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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Home Depot, Inc. (HD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-11): Designation Watch · Cairn score -13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 35 · Value -53 · Sentiment 2 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $237.28 vs $332.02 at analysis
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The Home Depot, Inc. is the world's largest home improvement retailer, operating big-box stores across the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The company specializes in selling a vast assortment of building materials, tools, construction products, appliances, home improvement items, lawn and garden products, and decor products. It caters to do-it-yourself customers, professional contractors, and facilities maintenance needs, offering facilities repair and operations products as well. Beyond retail sales, The Home Depot provides comprehensive installation services for flooring, water heaters, baths, garage doors, cabinets, countertops, sheds, furnaces, central air systems, and windows. Its e-commerce platform complements the physical stores, delivering over one million products with interconnected online and in-store shopping experiences. Each typical store spans about 105,000 square feet of indoor retail space, creating warehouse-style environments stocked for major projects and everyday needs. Founded in 1978 and headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, The Home Depot plays a central role in the home improvement and construction supply sector, serving individual consumers, businesses, and contractors throughout North America.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 11| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 19, 2026 | $3.41 | $3.43 +0.6% | — | — |
| Mar 10, 2026 | $-0.27 | $-0.04 +85.2% | — | — |
| Feb 24, 2026 | $2.52 | $2.72 +7.9% | — | — |
| Nov 18, 2025 | $3.83 | $3.74 -2.3% | — | — |
| Sep 21, 2025 | $0.38 | $0.48 +26.3% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 1:44pm (10d ago)| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Jun 24, 2026 | 11-K | View |
| Jun 24, 2026 | 11-K | View |
| May 29, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 28, 2026 | SD | View |
| May 27, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 26, 2026 | 4 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 14.23
Total Equity: $12.81B
Shares: 995,000,000
Total Debt: $49.40B
Cash: $1.39B
EBITDA: $24.40B
Total Debt: $49.40B
Cash: $1.39B
Revenue: $164.68B
Revenue: $164.68B
Revenue: $164.68B
Total Equity: $12.81B
Tax Rate: 23.9%
Equity: $12.81B
Total Debt: $49.40B
Cash: $1.39B
Current Liabilities: $32.42B
Long-Term Debt: $49.40B
Total Debt: $49.40B
Total Equity: $12.81B
Shares: 995,000,000
Shares: 995,000,000
CapEx: -$3.68B
Shares: 995,000,000
Stock Price: $333.35
Net Income: $14.16B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 1:44pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $151.2B | $157.4B | $152.7B | $159.5B | $164.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $100.3B | $104.6B | $101.7B | $106.2B | $109.8B |
| Gross Profit | $50.8B | $52.8B | $51.0B | $53.3B | $54.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $27.8B | $28.7B | $29.3B | $31.8B | $34.0B |
| Operating Income | $23.0B | $24.0B | $21.7B | $21.5B | $20.9B |
| Net Income | $16.4B | $17.1B | $15.1B | $14.8B | $14.2B |
| EBITDA | $25.9B | $27.0B | $24.8B | $24.9B | $24.4B |
| EPS | $15.59 | $16.74 | $15.16 | $14.96 | $14.26 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $15.53 | $16.69 | $15.11 | $14.91 | $14.23 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.3B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $1.7B | $1.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $29.1B | $32.5B | $29.8B | $31.7B | $34.4B |
| Total Assets | $71.9B | $76.4B | $76.5B | $96.1B | $105.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $28.7B | $23.1B | $22.0B | $28.7B | $32.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $36.4B | $41.2B | $42.2B | $51.4B | $49.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $73.6B | $74.9B | $75.5B | $89.5B | $92.3B |
| Total Equity | -$1.7B | $1.6B | $1.0B | $6.6B | $12.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $67.6B | $76.9B | $83.7B | $89.5B | $94.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 1:44pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $16.6B | $14.6B | $21.2B | $19.8B | $16.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.6B | -$3.1B | -$3.2B | -$3.5B | -$3.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $14.0B | $11.5B | $17.9B | $16.3B | $12.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$421.0M | $0 | -$1.5B | -$17.6B | -$5.4B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.5B | -$2.5B | -$1.3B | -$1.5B | -$5.0B |
| Dividends Paid | -$7.0B | -$7.8B | -$8.4B | -$8.9B | -$9.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$14.8B | -$6.7B | -$8.0B | -$649.0M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 1:44pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.1% | -3.0% | +4.5% | +3.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.8% | -3.4% | +4.6% | +2.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +4.3% | -9.8% | -0.8% | -3.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +4.1% | -11.5% | -2.2% | -4.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.3% | -8.4% | +0.5% | -1.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (11d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | $2.33 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-12 | $2.33 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-04 | $2.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-04 | $2.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-05 | $2.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-13 | $2.30 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-27 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-29 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-30 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $2.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $2.09 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $1.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $1.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-01 | $1.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $1.90 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-01 | $1.65 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-01 | $1.65 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: HD's TTM revenue is roughly $166.6B ($41.77+$38.20+$41.35+$45.28), up from ~$163B a year prior — call it 2% real growth. But TTM net income is ~$14.0B vs ~$15.2B in the year-ago stretch, a mid-single-digit earnings decline. Margins are the story: Q1 FY26 net margin was 7.9% vs 8.6% in the year-ago quarter, and the trailing four quarters show 7.9/6.7/8.7/10.1 — a clear compression pattern with the seasonal Q2 peak (10.1% this year) still below the 10.6% print from Q2 FY25. This is not collapsing, but it is not "cyclical trough" either — it's grinding lower. FCF has been the ugliest line: 5-yr FCF CAGR of -16% while capex ($3.68B) creeps up as HD invests in Pro/supply chain (SRS acquisition context). Book equity of just $12.8B against $49.4B debt gives you the eye-watering 25.9x P/B and 3.9x D/E — but that's a buyback artifact, not distress; ROIC of 26% is what actually matters and it's still elite.
Where I part company with the synthesis: the $202-231 fair value range implies HD should trade at roughly 14-16x earnings. That's a Kohl's/Target-in-crisis multiple for a business generating 26% ROIC, $12.6B FCF, and a genuine duopoly position with LOW. The DCF is almost certainly using depressed near-term FCF and extrapolating the -16% CAGR — that's a mechanical error on a cyclical. Normalize FCF to $15B (mid-cycle, pre-rate-shock levels), apply a 20x multiple appropriate for a wide-moat compounder with 2.8% yield and buyback, and you get ~$300B equity value, or ~$300/share. So I think fair value is closer to $290-310, not $203. The stock at $333 is modestly rich, not 39% overvalued.
The market-forces "deteriorating quality / value trap" call is the one I most disagree with. Quality hasn't deteriorated — cyclical demand has. Gross margin held at 33.3% through the downturn; operating margin at 12.7% is compressed from ~15% peak but not broken. The Pro contractor mix shift and SRS integration are real structural positives the bear case ignores. Where the market narrative layer gets it right: this IS a "quality premium on a quality business," not a speculative bubble — moderate intensity, anchored, no cult. That framing is more honest than the synthesis's blunt "overvalued." The contrarian argument against ME: if mortgage rates stay 6.5%+ through 2026, existing home turnover stays at 30-year lows, and the "aging in place" thesis has already been fully harvested (Americans deferred, not cancelled, big-ticket remodels — and deferrals compound), then normalized FCF might be $13B, not $15B, and fair value drifts to $260. Also worth noting: earnings CAGR of -3.3% with revenue CAGR of +3.9% means margin compression is doing real damage, and I can't rule out that 10%+ net margins were the anomaly, not 8%.
Data caveats: the balance sheet is stale (Feb 2026), we have no insider activity data provided, and the "26% ROIC" reflects the buyback-shrunken equity base — economic ROIC on invested capital including debt is more like 15%, still good but not the 26% headline. My verdict: I dissent from the "39% overvalued" synthesis but agree HD is not a bargain here. The stock is priced for a soft-landing recovery in housing turnover that may take another 12-18 months to materialize. Buying at $333 gives you a 2.8% yield, ~4% buyback yield, and low-single-digit organic growth — a 9-10% total return if margins stabilize, less if they don't. Fair, not cheap. I'd want $280 or a Q3 print showing margin stabilization before adding. The synthesis models are anchored to a mechanical DCF that punishes cyclicals at the trough; the market narrative layer is closer to right.
GPT Reading
Home Depot still looks like an excellent business priced like a growth-and-recovery story, and that is the mismatch. The core numbers are not broken, but they are not supporting a $332 billion equity value either. Annual revenue has risen from $152.67 billion in FY2024 to $164.68 billion in FY2026, about 7.9% total over two years, yet net income has gone from $15.14 billion to $14.16 billion, down 6.5%. Operating income has slipped from $21.69 billion to $20.89 billion over that same span, so the company is selling more dollars of goods for less profit. That is the key fact. The latest annual operating margin is 12.7% and net margin 8.6%, both below the 2023 peak year when revenue was $157.40 billion but operating income was a much richer $24.04 billion and net income $17.11 billion. Investors are paying 23.4x earnings and 15.6x EV/EBITDA for a retailer whose earnings power has not recovered and whose free cash flow is only $12.65 billion, implying roughly a 3.8% FCF yield on market cap before considering the heavy leverage.
The quarterlies reinforce that this is a low-growth, mildly margin-compressed operator rather than a rebound machine. The most recent quarter did show revenue growth to $41.77 billion from $39.86 billion a year earlier, but net income fell from $3.43 billion to $3.29 billion and margin compressed from 8.6% to 7.9%. That is not what a clean earnings recovery looks like. Even the better quarters show the same pattern: revenue has generally held up, but margins are softer than historical levels. Over the last eight quarters, net margin ranged from 6.7% to 10.6%, with the recent prints mostly below earlier-year comparisons. This tells me the demand base is resilient enough, especially with pro exposure and repair/remodel tailwinds, but pricing, mix, shrink, wages, and financing-sensitive demand are keeping incremental sales from dropping through at historical rates. That matters because at 2.0x sales and 2.3x EV/revenue, the market is not valuing Home Depot as a no-growth staple; it is valuing it as a high-quality compounder about to re-expand margins.
The balance sheet and capital structure make the valuation less forgiving. Home Depot has $49.40 billion of debt against just $1.39 billion of cash and only $12.81 billion of book equity. The 25.9x price-to-book is not useful as a traditional franchise signal here because buybacks and leverage have hollowed out equity, but it is a reminder that per-share value creation has leaned heavily on financial engineering. ROE above 110% is similarly flattered by a tiny equity base; ROIC at 26.1% is the more meaningful proof of business quality. I do not dispute the quality. I dispute paying a premium multiple for quality while cash generation has softened. Operating cash flow is $16.33 billion versus net income of $14.16 billion, so earnings quality is fine, but free cash flow is down meaningfully versus the business's better years and the dividend already consumes about 65% of earnings. With housing turnover weak and big-ticket discretionary categories still constrained by rates, I think the market is capitalizing normalized earnings too generously. On something like $14-15 billion of sustainable net income, a more defensible multiple is 18-20x, which points to equity value closer to roughly $255-$300 billion, or around $255-$300 per share.
The best case against this view is that I am underestimating how durable Home Depot’s moat and margin structure are once the housing cycle loosens. A bull can point to revenue rebounding to $164.68 billion, gross margin staying robust at 33.3%, ROIC still above 26%, and quarterly sales now turning positive again. They can also argue that this is exactly when you should pay up: not at peak earnings, but when earnings are 10-15% below normalized and the market can see the turn before GAAP does. If net income simply returns from $14.16 billion to the $16.5-$17.0 billion range achieved in prior years, today’s P/E on forward earnings drops toward 19-20x, much less demanding for a dominant duopoly-like asset with dependable capital returns. I take that seriously. My issue is that the latest data do not yet show operating leverage returning; sales have improved faster than profits, which weakens the “buy the trough” case because the trough may be less cyclical and more margin-structural than bulls assume.
What would change my mind is straightforward: if the next few quarters show revenue growth holding above 4-5% while net income grows faster than sales and annual operating margin rebuilds from 12.7% back toward 13.5-14.0%, then the earnings base is genuinely recovering and a premium multiple is justified. I would also revisit a more constructive stance if free cash flow moved back above $14.5-$15.0 billion without added leverage, because that would support the current enterprise value much better. Absent that, I see a best-in-class retailer priced for a normalization that is still more hoped for than demonstrated.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality franchise in clear fundamental decline that the market refuses to price as such. Revenue has crawled from $151B to $165B over four years (3.9% CAGR), yet operating income has fallen from a peak $24.0B in fiscal 2023 to $20.9B in fiscal 2026 and net income from $17.1B to $14.2B. Free cash flow is the sharper warning: $12.65B last year on a −16% FCF CAGR, leaving a free-cash-flow yield of roughly 3.8% at the $332B enterprise. The most recent spring quarter still shows the same pattern—revenue +4.8% year-over-year to $41.8B while net income slipped to $3.29B from $3.43B. Gross margin holds near 33%, but operating margin has compressed from the mid-teens to 12.7%. At 23.4× trailing earnings and 15.6× EV/EBITDA on a business whose earnings and cash flow are both shrinking, the multiple embeds a full cyclical recovery that has not yet appeared in the P&L.
Balance-sheet optics reinforce the caution. $49.4B of debt against $1.4B of cash and only $12.8B of equity produces a 3.9× debt-to-equity ratio and an artificially juiced 110% ROE; the more honest 26% ROIC remains excellent and confirms the moat, but it does not justify paying growth-stock multiples for negative earnings growth. The 65% payout ratio on a declining FCF base leaves limited cushion if housing turnover stays depressed. Rule-based and DCF engines that spit out fair values in the low $200s are directionally correct: the $130 gap between those anchors and the $333 quote is almost pure narrative premium—aging-in-place, contractor consolidation, “forever home”—rather than cash-flow compounding already visible in the statements.
The strongest counter-argument is the trough-earnings thesis. If rates ease, existing-home sales normalize, and operating profit reclaims the $23–24B zone last seen in 2022–23, today’s price becomes roughly 14× recovered EBIT and high-teens earnings—hardly demanding for a scaled duopolist with 26% ROIC and $12B-plus of annual cash generation. Buybacks have already shrunk the share count enough that even modest EPS recovery produces optical multiple compression, and the 2.8% dividend is well covered so long as FCF does not keep falling at double-digit rates. In that soft-landing world the stock is roughly fairly valued, not a value trap. I weigh this less heavily because three consecutive years of margin and FCF erosion have already occurred while the “recovery is imminent” story has been told the entire time; hope is not a substitute for the inflection.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive on two hard prints: fiscal 2027 operating margin re-expanding above 14% with FCF back above $15B, or a sustained two-quarter acceleration in comparable sales driven by measurable housing turnover rather than price/mix. Until then the risk-reward at $333 is skewed lower.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
Home Depot is a textbook mature_earner: revenue grew from $151.2B (2022) to $164.7B (2026), FCF averaged $14B+ per year, and diluted share count fell from 1.06B to 995M (-1.5% CAGR) with buybacks running 1427% of SBC. Earnings quality is clean - OCF/NI of 1.15x, accruals of -2.4% of assets, Beneish M of -2.42, and Altman Z of 5.67 all point to real, cash-backed earnings with no forensic red flags. The concern sits in the profitability trajectory: gross margin has drifted from 33.6% to 33.3% and operating margin has fallen more meaningfully from 15.2% to 12.7% over five years, with net income declining from $17.1B (2023) to $14.2B (2026) despite revenue growth. FCF also stepped down from $17.95B (2024) to $12.65B (2026). Balance sheet carries net debt of $48B against only $1.4B liquid cash - manageable for a business throwing off $12-16B FCF, but it is a constraint, not a cushion. Overall this is a durable, well-run franchise showing early operating-leverage deterioration rather than any integrity or survival issue.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Drivers of operating margin decline from 15.2% to 12.7% - is it SRS acquisition mix, wage inflation, or shrink/promotional pressure?
- Comparable sales and transaction trends to distinguish cyclical softness from structural share loss
- Debt maturity ladder and average coupon on the $48B net debt position
- Capex intensity trend and whether the FCF step-down is working-capital or investment-driven
- SRS Distribution integration progress and its impact on segment margins
Every triangulation point sits below the market. Composite FV is $231.81, signal-adjusted FV $202.63, DCF $230.52, EPV floor $169.77, and even the generous anchored-PE lands at $296.43 - still below the $332.02 print. The tightest of those (anchored-PE) implies roughly 11% downside; the composite implies about 30% downside. Earnings quality is high, so there is no haircut to apply - the gap is real, not an artifact of dirty accruals. This is a strong business (quality 35) that deserves a premium multiple, but the current price is asking you to pay that premium AND assume margin recovery from the recent FCF step-down to $12.65B. Bear case is straightforward: you are underwriting a decade of aging-in-place demand plus buyback arbitrage while margins are quietly compressing. That is a lot of good news already in the tape. It is not a short - the cash generation and buyback are real - but there is no margin of safety at $332. I would want a mid-teens discount to the anchored-PE number before calling this interesting, which lines up around the high $250s.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Pro vs DIY comp trends and whether pro demand is offsetting DIY softness
- Gross margin trajectory and whether the recent compression is cyclical or structural
- FCF guidance and buyback pace vs the $12.65B run-rate
- Any commentary on SRS Distribution contribution and integration margins
- Impact of mortgage rates and existing-home turnover on ticket size
The macro tape is quietly constructive (neutral-to-positive regime, VIX 16, S&P near highs), but HD's 0.95 beta means it neither gets amplified lift from risk-on nor punished by risk-off. The 10y at 4.68% is the one real overhang for a housing-adjacent name: rate-sensitive narratives (mortgage lock-in, home turnover) sit under a persistent low-grade cloud, and that lands specifically on HD as the largest home-improvement retailer. Offsetting this, HD's story is 'steady compounder' with moderate durability and low cult - it doesn't need a hot narrative to hold a bid, and it doesn't get sold in a de-rating of speculative cohorts. The active narrative is the 'forever home / aging in place / Pro consolidation' thesis, which the market has been willing to pay a premium for; intensity is only moderate, so there is no mania to unwind but also no fresh accelerant. Recent news flow is neutral-to-mildly positive: the organizational realignment around Pro and a $1.2T TAM gives analysts a clean bull talking point, and coverage tone ('fairly valued', 'still below fair value?') is measured rather than euphoric or bearish. Peer read-throughs (MAS margin lift on pricing/tariff refunds, FND flat EPS on soft demand) are mixed - pricing power is intact, end-demand is soft - which keeps sentiment range-bound rather than directional.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any move in the 10y toward 5% - would sharpen the rate-sensitive headwind meaningfully
- August housing turnover / existing home sales prints - the direct narrative test for the 'forever home' thesis
- Q2 earnings tone and comp trajectory vs peers (MAS pricing, FND traffic) - determines whether the reorg narrative gets validated
- Any sell-side downgrades citing 'priced-in' - would tip analyst tone from neutral to headwind
- Sector rotation into/out of defensive-cyclicals if the regime shifts risk-on hard
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.