2.50 | 2023-01-13 | 2023-03-02 | 2023-03-30 |
| 2022-11-30 | $2.50 | 2022-10-17 | 2022-12-01 | 2022-12-29 |
| 2022-08-31 | $2.50 | 2022-07-14 | 2022-09-01 | 2022-09-29 |
| 2022-05-31 | $2.00 | 2022-04-13 | 2022-06-01 | 2022-06-29 |
| 2022-03-01 | $2.00 | 2022-01-14 | 2022-03-02 | 2022-03-30 |
| 2021-12-01 | $2.00 | 2021-10-13 | 2021-12-02 | 2021-12-30 |
| 2021-08-31 | $2.00 | 2021-07-12 | 2021-09-01 | 2021-09-29 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw numbers first: GS revenue went from $109B (2023) → $127B (2024) → $125B (2025), so the top line is flat-to-down at scale. What's actually changed is operating margin — from 9.9% in 2023 to 17.5% in 2025 — and net income nearly doubled from $8.5B to $17.2B. The Q1 2026 print is the eye-catcher: $17.2B revenue with a 32.7% net margin and $5.6B net income. That margin is a clean outlier versus the 12-15% quarterly run-rate through 2025. Either this is a phenomenal trading/IB quarter (rate cuts + M&A reopening + equity vol), a mark-to-market windfall on principal investments, or it's a partial-quarter accounting artifact. Annualizing Q1 naively gets you to ~$22B+ NI and a forward P/E around 14x — but no serious analyst should annualize one Goldman quarter, because their earnings stream is the second-most volatile in the S&P after maybe an E&P name.
The balance sheet line items missing ("Total debt: —", "Total equity: —") matter more than the models acknowledge. For a bank/broker-dealer, leverage and capital ratios ARE the business. P/B of 2.20x is rich for GS historically — it traded 0.8-1.2x for most of 2015-2020 and only crossed 1.5x in the 2021 boom. The current 2.2x P/B implies the market is paying for sustained mid-teens ROE; reported TTM ROE of 14.6% just barely clears that hurdle, and ROA of 0.95% and ROIC of 0.88% are unremarkable for a capital-markets franchise. The -$45B operating cash flow and -$47B FCF look alarming but are essentially meaningless for a dealer bank — working capital swings in trading inventory, repo, and customer balances dominate; this is why FCF-based valuation on GS is malpractice, and the synthesis correctly ignores it while the secondary signals flag "Poor Cash Flow Quality" naively.
Where I diverge from the model stack: the synthesis calls this "Reasonable Premium" at 20.7x P/E, but they're anchoring on TTM earnings that include the suspicious Q1 2026 print. Strip that quarter and use 2025 full-year ($17.2B NI / $317B mcap = 18.5x), which is no longer at a discount to history — GS traded 8-12x trailing earnings for most of the last decade. The market-forces note about "losing market share in a booming industry" deserves more weight than the synthesis gave it: MS and JPM have outgrown GS in wealth/asset management, and that's the multiple-expansion story GS needs. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as anchored/low-cult — there's no story premium to fade, but also no story support if the cycle turns. Insider activity is uniformly sells, small in size, likely programmatic — neutral is the right read, but I'd note zero buys in a tape near all-time highs is itself a soft signal.
The contrarian case: GS at $1,077 is being priced on peak-cycle margins (IB league table #1, trading desks printing on vol, AWM scaling) right as the cycle is most favorable. Reversion to a 12% net margin and $14B NI (closer to 2024) makes this a 22x P/E stock. Rate-cut tailwinds are priced in; an M&A slowdown or credit event widens spreads and torches the trading book. Conversely, the bull retort is that GS is structurally more profitable post-Marcus-wind-down and the platform/AWM mix shift is real — but that thesis needs another 4-6 quarters of proof, and you're paying 2.2x book today for it. I dissent mildly from "Reasonable Premium" — I think it's closer to "Modestly Overvalued" given the Q1 print is distorting TTM. Fair value on normalized $16-17B earnings at a justified 14-15x multiple is ~$850-950, not $1,077. The 1.9% dividend yield doesn't bail you out while waiting. I would not chase here; I'd want $900 or a confirmation that Q1 margins are repeatable for two more quarters before paying this multiple.
GPT Critique
Analyzing Goldman Sachs' financial data independently reveals a mixed picture of stability and volatility. The quarterly revenue trend indicates a plateau, with a slight decrease from $32.24 billion in Q4 2024 to $31.27 billion in Q2 2025, before dropping to $17.23 billion in Q1 2026. However, what truly stands out is the significant leap in net income from $8.52 billion in 2023 to $17.18 billion in 2025, largely driven by improved operating margins. The Q1 2026 net margin spike to 32.7% is indeed an anomaly compared to previous quarters, suggesting either exceptional trading performance or a one-off financial event, as evidenced by the historical 12-15% margins. The absence of total debt and equity figures on the balance sheet is a glaring omission, as these are critical metrics for a financial institution, potentially masking leverage risks or capital adequacy issues.
Opus argues that Goldman Sachs is "modestly overvalued," citing the Q1 2026 margin as an outlier distorting the trailing twelve months (TTM) figures. I agree with this assessment, particularly given the danger of annualizing a single quarter's results in such a volatile sector. The P/B ratio of 2.20x and ROE of 14.58% suggest the market is pricing high expectations of sustained profitability, which may not be justified. Opus's concern about Goldman losing market share to rivals like Morgan Stanley in asset and wealth management is valid, as these areas represent crucial growth avenues that Goldman needs to capitalize on to justify its current valuation.
I diverge from Opus's assertion that the insider selling activity is merely neutral. The fact that there are no insider buys, particularly at near all-time high prices, could be a subtle indication of management's lack of confidence in the stock's future appreciation. Additionally, while Opus correctly ignores free cash flow figures due to typical bank cash flow volatility, the negative operating cash flow of $45.15 billion cannot be entirely dismissed without understanding its implications on liquidity and operational stability.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and my analysis overstate the impact of the Q1 2026 results and undervalue Goldman's strategic shifts post-Marcus wind-down. They could posit that Goldman's emphasis on asset management and private wealth might indeed yield long-term benefits that are not immediately visible in quarterly numbers. Moreover, skeptics might suggest that the market's current pricing already considers these cyclical and structural shifts, warranting a premium until proven otherwise.