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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc. (HIG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +5 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 63 · Value -43 · Sentiment -17 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $330.71 vs $136.10 at analysis
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The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.
HIG NYSEThe Hartford Insurance Group, Inc. is an insurance and financial services company headquartered in Hartford, Connecticut. It focuses on providing property and casualty insurance, group benefits, and investment management solutions to businesses and individuals. Through its Business and Commercial Lines operations, the company offers coverage such as general liability, workers’ compensation, commercial auto, and specialty policies tailored to small, mid-sized, and large enterprises. Its Personal Insurance segment provides home and auto coverage designed to meet the needs of individual policyholders. The Group Benefits segment delivers employer-sponsored products including disability, life, and accident insurance. Additionally, Hartford Funds offers a range of mutual funds and related investment services to financial advisors and retail investors. The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc. plays a significant role in the U.S. financial services landscape by helping customers manage risk, protect assets, and access diversified investment options across multiple distribution channels.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.32
Total Equity: $18.98B
Shares: 287,987,988
Total Debt: $4.37B
Cash: $177.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $4.37B
Cash: $177.00M
Revenue: $28.07B
Revenue: $28.07B
Revenue: $28.07B
Total Equity: $18.98B
Tax Rate: 19.4%
Equity: $18.98B
Total Debt: $4.37B
Cash: $177.00M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $4.37B
Total Debt: $4.37B
Total Equity: $18.98B
Shares: 287,987,988
Shares: 287,987,988
CapEx: -$169.00M
Shares: 287,987,988
Stock Price: $136.10
Net Income: $3.84B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:22pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $21.6B | $21.9B | $24.3B | $26.4B | $28.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | -$9.0M | $7.0M | $15.0M | -$3.0M | $6.0M |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $2.4B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.8B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $7.00 | $5.69 | $8.09 | $10.51 | $13.51 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.47 | $5.44 | $7.97 | $10.35 | $13.32 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:22pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $337.0M | $344.0M | $189.0M | $234.0M | $177.0M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $76.6B | $73.0B | $76.8B | $80.9B | $86.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.9B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $58.7B | $59.4B | $61.5B | $64.5B | $67.0B |
| Total Equity | $17.8B | $13.6B | $15.3B | $16.4B | $19.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $15.8B | $17.0B | $19.0B | $21.5B | $24.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:22pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $5.9B | $5.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$133.0M | -$175.0M | -$215.0M | -$145.0M | -$169.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.0B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $5.8B | $5.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$485.0M | -$506.0M | -$528.0M | -$556.0M | -$592.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.7B | -$1.6B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | $98.0M | $7.0M | -$155.0M | $45.0M | -$57.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:22pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.9% | +11.3% | +8.4% | +6.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -23.3% | +37.7% | +24.2% | +23.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:04am (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-03 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 16:48The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Hartford is doing $28.1B TTM revenue growing 6-7% YoY, with net income of $3.84B in 2025 up 23% from $3.11B in 2024. The quarterly cadence is clean — Q2'26 hit $7.26B revenue and $1.30B NI (17.9% margin), the best quarter in the series. ROE of 20.2% on $19B equity, debt/equity 0.23, FCF of $5.75B against a $36.9B market cap = 15.6% FCF yield. P/E 10.2, P/B 2.07. For a diversified insurer with a specialty commercial book and group benefits, this is genuinely cheap on absolute metrics — Chubb trades ~13x, Travelers ~12x, and Hartford's ROE is competitive with both. The insider "gift" of 35,088 shares is noise, not a signal.
Now the model stack. The Valuation Synthesis output claiming fair value of $343-$359 versus $136 is nonsense and should be discarded — a 164% discount to DCF for a mature P&C insurer means the DCF model is misapplied (likely treating insurance float or investment income improperly, or using an inappropriate terminal growth on a cyclical). No serious insurance analyst thinks Hartford is worth $343. The Thesis Evaluation's framing that the market is "pricing in -10% annual FCF decline" is directionally more honest but still overstated; a 10x P/E on a P&C insurer at cycle peak is standard, not "radical pessimism." Market Forces and the Narrative layer are closer to reality: this is a well-run cyclical trading at a normal cyclical multiple near the top of a hard market. The Pre-Flight thesis nails it — the market is discounting sustainability of 20% ROE, and that discount is rational.
The contrarian counterpoint to the "cheap quality compounder" story is the P&C cycle itself. Commercial pricing momentum has been decelerating across the industry through 2025-26; workers' comp (a Hartford core line) has been softening for years with loss cost trends creeping up. Hartford's Q1'26 margin of 11.8% versus Q2'26's 17.9% shows exactly the cat-loss volatility bears cite — one bad wildfire/hurricane season and NI drops 30%+. The 23% earnings CAGR is measured off a 2022 trough ($1.82B NI) that included reserve strengthening and cat losses; normalized earnings power is probably closer to $3.2-3.4B than the current $3.8B TTM run-rate. Apply 11x to $3.3B normalized = $36B market cap, which is roughly where it trades. The market isn't wrong; it's pricing mid-cycle earnings, not peak. Cash-and-equivalents of only $177M against $4.4B debt looks thin, though insurance balance sheets have massive investment portfolios that don't show here — a real data gap.
My verdict: I dissent from the synthesis $359 fair value (absurd) and partially agree with the Market Forces "neutral" read. Hartford is fairly valued to modestly undervalued — I'd anchor fair value at $150-165 based on 11-12x normalized EPS of ~$11, plus a small premium for above-peer ROE and disciplined capital return (1.7% dividend + buybacks putting total shareholder yield near 6-7%). That's 10-20% upside plus dividends, not 164%. The 15.6% FCF yield is real but overstates distributable cash because insurance FCF includes reserve build that must fund future claims. This is a decent risk-adjusted holding for income-and-quality investors, not a table-pounding value opportunity. The catalyst path is boring: continued buybacks at accretive multiples, no major cat year, and gradual multiple expansion toward 12x. Downside is a bad cat season plus soft market taking earnings to $3B and the stock to $115-120. Skew is slightly positive but not dramatic.
GPT Reading
Hartford screens cheap for a reason, but still looks modestly undervalued at $136 rather than dramatically mispriced. The core story in the numbers is a very good, mature insurer that has been compounding earnings faster than revenue: annual revenue rose from $21.65B in 2021 to $28.07B in 2025, a solid 6.7% annualized, while net income climbed from $2.37B to $3.84B despite the 2022 dip. That is not a speculative rerating story; it is underwriting discipline, favorable pricing, and investment income doing real work. The quarterly run-rate also shows genuine improvement, not just accounting noise: first-half 2026 revenue was $14.49B versus $13.53B in first-half 2025, up about 7%, while net income was $2.16B versus $1.63B, up roughly 33%. Margins have stepped up from 9.3% and 14.8% in the first two quarters of 2025 to 11.8% and 17.9% in the first two quarters of 2026. For a diversified insurer, that is a very strong outcome.
Balance sheet and cash generation support that favorable read. Debt of $4.37B against $18.98B of equity is conservative for the sector, and the reported debt-to-equity of 0.23 aligns with that. ROE of 20.2% is excellent, especially paired with a low 15.4% payout ratio, which leaves plenty of room for reinvestment, buybacks, or dividend growth. The market is only paying about 10.2x earnings and 2.1x book for a company earning 20% on equity and converting to $5.75B of free cash flow. I do not fully trust that headline FCF figure as an economic valuation input for an insurer, because working-capital-style insurance cash flows can flatter “free cash flow” versus industrial businesses, but even after discounting it conceptually, this is still a business producing materially more cash than its valuation implies. The absurd $343-$360 fair value output from the model is the wrong lesson; the right lesson is simply that a 10x multiple on this level of profitability is undemanding.
What stands out most is the contradiction between the “mature earner” profile and the earnings trajectory. This is not a no-growth bond proxy. Revenue is growing high-single digits, earnings over the last few years have grown much faster, and recent quarterly profit growth is over 20%. At the same time, I think the model’s extreme undervaluation conclusion is overstated because insurance earnings are inherently cyclical and sensitive to reserve development, catastrophe activity, and the pricing cycle. A P/E of 10 for a P&C-heavy insurer with good recent results is not obviously irrational; it may simply reflect that investors do not annualize a 17.9% quarter margin forever. So my read is more restrained than the bullish synthesis: Hartford deserves a premium to weaker insurers, but not a fantasy DCF price target. Fair value feels closer to the mid-$150s to low-$160s if current profitability broadly holds, not 2.5x the stock price.
The best bear case is straightforward and credible. First, book multiple matters for insurers, and 2.07x book is not optically cheap if returns normalize lower; if ROE falls from 20% toward the low-to-mid teens, today’s valuation can be fair very quickly. Second, recent strength may reflect a sweet spot of high rates and still-favorable commercial pricing, both of which can roll over. Third, the quarterly revenue pattern is not flawlessly linear — $7.61B in 4Q25 dropping to $7.23B in 1Q26 before recovering to $7.26B in 2Q26 suggests a business still subject to normal insurance seasonality and market conditions rather than a clean acceleration story. And finally, the insider tape is uselessly non-bullish here: awards and a gift tell you nothing, and there is no meaningful open-market buying to validate the bargain case. A smart skeptic would say the market is correctly refusing to capitalize peak-ish earnings at more than 10x.
I weigh those risks seriously, but the data still tilt positive because Hartford is not being valued like a high-quality insurer sustaining even decent economics. If 2026 can deliver something like $4.2B-$4.5B of net income on roughly $29B-$30B of revenue, the stock is trading around 8-9x current-year earnings power for a conservatively levered business with strong ROE. That is too low unless one assumes a meaningful earnings giveback. What would change my mind is evidence that 2026’s margin expansion is already stalling — specifically, if quarterly net margins slip back toward the 10-12% range, annualized ROE falls below about 16%, or if revenue growth decelerates from 6-7% to low single digits while book-value growth stalls. Conversely, another two quarters near the recent run-rate would make $136 look plainly cheap and justify a move toward at least the mid-$150s.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a P&C and group-benefits franchise that has quietly compounded its way into a different earnings regime. Revenue climbed from $21.65B in 2021 to $28.07B in 2025, a 7.4% CAGR, while net income nearly doubled from the 2022 trough of $1.82B to $3.84B—producing a 23.8% earnings CAGR and lifting reported ROE to 20.2%. Free cash flow of $5.75B against a $36.87B equity value is a 15.6% FCF yield; the balance sheet carries only $4.37B of debt against $18.98B of equity (D/E 0.23), and the 15% payout ratio leaves ample capacity for buybacks on top of the 1.7% dividend. Recent quarters reinforce rather than fade the story: the June 2026 quarter printed $7.26B of revenue and a 17.9% net margin, the best in the eight-quarter window, after a string of mid-teens margins that already sit well above the 2024 run-rate. At 10.2x trailing earnings and 2.1x book, the market is simply not paying for a 20% ROE compounder that is still growing mid-single digits on the top line.
What the quantitative stack calls a 164% discount to a ~$350 composite fair value is directionally right and numerically excessive. Insurance terminal-value math is brittle: a modest haircut to long-run growth or a permanent 100–200 bp lift in catastrophe load collapses those DCFs quickly, and the “pricing in –10% annual FCF decline” framing in the thesis layer overstates how much pure mean-reversion the multiple already embeds. Still, even a conservative 12–13x on normalized earnings power in the mid-$3.5B range, or 1.6–1.8x tangible book with a mid-teens ROE, lands well north of $136. The archetype label of mature earner fits; the fair-value verdict from the synthesis understates how cheap the cash-flow yield is relative to peers that trade closer to 12–14x with inferior ROEs. Insider activity is noise—awards and a gift, no open-market selling—and does not contradict the fundamental picture.
The cleanest bear case is cyclical, not structural. Commercial lines pricing is rolling over after multi-year hard-market gains; loss-cost inflation in liability and property has not fully normalized; and a single elevated cat year can erase several quarters of underwriting margin in a way the trailing 17.9% net margin does not preview. Revenue growth has already decelerated on a recent YoY basis to roughly 6%, and the market-forces layer is correct that Hartford lacks a differentiated moat beyond underwriting discipline and a diversified book. If the combined ratio drifts 300–400 bp worse and earnings settle closer to $2.8–3.0B rather than the current $3.8B run-rate, a 10x multiple is no longer a bargain—it is average pay for average results. That is the specific data an opponent would cite, and it is why I refuse to underwrite the $350 target even while rejecting the current price as fair.
I would flip to fairly valued or overvalued on two concrete signals: a sustained combined-ratio move above the mid-90s with management guiding to permanent pricing pressure, or two consecutive quarters of negative earnings growth alongside rising catastrophe loads that force reserve strengthening. Conversely, another year of ROE above 18%, FCF above $5B, and continued capital return at the current payout-plus-buyback cadence without balance-sheet stress would push conviction higher and justify a re-rating toward 13x. Until then the stock is a cash-compounding insurer the market prices as if the last three years of margin expansion were almost entirely luck.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The Hartford is executing cleanly as a mature diversified insurer. Revenue has climbed from $21.65B (2021) to $28.07B (2025), net income from $2.37B to $3.84B, and free cash flow has stepped up to $5.75B - $5.76B in the last two years. Cash conversion is excellent: OCF/NI at 1.81x and accruals at -2.7% of assets indicate reported earnings are backed by real cash, not accounting stretch. Per-share value is being concentrated, not diluted - diluted shares fell from 1.61B in 2021 to 288M in 2025 (note: the 2021 figure looks anomalous and likely reflects a data artifact, but the 334M to 288M trajectory from 2022 to 2025 is a genuine 4%/yr buyback pace on top of a rising earnings base). The Altman Z of 1.06 flagged as 'distress' is a false positive - the Z-score is not calibrated for insurers, whose balance sheets are structurally leveraged with policyholder reserves. Net debt of -$4.19B and only $177M of liquid cash look thin in isolation, but $5.75B of annual FCF makes the capital structure comfortably serviceable. Insider tape is entirely routine director awards and one gift - no open-market buys or sells, so no directional signal either way. This is a well-run, cash-generative insurance franchise in a durable improving trend.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Combined ratio trend by segment (P&C Commercial, Personal Lines, Group Benefits) to confirm underwriting discipline
- Reserve development history - favorable vs adverse prior-year development
- Investment portfolio credit quality and duration mismatch risk
- Reason for the 2021 diluted share count of 1.61B vs 334M in 2022 (likely data anomaly)
- Capital return policy split between buyback and dividend, and holding-company liquidity vs regulated-sub dividend capacity
The e2e composite fair value of $343 and signal-adjusted $360 imply HIG should trade at ~14-15x normalized earnings of ~$24/share, which is not how the market prices mature P&C insurers. Peers (TRV, CB, ALL) trade at 11-13x forward earnings, and HIG's own multi-year multiple has clustered in the 10-12x range. Applying an 11x multiple to ~$11 of run-rate EPS lands near $120-135 deserved value, essentially where the stock trades. The DCF at $418 and anchored-PE at $195 both look like runaway methods that don't respect the sector's cost-of-capital or cyclicality; I heavily discount them. Earnings quality is good and buybacks are real, which supports deserved value at the upper end of the peer band but does not create a discount. The bull case (fortress balance sheet, disciplined underwriting) is largely already in the price; the bear case (softening combined ratios, loss-cost inflation) is the reason a mid-teens multiple isn't warranted. Net: this is a quality business the market understands and prices correctly. No meaningful margin of safety at $136, but no obvious overvaluation either.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward combined ratio guidance and any reserve development in the next 10-Q
- Net investment income run-rate as portfolio yields reset
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization
- Any commercial lines pricing deceleration in management commentary
HIG is a textbook steady-compounder with minimal narrative intensity and low cult coefficient - the market simply is not telling a story about this name in either direction. In a nascent risk-on tape (regime +32, VIX 15.1), high-beta story stocks like Moderna are absorbing all the oxygen; a 0.46-beta diversified insurer barely registers. That means the modest tailwind from a calm tape lands soft here, and the absence of any active bull narrative means there is no sentiment lift to speak of. Analyst tone and news flow are quiet - no revisions, no catalysts, no sector rotation into insurance. The one real crosswind is macro: 10y at 4.69% and a 25.7 market PE are a background headwind for all equities, but for a P&C insurer with a large investment portfolio, higher rates are ambiguous - they pressure the multiple but support net investment income, so the pass-through to HIG sentiment is muted. Net: a stock the tape is neither punishing nor rewarding, drifting on its own fundamentals rather than being pushed by external pressure.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any sell-side target revisions or downgrades on P&C insurers as loss-cost inflation data prints
- Signs of sector rotation into or out of financials/insurance as the risk-on regime matures
- Catastrophe season news flow (hurricane, wildfire) that could inject a bear narrative
- Analyst tone on combined ratio trajectory heading into the next print
The world is paying Hartford twice right now: higher rates lift the float's earning power while post-2021 casualty and property rate hardening still earns through the book. Both are cycle gifts, not inventions. The structural question is what happens as commercial pricing converges on loss trend — Hartford's answer is small-commercial density and underwriting discipline, which is a real but modest moat, not a growth engine. The signal conflict matters: a 'contraction' sector demand score sits against 8.5% industry revenue CAGR and expanding margins. Resolved, that most likely means a still-profitable but late-cycle P&C market where price increases fade before margins do. Judged against a price-implied -10% growth rate, the market appears to be underwriting a hard-landing scenario for underwriting margins that the evidence does not support.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, HIG was $136.10. We expect it to be $152.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $115.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.