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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-13): Designation Watch · Cairn score +7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 48 · Value -27 · Sentiment 14 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $984.23 vs $1,018.38 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
GS NYSEThe Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. is a leading global investment banking, securities, and asset and wealth management firm headquartered in New York, New York. It provides a comprehensive range of financial services to corporations, financial institutions, governments, and individuals across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The firm operates through three primary segments: Global Banking & Markets, Asset & Wealth Management, and Platform Solutions. In Global Banking & Markets, it offers investment banking advisory for mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, restructurings, and corporate defense; securities underwriting; prime brokerage; and market-making in various financial products including fixed income, currencies, commodities, and equities. The Asset & Wealth Management segment delivers investment management, advisory services, and private equity and hedge fund operations for institutional and high-net-worth clients. Platform Solutions supports transaction banking and digital finance offerings. Founded in 1869, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. maintains a presence in major financial centers worldwide, serving as a key intermediary in global capital markets and facilitating complex financing solutions.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 13| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 14, 2026 | $14.54 | $20.98 +44.3% | — | — |
| May 28, 2026 | $1.23 | $1.28 +4.1% | — | — |
| May 5, 2026 | $2.88 | $3.30 +14.6% | — | — |
| Apr 13, 2026 | $16.24 | $17.55 +8.1% | — | — |
| Feb 24, 2026 | $2.52 | $2.72 +7.9% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 3:57pm (11d ago)| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | FWP | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
| Aug 13, 2026 | 424B2 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 51.32
Total Equity: $124.97B
Shares: 334,684,334
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $164.26B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $164.26B
Revenue: $58.28B
Revenue: $58.28B
Revenue: $58.28B
Total Equity: $124.97B
Tax Rate: 21.4%
Equity: $124.97B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $164.26B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $124.97B
Shares: 334,684,334
Shares: 334,684,334
CapEx: -$2.06B
Shares: 334,684,334
Stock Price: $1,018
Net Income: $17.18B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 11:41am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $59.3B | $47.4B | $46.3B | $53.5B | $58.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $18.3B | $16.0B | $16.1B | $17.4B | $19.6B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $21.6B | $11.3B | $8.5B | $14.3B | $17.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $60.25 | $30.42 | $23.05 | $41.07 | $51.95 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $59.45 | $30.06 | $22.87 | $40.54 | $51.32 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (13d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $261.0B | $241.8B | $241.6B | $182.1B | $164.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.5T | $1.4T | $1.6T | $1.7T | $1.8T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.4T | $1.3T | $1.5T | $1.6T | $1.7T |
| Total Equity | $109.9B | $117.2B | $116.9B | $122.0B | $125.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $131.8B | $139.4B | $143.7B | $153.4B | $165.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 11:41am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $921.0M | $8.7B | -$12.6B | -$13.2B | -$45.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.7B | -$3.7B | -$2.3B | -$2.1B | -$2.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$3.7B | $5.0B | -$14.9B | -$15.3B | -$47.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$2.1B | $487.0M | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.7B | -$3.7B | -$4.2B | -$4.5B | -$5.3B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$5.2B | -$3.5B | -$5.8B | -$8.0B | -$12.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $105.2B | -$19.2B | -$248.0M | -$59.5B | -$17.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 11:41am (14d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -20.2% | -2.3% | +15.7% | +8.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -48.0% | -24.4% | +67.6% | +20.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:11am (13d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $4.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $4.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-02 | $4.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $4.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $3.00 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $3.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $3.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $3.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-30 | $2.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-28 | $2.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $2.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $2.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $2.50 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-01 | $2.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $2.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $2.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $2.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-01 | $2.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-01 | $2.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $2.00 | — | — | — |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 12:14am (11d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-15 | HESS JOHN B | A-Award | 22.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | VINIAR DAVID A | G-Gift | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | JOHNSON KEVIN R | A-Award | 33.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | OPPENHEIMER PETER | A-Award | 50.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | Flaherty Mark A. | A-Award | 22.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-07-15 | LESLIE ERICKA T | S-Sale | 101.00 | $1,151.29 | $116,280 |
| 2026-07-15 | LESLIE ERICKA T | S-Sale | 149.00 | $1,152.15 | $171,670 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC | S-Sale | 1.00 | $9.90 | $10 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC | S-Sale | 22.00 | $9.90 | $218 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC | S-Sale | 25.00 | $9.90 | $248 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC | S-Sale | 1.00 | $9.90 | $10 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC | S-Sale | 22.00 | $9.90 | $218 |
| 2026-06-15 | GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC | S-Sale | 25.00 | $9.90 | $248 |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 2,509.00 | $972.29 | $2.4M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,560.00 | $973.19 | $1.5M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,360.00 | $974.53 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-14 | COLEMAN DENIS P. | S-Sale | 1,428.00 | $975.21 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 437.00 | $933.08 | $407,756 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 479.00 | $934.04 | $447,405 |
| 2026-05-06 | Ruemmler Kathryn H. | S-Sale | 481.00 | $934.76 | $449,620 |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: quarterly net income has run $3.04B → $2.99B → $4.11B → $4.74B → $3.72B → $4.10B → $4.62B → $5.63B over the last eight quarters — that's a genuine acceleration, with the latest print being the highest by ~22% over the year-ago quarter. Annual NI went $8.52B (2023) → $14.28B (2024) → $17.18B (2025), a doubling in two years. On $58.3B revenue and 29.5% net margins, GS is earning at rates it hasn't seen since 2021 ($21.6B NI on $59.3B — the actual cycle peak). ROE of 13.7% is healthy but not extraordinary; the 2021 comparable was closer to 23%. At $1,018 and 19.8x trailing, you're paying peak-ish multiple on peak-ish earnings — the classic setup the bear thesis flags.
The synthesis fair value of $953-974 (a 4-5% discount) is roughly right in direction but understates the asymmetry. Here's my disagreement with the "fair_value" verdict: mean-reversion in capital markets earnings is not a 5% event, it's a 20-30% event when it hits. 2023 NI was $8.5B — half of 2025. If normalized earnings sit at ~$13B (a reasonable mid-cycle blend of 2022-2025), then a 15x multiple on normalized gives you ~$490/share of equity value earnings power, plus the AWM re-rating premium. Even generously assuming $15B normalized NI and 17x, you get ~$810 — meaningfully below spot. The Thesis Evaluation's -7 score feels too balanced; the bear mass deserves more weight because the bull case ("AWM re-rate," "structural trading tailwinds") is exactly the kind of narrative that peak-cycle investors always tell themselves. I'd score this closer to -20.
Where the models are internally inconsistent: Market Forces flags "severe earnings quality issues" and "cyclical peak conditions that make current valuations unjustifiable," yet the composite lands at fair_value. Those aren't compatible — if earnings quality is poor and we're at cycle peak, fair value should be materially below spot, not 4% below. The -$45B operating cash flow and -$47B FCF are red flags the synthesis waves past too casually; yes, banks' cash flow statements are notoriously misleading (trading inventory swings dominate), but the magnitude here deserves more than a shrug. The "Net Insider Buying" tag is misleading too — the transaction list shows mostly small awards and sales, not conviction buying. And revenue_cagr of 12.3% over five years is flattered by starting from 2021 depression comparables in some segments; the underlying franchise doesn't grow at 12%.
The contrarian bull case worth stating: GS has genuinely transformed capital allocation since the failed consumer banking experiment, AWM fee-based revenue is stickier than trading, and if we're entering a multi-year M&A/IPO recovery cycle (rates stabilizing, private equity backlog enormous), 2025 might not be peak — it might be year two of a five-year up-cycle. In that world, $1,018 is a bargain and you're buying the best franchise in the business. I acknowledge this, but note it requires believing we're mid-cycle, not late-cycle, in an environment where credit spreads are tight, equity vol is low, and every capital markets input suggests we're closer to peak than trough. The burden of proof is on the bull.
GPT Reading
Goldman at $1,018 is not egregiously mispriced, but I lean modestly overvalued because the market is capitalizing a rebound year as though it were durable core earning power. The raw income line is undeniably strong: revenue rose from $46.25B in 2023 to $53.51B in 2024 and $58.28B in 2025, while net income recovered from $8.52B to $14.28B to $17.18B. Quarterly profit momentum also stayed healthy, with 2025 net income stepping from $4.74B in Q1 to $3.72B, $4.10B, and $4.62B, then accelerating again to $5.63B in 2026 Q1. That is a real earnings recovery, not an accounting mirage. But the valuation already assumes a lot of that strength persists: nearly 20x earnings and 2.73x book for a capital-markets-heavy franchise producing 13.7% ROE is not cheap. For a bank-like institution, price-to-book matters, and paying almost 2.7x book for mid-teens ROE leaves little room for a softer underwriting, M&A, or trading backdrop.
The biggest disconnect in the dataset is the quality of “cash generation.” Net income of $17.18B sits beside operating cash flow of negative $45.15B and free cash flow of negative $47.22B. For banks and brokers, traditional FCF is a poor valuation tool because working capital and balance-sheet movements swamp the economic signal, so I do not treat that as a simple red flag the way I would for an industrial. Still, it is a reminder not to overread earnings momentum as owner cash. What matters more is whether earnings are translating into book value growth and acceptable returns on equity. On that score, equity at $124.97B against a $300.43B market cap says the market is assigning a very full multiple to a business whose 2025 net income implies roughly a 13%-14% earnings yield on book, but only about a 5.7% earnings yield on the stock price. That spread is the whole debate: Goldman is a good business, but the stock now requires sustained premium returns, not just a cyclical rebound.
What stands out positively is that this is not 2023 anymore. The earnings path is cleaner, margins are strong at 29.5%, and 2025 revenue of $58.28B is nearly back to the 2021 peak of $59.34B, though net income at $17.18B still trails the 2021 high of $21.64B. That actually tells a useful story: the franchise has regained top-line power without fully regaining peak-cycle profitability, which suggests some combination of mix change, higher expense base, or less favorable market conditions than the best year. If you pay $1,018 today, you are implicitly betting that Goldman can either push ROE above the current 13.7% or convince the market that 13%-14% ROE deserves a permanent premium multiple. I’m skeptical on both. A mature, elite franchise can deserve above-book valuation, but 2.7x book usually wants either structurally higher ROE or visible secular growth, and this dataset shows recovery more than reinvention.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: maybe this is exactly what a premium global franchise should cost. Revenue has compounded well off the 2023 trough, earnings growth has been explosive from depressed levels, the latest quarter’s $5.63B in net income annualizes above 2025’s run rate, and the balance sheet shows $164.26B of cash and equivalents against nearly $125B of equity. If the business is entering a multi-year stretch of normalized deal activity, resilient trading, and better mix in asset and wealth management, then 19.8x earnings could compress quickly on rising profits rather than through a stock decline. The dividend payout ratio of 30.7% also leaves room for ongoing capital return. A smart bull would say the market is not paying for 2021 euphoria; it is paying for a scarcer thing, a fortress franchise with improving consistency after a messy 2023. I weigh that less heavily because the stock is already priced as a premium compounder while the actual reported history still looks cyclical: 2021 net income $21.64B, then down to $11.26B, then $8.52B, then back up. That is not yet stable enough to underwrite a “deserves any price” multiple.
What would change my mind is evidence that current earnings power is both durable and more profitable on equity than 2025 suggests. If the next few quarters keep net income above roughly $5B while full-year ROE pushes toward 16% without relying on one-off market surges, I would concede $1,018 is not stretched and could justify more. Conversely, if annualized earnings slip back toward the $14B-$15B range, or if book value growth lags badly enough that price-to-book remains above 2.5x on a sub-14% ROE profile, then fair value is clearly below the current quote. In short, Goldman is excellent; the stock simply asks investors to pay up as if excellence has become steadier than the numbers have yet proven.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a classic capital-markets recovery that has already been recognized by the tape. Net income climbed from the $8.52B trough in 2023 to $14.28B in 2024 and $17.18B in 2025, a near-doubling in two years, while revenue advanced from $46.25B to $58.28B. The most recent print—$5.63B of net income in the March 2026 quarter—annualizes above the 2021 boom-year peak of $21.64B. Net margin compressed into the high twenties (29.5% for full-year 2025), ROE sits at 13.7%, and the stock trades at 19.8x trailing earnings and 2.73x book. That combination is the story: the market is capitalizing late-cycle, high-teens earnings power as if it were mid-cycle normal. For a firm whose earnings have historically swung 50% peak-to-trough, a near-20x multiple and a 2.7x price-to-book that implies a mid-teens sustainable ROE look optimistic once the comparison set is the firm’s own cycle rather than the last four strong quarters.
Cash-flow quality reinforces the caution. Operating cash flow of –$45.15B and free cash flow of –$47.22B in 2025 are not merely “bank accounting noise”; they flag that reported earnings are running well ahead of cash generation even after allowing for trading-inventory and deposit volatility. The balance-sheet snapshot (equity $125B, cash $164B) looks fortress-like, yet the zero debt-to-equity figure is an artifact; leverage remains the core of the model. Insider activity is noise—token awards and sales of a few dozen to a couple of thousand shares—so it supplies no confirmatory signal either way. Momentum metrics (revenue CAGR 12.3%, earnings CAGR 42%, recent earnings +20% YoY) are real, but they measure the climb out of a trough, not a new structural plateau.
The strongest counter-argument is simply the trajectory and the franchise. If the March quarter’s $5.63B run-rate is sustained rather than a seasonal or deal-driven spike, 2026 net income could clear $20B and the trailing multiple would compress into the mid-teens without any price decline. Asset & Wealth Management is the cleanest re-rating lever: a durable mix shift toward stickier, higher-ROE fee streams would justify a higher through-cycle multiple and make today’s 2.7x book look less aggressive. Trading has also shown structural resilience in volatile regimes, and the firm’s oligopoly position in advisory and prime brokerage is not easily replicated. A bull can therefore claim that 2025’s $17.18B is the new base, not the peak, and that residual-income math understates scarcity value.
I weigh those points but still land on the other side. Capital-markets fee pools are mean-reverting; investment-banking wallets and equity underwriting volumes do not compound at 12–20% for long. Paying 19.8x and 2.7x book for 13.7% ROE already embeds several years of continued strength. The valuation synthesis’s $953–$974 fair-value range versus $1,018 spot is directionally correct; my own residual-income anchor (ROE 13.7%, cost of equity ~10%, modest growth) points closer to 1.8–2.1x book, or roughly $900–$980. The premium currently on offer is valuation noise, not a transformed earnings power story.
What would flip the verdict is straightforward: three consecutive quarters of net income at or above $5B together with reported ROE sustainably above 15%, or clear segment disclosure showing Asset & Wealth Management contributing a majority of earnings at higher incremental margins. Conversely, a return to sub-$3.5B quarterly net income or a drop in ROE back toward 10% would confirm the cycle-peak thesis and open material downside.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
Revenue has recovered from the 2023 trough of $46.3B back to $58.3B in 2025, with net income rebuilding from $8.5B to $17.2B — a two-year doubling that reflects both a better capital markets tape and cost discipline. The franchise is doing what it should at this point in the cycle: earning double-digit returns and buying stock back. Diluted shares fell from 374.6M (2022) to 334.7M (2025), a ~2.1% annual shrink, and buybacks run 2.4x SBC — per-share value is being concentrated, which is exactly the behavior you want from a mature earner. Insider tape is mixed but unremarkable for a large bank (routine awards, some officer selling, no cluster of open-market P buys of size). The forensic modules flag things that need context. Altman Z of 0.27 and 'distress' labeling is a false positive: Z-score is calibrated for industrial balance sheets, not a bank whose business model IS a large, leveraged balance sheet funded by deposits, repo, and trading liabilities. Similarly, FCF of -$47.2B and OCF/NI of -0.84x reflect trading inventory, financing receivables, and broker-dealer working capital swings, not cash-burning operations - GAAP cash flow is not a meaningful quality metric for a dealer bank. The $164B liquid cash figure is likewise operating liquidity, not free capital. What is real: earnings integrity looks acceptable (accruals 1.6% of assets is modest), the share count is genuinely falling, and the earnings trajectory is favorable. What is not verifiable here: capital ratios (CET1), VaR trends, litigation reserves, and consumer/Platform Solutions wind-down costs — all of which are the actual quality signals for this business and none of which appear in the derived data.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- CET1 ratio, SLR, and liquidity coverage ratio trend over the last 8 quarters
- VaR and trading loss days disclosure - is risk-taking rising into the earnings recovery
- Platform Solutions/GreenSky/Marcus wind-down charges and remaining consumer loan reserves
- Litigation and regulatory reserve movement (1MDB tail, ongoing matters)
- Composition of the $47B negative FCF - trading inventory vs financing receivables vs true operating drag
- Segment mix: Investment Banking vs FICC vs Equities vs Asset and Wealth Management revenue durability
- Compensation ratio trend - is the recent earnings growth being shared appropriately with shareholders
The e2e synthesis pegs composite fair value at $953.35 and signal-adjusted FV at $974.32 against a market price of $1,018.38 - roughly a 4-7% premium, well inside the noise band for a dealer bank whose earnings swing with capital markets activity. The anchored-PE method corroborates at $953, so no single method is running away. Given the Strong company-quality read (franchise, per-share discipline, recovering ROE), I am comfortable letting deserved value sit at the upper end of that range, but the earnings-quality haircut hint (-1, some red flags) argues against paying up further - trading and IB earnings at cycle-good levels should be capitalized conservatively. Net: the market has already priced in the steady-compounder narrative. To claim cheapness here you would need to assume through-cycle ROE structurally re-rates higher (wealth/AM mix shift sticks) AND multiple expands - two heroic asks stacked. To claim it is rich, you would need a capital markets downturn thesis that is not evident in current guidance. The honest read is a modest premium to deserved value, no margin of safety, no clear short.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Through-cycle ROE guidance and asset management fee-earning AUM growth in latest transcript
- Any one-off gains in trading/principal investments inflating recent EPS
- Buyback pace and capital return guidance under current CET1 constraints
- Loan-loss and private-credit exposure marks that could hit book value
The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime score +22, VIX 16, S&P just 1.6% off highs) but rates at 4.68% and a 26x market PE cap the upside. For a 1.29-beta capital-markets name, that translates into a modestly supportive backdrop - not a wind at the back, more the absence of a storm. The Bloomberg piece on the biggest Wall Street rotation since 2020 and AI crowding cracks is the most GS-relevant item: rotation out of AI mega-caps historically funnels flows into financials and cyclicals, a subtle tailwind for a franchise trading and prime-brokering that flow. On the narrative side there is almost nothing pushing the stock. Intensity is 'minimal', cult is 'low', and the story is a boring steady-compounder tale with no transformative hook. That means sentiment is neither inflating nor deflating the price - the +4.5% premium is described as valuation noise, not narrative froth. Analyst tone in the newsflow shows GS itself acting as an analyst (cutting HOOD targets) rather than being the subject of upgrades or downgrades, reinforcing the quiet-book read. Net: a low-drama name in a low-drama tape. The rotation dynamic and calm VIX give a slight tailwind edge, but nothing decisive - GS will trade on earnings and rates, not on story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the AI-to-financials rotation persists beyond a week or reverses
- Any move in the 10y above 4.9% that would pressure financials multiples
- Sell-side target revisions on GS itself (not GS acting as analyst on others)
- VIX behavior - a spike above 20 flips the high-beta calculus fast
- Signs the wealth-management pivot narrative starts gaining intensity (would add a genuine tailwind)
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