Business Description
Harley-Davidson, Inc., publicly traded under the symbol HOG, is fundamentally a manufacturer and seller of motorcycles. The company's operations are divided into two primary divisions: Motorcycle Products and Related Offerings, and Financial Services. The Motorcycle Products and Related Offerings segment focuses on the design, production, and worldwide distribution of Harley-Davidson motorcycles, encompassing various styles such as cruiser, touring, standard, sportbike, and dual models. This division also supplies motorcycle components, aftermarket accessories, branded apparel, and associated services. Its products are distributed to retail customers through a broad network of independent dealers and via e-commerce channels throughout the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. The Financial Services segment provides extensive financing solutions. These include wholesale financing options for dealerships, such as floorplan and open account arrangements for motorcycles, parts, and accessories inventory. It also offers retail financing directly to consumers, primarily through installment loans for purchasing both new and pre-owned Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Additionally, this segment markets various point-of-sale protection products, including motorcycle insurance, extended service contracts, and maintenance protection plans. Furthermore, it licenses third-party financial institutions to issue co-branded credit cards bearing the Harley-Davidson brand. Harley-Davidson, Inc. was founded in 1903 and is headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Business History
Generated: Jun 21, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.82
Total Equity: $3.14B
Shares: 121,257,000
Total Debt: $2.97B
Cash: $3.09B
EBITDA: $664.55M
Total Debt: $2.97B
Cash: $3.09B
Revenue: $4.47B
Revenue: $4.47B
Revenue: $4.47B
Total Equity: $3.14B
Tax Rate: 28.2%
Equity: $3.14B
Total Debt: $2.97B
Cash: $3.09B
Current Liabilities: $2.66B
Long-Term Debt: $1.65B
Total Debt: $2.97B
Total Equity: $3.14B
Shares: 121,257,000
Shares: 121,257,000
CapEx: -$153.68M
Shares: 121,257,000
Stock Price: $25.67
Net Income: $338.74M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Harley is a classic mature_earner where the financial machinery still works but the underlying business is shrinking. Revenue has gone from $5.84B (2023) to $5.19B (2024) to $4.47B (2025) — a ~23% peak-to-trough decline — and operating margin has collapsed from 15.8% (2022) to 8.6% (2025), with gross margin sliding from 37.4% to 30.2%. Net income has nearly halved from $741M to $339M over three years. That is not cyclical noise; that is a brand losing pricing power and volume in its core motorcycle business, likely compounded by an aging customer base and weak demand for big-bore cruisers.
Against that, the balance sheet and capital discipline are genuinely impressive: $3.09B liquid cash (114% of market cap), positive net cash, $415M FCF in 2025, and a diluted share count cut from 155M to 121M (-6% CAGR) with buyback/SBC ratio of 668% — management is a real net buyer, not a dilution machine. Earnings quality screens clean (OCF/NI 1.46x, accruals -1.9%, Beneish -3.66), Altman Z at 2.13 sits in the grey zone reflecting the earnings slide rather than balance-sheet stress. Insider tape shows modest net buying in dollar terms but the recent activity is overwhelmingly awards/exercises with one small sale — not a strong directional signal either way.
So the quality picture splits: capital allocation and reporting integrity are Strong-to-Fortress; the operating business is Shaky. Net it out and you get Mixed — a well-run treasury sitting on top of a franchise that is contracting.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- 10-K segment detail: is the decline concentrated in HDFS (financing) or core motorcycles, and what is the unit volume trend in North America vs. international?
- LiveWire and Touring/Cruiser mix — is the legacy core shrinking while new categories stagnate?
- Dealer inventory levels and any channel-stuffing risk given the revenue drop
- Composition of $3.09B liquid cash — how much is restricted/HDFS-related vs. truly available to the parent?
- HDFS credit quality and loan-loss trends in a weakening consumer cycle
- Detail on the buyback pace going forward and whether management commits to continuing it through the downturn
- Pension/OPEB obligations and any off-balance-sheet items affecting net cash interpretation
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $15.11 — roughly 41% below today's $25.67. That's a meaningful gap, and unlike many DCF outputs this one looks directionally credible: revenue is down 23% in two years, operating margin has been roughly halved, and the bear case (shrinking aging customer base, unproven EV bet) is being confirmed by the financials, not just the narrative. The earnings-quality signal is actually clean (FCF > net income, low accruals), so I can't haircut the deserved value further down — but I also can't haircut it up.
The offset is real: the balance sheet is a fortress (cash reportedly exceeds the $2.7B market cap) and management is retiring ~6% of shares per year. That cash optionality and aggressive buyback arguably support a deserved value above the raw DCF — call it $17-$20 once you credit net cash and per-share accretion. Even on that generous adjustment, $25.67 is still ~30-50% above deserved value. You're paying full retail for the brand, the cash pile, AND a turnaround that hasn't shown up in the numbers.
This isn't a screaming short — the cash cushion and buyback floor it — but it's not cheap either. The market is pricing the optionality (LiveWire works, younger riders show up, cycle turns) as a base case. That's the definition of priced-for-hope on a declining business.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Actual net cash position vs market cap (the 'cash > market cap' claim needs confirmation from latest 10-Q — HDFS receivables complicate this)
- HDFS (financial services) carve-out — how much of enterprise value is captive finance vs the motorcycle business
- Forward guidance on retail unit shipments and dealer inventory levels
- LiveWire cash burn rate and any path-to-breakeven commentary
- Buyback pace and authorization remaining — the per-share accretion is the main bull lever
HOG carries a 1.28 beta into a neutral-but-jittery tape (VIX 17.3, S&P 1.8% off highs), so any risk-off twitch lands harder here than on defensives. More importantly, this is a 'fallen-angel' story with strong intensity but fragile durability - the kind of narrative that does not get the benefit of the doubt when macro wobbles. The bull case (LiveWire EV pivot, younger riders, brand cult) is unproven and the bear demographic story (aging boomer base, declining sales) is the default frame the Street currently sits in. There is no fresh positive catalyst pushing flows in. Analyst tone is the tell: consensus Hold, only 8 Buys against 23 Holds and 4 Sells, and a target consensus of 23.60 sitting BELOW the 25.73 spot price with zero upward revisions this month. That is sell-side quietly signaling the stock is already ahead of where they think it belongs - a slow, persistent headwind on multiple. Combined with strong negative price momentum (-12.5% CAGR, -4.5pp over 3y), the tape of least resistance is down. The de-leveraging (D/E 2.19 to 0.94) is a real but quiet tailwind that few are narrating. Net: modest, grinding headwind - not a crash setup, just no one is buying the story right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any LiveWire / EV milestone or younger-rider data point that could refresh the bull narrative
- Next quarter retail registrations and dealer inventory commentary - the data the bear thesis lives on
- Sell-side target revisions - watch for the first upgrade or the first cut through 23
- Sector rotation into consumer cyclicals or a VIX drop below 15 that would relieve the high-beta drag
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:06am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.3B | $5.8B | $5.8B | $5.2B | $4.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $3.1B |
| Gross Profit | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $965.9M |
| Operating Income | $823.4M | $909.3M | $779.1M | $416.6M | $386.6M |
| Net Income | $650.0M | $741.4M | $706.6M | $455.4M | $338.7M |
| EBITDA | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $708.6M | $664.5M |
| EPS | $4.23 | $5.01 | $4.96 | $3.46 | $2.82 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $3.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $4.8B | $5.2B | $5.0B | $5.6B |
| Total Assets | $11.1B | $11.5B | $12.1B | $11.9B | $8.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $2.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.6B | $4.5B | $5.0B | $4.5B | $1.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $8.5B | $8.6B | $8.9B | $8.7B | $4.9B |
| Total Equity | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $3.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.8B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:06am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $975.7M | $548.5M | $754.9M | $1.1B | $568.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$120.2M | -$151.7M | -$207.4M | -$196.6M | -$153.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $855.5M | $396.8M | $547.5M | $867.3M | $415.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$11.6M | -$338.6M | -$364.0M | -$459.8M | -$353.3M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.4B | -$446.0M | $69.6M | $92.0M | $1.4B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.7B $3.7B – $3.7B
|
$3.8B $3.7B – $4.0B
|
$4.0B $3.9B – $4.2B
|
$4.2B $4.0B – $4.3B
|
| EBITDA |
$625.7M $624.0M – $629.1M
|
$653.6M $627.2M – $681.7M
|
$679.5M $655.9M – $721.3M
|
$707.2M $681.7M – $732.7M
|
| Net Income |
$505.3M $468.5M – $542.1M
|
$34.1M $30.0M – $74.9M
|
$187.3M $148.9M – $311.9M
|
$218.1M $214.9M – $407.6M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:06am (6d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.8% | +1.4% | -11.1% | -13.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +12.3% | +2.3% | -17.1% | -25.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +10.4% | -14.3% | -46.5% | -7.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +14.1% | -4.7% | -35.6% | -25.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +9.8% | -5.3% | -32.9% | -6.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:05am (6d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-21 | Sylvester Maryrose | A-Award | 6,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Reintjes Matthew J | A-Award | 6,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Reintjes Matthew J | A-Award | 2,479.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | NOVA DANIEL J | A-Award | 4,742.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | NOVA DANIEL J | A-Award | 6,520.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Masood Rafeh | A-Award | 11,207.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Golston Allan C. | A-Award | 6,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Flees Lori Ann | A-Award | 8,621.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Alstead Troy | A-Award | 6,250.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Root Jonathan R | S-Sale | 1,554.00 | $24.21 | $37,622 |
| 2026-05-14 | Sylvester Maryrose | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Sylvester Maryrose | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Masood Rafeh | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Masood Rafeh | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Golston Allan C. | M-Exempt | 3,008.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Golston Allan C. | M-Exempt | 3,008.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Flees Lori Ann | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Flees Lori Ann | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | FARLEY JR JAMES D | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | FARLEY JR JAMES D | M-Exempt | 6,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-08 | $0.19 | 2026-05-21 | 2026-06-08 | 2026-06-25 |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.19 | 2026-02-13 | 2026-03-02 | 2026-03-17 |
| 2025-12-09 | $0.18 | 2025-11-26 | 2025-12-09 | 2025-12-22 |
| 2025-09-10 | $0.18 | 2025-08-27 | 2025-09-10 | 2025-09-24 |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.18 | 2025-05-14 | 2025-06-02 | 2025-06-18 |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.18 | 2025-02-14 | 2025-02-28 | 2025-03-14 |
| 2024-12-10 | $0.17 | 2024-11-27 | 2024-12-10 | 2024-12-23 |
| 2024-09-16 | $0.17 | 2024-09-04 | 2024-09-16 | 2024-09-27 |
| 2024-06-05 | $0.17 | 2024-05-17 | 2024-06-05 | 2024-06-21 |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.17 | 2024-02-16 | 2024-03-04 | 2024-03-20 |
| 2023-12-08 | $0.17 | 2023-11-27 | 2023-12-11 | 2023-12-27 |
| 2023-09-11 | $0.17 | 2023-08-29 | 2023-09-12 | 2023-09-27 |
| 2023-06-02 | $0.17 | 2023-05-18 | 2023-06-05 | 2023-06-21 |
| 2023-03-02 | $0.17 | 2023-02-17 | 2023-03-03 | 2023-03-20 |
| 2022-12-08 | $0.16 | 2022-11-18 | 2022-12-09 | 2022-12-23 |
| 2022-09-09 | $0.16 | 2022-08-30 | 2022-09-12 | 2022-09-22 |
| 2022-06-01 | $0.16 | 2022-05-13 | 2022-06-02 | 2022-06-17 |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.16 | 2022-02-07 | 2022-02-28 | 2022-03-18 |
| 2021-12-07 | $0.15 | 2021-11-22 | 2021-12-08 | 2021-12-23 |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.15 | 2021-08-26 | 2021-09-10 | 2021-09-24 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly tape tells a messier story than the "melting ice cube" narrative. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.17B is down from $1.33B in Q1 2025 (-12% YoY), but Q4 2025 collapsed to $496M with a -$279M loss — that's not a normal seasonal trough (Q4 2024 was $688M with -$117M loss). Something structural happened in Q4 — likely dealer destocking, HDFS credit loss provisions, or restructuring charges. Strip that quarter out and the run-rate business is doing roughly $4.8-5.0B in revenue at high-single-digit operating margins, not the $4.47B reported. The annual NI of $338.7M against $5.19B prior year ($455M) is a -26% earnings decline, real but not catastrophic. Three-year revenue CAGR of -12.5% is misleading because it anchors against the 2023 peak of $5.84B — the post-2024 trajectory is closer to -10%, and Q1 2026's sequential snap-back suggests the Q4 print was a kitchen-sink quarter, not a new baseline.
I largely agree with the synthesis that this is priced for managed decline, but the Market Forces "irreversible demographic collapse" framing is overcooked. HOG generated $415M FCF on a $2.7B market cap — that's a 15% FCF yield, not a 6-7% yield as the pre-flight claims (the synthesis math is wrong; $415M/$2.7B = 15.4%). Even if FCF compresses 30% from here on continued volume decline, you're still at a 10%+ yield with a 3.5% dividend covered ~4x. The $3.09B cash position essentially equals the market cap, though HOG carries significant HDFS-related debt that the tile omits (likely $5-7B) — so EV/EBITDA of 5.9x is the truer multiple, not the headline P/B of 0.78x. The narrative engine's $15.11 DCF fair value implies a -10% perpetual FCF decline; that's a terminal-decline assumption typically reserved for coal miners and landline telcos. Harley sold ~150K bikes in 2024; even a managed decline to 100K units at current ASPs leaves a viable business.
The contrarian case the models underweight: HOG isn't priced as a "Reasonable Premium" — at 5.9x EV/EBITDA and 12x trailing P/E with a 3.5% yield and 15% FCF yield, it's priced as a value trap, and value traps occasionally aren't traps. The insider activity is almost entirely May 21 awards (grants, not purchases) — that's compensation noise, not a signal; calling this "Net Insider Buying" is misleading. The one open-market action was a sale. What would break the bear thesis: (1) Q2/Q3 2026 prints confirming the Q1 stabilization at ~$1.2B run-rate, (2) HDFS credit quality holding as used bike prices normalize, (3) any sign that the Hardwire strategy retention rates with sub-50 buyers are non-zero. What kills the long: another Q4-style write-down quarter, or HDFS loan losses spiking if subprime auto contagion hits powersports credit. Tariff exposure on steel/aluminum and on cross-border production (York PA, Thailand) is a real 2026 margin overhang the models ignore entirely.
I dissent partially from the synthesis "Reasonable Premium" verdict — at $25.67 this is closer to fair-to-cheap than premium, but only if you believe Q4 2025 was an anomaly rather than a trend acceleration. The narrative engine's $15.11 fair value is too pessimistic; my own back-of-envelope using $350-400M normalized FCF and a 10% discount rate with -3% terminal growth gets me to $28-32. The Market Forces "no viable path to growth exists" is true and irrelevant — you don't need growth at 12x earnings, you need stabilization. The real question isn't "is Harley dying" (yes, slowly) but "is it dying faster than 12x P/E implies" (probably not, but Q4 was a warning). Position sizing should reflect that this is a binary: either the LiveWire/Hardwire strategy stabilizes the core and you get a re-rating to $32-35, or HDFS cracks and you see $17 again. The asymmetry at $25.67 is mildly favorable but not compelling enough for a full position.
GPT Critique
Analyzing Harley-Davidson's recent financial performance, I see a company grappling with significant volatility, particularly highlighted by the drastic Q4 2025 revenue drop to $496.2 million and a net loss of $279.3 million. This deviation from previous quarters suggests the presence of extraordinary factors—perhaps a mix of inventory adjustments or financial restructuring—that are impacting the company more than seasonal trends would typically account for. The rebound in Q1 2026 to $1.17 billion in revenue, although still down year-over-year, indicates some stabilization, but the overall trend shows a firm in decline, with a three-year revenue CAGR of -12.5% and earnings CAGR of -30.8%. The consistency of free cash flow generation, however, is a redeeming factor, providing a cushion against further adverse developments.
Opus argues that the narrative of a "melting ice cube" is exaggerated, pointing out the high free cash flow yield of 15% as evidence of undervaluation. I agree that the cash generation capability offers some protection, but the severe Q4 loss cannot be overlooked as a potential harbinger of similar future disruptions if underlying issues aren't resolved. Moreover, while Opus corrects the pre-flight assessment by calculating the true FCF yield, they also acknowledge significant debts related to Harley-Davidson Financial Services (HDFS), which could complicate the financial picture further than the cash reserves suggest.
I concur with Opus's dissent regarding the "Reasonable Premium" verdict. The market seems to price Harley-Davidson closer to a value trap than a premium asset, especially given the uncertainties around its electric vehicle (LiveWire) strategy and demographic shifts. Opus notes that the narrative engine's DCF fair value of $15.11 appears overly pessimistic. I find their fair value estimate of $28-32 more plausible, considering the potential for stabilization if management successfully navigates its strategic shifts. However, I am less confident in the margin of safety provided by the current price, given the macroeconomic headwinds and competitive pressures in the recreational vehicle sector.
A careful skeptic might argue that both analyses, while insightful, underplay the risks associated with Harley-Davidson's strategic pivot towards electric vehicles and younger demographics, which require significant capital and may not yield returns swiftly enough to compensate for the declining core business. Additionally, the reliance on HDFS for financial stability could backfire if credit markets tighten or consumer defaults rise, posing substantial risks not fully captured by the current stock price.