Business Description
Hycroft Mining Holding Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, operates as a gold and silver exploration and development company in the United States. Its property, Hycroft Mine, consists of 25 patented claims covering approximately 1,855 acres and 3,249 unpatented lode and placer claims spanning 62,298 acres located 54 miles northwest of Winnemucca in Nevada. The company is based in Winnemucca, Nevada.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 7:42pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.94
Total Equity: $213.70M
Shares: 43,260,501
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $181.74M
EBITDA: -$27.73M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $181.74M
Revenue: $0.00
Shares: 43,260,501
Revenue: $0.00
Revenue: $0.00
Revenue: $0.00
Total Equity: $213.70M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $213.70M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $181.74M
Current Liabilities: $7.73M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $213.70M
Shares: 43,260,501
Shares: 43,260,501
CapEx: -$564,000
Shares: 43,260,501
Stock Price: $23.74
Net Income: -$40.66M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The mechanical picture is brutal: revenue went from $110.7M (2021) to literally $0 (2023-2025), FCF deteriorated to -$83.4M in the latest year, and diluted shares ballooned from 6.0M to 43.3M — a 7x increase in four years. Liquid cash of $182.5M against an $83.4M annual burn implies ~8.7 quarters of runway before another raise. At $32.15 with a $2.94B market cap on zero revenue, the market is paying ~$67/share for a development-stage asset that just three years ago was a sub-$5 stock; either the gold-cycle narrative has wildly outrun the cash flows, or there has been a recent operational catalyst (restart decision, financing, ore-body upgrade) that the headline numbers don't capture.
The one genuine signal cutting against the bear case is Eric Sprott's tape: three open-market P-purchases of 100K shares each at $3.8-3.9M tickets in April 2026 (~$11.5M total) — that is real, directional, smart-money capital from a known precious-metals specialist, not award noise. Everything else on the insider tape is A-awards (comp, not conviction) plus one small S-sale by Jennings. The 35 buys / $293.7M figure upstream is almost certainly contaminated by award grants and possibly the Sprott-led financing itself; the actual open-market conviction is concentrated in one buyer.
Earnings quality flags are 'clean' only because there are no earnings to manipulate — Altman Z of 31.57 is an artifact of low debt and a high market cap, not operational health. The pipeline's own AI dissent ($5-8 fair value vs $32 spot) lines up with the forensics: this is a lottery ticket on a restart, priced as if the restart is already de-risked and producing.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 4:17am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $110.7M | $33.2M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Cost of Revenue | $163.3M | $48.9M | $14.0M | $12.1M | $0 |
| Gross Profit | -$52.6M | -$15.7M | -$14.0M | -$12.1M | $0 |
| Operating Expenses | $31.3M | $37.8M | $31.0M | $31.7M | $44.5M |
| Operating Income | -$83.9M | -$53.5M | -$45.0M | -$43.8M | -$44.5M |
| Net Income | -$88.6M | -$60.8M | -$55.0M | -$60.9M | -$40.7M |
| EBITDA | -$67.1M | -$39.7M | -$34.2M | -$38.8M | -$27.7M |
| EPS | $-14.74 | $-3.58 | $-2.61 | $-2.63 | $-0.94 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 4:17am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.3M | $142.0M | $106.2M | $49.6M | $181.7M |
| Total Current Assets | $37.4M | $152.4M | $113.6M | $54.6M | $184.5M |
| Total Assets | $142.3M | $249.0M | $201.7M | $140.1M | $263.0M |
| Current Liabilities | $31.3M | $12.0M | $11.7M | $5.8M | $7.7M |
| Long-Term Debt | $143.6M | $132.7M | $142.6M | $124.9M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $210.8M | $185.6M | $189.0M | $173.6M | $49.3M |
| Total Equity | -$68.5M | $63.3M | $12.7M | -$33.4M | $213.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$609.3M | -$670.2M | -$725.2M | -$786.1M | -$826.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 4:17am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$37.0M | -$34.9M | -$41.4M | -$35.9M | -$82.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.0M | $-951,000 | -$1.1M | -$1.3M | $-564,000 |
| Free Cash Flow | -$44.0M | -$35.8M | -$42.5M | -$37.2M | -$83.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$49.4M | $129.3M | -$43.4M | -$55.5M | $127.2M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$6.2M $6.2M – $6.2M
|
$0 | $0 | $0 |
| EBITDA |
$1.7M $1.7M – $1.7M
|
$0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Income |
-$31.1M -$31.1M – -$31.1M
|
$1.3M $1.3M – $1.3M
|
$1.3M $1.3M – $1.3M
|
$1.7M $1.7M – $1.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 4:17am (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -70.0% | -100.0% | — | — |
| Gross Profit Growth | +70.2% | +10.3% | +13.7% | +100.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +36.3% | +15.8% | +2.6% | -1.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +31.3% | +9.5% | -10.7% | +33.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +40.9% | +13.8% | -13.6% | +28.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | Thomas David Brian | S-Sale | 25,000.00 | $26.32 | $658,000 |
| 2026-06-12 | Jennings Rebecca | S-Sale | 15,329.00 | $26.25 | $402,386 |
| 2026-06-15 | Jennings Rebecca | S-Sale | 1,194.00 | $28.64 | $34,196 |
| 2024-05-23 | Jennings Rebecca | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2024-05-23 | Jennings Rebecca | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-06-04 | Thomas David Brian | S-Sale | 9,000.00 | $30.15 | $271,350 |
| 2026-06-04 | RIDEOUT STANTON K | S-Sale | 16,500.00 | $30.18 | $497,970 |
| 2026-06-04 | GARRETT DIANE R | S-Sale | 21,550.00 | $31.50 | $678,825 |
| 2026-06-04 | Jennings Rebecca | S-Sale | 11,300.00 | $30.27 | $342,051 |
| 2026-04-16 | Colby Eric B | A-Award | 16,482.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-16 | Colby Eric B | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-24 | Sprott Eric | P-Purchase | 100,000.00 | $37.84 | $3.8M |
| 2026-03-09 | WENG THOMAS S. | A-Award | 5,231.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-09 | Sprott Eric | P-Purchase | 100,000.00 | $38.28 | $3.8M |
| 2026-04-09 | Sprott Eric | P-Purchase | 100,000.00 | $39.06 | $3.9M |
| 2026-03-31 | LANG STEPHEN A | G-Gift | 6,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-17 | Jennings Rebecca | S-Sale | 9,071.00 | $39.33 | $356,781 |
| 2026-03-09 | Naccarati David C | A-Award | 3,062.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | RIDEOUT STANTON K | A-Award | 17,224.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-09 | WENG THOMAS S. | A-Award | 3,062.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent read first: this is a zero-revenue shell with a Nevada heap-leach asset, burning ~$83M/yr in operating cash, sitting on $181.7M cash — roughly two years of runway before another raise. The 2026-Q1 net loss of $48.3M is a 4x step-up from the prior quarter's $7.8M and 4x the run-rate of every other quarter shown; that's not operational deterioration (there are no operations), it's almost certainly a non-cash charge — stock comp, warrant remeasurement, or impairment reversal. Either way, the underlying cash burn is ~$20M/quarter and trending flat-to-down, not improving toward production. Production stopped in 2022 ($33.2M rev, down from $110.7M in 2021), and three full years of zero revenue with negative historical gross margins (-$52.6M on $110.7M in 2021 = -48% gross margin when they WERE producing) tells you the orebody's metallurgy never worked at scale. That's the central fact the bull narrative elides.
Now the models: the synthesis verdict "Disconnected from Fundamentals" and the market-forces "Headwinds" call are directionally correct but I think they're underselling how absurd the setup is. A $2.94B market cap on a pre-revenue developer with negative legacy gross margins and a two-year cash runway is not a "5-10% probability bet" — it's pricing a re-rate that has essentially no precedent for an asset that already failed once. The pre-flight note that the in-situ resource is "worth ~$30B at spot" is exactly the trap retail falls into: in-situ ounces for a refractory ore with unsolved oxidation chemistry trade at $5-30/oz, not $300/oz. Even at $50/oz applied to 9.6M Au-equivalent ounces (generously rolling silver in at 80:1), you get ~$600M — a quarter of current cap. The narrative engine's "unanchored/fragile" tag is the most honest line in the whole stack.
The contrarian case for owning it: gold spot is elevated, the four insider open-market purchases of 100,000 shares each in April 2026 are real signal (not awards, not gifts — actual buys, and clustered), and a major (Newmont's Nevada JV, Barrick) could theoretically bolt this on for optionality at a premium. AMC's Adam Aron and Eric Sprott's 2022 bailout left a retail/cult shareholder base that supports squeeze dynamics — note the $2.93-$58.73 52-week range. But three of those insider "purchases" being identical 100,000-share blocks on consecutive dates looks more like scheduled 10b5-1 grants or warrant exercises than conviction buying — I'd want Form 4 detail before crediting them. And a takeout thesis at $2.9B requires an acquirer to pay ~$300/resource-oz for an asset the prior owner walked away from; Barrick wouldn't, Newmont wouldn't, and the juniors can't.
Where the data is thin: no debt figure, no equity figure, no share count trajectory — and for a serial diluter (the bear story flags this and it's the single most important variable), the absence of diluted share count over time is a critical gap. If shares outstanding doubled in the last 18 months — plausible given the burn — then per-share fair value collapses regardless of asset value. The momentum block is empty because there's nothing to compute, which itself should disqualify quantitative valuation models from speaking here. I dissent from nothing in the synthesis stack but I'd sharpen it: this isn't "disconnected from fundamentals," it's a binary option where the strike is "fully-financed restart with solved metallurgy" and the current premium implies ~40-50% probability of that outcome when the honest number is sub-10%. Fair value on a probability-weighted basis is $4-8, not $32. The only reason to be long is a short-dated squeeze or M&A rumor trade, and neither is investable on fundamentals.
GPT Critique
My analysis of Hycroft Mining Holding Corporation reveals a company that is, at its core, a speculative venture rather than a conventional investment. The absence of revenue over the past three years, combined with a historical inability to generate gross profits (notably a -48% gross margin in 2021), underscores significant operational challenges. The $2.94 billion market cap is strikingly high for a company that has halted production and is burning approximately $83 million annually in operating cash. The company's current cash reserves of $181.7 million suggest only a limited runway before additional financing is required, likely leading to further dilution unless a substantial operational turnaround occurs.
Opus's assertion that Hycroft is a "lottery ticket priced as a producing miner" is a sentiment I agree with, given the current financial and operational state of the company. The idea that Hycroft is being priced as a future major producer is indeed far-fetched when considering the unresolved metallurgical issues and lack of a clear path to profitability. The valuation synthesis that labels the stock as "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is well-founded, given the stark contrast between the company's potential resource value and the realities of its current operations and historical performance. However, I diverge slightly from Opus regarding the fair value range. While they suggest a $4-8 range, my assessment considers the speculative nature and potential for a short-term squeeze or takeover rumor could slightly elevate this range, although not justifying the current price.
Where I find myself in agreement with Opus is in their skepticism towards the insider purchases, which appear more structured than indicative of insider confidence. The narrative that these purchases signal a turnaround is weak without additional contextual financial filings. Moreover, I concur with the notion that any acquisition by major players like Newmont or Barrick at the current valuation would be unlikely, considering the historical failures associated with the asset.
A careful skeptic might argue that Hycroft’s substantial resource base, coupled with rising gold prices, could potentially justify the high market cap if management can secure additional financing and resolve metallurgical challenges. They might also point to the potential for strategic partnerships or acquisitions that could unlock value. However, these scenarios seem highly contingent on multiple favorable outcomes aligning, which history and current data suggest is unlikely.